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Sharīah governance is peculiarly exclusive and unique to Islamic systems of financial 
management. While affirming the need for sound and efficient Sharīah governance as a 
crucial part of corporate governance in Islamic financial institutions (IFIs), it has 
nevertheless been found that little has been written on the subject. In view of the scarcity 
of literature and specific studies in this area, this study aims to explore the state of 
Sharīah governance practices in IFIs, particularly in Malaysia, GCC countries (Kuwait, 
Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and the UK, as these countries 
present distinctive models and approaches towards Sharīah governance in diverse legal 
environments. This study explores and analyses the extent of Sharīah governance 
practices by highlighting seven main areas of Sharīah governance: (i) Sharīah 
governance approaches; (ii) regulatory frameworks and by-laws; (iii) roles of Sharīah 
boards; (iv) attributes of Sharīah boards in terms of independence, competence, 
transparency and confidentiality; (v) operational procedures; (vi) Sharīah board 
assessment; and (vii) disclosure practice.  
 
Since the availability of data and information on Sharīah governance practices is very 
limited, a detailed questionnaire was generated for the sourcing of primary data from 
IFIs. As part of the qualitative research strategy, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with Sharīah scholars, specifically to explore their perceptions on selected 
Sharīah governance issues. In addition, the content analysis approach was used in 
extracting and analysing the data and factual input derived from information and 
resources on IFIs’ websites, exchange websites, annual reports and financial statements. 
The findings in this study interestingly reveal that there are shortcomings and weaknesses 
in the present practice of Sharīah governance in all seven core areas mentioned above. 
Based on the empirical analysis extracted from the research findings, the study finally 
offers and formulates some policy recommendations for the purpose of enhancing and 
improving the present Sharīʿah governance system.  
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In recent years, corporate governance has received considerable attention in Islamic 
finance. The extensive development of corporate governance in conventional finance 
raises the issue of how Islamic corporate governance should be designed. Does it need its 
own theoretical model or is it sufficient to modify conventional corporate governance 
structures? This question has prompted scholarly research to identify and define 
the foundational dimensions and characteristics of Islamic corporate governance.  
An aspect of particular importance to formulate a theoretical foundation of Islamic 
corporate governance is to search for its epistemological orientation and to identify the 
theories associated with the existing corporate governance model. The main theories that 
have affected the development of corporate governance are agency theory, which is 
primarily concerned with the relationship between managers and shareholders, and 
stakeholder theory that takes account of a wider group of constituents (Mallin, 2007: 16). 
These theories generate the two most dominant corporate governance models known as 
the shareholder value system and stakeholder value orientation.  
The theoretical framework of both the shareholder value system and stakeholder value 
orientation is very important for the purpose of enlightening the theory of corporate 
governance from Islamic perspective. Despite the fact that these two models of corporate 
governance are human constructs and have different characteristics, they actually share 
certain similarities in term of values and principles with the Islamic model of corporate 
governance, particularly stakeholder value orientation. Having analysed the core features 
of both models, corporate governance in IFIs seems better suited to operate within the 
stakeholder value framework rather than shareholder system, emphasizing the interest of 
a diverse group of constituents such as employees, customers, suppliers and the local 
community.  
Another dimension of corporate governance in Islam which is different from the western 
concept refers to its epistemological orientation. The fundamental principles of Tawhīd, 
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shura, property rights and commitment to contractual obligation that govern the 
economic and social behaviour require IFIs to comply with the Sharīʿah rules and 
principles (Choudury, 2004 and 2006 and Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004). At this juncture, 
corporate governance structure in IFIs need additional measures of governance for the 
purpose of Sharīʿah compliance, known as Sharīʿah governance. As part of the corporate 
governance framework in IFIs, Sharīʿah governance is the very essence of Islamic 
finance practice in building and maintaining the confidence of the shareholders and other 
stakeholders and assuring them that all transactions, practices and activities are in 
compliance with the Sharīʿah principles.   
Sharīʿah governance is now becoming more diverse and advanced, in parallel with the 
development of Islamic finance industry worldwide. In view of the impressive growth 
and increasing sophistication of the Islamic finance sector, Sharīʿah governance of this 
rapidly evolving industry has proved challenging. As a consequence each jurisdiction has 
adopted different approaches to developing and nurturing its Sharīʿah governance 
framework. At this point, it is very important to understand and appreciate the pluralistic 
approaches of Sharīʿah governance across jurisdictions, so as to identify and highlight 
best practice. It should be noted that, from a regulatory point of view, Malaysia 
represents the most regulated Sharīʿah governance model, followed by Brunei, Pakistan 
and Sudan respectively, whilst GCC countries and the UK prefer less regulatory 
interference.  
Malaysia has developed its Sharīʿah governance infrastructure and architecture in both 
regulatory and non-regulatory aspects.  In fact, a special endowment fund of USD60 
million has been allocated by the government of Malaysia to promote the development of 
Sharīʿah compliance and governance in the Islamic financial services sector. With regard 
to the development of Sharīʿah governance at the macro level, Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM) has established the National Sharīʿah Advisory Council (SAC) as the highest 
Sharīʿah authority in Islamic banking and finance. The SAC works closely with the 
Sharīʿah board of IFIs as well as the Securities Commission (SC) and also acts as a 
reference point for advice from the judiciary. The Malaysian regulators have gone even 
further to enhance the quality of Sharīʿah governance in the Islamic financial services 
sector by issuing, in 2004, Guidelines on the Governance of Sharīʿah Committee for the 
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Islamic Banks, known as BNM/GPS1, and are introducing in 2010, a Concept Paper on 
Sharīʿah Governance Framework for IFIs.  
IFIs in GCC countries , namely countries in the Arabian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE (except for the Sultanate of Oman), have their own 
framework of Sharīʿah governance which is different from that of Malaysia. Saudi 
Arabia treats IFIs as equal to their conventional counterparts and therefore allows the 
market to develop its own Sharīʿah governance system. On the other hand, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE allow slight regulatory intervention in their Sharīʿah 
governance framework by issuing several directives in the form of rulebooks, as well as 
adopting the AAOIFI governance standards.  
The Sharīʿah governance framework in the UK is aligned with that of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), and is unregulated through specific legislation. The 
establishment of a Sharīʿah board of the Islamic Bank of Britain, for instance, is due to 
the market factors and not because of regulatory requirements in the UK. It should be 
noted that the practices and frameworks of Sharīʿah governance are developed and 
nurtured by the respective IFIs in the UK and that there is no formal monitoring or 
coordination as in the case of Malaysia. The IFIs are allowed to adopt their own Sharīʿah 
governance approaches without being subject to any national or higher level Sharīʿah 
boards. 
The discussion so far indicates that a study on the Sharīʿah governance system in IFIs is 
viable, indispensable and, in fact, beneficial, especially if it is explored theoretically as 
well as empirically. Indeed, this brings into focus the measures, analysis and empirical 
study that needs to be carried out to enhance and find the best practice of Sharīʿah 
governance in IFIs. In this regard, the study aims to provide, in the light of the research 
findings, useful guidelines and policy recommendations for sound Sharīʿah governance 
systems. 
1.1 Statement of Problem 
IFIs have taken the form of commercial banks, investment banks, investment and finance 
companies, asset management companies and financial services companies. There are 
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diverse banking models practised in different jurisdictions, namely dual banking models, 
fully fledged Islamic institutions, Islamic subsidiaries of conventional banks and Islamic 
windows. Basically, the implementation of Islamic finance, and the way it is nurtured, 
greatly depends on the local legal environment and market factors. 
In Malaysia, the establishment of a Sharīʿah board is a statutory requirement for all banks 
offering Islamic banking products pursuant to section 3 (5) (b) of the Islamic Banking 
Act 1983 (IBA 1983) for Islamic banks, section 124 (7) of the Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA 1989) for Islamic banking scheme banks, and section 51 of 
the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 (CBA) for the BNM. The main objective of the 
establishment of the Sharīʿah board is to advise Islamic banks on any Sharīʿah matters 
and also to ensure compliance with the Sharīʿah tenets and requirements in their 
operations. Even though these legislation provide regulatory frameworks for the 
establishment of Sharīʿah boards, their legal ambit is not clear. The existing provisions in 
these legislation are inadequate and the frameworks are slightly ambiguous.  
In the UK and GCC countries, the absence of a comprehensive set of regulatory 
framework on Sharīʿah governance may impede the development of Islamic finance. 
This position may create regulatory gaps and confusion to the players and the public with 
regard to the legal and Sharīʿah compliance of IFIs. Significant Sharīʿah governance 
issues, such as rejection of fatwa, differences in Sharīʿah pronouncements and Sharīʿah 
non-compliance risks, have the potential to affect the credibility and image of Islamic 
finance as well to create huge financial liabilities.  
In view of the diverse and distinct frameworks of Sharīʿah governance, this study 
attempts to explore the actual practices of Sharīʿah governance in Malaysia, GCC 
countries and the UK. It is expected that the empirical findings of such an extensive study 
on this subject will be able to identify issues, gaps and problems, and at the same time 
propose policy recommendations pertinent to Sharīʿah governance systems in IFIs for 
further development of the industry. 
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1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to analytically explore the extent of Sharīʿah governance 
practices in IFIs by analysing the practices and implementation of Sharīʿah governance in 
Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK through the perceptions and opinions of 
participants and available documents. This study explores, inter alia, whether the existing 
Sharīʿah governance framework provided in the mentioned case countries is adequate 
and efficient or whether it needs further enhancement. The study, thus, attempts to 
formulate a good and sound Sharīʿah governance framework based on the empirical 
analysis extracted from the research findings. 
 
There are a number of objectives through which the aim of this study will be fulfilled, 
which are as follows:  
(i) To investigate the different approaches of IFIs to Sharīʿah governance; 
(ii) To study the regulatory framework and internal policies of Sharīʿah 
governance in IFIs; 
(iii) To examine the roles and functions of the Sharīʿah board in IFIs; 
(iv) To examine the attributes of Sharīʿah board members on independence, 
competence and transparency, and confidentiality; 
(v) To examine the operational procedures of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs; 
(vi) To investigate the perception of IFIs of their Sharīʿah board’s performance; 
(vii) To ascertain the extent of disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices in IFIs;  
(viii) To provide, in light of the empirical results of the research, certain essential 
guidelines and policy recommendations that can be considered to enhance and 
improve the Sharīʿah governance system. 
1.3 Research Questions  
 
The study aims to respond and answer the following formulated research questions, 
which are derived from the aim and objectives of the study: 
(i) What is the Sharīʿah governance system? 
(ii) What are the different approaches of IFIs towards Sharīʿah governance? 
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(iii) How different are the regulatory and internal frameworks of Sharīʿah 
governance in IFIs? 
(iv) How do the roles and functions of Sharīʿah boards differ between IFIs? 
(v) Are there any standard operational procedures for Sharīʿah governance 
processes? 
(vi) What mechanisms are in place that would ensure independence, competence, 
transparency and confidentiality in Sharīʿah governance? 
(vii) To what extent has the Sharīʿah board demonstrated its roles and functions? 
(viii) What is the extent of disclosure practices of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs? 
 
Analytical responses to each of these questions are provided through qualitative and 
quantitative analysis in the following chapters in an empirical manner. 
1.4 Hypotheses  
 
In the light of the research aim and objectives, as well as the research questions, seven 
hypotheses have been formulated in order to give direction to the research. They are as 
follows: 
(i) There are differences in the approaches of various IFIs to Sharīʿah 
governance; 
(ii) There are differences in the regulatory and internal frameworks of Sharīʿah 
governance in IFIs; 
(iii) There are differences in the roles and functions of Sharīʿah boards; 
(iv) There are differences in the attributes of Sharīʿah board members in terms of 
competence, independence, transparency and confidentiality; 
(v) There are differences in the operational procedures of Sharīʿah governance 
practices; 
(vi) The IFIs are satisfied with the performance and contribution of the Sharīʿah 
boards;  





1.5 Thesis Statement 
 
This research is a theoretical and empirical study on the Sharīʿah governance practices of 
IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. The findings indicate that there are some 
common elements underlying and promoting good governance and best practices. If these 
are more widely disseminated they will create a better environment for the Sharīʿah 
governance which in turn is important for the consolidation and sustainability of the 
global Islamic finance industry.  
1.6 Significance of Research 
 
In view of the lack of intensive and in-depth research in the area of Sharīʿah governance, 
the researcher undertakes to conduct a comprehensive study of the extent of Sharīʿah 
governance practices, in the hope that its findings may provide certain guiding 
frameworks, principles and best practices for Sharīʿah governance system in IFIs. The 
findings of this study will provide useful information on the frameworks and practices of 
Sharīʿah governance of IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK by emphasizing the 
following aspects: 
 
(i) The design and implementation of the Sharīʿah governance strategy in 
Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK; 
(ii) The need for a comprehensive Sharīʿah governance framework at the 
institutional, national and international levels; 
(iii) The need to strengthen the existing Sharīʿah governance framework through a 
comparative study of the practices in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK;  
(iv) The role of the regulatory authority in improving the standards and best 
practices in order to ensure sound and effective Sharīʿah governance;  
(v) The role of Sharīʿah board practices in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK 
and best practices for policy adaptation. 
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1.7 Scope of Research 
 
The scope of this study is limited to Sharīʿah governance of IFIs or institutions that 
offering Islamic financial products and services in Malaysia, GCC countries (Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) and the UK. The study excludes Oman as one 
of the case countries in the GCC region, since the government of Oman has resisted 
implementing Sharīʿah -compliant banking for political reasons. This research focuses on 
the framework of Sharīʿah governance of these three different territories, as they provide 
three distinctive models and approaches. The research attempts to explore the extent of 
Sharīʿah governance practices by systematically analysing the empirical results of the 
research; its findings may provide certain essential guidelines for a strong and effective 
Sharīʿah governance system.  
1.8 Outline of Research 
 
Corporate governance is one of the vital parts of any corporation’s development, as it 
plays a role in designing and promoting principles of fairness, accountability and 
transparency. It seems that the Western concept and principles of corporate governance 
are very similar to Islamic perspectives and are in fact highly commendable in Islam, 
despite the fact that they stem from two different epistemological orientations. In the 
context of IFIs, the concept of corporate governance plays a crucial part in ensuring its 
development and, more importantly, fulfilling the objectives of the firm within the ambit 
of maqāsid Sharīʿah. In this regard, corporate governance in IFIs needs another layer of 
governance, namely Sharīʿah governance, to address the issue of Sharīʿah compliance.  
The literature seems to suggest that the existing Sharīʿah governance framework needs 
further enhancement and improvement in order to reinforce the development and growth 
of IFIs. This brings into focus the measures and efforts that need to be taken to strengthen 
the credibility of IFIs through enhancing the Sharīʿah governance framework. This 
research attempts to study the framework of the Sharīʿah governance system in IFIs and 
its actual practices in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. The research consists of ten 
chapters which are divided into four parts as follows. Part 1: Theoretical Concept of 
Corporate Governance; Part 2: Theoretical Concept of Sharīʿah Governance; Part 3: 
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Empirical Results of the Research; and Part 4: Discussion, Recommendations and 
Conclusion. 
Part 1 of the study comprises three chapters. Chapter 1 mainly presents an overview of 
the study, objectives, scope, significance, research questions, research methodology and 
statement of problems of the research. It outlines the whole research direction and the 
essence of the study in the area of Sharīʿah governance. Chapter 2 discusses a conceptual 
framework of corporate governance from a Western perspective. This includes 
conceptual definition, roles, models and institutions of corporate governance, particularly 
within the context of the financial services sector. References are made to famous 
Western academic concepts of corporate governance, namely ‘shareholder value’ and 
‘stakeholder value’ models. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive analysis of the concept 
and theoretical context of corporate governance from Islamic perspectives. This chapter 
briefly analyses a few models of corporate governance in Islam and explains its 
fundamental principles in the context of the financial services industry. 
 
The discussion on the conceptual definition and theoretical framework, as well as the 
comparative overview of corporate governance from both conventional and Islamic 
perspectives, in Chapters 2 and 3 is very important for the purpose of enlightening the 
relevancy of Sharīʿah governance as part of the corporate governance in IFIs. The faith-
based epistemology of corporate governance in Islam, which is inclined towards a 
stakeholder-oriented system, means that IFIs require additional measures to address 
specific issues pertaining to Islamic rules and principles in the form of Sharīʿah 
governance.  
 
There are two chapters in Part 2. Chapter 4 constructs a theoretical concept of Sharīʿah 
governance. It discusses the conceptual definition of Sharīʿah governance, roles and 
models of the Sharīʿah board, the development of the Sharīʿah governance system, and 
its process and guidelines. The research also highlights issues and challenges pertinent to 
the Sharīʿah governance system, as practised by IFIs in cross-border jurisdictions. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the regulatory frameworks of the Sharīʿah governance system in 
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Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. The study identifies five Sharīʿah governance 
models in the context of regulatory perspectives.  
 
Part 3 presents empirical results of the study and consists of four chapters. Chapter 6 
explains the research methodology used and how the study is conducted and the findings 
are derived. The study employed a mixed-method approach as a research strategy, 
namely a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. Primary data was 
collected through interviews and questionnaires and secondary data was generated 
through the literature review and unobtrusive research methods. Descriptive, 
interpretative and content analysis method of analysis are used to analyse the data and 
sources available. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 distinctively impart the empirical results of the 
study: Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the questionnaires; Chapter 8 presents the 
empirical results of the semi-structured interviews and Chapter 9 elucidates the extent of 
disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices via analysis of annual reports, financial 
statements and websites.  
 
Part 4 provides the overall findings, policy recommendations and conclusions. Based on 
the research findings derived from the empirical study, Chapter 10 offers details of 
specific policy recommendations derived from the overall research findings for the 
purpose of enhancement and improvement of Sharīʿah governance. This chapter 
concludes the study by summarizing the entire research findings and the extent of the 
study’s contribution, and highlighting research limitations. 
1.9 Conclusion  
 
The aim of this research is to conduct a theoretical and empirical study into Sharīʿah 
governance practices of IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. The study 
emphasizes the regulatory and non-regulatory aspects of Sharīʿah governance and these 
include Sharīʿah governance approaches, regulatory and internal frameworks, roles of the 
Sharīʿah board, attributes of the Sharīʿah board with respect to independence, 
competence, transparency and confidentiality, operational procedures, and assessment of 
the Sharīʿah board. With significant numbers of Sharīʿah boards in numerous IFIs in 
Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK, it is undeniable that there are distinctive models 
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and practices of Sharīʿah governance. This diversity actually reflects the beauty and 
blessing of Islam because it provides an opportunity to study comparatively the Sharīʿah 
governance practices with the purpose of identifying gaps, shortcomings and weaknesses, 
and highlighting the best practices for possible recommendations.  
 
It is important that some common elements underlying and promoting good governance 
and best practices are fundamentally to be drawn together to facilitate the creation and 
optimization of a healthy and viable environment for Sharīʿah governance without 
impeding further growth of the industry. Effective Sharīʿah governance is essentially that 
which adheres to its essential elements of being participatory, transparent and 
accountable. These elements are embedded in Islam and therefore become an integral 
part of corporate governance framework in IFIs. Consequentially, a sound Sharīʿah 
governance framework requires the involvement of all stakeholders, the government, the 
industry associations, the shareholders, the directors, the management and other persons 
relevant to the business. This research argues that the findings, solutions and 
recommendations from an in-depth study into this area will contribute something 
significant towards developing a good and effective Sharīʿah governance system. 
Constant enhancement of the framework is necessary to ensure optimal Sharīʿah 
governance in IFIs. 





CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CONVENTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.0 Introduction  
 
Corporate governance is one of the vital elements in any corporation. There has been 
much debate and discourse on the issue of corporate governance for many years. The 
concept of corporate governance is becoming much more popular since there have been 
more corporate failures due to ineffective governance.1 Basically, there is no consensus 
on the definition and concept of corporate governance. This is due to the different 
understandings of the goals of corporations with respect to different models of corporate 
governance, as well as a large number of distinct economic systems. As a result, there are 
various definitions and concepts of corporate governance propounded by different parties 
that basically reflect their special interest in the field.  
 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004: 43–44) argue that the increased attention on the issue of 
corporate governance is due to the growth of institutional investors, the weaknesses and 
defects of a ‘shareholder model’ of corporate governance, a shift away from the 
traditional shareholder value system to a stakeholder model, and impact of the 
globalization of the financial market. Recognizing all these aspects, this chapter explores 
the theoretical foundation of corporate governance from a conventional perspective in 
general and tries to conceptualize its framework in the context of the financial services 
sector. The discussion involves an overview of the corporate governance system, its 
conceptual definition, models, mechanisms and institutions. The aim of this chapter is to 
build a basic understanding of corporate governance in conventional literature so as to 
enable the study to construct and develop the concept of corporate governance within the 
Islamic paradigm that will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
                                                 
1
 There have been numerous scandals and corporate failures during the last two decades that have affected 
regional and global economic stability, such as the BCCI in 1991, Barings Bank in 1995, Credit Lyonnais 
in 1998, Enron, Arthur Anderson and WorldCom in 2002, Northern Rock in 2007, and Madoff Securities 
and Lehman Brothers in 2008. 




2.1 Conceptual Definition  
 
The discourse on corporate governance as a discipline in its own right is relatively new as 
it has evolved over centuries (Cadbury, 1999: 3). There are various definitions of 
corporate governance and the absence of any real consensus on its actual meaning leads 
to various interpretations. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 briefly provide a conceptual definition of 
corporate governance in conventional literature by defining corporations, governance, 
corporate governance, and corporate governance in financial services. 
 
Literally, the word ‘corporation’, as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary (1989), is 
derived from the Latin word corpus which means “a group of people authorized to act as 
an individual and recognized in law as a single entity”. A similar definition can be found 
in the American Heritage Dictionary (2007), where a corporation is referred to as “a body 
that is granted a charter recognizing it as a separate entity having its own rights, 
privileges, and liabilities distinct from those of its members”. In terms of legal definition, 
Blacks’ Law Dictionary (2009) legally defines a corporation as “an artificial person or 
legal entity created by, or under the authority of, the laws of a state”. In short, these three 
different definitions lead to a similar conclusion that a corporation can be defined as a 
form of organization that represents a group of people as a single entity for certain 
purposes. 
 
The term ‘governance’ originates from a Latin word, gubernare, which means to steer or 
to govern (Cadbury, 2002: 1). Lewis (2005: 5) also mentions that the word governance 
comes from the Greek word kybernan which means to steer, to guide or to govern.2 The 
Oxford English Dictionary (1989) provides a wide meaning of governance as to include 
any “act or manner of governing”. All of these definitions present a very wide meaning of 
governance as the term may cover areas of politics, economics, social justice and public 
administration. In other words, the term governance in a general sense means the style or 
way an organization, institution or corporation is guided, steered and controlled.  
                                                 
2
 The Macquarie Encyclopedic Dictionary (1990), states that the etymological root of governance is from 
the Greek to the Latin gubernare and to the Old French governer (Lewis, 2005: 25). 




From the above definitions of corporation and governance, the meaning of corporate 
governance can be categorized into two senses, namely a narrower sense and an 
expansive term. The former considers it a formal system of accountability between the 
shareholders and their agent such as BOD and senior management and the latter refers to 
it as the entire network of formal and informal relations involving large group of 
stakeholders in the firm, such as shareholders, management, employees, the community 
and the environment. 
2.2 Defining Corporate Governance in the Financial Services Sector 
A concept of corporate governance in the context of the financial services sector presents 
its own distinct characteristics and features. Basically, it requires additional measures and 
greater concerns as compared to the firms in other sectors as it involves a larger group of 
stakeholders. The OECD (2004: 11) provides a general definition of corporate 
governance as “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders, and other stakeholders”. This definition nevertheless does not specifically 
differentiate the nature of corporate governance in the financial services sector.  
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), on ‘Enhancing Corporate 
Governance for Banking Organizations’, specifically explains the corporate governance 
from a banking industry perspective, which involves “the manner in which the business 
and affairs of individual institutions are governed by their BOD and senior management 
affecting how a bank sets its corporate objective, daily business, interest of the 
stakeholder, to align corporate activities operate in a safe and sound manner and to 
comply with laws and regulations, and to protect the interest of depositors” (BCBS, 1999: 
3). At this point, the BCBS expands the term ‘stakeholders’ to include employees, 
customers, depositors, suppliers, supervisors, government and the community. In 
explaining corporate governance in the context of the financial services sector, Arun and 
Turner (2003: 6) specifically mention the importance of ensuring capital and investment 
return and protecting depositors as well as shareholders. On the whole, corporate 
governance in financial institutions to certain extent is different to that in other types of 
business organization, as it involves a larger group of stakeholders. With this position, 
financial institutions are much more regulated as compared to other commercial entities. 




2.3 Role of Corporate Governance  
 
If we refer to early academic discussion on corporate governance in the case of the 
United States, it is found that the main function of corporate governance is to reduce 
agency costs due to conglomerate mergers and hostile takeovers; it then evolves into 
other areas, including the role of institutional investors as corporate monitors to control 
managerial shirking and to maximize shareholder value (Macey, 2004: 580). This is 
affirmed by Scott (2003:527), who explains the objective function of a corporate 
governance system as a set of legal rules, incentives and behaviours that support the 
reliance by investors in order to maximize the economic efficiency of the firm. Studies by 
Selvaggi and Upton (2008), Black (2001) and Black et al. (2006), for instance, strongly 
affirm the positive correlation between corporate governance behaviour and firms’ 
performance.3  
 
In the context of the financial services sector, Claessens (2003: 14) considers that 
corporate governance is very important, particularly in determining a firm’s performance 
in terms of ability to facilitate access to external finance, to lower cost of capital, to 
improve operational performance, to mitigate the operational risk, and to achieve better 
relationships amongst the stakeholders. In this aspect, a clear and precise corporate 
governance framework will stimulate the bank’s efficiency which may contribute towards 
better performance, avoid unnecessary agency cost, and resolve the agency problem 
(Hart, 1995: 678).4 
 
Another key function of corporate governance refers to the promotion of corporate 
fairness, transparency and accountability (Wolfensohn, 1999). Corporate governance 
requires financial institutions to be more transparent and to ensure fairness not only to 
shareholders but also to other stakeholders. Having greater transparency and more 
                                                 
3
 In the UK, companies with good governance posted 18% higher returns than those with poor governance, 
while in Russia it is predicted that it may significantly increase the firm’s value and in Korea firms with 
good governance have been found to trade at a premium of 160% to poorly governed corporations (IFC and 
Hawkamah, 2008: 12). 
4
 In the absence of agency problems, all members of the organization can be instructed to maximize profit 
or to minimize cost and they will be prepared to carry out the instructions. Effort and other kind of costs 
can be reimbursed directly and incentives are not required to motivate and therefore no governance 
structure is required to resolve disagreement. The issue of the corporate governance model is not relevant in 
the absence of this agency problem (Hart, 1995: 678). 




accountability as an element of best corporate governance practice will positively affect 
growth as well as improve the firm’s stability, efficiency and trustworthiness (Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2006b: 5). 
 
To sum up, corporate governance plays an essential role in meeting the specific goals and 
objectives of a corporation. The distinct function of corporate governance in the financial 
services sector is mainly focused on the determination of policies, a set of legal rules and 
managerial behaviours amongst the shareholders, the managers, the BOD, the depositors 
and other stakeholders. The complication and sophistication of the financial services 
sector with a larger group of stakeholders affects the scope and framework of the 
corporate governance system in financial institutions. These factors also lead to the needs 
for a distinctive codes and guidelines to promote best practice of corporate governance in 
financial services sector.  
2.4 Corporate Governance Systems  
 
It is imperative to conduct a survey on the international corporate governance system in 
the world and how it has been practised. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a 
comprehensive survey of corporate governance, centring on the essence of legal 
protection of investors and ownership concentration in the governance system. The 
underlying problem of corporate governance, as recognized by a long tradition of 
scholars, such as Berle and Means (1932), Marshall (1920) and Smith (1993), lies with 
the issue of separation of beneficial ownership and executive decision-making (Keasey et 
al., 1997: 528).  
 
Corporate governance has emerged for several reasons including corporate fraud and 
corporate collapse, such as the cases of web fraud and deception involving Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International, the collapse of Barings and Polly Peck, and the 
Enron scandal in the United States (Kay and Silberston, 1995: 84). All these events have 
led to corporate governance reforms in the form of governance codes, rules and 
guidelines as to how companies can be best managed and controlled. 
 




Becht and Barca (2001) provide a literature review of a number of quantitative corporate 
governance models as a possible means to resolve the issue of the collective action 
problem among dispersed shareholders. These models consist of: the takeover model; 
block holder model; delegated monitoring and large creditors; board models; executive 
compensation models; and multi-constituency models. Another interesting examination 
can be found in Lewis (1999: 33–66), where he examines six different models of 
corporate governance, namely the Anglo-Saxon model, the Germanic model, the 
Japanese model, the Latin model, the Confucian model and the Islamic model. This study 
chooses this classification by Lewis (1999) to explain the differences of corporate 
governance models by focusing on the main two dominant systems, i.e. the Anglo-Saxon 
and the European models, and by briefly mentioning some other models of corporate 
governance in Japan,5 China,6 and Italy.7  
2.4.1 The Anglo-Saxon Model 
 
The Anglo-Saxon model is also known as a market-based, shareholder value or principle-
agent system and is considered the most dominant theory of corporate governance. This 
is demonstrated by the practice of numerous corporations all over the world, such as in 
the United States8 and the UK.9 This corporate governance system is relatively important 
                                                 
5
 The basic model of Japanese corporate governance system is known as a bank-led or bank-based model. 
The bank-based model not only refers to the bank as a shareholder per se but another essential element is 
powerful state supervision and intervention (Okumura, 2004: 3–4). In Japanese corporations, there are 
normally two groups of shareholders, namely corporate shareholders, known as market investors, and bank 
shareholders, known as stable investors. This structure affects the corporate governance objective as it is 
not only to maximize the investment return for corporate shareholders but also to protect the quality of its 
loan portfolio for bank shareholders (Yoshikawa and Phillip, 2005: 304). 
6
 The Chinese government has mandated the corporate governance structure for Chinese corporations to be 
modelled based on the Anglo-Saxon or market-based model (On Kit Tam, 2000: 52). In 1996, China 
decided to begin implementing its own version of a corporate governance system known as ‘Zhuban 
Yinhang’ or ‘Main Bank’, a combination of the Japanese and European models, as a means to reform state-
owned corporations (On Kit Tam, 2000: 52).  
7
 The Latin model is classified as an insider model of corporate governance, where the concentration of 
shareholding is owned by cross shareholdings, financial shareholdings, a residue state ownership and 
family-based control (Lewis, 1999: 44).  
8
 Grant, (2003: 923–934) interestingly examines the impact of corporate governance evolution and 
development in modern corporate America and concludes that corporate governance remains the core issue 
to align the interest of different stakeholders.  
9
 The concept of enlightened shareholder value is clearly enshrined in section 172 (1) of the Companies Act 
2006. With the recommendation of the Law Review Committee Steering Group, section 172 (1) provides 
that “directors owe their fiduciary duty only to the shareholders generally, rather than a range of interest 
groups, but seeks to provide a broader context for fulfilling that duty” (Andrew, 2007: 579).  .  




for corporations in these jurisdictions as it sets a clear and very objective corporate goal 
of maximizing shareholders’ profit10.  
 
Although the corporate governance theory has been discussed for centuries, there is no 
formal or serious discussion on the approach or model of corporate governance. The 
extensive discourse on corporate governance began in the 1970s when a group of 
American financial economists developed the agency theory as a basis of a corporate 
governance system (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000: 14–17). This agency theory was 
formulated with sole motivation of maximizing shareholder value and there are legal 
rules and policies to be imposed on BOD and executive officers which require them to 
act in the best interest of the shareholders.   
 
Mallin, (2007: 12) states that one of the advantages of the agency theory is it “identifies 
the relationship where one party, the principal, delegates work to another party, the 
agent”.  At this point, she mentions that BOD plays a role as an essential monitoring 
device to minimize any principal-agent relationship problems (Mallin, 2007: 13). In 
addition, Hart (1995: 678) considers that corporate governance is very important to 
resolve the agency problem either in the form of cost of business or conflict of interest. 
At this point, the agency theory influences the corporate governance structure in the 
Anglo-Saxon model of corporation where BOD and senior managers act as agents to 
protect the interest and rights of investors or shareholders. Cernat (2004: 3) briefly 
illustrates this structure in Figure 2.1. 
 
                                                 
10
 Although the UK and the United States corporate governance models share many similarities, there are 
several differences on their actual practices such as the board structure and the roles of Chairman, CEO and 
executive directors. It is reported that the Chairman and the CEO of 75 percent of the S&P500 in the 
United States are the same person while in the UK the roles are separated (Keenan, 2002: 173). In addition, 
unlike in the UK, it is a rare practice in the United States to appoint additional executive directors on top of 
the Chairman, CEO and Chief Financial Officer (Keenan, 2002: 173). 




Figure 2.1: The Anglo-Saxon Model of Corporate Governance 
 
 
Source: Cernat (2004: 153). 
 
Figure 2.1 appears to show that the Anglo-Saxon model is based on the corporate concept 
of a fiduciary relationship between the shareholders and the managers motivated by 
profit-oriented behaviour. The central motivation of corporate governance in the 
shareholder value orientation system is to protect the interests and rights of the 
shareholders. In this regard, Miller (2004: 2) considers that corporate governance is 
concerned with shareholder value, in which the individual is sovereign, and not the 
government, the producers or the merchants. The connection between customer 
sovereignty and corporate governance does not just lie in the benefit the customer derives 
from the corporation’s output, but the shareholders, investors and owners are also 
customers and that is what drives the shareholder value principle.  
2.4.2 The European Model 
 
Since the publication of Berle and Means (1932), many have believed that there are 
significant problems with the shareholder value system of corporate governance. This 
model is viewed as inferior by some scholars because it does not effectively address the 
agency problems (Macey and Miller, 2004: 552). This modern tendency has led to a 
formulation of another corporate governance system known as stakeholder theory.11 
 
A different perception of corporation in the European countries results in another 
approach to corporate governance which is based on the stakeholder-oriented model. 
                                                 
11
 Some authors use different terminology for the European model of corporate governance, such as 
stakeholder model or theory, stakeholder management, stakeholder value orientation, Franco-German 








Initial studies on the stakeholder theory of corporate governance has been conducted by 
Clarkson (1995) and Donaldson and Preston (1995), who claim that the interests of all the 
stakeholders have intrinsic value and that one set of interests is not supposed to dominate 
the others (Yamak and Suer, 2005: 113). The efficiency of this model is proven by 
referring to the successful corporations and industrial societies that has developed a 
reputation for the ethical treatment of suppliers, clients and employees and that are able 
to build up trusting relationships, which support profitable investments and mutually 
beneficial exchanges (Jones, 1995: 404). 
 
As a basic premise, the stakeholder theory rejects propositions of the shareholder value 
model and enhances the corporate governance framework by which stakeholders have a 
governance right to participate in corporate decisions, it is the manager’s fiduciary duty 
to protect the interests of all stakeholders and the corporation’s objective to promote the 
interest of all stakeholders and not only the shareholders (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004: 46). 
Mallin, (2007: 16) states that “stakeholder theory takes into account of a wider group of 
constituents rather than focusing on shareholder”. In explaining the term stakeholders, 
Freeman (1984: 46) defines it as a group of constituents who have a legitimate claim on 
the corporation or a person who contributes directly or indirectly to the firm. In addition, 
Lepineu classifies the stakeholders into shareholders, internal stakeholders (employees 
and labour unions), operational partners (customers, suppliers, creditors and contractors), 
and the social community (state authorities, trade union, non-governmental organizations 
and civil society) (Yvon Pesqueux and Salma, 2005: 7).  
 
In terms of corporate governance structure, the special attribute of the European model of 
corporate governance system refers to the practice of the two-tier system, comprising a 
supervisory board of outside directors and a separate management board of executive 
directors, in which structure the two boards meet separately (Dignam and Galanis, 2009: 
269-274). Basically, there is much literature examining and discussing the role of the 
firms, which is contrary to the understanding of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
model, particularly in Germany. The concept of corporate personality or ‘Verbands 
Personlichkeit’ affects the German view about a corporation as it constitutes part of the 
social and economic structure within the community and has its own function towards 




society at large (Kay and Silberston, 1995: 88). At this point, Mallin, (2007: 162) states 
that the philosophy of the German approach to corporate governance emphasizes on a 
wider set of stakeholder interest and this includes the employees and customers. Figure 
2.2 illustrates the corporate governance structure of the European model. 
 
Figure 2.2: Corporate Governance Structure of the European Model 
 
Source: Cernat (2004: 153). 
Figure 2.2 illustrates that the European model of corporate governance operates on the 
two-tier boards system, i.e. supervisory and management board system. The supervisory 
board is elected by the shareholders and the employees and has the authority to elect the 
management board (Schilling, 2001: 148). Members of the supervisory board normally 
consist of shareholders, trade union members and work council representatives (Dignam 
and Galanis, 2009: 271). The management board has a fiduciary duty to manage the 
business of the company by not only taking into consideration the rights and interests of 
shareholders but also of other stakeholders, while the supervisory board plays the role of 
supervising and monitoring the management board (Schilling, 2001: 148).  
2.4.3 The Differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the European Models 
 
The main difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the European models of corporate 
governance refers to the ownership and control of corporations. The former presents the 
feature of maximization of the shareholders return and the latter displays the 
characteristic that decisions are traditionally made under the assumption that employee’s 
Shareholders 
Supervisory Board BOD 
Corporate Governance 
Works Council Trade Union 




interests will be safeguarded (Franks and Mayer, 2004: 535).12 Table 2.1 summarizes the 
diversity of the Anglo-Saxon and the European models of corporate governance:13  
Table 2.1: The Diversity of the Anglo-Saxon and the European Models of Corporate 
Governance 
Aspects The Anglo-Saxon Model  The European Model 
Objective   
Rights and interests To protect the interests and 
rights of the shareholders 
To include the rights of other 
stakeholders 
Corporate goal Shareholders controlling 
managers for purpose of 
shareholder profit 
Society controlling corporation 
for purpose of social welfare 
Nature of 
management 
Management dominated Controlling shareholder 
dominated 
Labour-related   
Cooperation between 
social partners 
Conflictual or minimal 
contact 
Extensive at national level 
Labour organizations Fragmented and weak Strong, centralized unions 
Labour market 
flexibility 
Poor internal flexibility; 
high external flexibility 
High internal flexibility; lower 
external flexibility 
Employee influence Limited  Extensive through works councils 
and codetermination 
Capital-related   
Ownership structure Widely dispersed 
ownership; dividends 
prioritized 
Banks and other corporations are 
major shareholders; dividends less 
prioritized 
Role of banks Minimal role in corporate 
ownership 




General separation of 
equity holding and 
management 
Family ownership important only 
for small and medium sized 
enterprises 
Management boards One-tier board Two-tier boards; executive and 
supervisory responsibility 
separate 
Market for corporate 
control 
Hostile takeovers are 
allowed and considered as 
a ‘correction mechanism’ 
for management failure 
Takeovers restricted 
Role of stock 
exchange 
Strong role in corporate 
finance 
Reduced role in corporate finance 
                                                 
12
 Due to these inherent characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon and the European models, Iqbal and Lewis 
(2009: 268) classify the former as within the ‘managed corporation’ paradigm and the latter as a ‘socially 
responsive’ corporation.  
13
 It is worth mentioning that the following comparison is based on the general characteristics of the Anglo-
Saxon and the European models. Undeniably, both models evolve and their features may change and 
transmit into another form or even converge. 





Source: Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn (1997: 174–5) as cited in Cernat (2004: 150): 
modified. 
 
Although the corporate governance models have their own characteristics and distinctive 
features, it is hard to provide grounds for the sharp distinction of all these governance 
systems in actual practice. Commentators have argued that the market-based system and 
bank-based system are converging because it is difficult to differentiate the actual 
application of both systems. At this point, Hansmann and Kraakman, (2001: 439) 
considers that there is a substantial convergence in the practices of corporate governance.  
In fact, Articles I, II and III of the OECD (2004) appear to promote the convergence of 
the shareholder and stakeholder models by providing that corporate governance should 
protect shareholders’ rights, ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders and 
guarantee the rights of stakeholders as established by law.  
 
Macey and O’Hara (2001: 91) seem to agree with the notion of convergence of these two 
corporate governance systems; they argue that the BOD and managers must not only 
manage the business of the company for the sake of shareholders alone but must also take 
into consideration other stakeholders’ interests. The notion of convergence of the 
corporate governance system has already happened all over the world at least in the 
aspect of laws on corporate governance particularly rules on shareholder protection, 
diverged in worker protection and evened out in creditor protection (Siem, 2010: 756). 
The corporate governance system in Japan has evolved with a combination of the 
stakeholder, shareholder, and bank-based models, and the firms in the European model 
countries have emerged to accept and practise a few aspects and characteristics of the 
Anglo-Saxon model (Jacoby, 2000: 14). In fact, the corporations in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries have also shown interest and inclination towards adopting and importing values 
and approaches of the European model. Therefore, the hypothesis of the convergence of 
the stakeholder and shareholder systems appears to be affirmative. 
2.5 Corporate Governance Code 
With a number of high-profile corporate collapse because of lack of effective corporate 
governance, the corporate governance codes and guidelines have been issued by a variety 




of bodies all over the world. The earlier corporate governance code was introduced in the 
United States in 1970s, a period in which the corporate sector experienced numerous 
mergers and hostile takeovers. In 1978, a report was published by the Business Round 
Table entitled “The role and composition of the BOD of the large publicly owned 
corporation”; it was a guideline to prevent corporate criminal behaviour and to provide a 
set of laws on corporate governance (Hermes et al., 2006: 280). In 2002, the United 
States government introduced the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 with the purpose of 
strengthening the corporate governance framework by emphasizing the importance of 
corporate disclosure and strengthening auditor independence and company’s audit 
committee (Walsh, 2007: 770).  
The first corporate governance code in the UK was instituted by the Bank of England and 
the London Stock Exchange in 1992. The report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspect of Corporate Governance with its Code of Best Practice was published in 
December 1992 (Cadbury, 2002: 15). This code provides recommendations of best 
practice of corporate governance. In May 1995, another committee known as the 
Greenbury Committee was set up to specifically study the director’s remunerations, as a 
response to public and shareholder concern over executive pay (Mallin, 2007: 24). In 
view of several shortcomings and weaknesses of the previous corporate governance 
codes, the Hampel Committee was established in November 1995 to review the previous 
governance recommendations and issued its full report in January 1998 (Sheridan et al., 
2006: 499). Finally, all of the previous corporate governance codes were superseded by 
the Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice issued by the London 
Stock Exchange (Cadbury, 2002:16).14  
Since the emergence of corporate governance as a discipline of its own, there have been 
numerous reports produced all over the world with different approaches and features. In 
France, the Marini report of 1996 led to the issuance of a specific law on corporate 
governance known as the Law on New Economic Regulation 2001 (Mesnooh, 2002: 9). 
Other significance corporate governance codes are the Cromme Code 2003 of Germany, 
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 There are other two reports on corporate governance in the UK, namely the Higgs Report and Smith 
Report in 2003; the former emphasized the roles of non-executive directors and the latter was a specific 
response to the Enron corporate scandal. For further reading on the development of corporate governance 
code in the UK, see Mallin, (2007: 21-29) 




the Aldama Report 2003 of Spain, the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 2004, the 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2003, the Belgian Corporate Governance Code 2004, 
and the Report on Corporate Governance 2003 in Denmark (Hermes, et al., 2006: 281). 
By 2004, a total of twenty-two European countries had established their own corporate 
governance code (Hermes, et al., 2006: 281). In 2003, the European Commission released 
Communication 284, a specific code of corporate governance for the European 
Commission countries entitled “Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward” that consists of rules and 
guidelines to enhance corporate governance disclosure, strengthen shareholders’ rights 
and modernize the BOD (Hermes, et al., 2006: 282). These corporate governance codes, 
however, are classified as voluntary in nature and have no statutory force as in the case of 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002.  
The first effort to offer a universal code of corporate governance principles was carried 
out by the OECD. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance was issued in May 
199915 and further revised in 2004 (Mallin, 2007: 31-33). The OECD (1999 and 2004) 
provide guidelines and recommendations on corporate governance, particularly with 
respect to the rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, roles of 
stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and the responsibilities of the board. 
Interestingly, the OECD principles enhance the scope of corporate governance by 
recognizing the rights of stakeholders instead of shareholders alone. The OECD 
principles nevertheless have no binding force upon the member countries and it is 
reported that none of the fifteen countries assessed by Fremond and Capaul, 2002: 2) 
comply with it. 
On the whole, the United States is the pioneer for the issuance of corporate governance 
codes, followed by the UK, the European countries, and the rest of the world. The 
universal code of corporate governance then was initiated by the OECD with its 
Principles of Corporate Governance and supported by the International Corporate 
Governance Network and the Communication 284 at the European Commission level.On 
top of this, a number of influential organizations have also issued corporate governance 
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 Twenty-nine governments of the OECD voted unanimously to endorse the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999). 




guidelines such as the World Bank, the Global Corporate Governance Forum, the 
Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance (Mallin, 2007: 43). It is reported 
that by January 2002 more than forty-three countries all over the world had developed 
their own corporate governance codes (Freemond and Capaul, 2002: 2). The emergence 
of all of these codes demonstrates the essence of best practice and the value of corporate 
governance.  
2.6 Corporate Governance in the Financial Services Sector 
 
Corporate governance is crucial in the financial services sector. History has witnessed the 
corporate collapse and malpractice of several financial institutions because of weak 
corporate governance frameworks such as the cases of BCCI, Barings, Equitable Life 
mortgage endowment mis-selling, split-cap investment trust opacity and a spate of money 
laundering failures16 (Schachler et al., 2007: 628). There are various significant issues of 
corporate governance in the financial services sector that affect its structure and 
approach, such as the opaqueness of the banks, heavily regulated and impeded natural 
corporate governance mechanisms and government ownership, which alter the corporate 
governance equation (Caprio and Levine, 2002: 11–18).17  
 
Financial institutions are more opaque than other sectors of the economy. In this regard, 
the government or regulatory authority normally imposes certain regulatory requirements 
upon banks, such as restrictions on shareholders, rules on deposit insurance and 
restrictions on certain activities.18 In addition, there are differences in some key corporate 
governance variables in the financial services sector, particularly in terms of board size 
and composition, board activity, CEO compensation, and ownership and block share 
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 See Komert (2003) and Dale (2001). Both articles analyse the failure of financial institutions that led to 
the establishment of the Financial Services Authority in 1998 with a purpose to take over responsibility for 
banking supervision. 
17
 Another corporate governance issue in financial institutions refers to the intervention of bureaucrats, 
especially in the case of governments as shareholders of the banks (Caprio and Levine, 2002: 18). As 
reported by La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2000: 12, as cited in Caprio and Levine, 2002: 18), it 
is estimated that about 40% of the total assets in the banking system are majority-owned government banks. 
18
 For instance, in the UK, the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 grants power to the Financial 
Services Authority to regulate and enforce rules and regulations related to the financial services sector. The 
FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance of 2005 further provides general guidelines for corporate 
governance, particularly in relation to the responsibilities of the BOD, senior management and maintaining 
proper mechanisms of control (Dewing and Russel, 2004). 




ownership. These unique characteristics imply the need for distinctive and effective 
corporate governance measures for financial institutions. This is affirmed by Macey and 
O’Hara (2003) who conducted a study on corporate governance for the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York19 and highlighted the need for additional measures on corporate 
governance in the financial services sector.  
 
In view of the unique features of corporate governance in the financial services sector, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has taken the initiative to issue 
guidelines on Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations in order to 
foster safe and sound banking practices. Unlike the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, which are more general and applicable to any type of corporate entity, the 
BCBS guideline addresses specific corporate governance issues exclusive to financial 
institutions. The BCBS (1999 and 2004) stresses the importance of an environment 
supportive of sound corporate governance, the role of supervisors and the significance of 
other stakeholders.  
 
The above corporate governance studies imply that the multiple approaches to corporate 
governance models is necessary within the context of the financial sector. The diversity 
in the financial sector as compared to other types of corporate entity stems mainly from 
the presence of various stakeholders, such as shareholders, investors, depositors and 
regulators (Yamak and Suer, 2005: 112). This condition entails that the BOD and 
managers are assumed to have a duty to all stakeholders and it needs a distinctive 
corporate governance system as a mechanism of control. Yamak and Suer (2005: 114–
115) identify and classify major stakeholders in financial institutions into the owners, the 
managers, the depositors, the borrowers and the regulators. The shareholders and the 
owners expect profit maximization, the managers assume they will obtain monetary and 
non-monetary compensation as stipulated in their contracts, the depositors expect a return 
on their deposits, the borrowers are concerned with fair and non-discriminatory treatment 
by the banks, and the regulators are interested in the compliance to the laws and 
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regulations by all the stakeholders. Recognizing all the stakeholders’ interests and rights, 
the corporate governance model in the financial services sector seems to be more 
complicated than in other types of corporation and it implies the need for a specific and 
distinctive model. 
2.7 Key Participants in Corporate Governance in Financial Services 
 
The corporate governance key participants in the financial services sector can be divided 
into internal and external. There are four internal key participants: the BOD or 
supervisory board, the managers, the shareholders and the depositors. External key 
participants refer to government regulatory agencies, stock markets and the court that 
enforces the remedies for violation of governance rules (Salacuse, 2003: 52). All these 
institutions play their own roles in the corporation, with the specific goal of protecting the 
interests and rights of the shareholders and the stakeholders as a whole. Figure 2.3 
summarizes the corporate governance structure and style in the financial services sector. 
This figure combines both the Anglo-Saxon and the European models and the only 
differences between these two are the supervisory board and the goals of the corporation. 
Figure 2.3: Corporate Governance Structure in Conventional Financial Institutions 
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2.7.1  Internal Key Participants  
2.7.1.1 Board of Directors (BOD)  
 
One of the major debatable issues in corporate governance has focused on the role of the 
BOD. In general, the main functions of the BOD are to define the firm’s purpose, to 
agree strategies, to plan for that purpose, to establish the firm’s policies, to appoint the 
management, particularly the CEO, to monitor and assess the performance of the 
management team and to assess their own performance (Cadbury, 2002: 33–47). Nathan 
and Ribiere (2007: 475–476) divide the BOD’s role into five main functions: an active 
role as independent thinkers in shaping the strategic directions of their organization; 
responsible for monitoring and influencing the strategy rather than implementing the 
strategic decisions; leans towards guiding the top management rather than setting up the 
actual strategy; a strategizing role in advising the management team and providing 
strategic alternatives; and establishing standards, advising the CEO and monitoring 
strategy implementation.20 
 
In banking sectors, the BOD acts as internal control mechanism in protecting the 
shareholder and stakeholders interest. The BOD has a strong role to play in corporate 
governance and that is why the board members must be technically qualified and possess 
high moral integration. The BOD has certain specific duties, such as monitoring and 
supervising the firm’s performance, setting the business objectives and framing the 
policy. The board’s main function is to set the firm’s aims and objectives and to ensure 
that all of them are achieved. It is therefore for them to devise plans and policies to 
achieve those aims and to appoint and monitor the management to meet those objectives.  
2.7.1.2 Supervisory Board 
 
While the Anglo-Saxon model provides a single model BOD, certain European countries 
that promote the stakeholder system require corporations of a certain size to have a two-
tiered system. A two-tiered system consists of a management board and a supervisory 
board; the former is composed of members of the corporation and the latter is composed 
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of non-executives elected by shareholders or employees. The supervisory board has the 
power to elect the management board and ensure their accountability to corporate aims 
and governance regulations. This two-tier system encompasses a clearer formal 
separation between the supervisory board and those being supervised and monitored 
(Weil and Manges, 2002: 43).  
2.7.1.3 Managers  
 
The management team refers to the CEO and other members of staff who perform 
management functions. The management team is responsible and accountable before the 
BOD. The BOD appoints the CEO and his management team. Since the quality of 
decision-making is dependent on the volume, relevance and quality of collected 
information, the CEO and executive members should be responsible for making 
information available to the BOD. The stakeholder’s model of corporate governance 
considers the managers as having fiduciary duties not only to the shareholders but to all 
parties related with the corporation, including the community and the public at large.  
2.7.1.4 Shareholders and Depositors 
 
In both the Anglo-Saxon and the European models of corporate governance, the direct 
participation of shareholders is limited: in the former, to electing directors; and in the 
latter, to electing directors and the supervisory board. Shareholders are also limited in 
their ability to approve certain items that should ideally require their approval, such as 
decisions on mergers and acquisitions (Salacuse, 2003: 57). The European model of 
corporate governance particularly in Germany emphasizes on a wider set stakeholder 
interest and views companies as more of partnership between employers and employees 
as well as between shareholders (Dignam and Galanis, 2009: 269). In this regard, 
employees have the right to elect some members of the board as their representative. By 
contrast, in the case of the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, the board 
members are elected by the shareholders and the emphasis is on the relationship between 
shareholders and the directors (Mallin, 2007: 57). The Anglo-Saxon model seems to 
protect the minority shareholders through strong legal protection more in comparison 
with the European model.  





In the conventional financial sector, the depositors are not of the essence institutions of 
corporate governance. Depositors whose interest is also at stake do not get much attention 
in either the Anglo-Saxon or European model. The reason for this is that the depositors 
are insured with a certain positive rate of return and it is in fact guaranteed in the hope of 
reducing the risk of systemic failure and to stabilise the financial system (Cull et al. 
(2005: 44) Therefore, it is not necessary for the conventional models of corporate 
governance in the financial sector to deal with depositors in depth, as their primary 
concern is to protect the shareholders’ interests, who have invested their wealth in the 
corporation, and not the depositors who have been guaranteed their returns (Chapra and 
Ahmed, 2002: 14–15, 43–44). 
2.7.2 External Key Participants 
 
The external key participants refer to external institutions that facilitate and support the 
implementation of corporate governance and these include government agencies, the 
judiciary and regulatory authorities. The government plays a key role in corporate 
governance by defining the regulatory and legal environment and may influence 
managerial decisions (Caprio and Levine, 2002: 8). The regulatory authorities, as part of 
a corporate governance institution, provide sound guidelines for the financial system and 
develop internal control, risk management procedures, standards of transparency and 
monitor overall banking operations. In terms of laws and regulations, all institutions of 
corporate governance must follow and comply with the rules promulgated by either the 
legislative or regulatory agencies, while the court is the institution that enforces the 
remedies for violation of corporate rules.21 
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This chapter has attempted to explore the conceptual dimension and theoretical 
framework of corporate governance from conventional perspectives by referring to the 
two main dominant corporate governance systems of the Anglo-Saxon and the European 
models. The Anglo-Saxon model, which is formulated on the basis of agency theory, 
represents the shareholder value system, while the European model, which is constructed 
on the basis of stakeholder theory, seems to offer remedies for the defects of the 
shareholder model by promoting the stakeholder value orientation system. In the context 
of financial services, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the BCBS on 
Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations seem to bridge the gap 
between these two models by acknowledging the essence of the shareholders’ value and 
at the same time recognizing the large stakeholders’ interest. In this regard, the BOD, the 
supervisory board, the managers, the shareholders, the depositors and the regulatory 
authorities are the key participants in corporate governance in the conventional financial 
services sector. The literature further proves that there is a tendency and trend for 
convergence of these two corporate governance systems and the determination of either 
the ‘shareholder’ or the ‘stakeholder’ system nevertheless is preoccupied by five main 
factors, these are: the origins of national diversity, the nature of the legal framework, the 
political background, social norms or culture, and the economic conception (Jacoby, 
2000: 7–14).  
 
In conclusion, therefore, this chapter provides an extensive literature survey and 
overview of corporate governance from conventional perspectives, particularly in relation 
to financial institutions. The understanding of the conceptual and theoretical framework 
of corporate governance is imperative in this study since it will enlighten further 
discussion of corporate governance from an Islamic perspective. The model of corporate 
governance system from a conventional perspective raises an issue of the design of an 
efficient corporate governance structure of IFIs within an Islamic paradigm. It is very 
important to identify characteristics, values, norms and behaviour of corporate 
governance from an Islamic perspective. As an observation, the initial study finds that the 
corporate governance model in Islam is inclined towards the stakeholder value 




orientation, where its governance style aims at protecting the wider group of 
stakeholders. The study further explores the conceptual and foundational dimensions of 
corporate governance in Islamic literature and further highlights its differences and 
diversities in Chapter 3. 





CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IN SEARCH OF AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE22 
 
3.0 Introduction  
  
Corporate governance in banking has been analysed extensively in the context of 
conventional banking. The Western concept of corporate governance, either the Anglo-
Saxon model that promotes a shareholder value system or the European model that 
upholds the stakeholder value orientation, has been subject of continuing debate for many 
years. By contrast, little is written on corporate governance from an Islamic perspective, 
particularly in the context of Islamic finance, despite its rapid growth since the mid-1970s 
and its increasing presence in the world’s financial markets (Yunis, 2007: 308).  
 
This study classifies the existing literature on corporate governance in IFIs into three 
main phases, namely the first phase (pre-1980s), the second phase (1980s–1990s) and the 
third phase (post-2000s). The first phase shows an absence of studies on corporate 
governance and the subject has not been given due concern in mainstream research. This 
is affirmed by the surveys of Siddiqi (1981), Mannan (1984) and Haneef (1995) on the 
contemporary literature on Islamic economics. Specific studies on the issue of corporate 
governance of IFIs began in the second phase (1980s-1990s). For example Abomouamer 
(1989) conducted a survey on the role and function of Sharīʿah control in Islamic banks 
and Banaga et al. (1994) carried out research on external audit and corporate governance 
in Islamic banks. Both studies nevertheless were carried out by individual and only 
addressed the issues of Sharīʿah control and audit. In view of the several corporate 
failures of IFIs in the 1990s and 2000s, as in the cases of the closures of Ihlas Finance 
House in Turkey, the Islamic Bank of South Africa and Islamic Investment Companies of 
Egypt, a significant number of studies on corporate governance were then carried out by 
different individuals, organizations and institutions in the third phase (post-2000s). One 
of the most significant studies on corporate governance in IFIs was carried out by Chapra 
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and Ahmed (2002), who discussed the issue of the roles and functions of the Sharīʿah 
board, auditing, accounting and the general framework of corporate governance in IFIs. 
Other studies were conducted by Al-Baluchi (2006), on corporate disclosure practices of 
IFIs, and Al-Sadah (2007), on the corporate governance of Islamic banks, its 
characteristics, its effect on stakeholders and the role of Islamic bank supervisors. In 
2008, the IFSB published a survey on Sharīʿah Boards of Institutions Offering Islamic 
Financial Services across Jurisdictions (IFSB, 2008) and this was followed by Faizullah 
(2009), who discussed issues of governance, transparency and standardization of Islamic 
banks.  
 
Despite all of the above research, it is nevertheless found that there is a lack of studies 
that attempt to deconstruct and establish the theoretical foundation of corporate 
governance from an Islamic perspective. At this point, Choudhury and Hoque (2004) and 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) deconstruct the theoretical framework of Islamic corporate 
governance; the former demonstrates the theory of corporate governance founded on the 
epistemology of Tawhīd (Oneness of God), while the latter recommends the stakeholder-
oriented value system based on the principle of property rights and contractual obligation. 
Safieddine (2009) extends the existing literature by highlighting variations of agency 
theory in the unique and complex context of Islamic banks. Until now, corporate 
governance has been major concern of IFIs, regulators, supervisors and international 
standard-setting agencies. 
 
Based on the above development, undeniably corporate governance is one of the vital 
components in IFIs as it plays a role in designing and promoting principles of fairness, 
accountability and transparency. In fact, it is an even bigger challenge to IFIs due to their 
additional risk as compared to the conventional banking system.23 Therefore, it is 
strongly indicated that any Islamic corporation, particularly an IFI, needs to have a sound 
governance system and appropriate strategies that will promote the adoption of strong 
and effective corporate governance within the Islamic paradigm. This chapter attempts to 
provide an overview of the foundational dimension of corporate governance from an 
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Islamic perspective, with special emphasis on the governance framework of IFIs. It also 
aims at constructing the basic understanding of corporate governance in Islam and to 
clarify any issues involved so as to differentiate its value and features from its Western 
counterpart. The initial study submits that Islam presents distinctive values and special 
characteristics of corporate governance with aim to uphold and maintain the principle of 
social justice not only to the shareholders of the firm but to all stakeholders. 
3.1 Conceptual Framework of Corporate Governance from an Islamic 
Perspective 
Basically, the concept of corporate governance from an Islamic perspective does not 
differ much from the conventional definition as it refers to a system by which companies 
are managed, directed and controlled with the purpose of meeting the corporation’s 
objective by protecting all the stakeholders’ interests and rights. Uniquely, the context of 
corporate governance within the Islamic paradigm presents certain exceptional 
characteristics and features in comparison with the Western theories. 
Choudhury and Hoque (2006) discuss the faith-based theoretical framework of corporate 
governance in Islam and they consider it as a theory pertaining to decision-making 
processes that employ the premise of the Islamic socio-scientific epistemology of 
Tawhīd. The practical implications of the Islamic idea of corporate governance are 
immense, especially when they are related with transaction cost minimization in decision-
making environments and achieving the aims and objectives of the corporation within the 
boundary of Sharīʿah rules and principles (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). In this regard, 
it is essential to understand and refine the conceptual definition of corporate governance 
from an Islamic point of view in order to enlighten any further discussion on the subject 
of Sharīʿah governance.  
3.1.1 Defining ‘Corporation’  
 
Although the concept of partnership in the form of mushārakah or mudhārabah has been 
well known since the early period of Islam, it is found that there is less discussion on a 
concept akin to ‘corporation’. At this point, Vogel and Hayes (2006: 133–134) mention 
that classical Islamic law only discusses a concept of partnership and not modern 




companies with an artificial personality. 24 In other words, the corporate form of business 
organization with a separate legal entity does not appear directly in the classical fiqh 
discussions by Muslim jurists.25 This is supported by a group of eminent scholars in 
Pakistan who argue that the concept of juristic person and limited liability are alien to 
Sharīʿah and exploitative in nature (Rahman, 2010: 77).  
 
Despite the above connotation on the concepts of legal personality and limited liability26, 
they are nevertheless generally accepted almost without question. Most of contemporary 
Muslim scholars such as Abdul Qadir Audah, Mustafa Zarqa and Hasanuzzaman have 
accepted this concept27 known as shahsiyyah itibāriyyah (juristic person) based on 
principles of qiyās (analogy), istihsān (equity), maṣalih mursalah (public interest) and 
dhimma.28 In addition, the Islamic Fiqh Academy and the AAOIFI Sharīʿah Council 
affirm the acceptability and recognition of the concept of limited liability, where the 
former states “there is no objection in Sharīʿah to setting up a company whose liability is 
limited to its capital” (IFA and IRTI, 2000: 130) and the latter mentions in the AAOIFI 
Sharīʿah Standards No. 12, which accepts its practice through incorporation by law 
(AAOIFI, 2003: 208). 
 
Since this subsection focuses on the conceptual framework of corporate governance, the 
research does not intend to discuss in depth the debates on the concept of corporation in 
Islam. It is submitted that the concept of artificial personality or a corpus with a separate 
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legal entity is clearly acceptable in Islam. The concept of corporation in business 
organizations is essential as it provides certain distinct core characteristics, namely 
separate legal personality, limited liability of the shareholders, divisibility, transferability 
of ownership, centralized management under a board structure, the absence of delectus 
personae amongst the shareholders and shared ownership by holders of capital29 
(Kraakman et al., 2004).30  
 
The recognition and acceptability of the concept of corporation in Islam raises another 
issue as to its conceptual definition. At this point, the existing literature attempts to define 
an Islamic corporation by specifying its distinct characteristics. Choudhury and Hoque 
(2006: 127) define an Islamic corporation as “a legal entity of shareholders with principal 
and proportionate ownership of assets according to individual group equity and profit-
sharing capabilities”.31 They further state additional social and commercial criteria of 
corporation as a market-driven and profit-oriented legal entity within a social and 
responsible cooperative milieu. Another definition also characterizes an Islamic 
corporation as a business organization with the objective of maximizing profit without 
violating property rights or infringing the interests of any group of stakeholders (Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 2004: 48). From these definitions, it is concluded that a corporation in 
Islam is characterized by at least three core features, namely: (i) a legal entity with 
limited liability; (ii) a profit-motivated and market-driven objective; and (iii) being within 
the boundary of Islamic social justice. Within these frameworks, Sharīʿah rules and 
principles play an important role in defining and determining the scope of Islamic social 
justice as well as the extent of permissible and non-permissible activities.  
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3.1.2 Defining ‘Governance’  
 
There is no standard translation for the term ‘governance’ in Arabic. At this point, 
Boutros-Ghali (2001) states that the concept of corporate governance is not yet clearly 
understood in the Arab world. This statement is not really accurate as the term 
governance is synonymous with the word wilaya or hawkamah. For example, a number 
of Muslim jurists seem to have employed the principle of governance of the scholars as 
wilayat al-‘ulama’ (Khir, 2007: 79). The term wilaya is derived from the root waly, 
which means “to be near, adjacent, contiguous to” someone or something. In other words 
it denotes “the exercise of authority” or representation, which signifies the power of an 
individual to personally initiate an action (Dien, 2008).  
 
Another terminology used for governance is hawkamah.32 In Egypt an official translation 
of governance in Arabic is known as hawkamah and this term has been accredited by the 
Egyptian Linguistic Department (Lewis, 2005: 25). The word hawkamah has been used 
extensively, particularly in reference to corporate governance. The meaning of these two 
terminologies concludes that the word governance indicates the authority of individual or 
legal personnel to initiate an action to govern, direct and steer someone or something, and 
this includes how a corporation is controlled, managed, directed and monitored.  
3.1.3 Defining Corporate Governance in IFIs 
 
The understanding of the terms corporation and governance from an Islamic perspective 
enables the study to come up with an appropriate definition of corporate governance. The 
researcher simplifies the definition of corporate governance as: a set of organizational 
arrangements as to how a corporation is directed, managed, governed and controlled, 
which provides the governance structure through which all stakeholders’ interests are 
protected, the company’s objective is achieved, social responsibility is upheld and the 
principles of Sharīʿah33 are complied with. 
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In the context of IFIs, the definition of corporate governance can be referred to in the 
IFSB-3, Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance for Institutions Offering Only 
Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic Insurance (Takāful) Institutions and 
Islamic Mutual Funds).34 The IFSB-3 defines corporate governance “as a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its BOD, its shareholders, and other 
stakeholders which provides the structure through which the objectives of the company 
are set; and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined.” It further explains corporate governance in IFIs to encompass “a set of 
organizational arrangements whereby the actions of the management of IIFS are aligned, 
as far as possible, with the interests of its stakeholders; provision of proper incentives for 
the organs of governance such as the BOD, Sharīʿah board, and management to pursue 
objectives that are in the interests of the stakeholders and facilitate effective monitoring, 
thereby encouraging IFIs to use resources more efficiently; and compliance with Islamic 
Sharīʿah rules and principles” (IFSB, 2006: 33).  
 
The IFSB-3’s definition provides a clear explanation as to the actual meaning and 
framework of corporate governance in IFIs. The definition consists of all elements of 
corporate governance framework with an additional feature of Sharīʿah requirement. The 
first limb of the definition explains the general functional objective of corporate 
governance as a set of relationships between the stakeholders.35 The second limb of the 
definition then incorporates the requirement of compliance with the Sharīʿah rules and 
principles, which clarify the actual conceptual framework of corporate governance in 
IFIs. Referring back to the definition of Sharīʿah and its framework in business 
organizations, particularly IFIs, it is observed that the majority of Sharīʿah issues 
involved in the context of corporate governance fall under the purview of fiqh al 
muāmalāt.  
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3.2 Role of Corporate Governance in IFIs 
 
With several corporate failures and difficulties of IFIs, such as the closures of Ihlas 
Finance House in Turkey,36 the Islamic Bank of South Africa37 and the Islamic 
Investment Companies of Egypt,38 and corporate difficulties, as in the case of the Dubai 
Islamic Bank,39 and Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad40, the need for a good and efficient 
governance system is considered as a crucial part of corporate governance. All these 
cases indicate that IFIs are not immune from crisis and failures due to governance issues 
and conundrums.  
 
The role of corporate governance in IFIs is more or less similar to the general concept of 
corporate governance in any other type of corporation. The best explanation of the 
corporate governance objective can be simplified as being about promoting corporate 
fairness, transparency and accountability. Good corporate governance is crucial in order 
to protect the rights and interests of all stakeholders. This is the main reason why there 
has been a growing interest in the topic of corporate governance, particularly in financial 
institutions (Macey and O’Hara, 2003).41 In the context of corporate governance in IFIs, 
its framework goes beyond the relationship between the shareholders, BOD, management 
and stakeholders, since it also includes how maintain the relationship with God. In this 
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aspect, IFIs require the additional framework of Sharīʿah to safeguard and maintain not 
only the relationship with God but to include other human beings and the environment.  
 
Grais and Pellegrini (2006a: 2) state that there are two broad corporate governance roles 
that are exclusive to IFIs. Firstly, there is a need to reassure stakeholders42 that their 
activities are fully compliant with Sharīʿah principles. Secondly, the stakeholders also 
need to be assured that IFIs aim to maintain and improve growth and are able to prove 
their efficiency, stability and trustworthiness. Corporate governance hence plays a role to 
basically harmonize these two functions so as to meet the requirement of Sharīʿah and to 
satisfy the natural aim of corporation of maximizing profit without violating 
stakeholders’ rights and interests. 
 
Corporate governance in IFIs is also crucial as a means to address numerous types of risk 
and this includes governance risk. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007: 227–250) define 
governance risk as “the risk arising from failure to govern the institution, negligence in 
conducting business and meeting contractual obligations and from a weak internal and 
external environment”. They further classify the governance risk into operational risk, 
fiduciary risk, transparency risk, Sharīʿah risk and reputation risk (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2007: 242–246). With the complexity and some exclusive characteristics of risks in IFIs, 
unlike its conventional counterparts, a sound and efficient corporate governance system 
must be in place in order to mitigate those kinds of risks.43  
 
The special characteristic of IFIs needing to comply with Sharīʿah rules and principles in 
all their activities requires for a specific kind of governance. As Islamic corporations, 
IFIs should avoid any involvement with all kinds of Sharīʿah prohibitions, such as riba 
(interest), gharar (uncertainty), speculation and maysir (gambling), to stay away from 
investing in any unlawful activities, and to observe the principles of Islamic morality or 
the Islamic ethical code. In this respect, corporate governance in Islam is a necessity to 
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 Stakeholders include shareholders, employees, customers, depositors, regulators, governments, 
communities and environments (IFSB, 2006a: 27). Unlike conventional banking organizations, corporate 
governance in IFIs also concerns another kind of stakeholders, namely investment account holders.  
43
 For further reading on the specific risk exclusive to IFIs, see Greuning and Iqbal (2008). 




IFIs not only to foster and gain the confidence of the stakeholders but also to the general 
public that all products, operations and activities adhere to Sharīʿah rules and principles.  
3.3 The Development of Corporate Governance in IFIs 
 
This section briefly discusses the development of corporate governance in IFIs by 
revisiting the historical development of financial institutions from the early stages of 
Islam until today. This study classifies the development of corporate governance in IFIs 
into two main phases, namely: (i) pre-20th century and (ii) post-20th century. The study 
further divides the second phase into two different stages: the first stage (pre-1970s) and 
the second stage (post-1970s).  
 
Phase I (Pre-20th Century): Absence of Corporate Governance in Traditional IFIs 
 
The term ‘bank’44 is alien to the early Muslim period where the term bayt al-māl is 
extensively used45. In the 8th and 9th centuries, financiers were known as ṣarrāf46 and 
jahbadh and functioned as modern bankers in pre-modern Islam. Sarrāf provided 
financing facilities primarily on the basis of mudhārabah and mushārakah, negotiable 
instruments and trade facilities by cashing cheques, and issued promissory notes and 
letter of credits47 (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002: 3). They also provided banking facilities to 
the public as well as the private sector, while jahbadh served mainly the public sector.48 
                                                 
44
 The term bank originates from the Italian word banco, which means ‘table’ as in the past moneychangers 
from Lombardy used to place money on a table (Baldwin, 1988: 178). The first modern bank was started in 
Venice in 979H or 1584CE and was known as Banco di Rialto (Imamuddin, 1997a: 153). 
45
 Bayt al-māl could be considered as a state-owned bank; it played the role of an agricultural credit bank, 
commercial bank and clearing house for merchants to facilitate commercial activities from the time of 
Umayyad (Imamuddin, 1997: 132). 
46
 In the Ottoman Empire, ṣarrāf were moneylenders, brokers and pawnbrokers; many ṣarrāf became large 
financiers with well-recognized international connections and played a significant role in the economy and 
politics of the Ottoman Empire (Saeed, 2002). Sarrāf also functioned as moneychangers to provide 
facilities of currency exchange (Imamuddin, 1997: 134) and played a role in determining the relative value 
of coins (Cohen, 1981: 315–333). 
47
 In 313H or 924CE, the caliph Al-Muqtadir received a suftajah (bill of exchange) of 147,000 dinars, sent 
by the Governor of Egypt and Syria. Suftajah as one of the financial instruments was commonly used by 
Abbasid Empire and the Fatimid State in commercial, government and private transactions (Imamuddin, 
1997: 137). These financial instruments enabled the Muslims to mobilize their financial resources and 
further provided a great boost to trade not only in the Middle East but to Europe in the West, China in the 
East, Central Asia in the North and Africa in the South (Chapra, 2007: 328). 
48
 Dj̲ahbadh played its function as an administrator of deposits and as a remitter of funds from place to 
place through the medium of the ṣakk and especially of the suftadj̲ ̲ a (Fischell, 2002). Chachi (2005: 3–25) 
and Heck (2006) view that the Islamic bank of today is a transformation of Jahbadh in a modern form 
where it has some characteristics of a full-fledged banker as well as merchant banker.  




Sarrāf as financiers were owned by the individual, family49 or tribe, whereas jahbadh 
were owned by the state. Neither institution, however, was a bank, as they did not receive 
deposits or issue cheques as normal modern banks do; therefore Udovitch prefers the 
term ṣarrāf to mean bankers without a bank rather than the bank as financial 
intermediary50 (Chapra, 2007: 328).  
 
Corporate governance was not an issue at all in ṣarrāf or jahbadh, since neither 
institution was classified as a corporate legal entity. Interestingly, even without any sort 
of corporate governance framework, the so-called banking institutions during that time, 
in the form of ṣarrāf and jahbadh, were able to effectively facilitate economic activities 
both locally and internationally.51 Although there is no appropriate data available to 
prove the efficiency of such a financial system, historical evidence in many works of 
literature provides its clear indication.52  
 
                                                 
49
 The ṣarraf families included the Baltazzis, the Rallis, Zarafis, the Rodoconachis and Duzuoglus. These 
families played big roles in most of the major private and public banks that were established in the second 
half of the 19th century, starting with the Istanbul Bankasi (Bank of Istanbul) in 1845 (Saeed, 2002). 
50
 Udovitch (1970) provides a comprehensive commercial law and economic history, particularly on the 
practice of partnership and profit in medieval Islam. 
51
 Chapra (2007: 329–330) mentions that there are several factors contributing to this phenomenon and 
these include common practice of Islamic values, nature of communities, economic environment, absence 
of agency problems, extensive legal instrument for trade and independence of judiciary. In fact, ṣarrāf and 
Jahbadh operated in communities which were far smaller than those the modern banks operate in. The 
parties involved, such as the providers, users of funds and ṣarrāf personnel, were known to each other as 
the participants normally consisted of individuals in tribes, guilds and fraternities. The economic 
environment during that period was also less complex and the nature of ṣarrāf and Jahbadh meant there 
was no agency problem, such as the issue of separation of ownership and control as experienced by the 
modern financial institutions. In addition, the economic activities were controlled and supported by the 
strength and independence of the judiciary which led to economic stability (Chapra, 2007: 329–330). 
52
 Udovitch writes that the Islamic modes of equity financing were able to mobilize the resources of the 
Islamic world for financing of agriculture, crafts, manufacturing and international trade (Chapra, 2007: 
328). Cohen (1981: 315–333) illustrates the the monetary system in Egypt at the time of the Crusades and 
the reform of Al-Kamil and mentions that there was a sophisticated system of exchange during that time. In 
fact, early Muslim jurists have already discussed the concept of economy in general. This is affirmed by 
Chachi (2005: 3–25), who refers to the historical writings of numerous Muslims scholars such as al-
Qalqashandi and al-Djahshiyari.   




Phase II (Post-20th Century): The Emergence of Corporate Governance in Modern 
IFIs 
 
Stage I: Pre-1970s 
 
At the end of the 19th century, the Muslim role in ṣarraf business was radically reduced 
by the increase in non-Muslim ṣarraf families and the emergence of modern banks, 
established largely by Europeans and by Armenian and Greek ṣarrāf 53 (Saeed, 2002). 
The colonization of the majority of Muslim countries further affected the existing Islamic 
financial system and hence it was replaced with Western modern banking, an interest-
based financial system. Not until the 1950s were there efforts to establish IFIs, such as in 
Pakistan, on the notion of inserting a clause to ban interest in the constitution and the 
establishment of a local Islamic bank that provided financing mainly for the poor.54 This 
is followed with the opening of the Mitr Ghams Savings Bank on 23rd July 1963 and the 
Nasser Social Bank in 1972 (Haron, 1997: 3). The establishment of the Mitr Ghams 
Savings Bank and the Nasser Social Bank in Egypt demonstrates the potential of the 
Islamic financial system in the modern economic infrastructure.  
 
The success of the earlier Islamic banks, although a partial breakthrough, was discussed 
extensively by many scholars, particularly the aspects of operations, procedures, 
activities, performance, nature of financing facilities and socio-legal matters. Corporate 
governance nevertheless was not given due concern and there is no specific discourse or 
initiatives on it. This is because all of those Islamic banks were incorporated in the form 
of either cooperative societies or social banks. In fact, the modes of financing activities 
were also very limited and only attempted to redress social and small community needs. 
In this regard, corporate governance is less relevant to this kind of business organization.  
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 There were many European banks established in the Ottoman Empire such as the Deutsche Orient Bank, 
the Deutsche Bank, the Credit Lyonnais and the Banque Ottomane and all of these big banks were 
controlled by foreign entities (El-Ashker, A.A.F, 1987: 26). 
54
 The experiment was, however, unsuccessful; it faced a lot of operational problems, was short of funds 
and had weak governance (Wilson, 1984: 33).  




Stage II: Post-1970s  
 
The period between 1975 and 1990 was the most crucial period in the development of the 
Islamic financial sector. The establishment of several Islamic banks, in the form of 
corporations such as the Dubai Islamic Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank and the Kuwait 
Finance House including the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, triggered the need for 
a specific corporate governance system.55 In fact, due to several corporate failures and 
difficulties of IFIs in the 1990s and 2000s, a few international infrastructure institutions 
were established with the purpose of supporting the Islamic financial sector to enhance 
and strengthen their corporate governance framework; these include the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for IFIs (AAOIFI), the International Islamic Financial Market 
(IIFM), the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA) in Bahrain, the General Council 
of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBAFI)56 and the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) in Malaysia.57 The AAOIFI and the IFSB were established inter 
alia to address issues pertaining to corporate governance in IFIs by issuing governance 
standards and guidelines of best practice while the rest of the institutions provide 
infrastructure support to the implementation of Islamic finance. In addition, the 
Hawkamah, the Institute for Corporate Governance based in Dubai, also used its own 
initiative by setting up a specific task force and working committee on corporate 
governance for Islamic banks and financial institutions with the purpose of studying and 
developing best practice for corporate governance in the regions of the Middle East and 
North Africa.  
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 The numbers of financial institutions offering Islamic financial products and services has risen, including 
the conventional banks that have opened Islamic windows and branches. In 2002, there were twenty-two 
Islamic banks in South East Asia, representing 13.5% of the total assets of Islamic banks, twenty-six in 
Gulf Cooperation Council countries (77.7%), fifteen in other Middle Eastern countries (8.6%), four in 
Africa and two in the rest of the world (0.2%) (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005: 47). The average growth since 
the mid-1970s is around 10–-15% per annum and in 2001 it achieved almost 23.5%. In terms of worldwide 
consolidated assets it stands at over USD260 billion and in 2005 the total number of Islamic banks was 267 
(Baba, 2007: 384).  
56
 Bahrain has become the pre-eminent financial centre in the Middle East and hosts 52 offshore banks, 357 
financial institutions, 24 full commercial bank, 35 investment banks and 157 insurance companies (Bahrain 
Monetary Agency, 2005). 
57
 The IFSB was established in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 3rd November 2002 with the purpose of serving 
as an international standard-setting institution responsible for providing prudent and substantial guidelines 
in order to ensure the stability of the Islamic financial services industry (IFSB, 2010). 




To date, the AAOIFI has issued seven governance standards, namely the standard on 
Sharīʿah Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report; the Sharīʿah 
Review; Internal Sharīʿah Review; Audit and Governance Committee for IFIs; 
Independence of Sharīʿah Supervisory Board; Statement on Governance Principles for 
IFIs; and Corporate Social Responsibility. Similarly, the IFSB has issued seven 
guidelines on governance, disclosure and supervisory review processes for IFIs, namely 
the Guiding Principles on Governance for Islamic Collective Investment Schemes; the 
Guidance Note In Connection with the Capital Adequacy Standard: Recognition of 
Ratings by External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIs) on Sharīʿah-Compliant 
Financial Instruments; the Guidance on Key Elements in the Supervisory Review Process 
of Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services (excluding Islamic Insurance (Takāful) 
Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds); the Disclosures to Promote Transparency and 
Market Discipline for Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services (excluding Islamic 
Insurance (Takāful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds); the Guiding Principles on 
Corporate Governance for Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services 
(Excluding Islamic Insurance (Takāful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds); the 
Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business for Institutions offering Islamic Financial 
Services; the Guiding Principles on Governance for Takāful Operations; and the Guiding 
Principles on Sharīʿah Governance System for Institutions offering Islamic Financial 
Services. 
3.4 Foundational Dimension of Corporate Governance  
 
In view of the distinctiveness of the underlying principles and paradigm of the corporate 
governance in Islam compared with the Western model, there are several studies that 
attempt to construct an Islamic model of corporate governance.58 Unlike the Western 
concept of corporate governance, which is based on the Western business morality that 
derives from ‘secular humanism’, the study discovers that Islamic corporate governance 
is founded on the epistemological aspect of Tawhīd and the embedded Sharīʿah rules and 
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 There are at least three different underlying ethical principles of Western corporate governance that are 
inappropriate to Islam. Firstly, the Western concept of corporate governance is derived from a secular 
humanist perspective. Secondly, the Western concept remains rooted in a self-interest paradigm. Thirdly, 
the theoretical model of Western corporate governance is based on the agency theory rather than 
stewardship theory (Iqbal and Lewis, 2009: 272).  




principles where the former refers to the principle of consultation in which all 
stakeholders share the same goal of Tawhīd or the oneness of Allah (Choudury, 2004 and 
2006) and the latter concerns an adoption of the stakeholder-oriented value system (Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 2004 and Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). At this point it is worth discussing 
the foundational dimension and the main arguments of the Islamic corporate governance 
model, as identified in the literature, which are based on the four fundamental principles 
of Tawhīd, shura, property rights and commitment to contractual obligation that govern 
the economic and social behaviour of individuals, organizations, society and state.  
3.4.1 Tawhīdi Epistemology and Shuratic Process  
  
Although there is consensus amongst Islamic economists and Muslim jurists on the 
concept of Tawhīd as one of the philosophical pillars of Islamic economics,59 it is 
observed that little is written on the Tawhīd epistemological aspect of the issue of 
corporate governance. Fortunately, Choudhury and Hoque (2004 and 2006) lay down the 
fundamental Islamic epistemology of Tawhīd in Islamic corporate governance.60  
 
As the foundation of Islamic faith is Tawhīd (Al-Faruqi, 1982), the basis for corporate 
governance framework also emanates from this concept. Allah says in al-Qur’an “Men 
who celebrate the praises of Allah, standing, sitting, and lying down on their sides, and 
contemplate the (wonders of) creation in the heavens and the earth, (with the thought): 
‘Our Lord! Not for naught Hast thou created (all) this1 Glory to Thee! Give us salvation 
from the Penalty of the the Fire” (3: 191).61 The praise by Allah upon the believers that 
remember Him standing, sitting, lying down, and contemplate the wonders of creation 
indicates the Tawhīd paradigm. Another verse of al-Qur’an (51: 56) further points out the 
Tawhīd dimension in Islam as Allah says “I have only created Jinns and men, that may 
serve Me”. Both these verses indirectly provide the fundamental principles of 
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 See Mannan (1970), Siddiqi (1978), Kahf (1978), Ahmad (1980), Naqvi (1981), Taleghani (1982), Al-
Sadr (1982) and Choudhury and Malik (1992). 
60
 Choudhury and Malik (1992) discuss the principle of Tawhīd as the episteme of corporate governance 
and human solidarity in Islamic political economy. Episteme means “the total set of relations that unite at a 
given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, science and possibly 
formalized system” (Dreyfuss and Rabinow, 1983: 18).  
61
 Translations of Qura’nic verses throughout this thesis are from Abdullah Yusuf Ali (2004) The Meaning 
of the Holy Qur’an. Maryland, USA: Amana Publication. For ease of typography and reading, the full 
transliteration used in the quotations has not been retained. 




governance, where everything created by Allah has a purpose and a human being is 
created to be the vicegerent of God on earth towards the Unity of God. By putting His 
trust in mankind as a vicegerent, Allah plays an active role in monitoring and being 
involved in every affairs of human beings and He is omnipresent and a knower of 
everything (Chapra, 1992: 202). Allah states in al-Qur’an (31: 16) “O my son! (said 
Luqman), if there be (but) the weight of a mustard seed and it were (hidden) in a rock, or 
(anywhere) in the heavens or on the earth, Allah will bring it forth: for Allah understands 
the finer mysteries, (and) is well acquainted (with them)”.62 As Allah knows everything 
and all mankind is accountable and answerable to Him, the Tawhīd paradigm therefore 
enhances the scope of firm’s obligation and objectives to include a large group of 
stakeholders rather than the shareholders alone. Furthermore, it also denotes the concept 
of accountability, or taklīf, indicating that everyone is accountable to God for his own 
deeds. As such, the principle of taklīf that is derived from the supreme concept of Tawhīd 
should be the foundation of corporate governance in Islam.   
 
Inspired by the paradigm of Tawhīd, which acknowledges the stakeholders as vicegerent, 
firms and corporate organizations have a fiduciary duty to uphold the principle of 
distributive justice63 via the shuratic process. There are numerous references in both al-
Qur’an and al-Sunnah that oblige every single human being to practice the principle of 
shura in every aspect of their life. Allah says in al-Qur’an (3: 159) “So pass over (their 
faults), and ask for (Allah's) forgiveness; for them; and consult them in affairs (of 
moment). Then, when thou hast taken decision, put thy thrust in Allah. For Allah, loves 
those who put their trust (in Him).” Based on this verse, in explaining as to how 
important the concept of shura is, Chapra (1992: 234) mentions that the practice of shura 
is not an option but rather an obligation.  
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 See al-Qur’an 99: 7-8: “So, whosoever does good equal to the weight of a speck of dust shall see it. And 
whosoever does evil equal to the weight of a speck of dust shall see it.” The verse reminds the human being 
that Allah knows everything and this invokes the principle of accountability in which all groups of 
stakeholders are answerable to God. 
63
 Islam clearly emphasizes the principle of distributive justice, where Allah says “We sent Our Messengers 
with clear signs and sent down with them the Book and the Measure in order to establish justice among the 
people” (57:25). See also 16:90 and 5:8. 




In the context of corporate governance, the constituent of shura provides the widest 
possible participation of the stakeholders in the affairs of the corporation either directly 
or via representatives. The constituent of shura’s group of participants, namely the 
shareholders, the management, the BOD, the employees and the communities, plays a 
crucial role to ensure that all corporation activities not only meet all the firm’s objectives 
but are also in line with the Sharīʿah principles. In this aspect, each organ of governance 
structure has its own unique function. For instance, the management and the BOD act as 
active participants and conscious stakeholders in the process of decision-making and 
policy framework. The decisions are made by considering the interests of all direct and 
indirect stakeholders, rather than maximizing shareholders’ profit alone. The other 
stakeholders, such as the community, on the other hand, play their roles of providing 
mutual cooperation and stimulating the social wellbeing function of the corporation.  
 
In deconstructing the foundational paradigm of corporate governance in Islam, 
Choudhury and Hoque (2004) summarize their model of Tawhīd and the shuratic process 
by referring to four principles and instruments governing Islamic corporate governance, 
i.e. unity of knowledge, the principle of justice, the principle of productive engagement 
of resources in social, and the principle of economic activities and recursive intention. All 
of these principles are the main premises of the Islamic corporate governance, in which 
Sharīʿah rules embedded in al-Qur’an and al-Sunnah make the Islamic corporation 
market-driven and at the same time uphold the principles of social justice (Choudury, 
2004: 57–83). Lewis (2005: 16–18) seems to support this approach by mentioning the 
essence of Tawhīd and the institution of a shuratic decision-making process and 
explaining how decision-making in business and other activities can meet Islamic moral 
values.64 He mentions that all resources are from Allah, ownership of wealth belongs to 
Allah and the individual is only a trustee who is accountable and answerable to Allah. 
The ultimate ends of business and economic activities, including the aims of the business 
organization, shall be in the direction of upholding the principle of Tawhīd. The concept 
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 Lewis (2005: 16) states that, on the basis of Sharīʿah, all stakeholders shall participate in decision-
making or at least to contribute knowledge to the formulation and implementation of the organizational 
vision and consultative procedures. 




of corporate governance from an Islamic perspective is summarized by Choudhury and 
Hoque (2004: 86), shown in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Tawhīd and Shura-Based Corporate Governance Structure 
 
Source: Choudhury and Hoque (2004: 86). 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates that the Islamic corporate governance approach is premised on the 
Tawhīd epistemological model, in which the functional roles of the corporation are 
working via the Sharīʿah rules. The principle of Tawhīd leads to the important concepts 
of vicegerency (khilāfah) and justice or equilibrium (al-adl wal ihsān65). The 
stakeholders, as vicegerents of Allah, have a fiduciary duty to uphold the principles of 
distributive justice via the shuratic process. Chapra (1992: 234) highlights that the 
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 Naqvi (1994: 27–28) defines al-adl wal ihsān as a state of social equilibrium, which means the best 
configuration of the production, consumption and distribution activities where the needs of all members in 
the society constitute the first priority over the individual. 
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practice of shura is an obligation in any decision-making process and the constituent of 
shura denotes the widest participation of the stakeholders. 
 
There are two main institutions involved in Islamic model of corporate governance, 
namely the Sharīʿah board and the constituent of the shura’s groups of participants. In 
determining the scope of Sharīʿah, the institution of the Sharīʿah board comes into the 
picture and plays crucial role to ensure that all corporation activities are in line with the 
Sharīʿah rules and principles. In addition, the shareholders also have a responsibility as 
active participants and conscious stakeholders in the process of decision-making and 
policy framework by considering the interests of all direct and indirect stakeholders 
rather than maximize their profit alone. The other stakeholders, including the community, 
should also play their roles to provide mutual cooperation to protect the interests of all 
stakeholders and to stimulate the social wellbeing function for social welfare. All of these 
processes are centred on fulfilling the ultimate objective of Islamic corporate governance 
of complementing the private and social goals via upholding the principle distributive 
justice (Choudury, 2004: 85–88).  
 
The Tawhīd and shura-based approach provides the epistemological foundation of 
corporate governance. This approach, however, seems to be unclear and ambiguous as to 
how it could be adopted and implemented in the current corporate governance system. 
Moreover, the practice shows that major corporations, including IFIs, tend to adopt the 
existing corporate governance model, which is founded on the episteme of rationalism 
and rationality. This triggers the need for further research and empirical rather than 
theoretical studies to examine the operational aspects of this Tawhīd and shura-based 
approach. 
3.4.2 Stakeholder-Oriented Approach 
 
Chapra and Ahmed (2002: 14) emphasize the notion of equitably protecting the rights of 
all stakeholders irrespective of whether they hold equity or not. This seems to support the 
model proposed by Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004), who argue that the corporate governance 
model in the Islamic economic system is a stakeholder-centred model in which the 




governance style and structures protect the interests and rights of all stakeholders rather 
than the shareholders per se66 (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004: 43, 48 and Iqbal, 2007: 273–
294). Iqbal and Mirakhor’s main arguments are based on two fundamental concepts of 
Islamic law, namely the principle of property rights and the commitment to explicit and 
implicit contractual obligations that govern the economic and social behaviour of 
individuals, institutions, corporations, societies and states. These two principles provide 
strong justification for the notion of classifying Islamic corporate governance as a 
stakeholder-oriented model.67 In addition, Nienhaus (2006: 290) states that Islamic 
corporate governance should promote the principle of fairness and justice with respect to 
all stakeholders.68 
 
The principle of property rights in Islam formulates a framework as to how to identify 
and then protect the interests and rights of all stakeholders69. The majority of jurists 
agreed that usufructs (manafi’) and rights (huquq) are considered as property70 and they 
must be protected and safeguarded. At this point, Islam guarantees the protection of 
property rights, be it in the form of manafi’ or huquq, and these include right of 
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 Archer (2007) implies that corporate governance of IFIs is inclined toward the stakeholder value model. 
This is because the nature of corporations, particularly of the directors and the management, owe fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty to the shareholders and also other stakeholders, including and especially the 
investment account holders. Grais (2006) states that corporate governance of the Islamic financial sector is 
concerned with the issue of protecting the stakeholders’ financial interests via internal and external 
arrangements. Dusuki (2008: 391–413) further supports the notion of the stakeholder-oriented model in 
IFIs and provides the pyramid of maṣlahah as a device or mechanism to protect rights and interests of 
various stakeholders. 
67
 The stakeholders’ model of Islamic corporate governance seems to be against the traditional shareholder-
oriented corporate governance doctrine as reflected by Friedman (1970), who indicates that the social 
responsibility of any business organization is to generate profits. Friedman’s doctrine not only contradicts 
the Islamic model of corporate governance but it has been criticized by Western scholars as well. Mulligan 
(1986), for instance, criticizes that Friedman fails to prove that the exercise of social responsibility in 
business is by nature an unfair and socialist practice. He considers Friedman's contention is based on a 
questionable paradigm, a false key premise and that it lacks logical cogency. 
68
 Interestingly, Nienhaus (2006: 298–301) discusses whether the depositors of Islamic banks have a need 
for representative in boards for more efficient corporate governance supervision, as in some corporations in 
Germany. He concludes, however, that the said notion will not be effective in the case of Islamic banks that 
are exposed to competition. This strongly implies that the corporate governance of IFIs is more toward the 
stakeholder value model. 
69
 Bashir, (2000) interestingly analyse the concept of property rights in Islam. While Islam acknowledges 
the right of invidual property, this right must be exercised with due caution by maintaining the interest of 
large group of stakeholders including the society at large. 
70
 Manafi’ refers to the ostensible benefits taken out of material things by way of their utilization, such as 
rental payment from a leasing contract, and huquq means something that can be justly claimed such as right 
of ownership, right of easement and right of acquisition (Islam, 1999: 361–368). 




ownership, acquisition, usage and disposition. In terms of right of ownership, Islam 
declares that Allah is the sole owner of property71 and a human being is just a trustee and 
custodian in whom it implies the recognition to use and manage the properties in 
accordance with Sharīʿah, as property is given as amanah (trust) to individuals. There are 
numerous verses of al-Qu’ran referring to the principle of property rights such as 
“Believe in Allah and His Messenger and spend (in charity) out of the (substance) 
whereof He has made you Heirs. For those of you who believe and spend (in charity) for 
them is a great reward” (Al-Qur’an, 57: 7) and “It is He who hath created for you all 
things that are on earth, then he turned to the heaven and made them into seven 
firmaments and all of things he hath perfect knowledge” (Al-Qur’an, 2: 29). The implied 
meaning of these verses lays down the foundational principle and the effect of property 
ownership where mankind is only regarded as a trustee of God.  
 
Azid et al. (2007: 7) considers that property rights in Islam guarantee individuals as well 
as corporations “the right to own private property and economic resources, to make a 
profit, to expand jobs, to boost investment and to increase prosperity”. This implies the 
recognition of individual ownership in corporation. While acknowledging the right to 
property of an individual or firm, Islam at the same time provides guidelines on how to 
deal with the property ownership via the Sharīʿah principles. The Sharīʿah then requires 
the enjoyment of rights to property by either individuals or corporations to be balanced 
with the rights of the community at large. This property rights principle is a vivid 
recognition of Islam that the corporation should not concentrate on protecting the 
interests of certain organs of governance in the corporation, particularly shareholders, but 
should include other stakeholders. In summary, the concept of property rights in Islam is 
based on three fundamental principles: the right to property is subjected to Sharīʿah; the 
enjoyment of the right to property is balanced with the rights of society and the state; and 
individuals, society and the state are stakeholders and the rights of stakeholders are 
recognized by Islamic law (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004: 54). 
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 The consensus view of Islamic economists is that the ownership of property belongs to Allah (Siddiqi, 
1981: 7). 




The contractual framework is also unique in Islam. In al-Qur’an, surah 5:1, Allah clearly 
reminds the Muslims of the principle of fulfilling each of their contractual obligations 
where He says: “O you who believe! Fulfil (all) obligations”. This verse presents a basic 
foundation for the principle of contract that every individual, society, corporation and the 
state are bound by their contracts. In relation to the issue of corporate governance, each 
stakeholder has a duty to perform his contractual obligations in accordance with the terms 
stipulated in the contract. While Islam guarantees the freedom of contract within the 
Sharīʿah parameters, the parties to any transactions are bound to fulfil their contractual 
obligations72.   
 
This contractual framework enhances the scope of the firm’s stakeholders, as it is not 
necessary to refer to the shareholders alone but it also involves those who have active and 
non-active participation in the firm. At this point, Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004: 58) 
formulate two tests to determine whether any individual qualifies as a stakeholder: firstly, 
whether the individual or group has any explicit and implicit contractual obligations; and, 
secondly, whether they are someone whose property rights are at risk due to business 
exposure of the corporation.73 As such, all parties who are directly or indirectly affected 
by the firm’s business are considered as the rightful stakeholders. In this regard, each 
stakeholder has its own function, the shareholders have a duty to provide business capital, 
the management to manage and run the business, the employees to perform their 
respective duties and the regulators to ensure enforceability of the contracts. All these 
duties arise through the contractual framework and provide vivid evidence that the 
Islamic corporate governance model is inclined towards the stakeholder-oriented 
approach.  
 
Corporate governance based on the stakeholder value orientation is preoccupied by the 
two fundamental concepts of Sharīʿah principles of property rights and contractual 
obligation. The governance of any corporation in Islam is ruled by Sharīʿah. It 
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 For further analysis on the theory of contracts in Islamic law, see Rayner, (1991) and Vogel, (2006). Both 
of them discuss in details the position of Islamic law of contract and its modern application particularly in 
the Arab Middle East. 
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 This is in line with the saying of Prophet: “A Muslim is the one from whose hand others are safe” (Sahih 
Bukhari, Volume 1, Book 2, Number 10). 




emphasizes the notion of protecting the rights and interests of all the stakeholders. 
Interestingly, the stakeholder-based governance structure considers a Sharīʿah board as a 
unique institutional arrangement in corporate governance, which plays a role of 
overseeing and supervising the Sharīʿah aspects of Islamic corporation. The BOD, on the 
other hand, acting on behalf of the shareholders, has a duty to monitor and oversee 
overall business activities while the managers have a fiduciary duty to manage the firm. 
The other stakeholders, such as employees, depositors and customers have a duty to 
perform all of their contractual obligations. The regulatory and supervisory authorities, as 
external stakeholders, play a role in promulgating rules and laws and providing an 
appropriate regulatory environment.  
 
Having analysed the stakeholder-based model approach, it is important to highlight a few 
issues on the arguments put forward by Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004); Chapra (2004: 65), in 
his critical review on Iqbal and Mirakhor’s arguments, commented that while most of the 
arguments positively supported the stakeholder model and acknowledged the 
stakeholders’ rights, they failed to demonstrate how these rights would be protected. The 
argument that the observance of rules of behaviour guarantees internalization of 
stakeholder rights seems difficult to be materialized. Chapra (2004: 65–66) argues that 
Islamic norms had become internalized in the Muslim society during the classical period 
but this does not work in today’s society. There are a few factors that contributed to the 
phenomenon of internalization of the stakeholders’ rights and they include common 
practice of Islamic values, nature of communities and economic environment (Chapra, 
2007: 329–330). In this respect, he considers that there are other factors need for the 
internalization of stakeholder rights, such as well-functioning competitive markets and a 
proper legal framework for the protection of stakeholders (Chapra, 2004: 67). 
 
Another debatable argument refers to the task of designing a corporate governance 
system to be solely the prerogative of Islamic government. It is the duty of Islamic 
government to regulate the rules and legislation to specify the appropriate corporate 
governance structure. This argument raises a few issues, such as a proper definition of 
Islamic government and the corporate governance structure of Islamic corporations in the 
countries where Muslims are a minority.  





The overall arguments on stakeholder value orientation as the ideal model of corporate 
governance in the Islamic economic system indicate that the corporate goal of Islamic 
firms is balanced with the aim of maximizing profit and duty to observe social justice by 
protecting the rights, interests and welfare of all stakeholders. It is observed nevertheless 
that, contrary to its ideal framework, the main objective of many corporations, including 
the so-called Islamic corporations, is to maximize the shareholders’ profit. This implies 
that, in actual practice, many Islamic corporations adopt the shareholder model of 
corporate governance rather than the stakeholder value orientation.74 Therefore, the issue 
before researchers and scholars is to come up not only with the theoretical foundations of 
Islamic corporate governance but to support it with empirical evidence and appropriate 
case studies as to the actual corporate governance practice and possible transformation. 
3.5 Corporate Governance Framework in IFIs 
 
This section briefly explains the corporate governance framework from an Islamic 
perspective in the context of IFIs by describing the roles, functions and relationships of 
the institutions of the BOD, the management, the shareholders, the depositors and, more 
importantly, the Sharīʿah board, which represents the fundamental component of the 
study. As a basis of the discussion, the study refers to the IFSB-375. In addition, the study 
also makes reference to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance as well as the 
BCBS guidelines, as both documents are very relevant in discussing the key elements of 
corporate governance best practice, such as separation of ownership and control, 
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 The World Bank Note on Risk Analysis for IFIs states that the existing corporate governance in IFIs is 
modelled along the lines of shareholder value orientation (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008: 185). This is affirmed 
by a study conducted by Lim (2007: 737–738) on corporate governance reform in Malaysia, which found 
the majority of companies prefer to adopt the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance as a benchmark 
rather than the stakeholder value model.  
75 The IFSB-3 sets out seven guiding principles of prudential requirements in the area of corporate 
governance for IFIs. It is divided into four parts, namely: general governance approach, rights of 
investment account holders, compliance with Islamic Sharīʿah rules and principles, and transparency of 
financial reporting in respect of investment accounts. Section 10 of principle 1.1 specifically mentions the 
need to establish a policy framework for the purpose of Sharīʿah governance by setting out a Sharīʿah 
supervisory board (IFSB, 2006a: 3).  




transparency and market discipline, balancing the stakeholders’ interest, and information 
asymmetries.76 
 
One of the versions of Islamic corporate governance framework is illustrated by Abdul 
Rahim (1998: 55–70), who presents the framework that integrates Sharīʿah77 and Islamic 
moral precepts and emphasizes the institutions of shura, ḥisbah, and religious audit as the 
major components of the corporate governance framework. The institution of shura, 
which consists of management, BOD, shareholders, employees, customers and other 
interested parties, may ensure the effectiveness of any corporate decision-making that 
may possibly affect the corporation. The institution of ḥisbah 78 and the religious auditor 
play a role in monitoring the corporate activities with regard both regulatory and moral 
aspects, while Sharīʿah boards are concerned with issuing legal rulings and providing 
Sharīʿah advisory and supervisory services.  
 
A more comprehensive framework of Islamic corporate governance is illustrated by 
Choudhury and Hoque (2004: 86). They clearly locate the governance structure and the 
appropriate level of each institution, its roles and functions, aims and objectives, and 
governing laws of the corporation based on the epistemology of Tawhīd and shura. 
Nienhaus (2007: 129) also offers another illustration of Islamic corporate governance 
framework by insisting on the aspects of regulatory framework of Islamic law as well as 
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 Bhatti and Bhatti (2010: 34–35) assert that the concept of corporate governance in Islam is consistent 
with all of the six OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, namely: ensuring the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework through rule of law and market transparency; protection of shareholders’ 
rights; equitable treatment of shareholders; role of stakeholders to create wealth and jobs; disclosure and 
transparency; and ensuring the strategic guidance of the company through effective monitoring and 
supervision. All of these principles are consistent and in fact commendable from an Islamic point of view. 
77
 Bearing in mind that people are sometimes confused with the terminology of Sharīʿah and fiqh, it is 
worth noting a distinction between these two. Sharīʿah is the perfect and immutable divine law as revealed 
in al-Qur’an and al-Sunnah and fiqh refers to the sum of human efforts to understand and interpret the law 
derived from these sources, in other words, the valid means to know Sharīʿah by utilizing its proper 
methodology of usul al-fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) (Vogel and Hayes, 2006: 23–24).  
78
 During the early Abbasids (750 CE), the institution of ḥisbah or an office of local administration was 
established to ensure compliance with the requirements of Sharīʿah. The very basic functions of muḥtasib 
or the officeholder of ḥisbah were to promote good and discourage evil and these include duties to inspect 
correct weights and measures in business dealings, ensure fair trading transactions, check business frauds 
and irregularities, audit illegal contracts, keep the market free and prevent hoarding of necessities (Abdul 
Rahim, 1998: 63–64). Klein (2006) provides a comperehensive examination of theoretical and manual 
ḥisbah literature. The literature mentions several ḥisbah duties and they include music-related offences, 
public display of wine offences, offences inside the home, overseeing cemeteries and wailing practices, 
instruction of children and mosque-related tasks. See also Schacht (1964). 




general banking law and regulations. Banaga et al. (1994: 168–196) conceptualizes an 
integrated framework incorporating a corporate culture and control mechanism within an 
Islamic setting.79 On the whole, Choudhury and Hoque (2004), Nienhaus (2007), Banaga 
et al. (1994) and Abdul Rahim (1998) tend to conclude that a conceptual framework of 
Islamic corporate governance must take into account the element of the epistemology of 
Tawhīd, the shuratic process, the concept of vicegerency (khilafah), social justice (al-adl 
wal ihsān), accountability (taklīf), regulatory aspects of Islamic law, general banking law 
and regulations, and the principles of Islamic morality. Despite having this solid 
conceptual framework, there is a big challenge as to how to address the problems in 
operationalizing such framework, to integrate all of the said principles and to internalize 
the Islamic norms in the corporation. In fact, Banaga et al. (1994: 177–178) mentions that 
the implementation of Sharīʿah, moral and ethical standards in an Islamic business 
organization will not necessarily be followed with excellent economic performance.  
 
With respect to the above, corporate governance in IFIs requires additional measures of 
governance as compared to its conventional counterpart as a tool to integrate each 
component of the corporate governance framework. In this regard, the IFSB-3 attempts to 
provide guidelines and key principles to facilitate IFIs with appropriate governance 
structures and processes with the stakeholder-oriented approach as a model basis. Part 1 
and part 3 of the IFSB-3 recommend the integrated approach of corporate governance by 
insisting on ethics and compliance with Sharīʿah rules and principles (IFSB, 2006a).  
 
In order to understand and appreciate the corporate governance framework in IFIs, it is 
essential to examine roles and duties of several of its key participants, i.e. the 
shareholders and depositors, the BOD, the management,80 and the Sharīʿah board. Unlike 
their conventional counterparts, the Sharīʿah board, religious auditors and depositors, 
particularly investment account holders (IAHs), are additional key participants for 
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 Corporate culture refers to core values, common behaviour, codes of conduct, self-regulation and control 
mechanism concerns of executive management, goals and strategies, and leadership (Banaga, 1994: 180). 
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 Chapra (2002: 31–48) considers the BOD, the senior management, the shareholders and the depositors as 
the most significant mechanisms of corporate governance in IFIs.  
 




corporate governance in IFIs. Table 3.1 illustrates the key participants in corporate 
governance in IFIs and briefly mentions their functional roles. 
Table 3.1: Key Participants in Corporate Governance in IFIs  
Key 
Participants 
Interest Functional Roles 
Regulatory 
Authority 
Economic stability Set regulatory framework for sound 
and proper corporate governance 
Supervisory 
Authority 
Compliance with the laws and 
regulations 
To supervise and monitor the 
effectiveness of corporate governance 
and to check compliance with 
regulations 
Shareholders Profit maximization; 
satisfactory earnings per share; 
dividends; above average 
return on investment; and 
excellent continuous growth 
Appoint fit and proper boards, 
management auditors and Sharīʿah 
board 
IAHs Repayment of deposits at 
maturity on the agreed terms; 
protection of their interests and 
profit 
To monitor the investment 
performance  
Sharīʿah Board Compliance with Sharīʿah and 
fulfilling maqāsid Sharīʿah 
To ensure Sharīʿah compliance and 
protect the rights and interests of 
depositors and other stakeholders 
BOD Monetary and non-monetary 
compensation; manage the 
company efficiently, 
effectively and with high 
integrity; and outstanding 
corporate reputation and brand 
 
To set the IFI’s direction and policies 
Management Monetary and non-monetary 
compensation; and 
commitment to claims of the 
contract 
To implement policies set by the 
BOD 
 
The regulatory authority, as an external organ of governance, plays a key role in 
corporate governance by defining the regulatory and legal environment to facilitate a 
sound corporate governance framework. It also has responsibilities to provide appropriate 
guidelines for IFIs, to develop internal control, risk management procedures and standard 
of transparency, and to monitor the IFI’s overall operation. To complement this function, 




the supervisory authority has a duty to supervise and monitor the effectiveness of the 
corporate governance system and to check compliance with such regulations.  
 
With regard to the internal institution of governance, shareholders have responsibilities to 
appoint fit and proper BOD, management auditors as well as a Sharīʿah board. Unlike 
conventional banks, the functions of shareholders in IFIs are extended to include the duty 
to appoint a Sharīʿah board. This is affirmed by the AAOIFI Governance Standards, 
which require that the appointment of the Sharīʿah board shall be made by the 
shareholders in the general assembly. This demonstrates the uniqueness of IFIs, where 
the shareholders play a role in electing and appointing the Sharīʿah board members. This 
position is essential to indicate that Sharīʿah board is independent from the BOD so as to 
enable them to provide advisory and supervisory functions without fear or favour.  
 
The scope of corporate governance has been enlarged for IFIs to include not only 
protection of the shareholders but also the depositors, particularly IAHs. This is because 
the depositors in IFIs are exposed to a much higher risk than in conventional banks. The 
modus operandi of a deposit in an Islamic bank, especially an investment account, 
implies participation in the financial results of the employment of funds (Nienhaus, 2007: 
128). This indicates that corporate governance in IFIs must take into consideration the 
interest of the depositors as one of the main stakeholders. 
 
The IAHs in IFIs participate in the profit and loss, since their investments are not 
explicitly or implicitly insured or guaranteed as in the case of conventional financial 
institutions. In actual context of IFIs, the IAHs nevertheless are not directly exposed to 
the risks of Islamic banking business as they are not involved in the management and 
have no voting rights in the shareholders’ meetings.81 The depositors are exposed 
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 Although known as quasi-shareholders, the IAHs do not have shareholders’ governance rights such as the 
power of appointment or dismissal of the BOD and the external auditors, the right to receive annual reports, 
the right to vote in annual general meetings and general assemblies and the right to appoint the Sharīʿah 
board (Archer and Karim, 2006: 137). The IFSB-3 recommends several key principles with respect to 
protecting the rights and interests of the investment account holders (IAHs). For instance, principle 2.1 
requires IFIs to acknowledge IAHs’ rights to monitor the performance of their investments and associated 
risks, while principle 2.2 encourages them to adopt a sound and transparent investment strategy (IFSB, 
2006a: 6–10). In the absence of the right to participate in governance, even though recognized as quasi-




indirectly to the risks incurred in two situations, namely the deposit insurance system 
does not insure demand deposit beyond a certain limit and the losses suffered by the 
banks on their profit and loss sharing advances may be substantial and the capital and 
reserves plus investment deposit may not be sufficient to cover them (Chapra and 
Ahmed, 2002: 42–47). This position raises several issues pertaining to the rights and 
interests of the IAHs and demands extra precautions in terms of good governance in order 
to gain the confidence of the depositors and at the same time protect the rights and 
interests of the main shareholders.82  
 
The BOD plays a strong role in specifying the strategic objectives, guiding principles, 
code of conduct and standard of appropriate behaviour of the employees (Chapra and 
Ahmed, 2002: 31–32). Corporate governance requires the BOD to be not only 
professionally competent in the aspect of risks, business strategies and banking business, 
but also to have the additional qualifications to understand and appreciate maqāsid 
Sharīʿah,83 as well as having at least a basic understanding of Sharīʿah rules and 
principles. The motivation of managing the corporation is not solely for the purpose of 
maximization of the shareholders’ profit but rather to promote the welfare of all 
stakeholders. At this point, principles 13–17 of the IFSB-3 state that the BOD shall be 
responsible for steering the establishment of a governance policy framework (IFSB, 
2006a: 3–4). These principles require the BOD to not only concern themselves with the 
profit-driven business strategy of the firm but also to consider the interests and rights of 
all stakeholders, such as depositors, employees and consumers.  
 
Unlike the BOD, the management has a fiduciary duty to implement the policies and 
strategies set by the BOD. The management is an agent or wakil to the BOD and acts as a 
trustee not only to the BOD but to the shareholders and other stakeholders. It is therefore 
important to the management to be honest and frugal at all times and in all matters. It is 
                                                                                                                                                 
equity holders, the Sharīʿah board and the regulatory and supervisory authorities are expected to protect 
their rights and interests (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008: 194). 
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 In this circumstance, the Sharīʿah board and regulatory authorities are responsible for protecting the 
interests and rights of the IAHs by ensuring adequate and efficient monitoring mechanisms are in place (El 
Hawary, Grais and Iqbal, 2004: 16). 
83
 Maqāsid Sharīʿah means protection of the welfare of the people, which lies in safeguarding their faith, 
life, intellect, posterity and wealth (Al-Ghazali, 1937: 139–140). 




also essential for the management to be truly aware of the principle of maqāsid Sharīʿah 
and other Islamic principles so as to ensure that all stakeholders’ interests are protected 
while performing their duties. The IFSB-3 considers the management as a crucial entity 
to ensure the direction and all business transactions meet the Sharīʿah requirements and 
are aligned with the interests of all stakeholders because it involves the day-to-day 
activities of IFIs (IFSB, 2006a: 16). 
 
One of the most essential key participants of Islamic corporate governance is the 
Sharīʿah board. The Sharīʿah board is an institution that can only be found in the 
organizational structure of Islamic corporations. Principle 13 of the IFSB-3 requires each 
IFI to set up a Sharīʿah board comprising at least three members to oversee and monitor 
the implementation of the governance policy framework by working together with the 
management and the audit committee (IFSB, 2006a: 3). The Sharīʿah board is considered 
as part of the corporate governance limbs that play essential roles in Sharīʿah 
supervision. Basically, the functions of the Sharīʿah board are twofold, i.e. advisory and 
supervisory, and these include advising IFIs in their operation, to analyse and evaluate 
Sharīʿah aspects of any banking and financing activities, and to monitor and supervise 
the extent of Sharīʿah compliance.  
 
To sum up, corporate governance in Islam adds additional value to the existing 
governance structure as it emphasizes the elements of faith, ethics and Sharīʿah 
principles. A unique feature of the Islamic corporate governance model requires another 
layer of governance structure in order to accomplish all of those elements. In this regard, 
IFIs need a specific organizational arrangement as part of their corporate governance 
framework for the purpose of Sharīʿah compliance and to ensure an effective 
independent oversight over Sharīʿah-related matters. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
It is worth mentioning that this chapter does not intend to discuss in detail every single 
issue of corporate governance as it only aims at providing its conceptual framework and 
theoretical foundation. The foundational paradigm of corporate governance from an 




Islamic perspective, then, would be able to enlighten the concept of Sharīʿah governance 
in IFIs. In summary, the design of the corporate governance system in Islam has its own 
unique features and presents distinctive characteristics. The study summarizes the 
diversities of the Western models of corporate governance and classifies them into six 
aspects, namely: the episteme, the rights and interests, the corporate goal, the nature of 
management, the management board, and the capital-related ownership structure.  
 
Table 3.2: The Diversities of the Anglo-Saxon, the European84 and the Islamic Models 
of Corporate Governance 
Aspects The Anglo-Saxon 
Model  
The European Model The Islamic Model 






Tawhīd as a basis. 
Rights and 
Interests 
To protect the 
interests and rights of 
the shareholders. 
The rights of the 
community in relation 
to the corporation. 
To protect the 
interests and rights of 
all stakeholders but 






for purpose of 
shareholders’ profit. 
Society controlling 
corporation for purpose 
of social welfare. 
Corporate objective is 

















Sharīʿah board as part 









Banks and other 




depositors or IAHs. 
 
Source: Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn (1997: 174–5) as cited in Cernat (2004: 150): 
modified. 
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 It is worth mentioning that the following comparison is based on the general characteristics of the Anglo-
Saxon and the European models of corporate governance. Undeniably, both models evolve and their 
features may change and transmit into another form or even converge. 




The above simplified version of the differences of Islamic and Western concepts of 
corporate governance provides an overview of the diverse approaches of corporate 
governance style and structure. With respect to epistemological method, Islam rejects 
rationality and rationalism as the sole episteme of corporate governance and replaces it 
with the episteme of Tawhīd. While the shareholder model prioritizes the shareholders’ 
value alone and the stakeholder value orientation protects all the stakeholders’ interest 
and rights, the corporate governance objective in Islam balances the corporate goal of 
maximizing the profit with the duty to uphold the principle of social justice and maqāsid 
Sharīʿah and this entails the notion of protecting the interests and rights of all 
stakeholders within the Sharīʿah rules.  
 
The nature of management of the corporate governance model is premised by the 
fundamental principles of shura, with the Sharīʿah board playing a significant role in 
supervising and overseeing the overall corporate activities so as to ensure they comply 
with the Sharīʿah principles. In contrast to the Western concept, the nature of ownership 
structure in corporate governance considers the shareholders and the IAHs as the rightful 
owners, rather than the shareholders alone. The distinct features and characteristics of 
corporate governance combine the element of Tawhīd, shura, Sharīʿah rules and Islamic 
morality to maintain the private goal without ignoring the duty of social welfare. 
 
On the whole, unlike the Western model of corporate governance, the foundational 
dimension of Islamic corporate governance is rooted in the fundamental principles of 
Tawhīd, the shuratic process, property rights and contractual obligation. Based on this 
aspirational foundation, key participants in corporate governance in Islamic corporation, 
particularly IFIs, such as the BOD, the shareholders, the depositors, the managers and 
particularly the Sharīʿah board, play significant roles in ensuring the Sharīʿah objectives 
and the firm’s goal are both realized within the parameters of Sharīʿah and Islamic values 
and ethics. As a matter of fact, the spread of Islamic banking business and strong growth 
of the Islamic finance sector, along with the increasing numbers of IFIs, require a specific 
organizational arrangement in the form of ‘Sharīʿah governance’ as part of an Islamic 
corporate governance framework.  










The philosophical foundation of corporate governance in Islam requires an additional 
layer of governance for the purpose of Sharīʿah compliance. With this aspiration, 
corporate governance in IFIs needs a set of institutional arrangements to oversee the 
Sharīʿah-compliant aspects of their business and operations. In the absence of any model 
of corporate governance in Islamic literature, IFIs have innovatively introduced the 
Sharīʿah governance system as part of their corporate governance framework, which is 
peculiarly exclusive to its corporate governance framework.  
 
With the lessons from the failure and financial scandal of several IFIs and the huge 
potential implications of Sharīʿah non-compliance risks, the need for a good and efficient 
Sharīʿah governance system is considered as part of the crucial portion of corporate 
governance. As one of the essential key participants of corporate governance in IFIs, the 
institution of the Sharīʿah board plays an essential role in the aspect of Sharīʿah 
supervision, monitoring, auditing and issuing legal rulings. The Sharīʿah board has 
become the central part of the Sharīʿah governance system that has a profound influence 
on the day-to-day practice of finance in providing advisory and consultative services to 
IFIs.  
 
In parallel with the tremendous growth of the Islamic finance sector worldwide and the 
complexity of Islamic financial products and services, it is strongly indicated that there 
must be a sound and proper Sharīʿah governance system. With the aim of providing an 
overview of the Sharīʿah governance system and its related issues, this chapter is 
organized into ten sections, comprising of an introduction, conceptual framework, 
historical development, objective of Sharīʿah governance system, roles of Sharīʿah 
board, models of Sharīʿah board, international standard-setting agency, Sharīʿah 
governance process, issues and challenges, and a conclusion.  




4.1 Conceptual Framework of Sharīʿah Governance Systems 
Until the issuance of the IFSB Guiding Principles on Sharīʿah Governance Systems in 
Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-10), there is no formal or proper 
definition of a Sharīʿah governance system. The AAOIFI Governance Standard No. 1-5 
is also silent on its actual definition. In fact, the existing literature, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, seems to provide definitions of corporate governance rather than Sharīʿah 
governance in particular. Furthermore, neither the AAOIFI nor the IFSB have provided a 
proper definition of the existing governance standards. This leads to uncertainty and 
different understandings as to what is meant by a Sharīʿah governance system. Because 
of this, it is very important to clarify the term ‘Sharīʿah governance system’ and to have a 
sound understanding of its actual concept and meaning. 
Perhaps, the best definition of Sharīʿah governance can be found in the IFSB-10.85 The 
IFSB-10 defines the Sharīʿah governance system as “a set of institutional and 
organizational arrangements through which IFIs ensure that there is effective independent 
oversight of Sharīʿah compliance over the issuance of relevant Sharīʿah pronouncements, 
dissemination of information and an internal Sharīʿah compliance review” (IFSB, 2009a: 
2). To understand further, this definition can be divided into three essential components: 
(i) The set of institutional and organizational arrangements: This refers to the 
Sharīʿah board and its related institutions, such as an internal audit department 
and Sharīʿah division. 
(ii) Effective independent oversight of Sharīʿah compliance: This indicates the 
aims and objectives of the Sharīʿah governance system to provide efficient 
mechanisms for the purpose of Sharīʿah compliance. 
                                                 
85
 Sheikh Mohammad Ali El Gari, a prominent Saudi Sharīʿah scholar, defines Sharīʿah governance as “the 
set of procedures, institutions and organizational arrangements through which the Sharīʿah position on 
contemporary issues is revealed and Sharīʿah compliance ensured” (Parker, 2010). This definition 
nevertheless provides a narrow interpretation of the concept of Sharīʿah governance as it mainly refers to 
fatwa issuing and the process of Sharīʿah compliance.  




(iii) Sharīʿah pronouncements, dissemination of information and an internal 
Sharīʿah compliance review: This involves the overall Sharīʿah governance 
processes that cover both ex ante and ex post aspects of the Sharīʿah 
compliance framework. 
This definition implies that the institution of the Sharīʿah board is crucial to the Sharīʿah 
governance system as an authoritative body to ensure Sharīʿah compliance in IFIs. The 
AAOIFI Governance Standard No.1 defines a Sharīʿah board as “an independent body 
entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and supervising the activities of IFIs for 
the purpose of Sharīʿah compliance and issuing legal rulings pertaining to Islamic 
banking and finance” (AAOIFI, 2005: 4). A similar definition is given by the IFSB-10, 
which refers to “a body comprised of a panel of Sharīʿah scholars who provide Sharīʿah 
expertise and act as special advisers to the institutions” (IFSB, 2009c: 1). In carrying out 
this duty, the Sharīʿah board needs a clear framework and structure to ensure its 
effectiveness, particularly with respect to its independence, the binding force of its 
rulings, its objectivity and its full mandate. On this basis, any formal or informal 
arrangement as to how the Sharīʿah board is directed, managed, governed and controlled 
for the purpose of Sharīʿah compliance is also part of the Sharīʿah governance system.  
Sharīʿah governance is a unique kind of governance in financial architecture as it is 
concerned with the religious aspects of the overall activities of IFIs. To illustrate the 
rationale of the Sharīʿah governance system in the existing corporate governance 
framework, Table 4.1 provides an illustration as to how Sharīʿah governance 
complements the existing corporate governance framework in IFIs. 




Table 4.1: Institutional Arrangement in the Sharīʿah Governance System  
Functions Typical Financial Institutions Exclusive to IFIs 
Governance BOD Sharīʿah Board 
Control Internal Auditor/External Auditor Internal Sharīʿah Review 
Unit/External Sharīʿah Review 
Compliance  Regulatory and Financial 
Compliance 
Officers/Unit/Department 
Internal Sharīʿah Compliance 
Unit 
Source: IFSB (2009c: 4). 
Table 4.1 initially indicates that IFIs and typical financial institutions share common 
institutional arrangements for their corporate governance framework, particularly in the 
aspects of governance, control and compliance. The only element that differentiates 
corporate governance in IFIs is the institutional arrangement for their Sharīʿah 
governance mechanism. IFIs require another set of organizational arrangements in the 
form of a Sharīʿah board, an internal or external Sharīʿah review and an internal Sharīʿah 
compliance unit to meet the religious requirement of Sharīʿah compliance in all aspects 
of their business transactions and operations.  
In terms of governance structure, the Sharīʿah governance system adds an additional 
layer of governance to the existing corporate governance structure. Figure 4.1 simply 
demonstrates the unique corporate governance structure in typical IFIs, in which the 
Sharīʿah board and internal or external Sharīʿah review are the additional institutions that 
oversee the Sharīʿah compliance aspects. This is actually based on the AAOIFI 
governance standards, which put the Sharīʿah board on a par with the BOD in the 
corporate governance structure and therefore it is subject directly to the shareholders. The 
IFSB-10 approach, on the other hand, places the Sharīʿah board either as parallel or 
subordinate to the BOD. Both the AAOIFI and IFSB guidelines nevertheless agree that 
the Sharīʿah board must be independent of the BOD and be accountable not only to 
shareholders but to all stakeholders. 




Figure 4.1: Corporate Governance Structure in IFIs. 
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Source: Stanley (2008): modified. 
With regard to scope of the Sharīʿah governance framework, it covers ex ante and ex post 
aspects of Sharīʿah compliance, of which the former refers to issuance of Sharīʿah 
rulings and dissemination of Sharīʿah -related information and the latter to the periodic 
and annual internal Sharīʿah review process. Figure 4.2 illustrates the scope of the 
Sharīʿah governance system in the two phases, i.e. ex ante and ex post. It is worth noting 
that the process outlined here only illustrates the generic process for the approval of 
Islamic financial products and this process can differ from one IFI to another. Figure 4.2 
only attempts to provide a general idea of the Sharīʿah governance process and its 
framework in typical IFIs.  




Figure 4.2: Scope of the Sharīʿah Governance Framework 
 
Source: Dar (2009): modified. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the scope of the Sharīʿah governance framework in IFIs. It involves 
a systematic process and requires involvement of numerous organs of governance. In 
phase 1, processes 1–6, the diagram illustrates ex ante Sharīʿah compliance aspects, 
which include a product proposal, legal documentation, Sharīʿah review, and procuring 
and dissemination of Sharīʿah rulings. In phase 2, processes 7–8, the diagram 
demonstrates the ex post processes, which involve the periodic and annual Sharīʿah 
reviews. The Sharīʿah board plays a central role in ensuring the legitimacy of the 
products and services and this can only be achieved by having sound Sharīʿah 
coordination and an efficient internal Sharīʿah review unit. The Sharīʿah coordinator acts 
as a liaison officer or coordinator to the Sharīʿah governance process from product 
initiation to annual Sharīʿah review. 
This section attempts to provide the conceptual framework of Sharīʿah governance in 
IFIs in three main aspects, namely its definition, institutional arrangement and scope of 
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of institutional arrangements for the purpose of Sharīʿah compliance and this involves ex 
ante and ex post Sharīʿah-compliant processes, such as Sharīʿah pronouncements, 
dissemination of information and an internal Sharīʿah compliance review. The 
institutional arrangement in Sharīʿah governance places the Sharīʿah board as the 
backbone of the system. The formation of the Sharīʿah board has become an integral part 
of the Sharīʿah governance system in IFIs. In light of this conceptual framework, this 
research attempts to explore various practices of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs with the 
Sharīʿah board as the focus point.86 The study highlights the different governance 
structures and processes across jurisdictions, including issues and challenges, with an 
objective of identifying and promoting best practices of Sharīʿah governance. 
4.2 Objectives of the Sharīʿah Governance System 
 
The objectives of the Sharīʿah governance system lie in the very reason for its existence, 
i.e. for the sake of Sharīʿah compliance as inspired by its philosophical foundation. It 
involves numerous processes and procedures which incur cost and involvement of 
various organs of governance in IFIs. Despite the extra cost, time and effort, IFIs still 
favour having Sharīʿah governance, at least with the establishment of the Sharīʿah board. 
This raises another very significant issue as to what extent the essence of Sharīʿah 
governance system for IFIs? To address this issue, it would be better to understand the 
objectives and instrumental functions of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs and these include 
legitimacy of the product, promotion of moderation and justice in financial transactions, 
confidence and trust of stakeholders, and as part of the risk management tools exclusive 
to IFIs. 
  
                                                 
86
 Bearing in mind that there are other fatwa institutions which issue rulings pertaining to Islamic banking 
and finance, such as the Council of Islamic Fiqh Academy, the Egyptian Office of the Mufti, the Council of 
Islamic Studies, Al-Azhar, Cairo, Egypt, the Council of Islamic Fiqh, Muslim World League, the General’s 
Presidency of Ifta’ in Saudi Arabia and others, the scope of the research nevertheless is only confined to 
Sharīʿah governance system in IFIs. In this regard, it is important to note that such fatwa institutions are 
excluded from the definition of Sharīʿah governance in this research. Meanwhile, although the term 
Sharīʿah board has been used interchangeably with other names such as Sharīʿah committee, Sharīʿah 
advisory body, Sharīʿah advisory council, Sharīʿah control board, Sharīʿah advisor, Sharīʿah control 
committee, Sharīʿah controller, Sharīʿah council and religious committee, this research prefers to use the 
term Sharīʿah board. 




Islamic financial products must be genuinely legitimate and comply with the Sharīʿah 
principles. In this respect, IFIs are in need of specialized body who are expert in 
Sharīʿah, particularly fiqh al muāmalāt and usul al fiqh, to assist them in determining the 
legitimacy of certain Islamic financial products. In view of the numerous issues involved 
in this process, such as the independence, qualifications, reporting structure, 
accountability and transparency of the Sharīʿah board, the Sharīʿah governance system is 
very important to maintain the credibility of the Sharīʿah board as well as to ensure the 
legitimacy of the products.  
 
The Sharīʿah governance system is also important in promoting moderation and justice in 
financial transactions (Wilson, 2009a: 61) and therefore enhancing the public confidence 
in IFIs on the aspect of compliance in its application of Sharīʿah principles. The objective 
of IFIs is not to satisfy the shareholders’ alone but to inculcate the confidence and trust of 
the public and community, who rely on the services provided by them. In the absence of 
any control mechanism or governance system, the public confidence in the legitimacy 
and legality of the products may be impaired.87 The Sharīʿah governance system, which 
consists of ex ante and ex post Sharīʿah compliance processes, would enhance the 
credibility of IFIs. 
 
The Sharīʿah governance system is meant to address a specific type of risk exclusive to 
IFIs, known as Sharīʿah non-compliance risk. The IFSB-3 defines Sharīʿah non-
compliance risk as “the risk that arises from IFIs’ failure to comply with the Sharīʿah 
rules and principles determined by the Sharīʿah board or the relevant body in the 
jurisdiction in which the IFIs operate” (IFSB, 2006a: 26). In this aspect, Delorenzo 
(2007: 398–407) illustrates Sharīʿah non-compliance risk by referring to the risk of fatwa 
rejection and differences as a form of operational and regulatory risk. In addition, Iqbal 
and Mirakhor (2007: 245) classify Sharīʿah risk into two types, namely the risk due to 
                                                 
87
 It is reported that 81.4% of the total number of 468 depositors from Bahrain, Bangladesh and Sudan will 
transfer their funds to other banks due to non-compliance to Sharīʿah principles and 70% of depositors will 
also move their funds if they know that the bank’s income is derived from interest-based earnings (Chapra 
and Ahmed, 2002: 118–120). 




non-standard practices of Islamic financial products and the risk due to non-compliance 
with the Sharīʿah.  
 
The significance of Sharīʿah non-compliance risk to the Islamic finance industry can be 
illustrated in the case of falling sukuk issuance due to a statement made by the chairman 
of the AAOIFI Sharīʿah board, the OIC Fiqh Academy declaration on the 
impermissibility of tawarruq,88 the Malaysian High Court judgment on the issue of 
BBA,89 and the dispute in the case of The Investment Dar Company KSCC v Blom 
Developments Bank Sal (2009) EWHC 3545 (Ch).90 Despite other factors that affect 
sukuk issuance worldwide, undeniably, the statement of 85% of potential Sharīʿah non-
compliance sukuk in the Gulf by Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani has negated in some 
way public confidence on the legitimacy and Islamicity of the sukuk.91 Besides, the 
declaration of the impermissibility of tawarruq has potentially huge implications for IFIs, 
since the tawarruq financial instrument is widely offered in the market. Similarly, in the 
case of BBA in the Malaysian High Court, the learned judge declared that the profit 
portion derived from the BBA facility was illegitimate. This nearly caused panic to IFIs 
as more than 80% of Islamic financing facilities in Malaysia are based on the BBA 
concept.  
 
All of these major cases indicate the significance of the Sharīʿah governance system as a 
risk management tool to mitigate the Sharīʿah non-compliance risk. If other kinds of 
risks, such as credit, equity investment, market, liquidity and rate of return risks, are 
                                                 
88
 The Islamic Fiqh Academy of the OIC issued the final resolution on tawarruq at the 19th meeting in 
Sharjah, United Arab Emirates on 26–30th April 2009 which confirmed its impermissibility. 
89
 Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd & Ors (Koperasi Seri Kota Bukit Cheraka 
Bhd, third party) [2008] 5 MLJ 631 
90
 This case was an appeal from a summary judgment granted to the claimant on part of its claim in the 
amount of USD10,733, 292.55. In this case the Investment Dar refused to pay the expected profit and to 
return the principal amount of wakala-based deposit. The Investment Dar claimed that the wakala-based 
deposit did not comply with the Sharīʿah and therefore should be considered void. On the other hand, the 
Blom argued that the claim was nonsense as the wakala-based deposit had already been authorized by the 
Investment Dar’s Sharīʿah board. The court allowed the appeal and held that there was a triable issue on 
both claims. This case is a timely reminder to IFIs about the essence of the Sharīʿah compliance of 
products via the mechanism of Sharīʿah governance.  
91
 Sales of sukuk dropped 50% in 2008 and prices fell at an average of 1.51% (Kettel, 2008: 38). According 
to Bloomberg, sales of global sukuk had dropped to USD856 million in 2008 (Sobri, 2008: 16). 




quantifiable, the Sharīʿah risk on the other hand is difficult to manage. Furthermore, there 
is no specific risk management model to address the Sharīʿah non-compliance risk which 
is unique to IFIs. The IFSB Guiding Principles on Risk Management (IFSB-1) 
specifically classify the Sharīʿah risk as part of the operational risks which can be 
managed through a sound and proper Sharīʿah governance system. The Sharīʿah 
governance system would help IFIs to mitigate the Sharīʿah non-compliance risk that 
may incur unimaginable loss and negate IFIs’ credibility. 
4.3 Institutionalization of the Sharīʿah Board  
 
Although Sharīʿah governance is relatively new to any discourse on fiqh al muāmalāt, 
the notion of market regulation and enforcement through the institutionalization approach 
has already been implemented since pre-modern Muslim societies and is known as the 
institution of ḥisbah.92 The ḥisbah was instituted for the purpose of supervising public 
morals, where markets were regulated and monitored by its executor or the muḥtasib.93 
Traditionally, the functions of ḥisbah include duties related to transgressing physical 
boundaries such as music-related offences and the public display of wine (Klein, 2006: 
46–50). On top of that, the jurisdiction of ḥisbah also covered matters inside the private 
domain such as offences inside homes, cemeteries and wailing practices, the instruction 
of children, and proper functioning of the mosque (Klein, 2006: 50–58). The most 
important function of ḥisbah in the context of the economic welfare of the people was 
supervision of market affairs and this included control of scale and prices, protection of 
measures and standards of weight, accurate valuation of coins used in the market and 
prevention of fraud (Wittmann, 2006: 115–122). 
 
                                                 
92
 The literature on ḥisbah can be divided into theoretical, such as Public Duties in Islam: The Institutions 
of the ḥisbah by Ibnu Taymiya and Al Ahkam Al Sultaniya by Al Mawardi, and prescriptive-legal literature 
(ḥisbah manuals), such as the manuals of Ibnu Bassam and Ibnu Ukhuwa (Klein, 2006: 42–43). Ibnu 
Taymiya discusses in great detail the institution of ḥisbah, pertaining to its duties, rights and obligations 
upon specific socio-economic activities as well as market regulation (see Ibnu Taymiya, 1985). 
93
 The muḥtasib is the executor who discharged the principles of religious obligation of the individual 
believer “to command right, when its omission becomes apparent and to forbid wrong, when its realization 
becomes imminent” (Wittmann, 2006: 109).  




In view of some similarities of the institution of ḥisbah with Sharīʿah governance, 
particularly to their objectives and functions, the institutionalization of the Sharīʿah board 
can be considered as a new concept of the muḥtasib in modern Muslim societies. The 
adoption of this modified ḥisbah model is very important to ensure all activities, 
transactions and operations of IFIs meet the principles of Sharīʿah and Islamic morals. At 
this point, the Sharīʿah board particularly at the national or regulatory level is the ideal 
institution that would be able to play some function of the muḥtasib as the institution of 
ḥisbah within the context of IFIs. As with the notion of the ḥisbah institution during the 
pre-modern Muslim societies commanding right and forbidding wrong, the spread of 
Islamic banking business and the strong growth of the Islamic finance sector require a 
specific organizational arrangement to provide a standard of appropriate behaviour, 
guidelines and code of conduct for IFIs. At this juncture, it is worth briefly exploring the 
historical development of the institution of the Sharīʿah board and the Sharīʿah 
governance system in IFIs.  
 
The establishment of the Sharīʿah board in IFIs is relatively new. The idea of setting up 
the Sharīʿah board as part of the governance structure of IFIs is considered to be the 
initiative of Sheikh Saleh Kamel when he founded the Dallah Al Baraka Group (Abdul-
Rahman, 2010: 76). In 1976 the first formal Sharīʿah board was instituted by the Faisal 
Islamic Bank of Egypt (Kahf, 2004: 17–36). In the early period of Islamic finance 
practice there was no special body responsible for advising Islamic banks on Sharīʿah 
matters. The formations of the Mitr Ghams Savings Bank on 23rd July 1963, the Nasser 
Social Bank in Egypt in 1972 and the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975 were made without 
setting up any Sharīʿah body as part of their governance structures. Although without 
such Sharīʿah supervisory boards, it is observed that the activities of IFIs did conform to 
the spirit of Sharīʿah.  
 
The setting up of the institution of the Sharīʿah board began in 1976 when the Faisal 
Islamic Bank of Egypt was established. It was the first to have a formal Sharīʿah board 
consisting of selected Sharīʿah scholars in Egypt (Kahf, 2004). This practice was then 




followed by the Jordan Islamic Bank94 and the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan in 1978, the 
Kuwait Finance House in 1979, the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad in 1983, and the Dubai 
Islamic Bank in 1999.95 The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) had no formal Sharīʿah 
supervisory board or an appointed Sharīʿah council during its early establishment but it 
has started establishing relationships with several Sharīʿah scholars by inviting them for 
consultation, seeking fatwa on muamalāt issues (Kahf, 2004: 17–36). The IDB also then 
established its own internal Sharīʿah board which was appointed by the IDB Board of 
Executive Directors.96 
 
Besides this, the International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB) also set up its own 
Sharīʿah board.97 The IAIB, however, was replaced with the CIBAFI in 1999.98 In the 
meantime, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) countries acknowledge the 
Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy based in Jeddah as having the authority to issue 
fatwa rulings including matters related to Islamic banking and finance.99 To date, the 
majority of IFIs, including some of the well-respected central banks, have established 
their own Sharīʿah boards.  
 
There are a few independent international entities established to support the Islamic 
finance sector on the aspect of governance, such as the AAOIFI and the IFSB. The 
AAOIFI has developed seven governance standards, of which five relate specifically to 
Sharīʿah governance. Similarly, the IFSB has issued seven guidelines on governance, 
disclosure and the supervisory review process and the IFSB-10 specifically addresses 
                                                 
94
 The Jordan Islamic Bank was established on 1st April 1978 and in the same year it set up a Sharīʿah 
board known as the Sharīʿah supervision authority. Sheikh Abdul Hamid Al Sayeh was the first Sharīʿah 
advisor to the Jordan Islamic Bank (Shallah, 1989: 230–231).  
95
 Interestingly, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation also set up its own Sharīʿah board in May 
2006 (JBIC, 2007: 5). 
96
 The IDB established its own Sharīʿah board in 2002. Before this, the IDB referred any of its Sharīʿah 
matters to the Islamic Academy of Fiqh for deliberation (Bakar, 2002: 79).  
97
 This institution, based in Cairo, Egypt, was established in 1977 and it has the official support of the IDB, 
the OIC, the central banks and monetary agencies of Muslim countries. The IAIB is active in providing a 
forum of cooperation amongst IFIs, promoting the concept of Islamic banking and finance, provide 
research, consultancy and training (Wilson, 1997: 83–93). 
98
 The CIBAFI was incorporated in Bahrain on 16th May 2001 as an international autonomous non-profit 
corporate body that represents IFIs globally. 
99
 The Council of Islamic Fiqh Academy is a subsidiary body of the OIC, created by the Third Islamic 
Summit Conference held in Makkah al-Mukarramah in January 1981 (IFA, 2010).  




issues to promote best practice for the Sharīʿah governance system. At the national level, 
the BNM issued the BNM/GPS1 in December 2004 and Sharīʿah Governance 
Framework for IFIs in April 2010,100 as well as the State Bank of Pakistan issuing the 
Instruction and Guidelines for Sharīʿah Compliance in Islamic Banking Institutions in 
2008 (SBP, 2008). In addition, Bahrain formally acknowledged the adoption of the 
AAOIFI governance standards, the Dubai International Financial Centre and the Qatar 
Financial Centre have each issued a Rulebook on Islamic Financial Business Module, 
which specifies, among others, the requirements of Sharīʿah governance.  
 
Regardless of the positive development of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs, it is observed that 
there are a few significant issues involved, particularly with respect to the Sharīʿah 
governance process, such as the Sharīʿah board’s independence, competence, conflict of 
interest, confidentiality, transparency, disclosure, issue of Sharīʿah -compliance and 
Sharīʿah-based products, and the remit of the Sharīʿah boards. With the diversity of 
Sharīʿah governance approaches in IFIs, a high standard of Sharīʿah governance practice 
should be implemented to ensure that the institution of the Sharīʿah board can play its 
role effectively.  
4.4 Role of the Sharīʿah Board  
The role of the Sharīʿah board varies from one board to another and it depends upon the 
nature, extent and degree of Sharīʿah compliance. Inspired by its foundational dimension 
and stakeholder value orientation, the Sharīʿah board has fiduciary duties towards all 
stakeholders of the IFIs.101 Moreover, the integrity of IFIs is greatly dependant on the 
status of Sharīʿah compliance, the impact of products, professional competence and 
behaviour towards observance of Sharīʿah norms (Ayub, 2007: 467). In this aspect, the 
                                                 
100
 The Sharīʿah Governance Framework for IFIs will replace the BNM/GPS1 and become officially 
effective in 2011.  
101
 It is also contended that the duty to protect the rights and interests of the account holders especially 
IAHs are at the mercy of the Sharīʿah board since they do not have governance rights or rights of 
participation in IFIs. 




Sharīʿah board plays a fundamental role in ensuring and enhancing the credibility of 
IFIs102 as well as having the authority to issue fatwa via collective ijtihād.103  
As a general observation, the Sharīʿah board plays a role as a control mechanism to 
monitor the IFI’s activities and operations for the purpose of Sharīʿah compliance 
including assuring zakah obligation (Briston and El-Ashker, 1986). This is affirmed by 
Dawud (1996), who mentions that the Sharīʿah board’s objective is to guide IFIs in the 
setting of policies and regulations according to Sharīʿah h in approving their financial 
transactions from the legal side and in preparing their contracts for future transactions 
according to Islamic law. In addition, AbuMouamer (1989) describes the role of the 
Sharīʿah board as being proactive rather than reactive and mentions that the Sharīʿah 
board has fiduciary duties to force the management of IFIs to disclose and dispense 
revenue from any unlawful transaction to charity as well as to conduct audits on zakah 
funds. Abdallah (1994) seems to agree with the contention that the Sharīʿah board must 
be proactive rather than reactive. At this point he suggests that the Sharīʿah board should 
set up accounting policies to assure that the formula used in allocating profit between 
shareholders and account holders is fair and that all revenues are generated from lawful 
transactions, to ensure zakah funds are properly calculated and to influence the IFIs to 
perform their social responsibilities towards the community and other stakeholders 
(Abdallah, 1994).  
Banaga et al. (1994), on the other hand, details the Sharīʿah board’s responsibilities from 
an auditor’s perspective as including answering enquiries, issuing legal opinions, and 
reviewing and revising all business transactions and operations to ensure they are in 
compliance with Sharīʿah principles. This is affirmed by Grais and Pellegrini (2006: 4), 
who summarize the functions of the Sharīʿah board into five main areas, namely ex ante 
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 Iqbal (2002: 47) mentions that one of the factors of the failure of Kleinwort Benson, the first investment 
bank to introduce an Islamic unit trust in 1986, was due to investors’ reservations about the absence of a 
Sharīʿah board. This indicates how important the establishment of Sharīʿah boards in IFIs is for the sake of 
gaining confidence from investors and the general public as well as to ensure Sharīʿah compliance. 
103
 A concept of a group ijtihād in the form of a Sharīʿah board is important, especially within the 
individual IFIs, and its establishment is really necessary to facilitate research, enhance credibility and to 
promote standard practice in the industry (Vogel and Hayes, 2006: 47–50). 




audit, ex post audit, calculation and distribution of zakah, disposing of non- Sharīʿah-
compliant earnings, and advising on the distribution of income and expenses.  
Unlike AbuMouamer (1989), Dawud (1996), Banaga et al. (1994), Abdallah (1994), 
Briston and El-Ashker (1986) and Grais and Pellegrini (2006), who are not Sharīʿah 
scholars, it is worth referring to a Sharīʿah scholar’s views on the functions of the 
Sharīʿah board. Sheikh Yusuf Talal De Lorenzo, a prominent Sharīʿah advisor, describes 
the functions of the Sharīʿah board in IFIs; these include assisting IFIs in the product pre-
certification stage, such as product development and structuring, certifying products by 
means of fatwa, and ensuring Sharīʿah compliance throughout the financial product’s life 
cycle (Delorenzo, 2007: 399–400). In another paper, Delorenzo (2006: 3–11) further 
explains the functions of the Sharīʿah board in the context of the Islamic mutual fund and 
these include consumer advocacy, fiscal and moral portfolio purification, portfolio 
purification with regard to screening stocks, portfolio monitoring of management, fees, 
funds, documentation, industry, product development and zakah. Based on all these 
descriptions from various works of literature, the ideal functions of the Sharīʿah board 
can be summarized as overseeing the ex ante and ex post aspects of the business 
transactions, activities and operations of IFIs for the purpose of Sharīʿah compliance and 
these include advisory, approval and audit roles. 
Despite numerous descriptions of the roles of the Sharīʿah board in the existing literature, 
they fail to differentiate the diverse functions of various models of Sharīʿah advisory 
services. Even though the majority of the Sharīʿah boards share common objectives and 
responsibilities, it is very important to identify and understand their different functions. 
For this reason, the roles of the Sharīʿah board can be divided into three different levels, 
namely international, macro and micro levels. 
(i) The Sharīʿah Board at the International Level 
 
At the international level institution, we may refer to the roles play by the Sharīʿah 
boards of the AAOIFI and the IDB. The AAOIFI has laid down the objectives of its 
Sharīʿah board and these include duties in realizing harmonization and convergence in 




the concepts and application amongst the Sharīʿah supervisory boards of IFIs so as to 
avoid contradiction or inconsistency between the fatwa. The AAOIFI Sharīʿah board is 
also involved in the development of Sharīʿah approved instruments, examining any 
inquiries they receive, and reviewing the standards the AAOIFI issues in accounting, 
auditing and code of ethics and related statements to ensure that these issues are in 
compliance with the rules and principles of Sharīʿah (AAOIFI, 2008a). The AAOIFI 
Sharīʿah board mainly functions as a body to harmonize fatwa and to develop, examine 
and review the Sharīʿah standards. It does not have power to enforce its rulings or 
decisions upon any IFIs. The IDB Sharīʿah board acts as an advisory body to the IDB by 
issuing Sharīʿah opinions and it is also involved in developing the governance standards 
of IFIs together with the IFSB.104  
 
(ii) The Sharīʿah Board at the Macro Level 
To date, there are five jurisdictions that have established Sharīʿah boards at the central 
bank or regulatory authority level, namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Pakistan and 
Sudan. Basically, a national Sharīʿah board plays a role as the authority to establish a 
Sharīʿah governance framework and to formulate national policy and rulings for the 
industry. This is affirmed by the IFSB survey on the practice of Sharīʿah governance in 
69 IFIs from 11 countries, namely Bahrain, Brunei, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan, the UAE and Bangladesh, which indicates that the primary role 
of a national Sharīʿah authority is to establish the Sharīʿah governance framework and 
not as a body for specific rulings for IFIs (IFSB, 2008b: 17). Despite the above findings, 
Sharīʿah boards at the macro level also play a significant role in respect of harmonization 
and standardization of fatwa, and acts as the highest authority for IFIs.105  
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 The Sharīʿah board of the IDB consists of Sheikh Mohamed Mokhtar Sellami as Chairman, Sheikh 
Saleh bin AbdulRahman bin Abdul Aziz Al Husayn as Deputy Chairman, and Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu 
Ghodda, Sheikh Hussein Hamed Hassan, Sheikh Mohammad Ali Taskhiri and Sheikh Mohamed Hashim 
Bin Yahaya as members (IFSB, 2006: ii). 
105
 For instance, the SAC is the highest authority for the ascertainment of Islamic law pertaining to banking 
and finance in Malaysia. The decision made by the SAC is binding and statutorily enforceable to all IFIs in 
Malaysia.  




(iii) The Sharīʿah board at the Micro Level 
The AAOIFI governance standard provides universal guidelines as to the roles and 
functions of the Sharīʿah. board to advise, monitor and supervise the activities of IFIs so 
as to ensure that they are in compliance with the Sharīʿah principles (AAOIFI, 2005). 
Basically, the Sharīʿah board at the micro level performs a range of responsibilities and 
these include participation in product development and structuring activities, reviewing 
and approving matters related with Sharīʿah, issuance of fatwa, Sharīʿah auditing, 
issuance of an annual certification of Sharīʿah compliance (McMillen, 2006: 141), to 
ensure the Sharīʿah compliance of IFIs’ investment in shares, equities, sukuk and other 
business avenues (Ayub, 2007: 363), and computation of zakah. Provisions on the duties 
and objectives of the Sharīʿah board in individual IFIs can be found in the article of 
association, the AAOIFI governance standards and the IFSB guidelines. For instance, 
clause 2.4 of the Islamic Bank of Britain’s article of association specifies its Sharīʿah 
board’s function at ascertaining the bank’s activities to be in conformity with the 
Sharīʿah principles (IBB, 2008).  
To sum up, the Sharīʿah board is normally involved in three main areas of Sharīʿah 
governance, i.e. the issuance of fatwa via collective ijtihād, supervision (raqabah) and 
review (mutābaah). The Sharīʿah board at the micro level has a key function in advising 
Sharīʿah matters, to ensure that the operations comply with Sharīʿah principles, 
endorsing and validating relevant documentations pertaining to the products and services, 
as well as the internal policies, manuals, and marketing advertisements, and ensuring all 
its decisions are properly implemented. The Sharīʿah board at the national (macro) level 
acts as the highest Sharīʿah authority and has ability to establish a Sharīʿah governance 
framework and to formulate national policy and rulings for the industry. Meanwhile, a 
Sharīʿah board at the international level, such as the AAOIFI, is engaged mostly in the 
aspects of harmonization and development of Sharīʿah standards. 




4.5 Models of Sharīʿah Boards 
 
Banaga and Tomkins (1994: 10) describe three main types of Sharīʿah board, namely that 
which is composed of Sharīʿah scholars, the judicial advisors who are authorized to deal 
with Sharīʿah issues, an in-house Sharīʿah department staffed with Sharīʿah experts, who 
provide professional services in relation to Sharīʿah matters, and the third form of 
Sharīʿah board allows individuals other than Sharīʿah scholars to be appointed as its 
members, as in the case of the SBP and BNM. The researcher offers a further 
classification of the Sharīʿah board into internal and external Sharīʿah boards, where the 
former refers to the in-house Sharīʿah board of IFIs and the latter to the Sharīʿah boards 
at national and international levels, Sharīʿah advisory firms and individuals undertaking 
Sharīʿah advisory services. In addition, there are standard-setting agencies that do not 
issue fatwa but play a role in developing Sharīʿah standards and issuing guidelines on 
Sharīʿah governance, namely the AAOIFI and the IFSB. 
4.5.1 Internal Sharīʿah Boards 
 
(i) Sharīʿah Boards at Individual IFI Level 
This model is the most prevalent practice of IFIs. Generally, an IFI is required to 
establish its Sharīʿah board as stipulated in the article of association.106 The internal 
Sharīʿah board structure may vary from one board to another. The objective of the 
establishment of the Sharīʿah board, as stated in the article of association, determines the 
nature of its governance structure. This model lets an individual IFI establish its own 
Sharīʿah board, regardless of its parent or group companies. For instance, HSBC Amanah 
has a different Sharīʿah board in each of its subsidiaries to suit the legal environment of 
the local market.107 
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(ii) Central Sharīʿah Board for the Whole Group 
Unlike the former model, this model centralizes the Sharīʿah board for a whole group of 
companies. Although IFIs of this model are involved in cross border transactions, there is 
one central Sharīʿah board that undertakes responsibility for matters pertaining to 
Sharīʿah compliance. This model is practised by the Dallah al-Baraka Group. This model 
nevertheless seems to be inefficient in most jurisdictions, since a single Sharīʿah board is 
incapable of handling numerous Sharīʿah issues from various jurisdictions at one 
particular time.  
4.5.2 External Sharīʿah Boards  
External Sharīʿah boards can be further classified into national Sharīʿah boards, Sharīʿah 
boards at international level, Sharīʿah advisory firms and individuals undertaking 
Sharīʿah advisory services.  
(i) National Sharīʿah Boards 
There are a few Sharīʿah boards established by governments, particularly at the national 
level, either by the central bank or securities commission, such as in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Brunei, Pakistan and Sudan, or by other government agencies such as the Ministry of 
Awqaf in the case of Kuwait. Another form of national Sharīʿah board refers to the 
practice in Iran by which the Council of Guardians plays a role as the only institution that 
deals with Islamic banking and finance matters (Dar and Azami, 2010: 184). Unlike the 
model in Malaysia, Brunei, Pakistan and Sudan, which also allows the establishment of 
Sharīʿah boards at the institution level, the practice in Iran recognizes the Council of 
Guardians as the sole Sharīʿah authority for IFIs. All these national Sharīʿah boards 
nevertheless have common functions as the highest fatwa authority for IFIs and aim at 
harmonizing and standardizing Sharīʿah practices and all its decisions are final and 
binding. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Committee to supervise businesses and operations in seven regions (UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Mauritius, the United States and the UK) and a Regional Sharīʿah Committee to oversee Sharīʿah 
compliance matters in respective markets (HSBC, 2009).  




(ii) Sharīʿah Boards at International Level 
A Sharīʿah board at international level normally refers to an independent Sharīʿah body 
established by the mutual cooperation of several Muslim countries, such as the AAOIFI 
and the IDB. The AAOIFI Sharīʿah board has different functions from the internal and 
national Sharīʿah boards as it plays a role in developing Sharīʿah standards and 
promoting uniformity of Sharīʿah governance practice (AAOIFI, 2008a). The IDB 
Sharīʿah board provides internal Sharīʿah advisory services to the IDB as well as being 
involved in developing the governance standard of IFIs. Usually, the composition of the 
AAOIFI and the IDB is comprised of the eminent Sharīʿah scholars in the world from 
diverse backgrounds. All of these scholars are considered as the leading experts in fiqh al 
muāmalāt and enjoy high authority in the Sharīʿah aspect of Islamic finance. 
(iii) Sharīʿah Advisory Firms 
A Sharīʿah advisory firm is an organization which offers Sharīʿah services, either as a 
supervisory or consultative function, such as the Institute of Islamic Banking and 
Insurance (IIBI), the International Institute of Islamic Finance Incorporated (IIIF), the 
Islamic Banking and Finance Institute of Malaysia (IBFIM), Yasaar Limited (YL), the 
Minhaj Sharīʿah Financial Advisory (MSFA), Failaka International (FI), BMB Islamic 
(BMBI) and Taqwaa Advisory and Sharīʿah Investment Solutions (TASIS).108 These 
organizations are business entities and not part of any IFIs as they provide consultative 
and supervisory services for various aspects of banking and finance including matters 
related with Sharīʿah. In terms of ownership, the current practice shows that Sharīʿah 
advisory firms are either owned by independent parties (e.g. IIBI), IFIs (e.g. BMBI and 
IBFIM), legal firms or even by Sharīʿah scholars themselves (e.g. FI, YL, IIIF and 
MSFA).  
All of the above entities provide various Sharīʿah consultancy services such as Sharīʿah 
reviews, auditing and product endorsement. The nature of these Sharīʿah advisory firms’ 
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roles and responsibilities is more towards providing Sharīʿah compliance and 
consultancy services. The IFIs that seek their services have to pay consultancy and other 
related fees based on the degree and extent of the services rendered. The decisions or 
rulings made by the Sharīʿah advisory firms nevertheless are not binding upon the IFIs 
since their roles are merely advisory. 
(iv) Individuals Undertaking Sharīʿah Advisory Roles 
This form of Sharīʿah advisory services is rarely utilized by IFIs. In the absence of an 
internal Sharīʿah board, instead of hiring a Sharīʿah advisory firm, IFIs may seek 
Sharīʿah advisory services from individual Sharīʿah experts. This model is more 
prevalent in the case of Islamic windows, IFIs in non-Muslim countries or small scale 
companies.109  
4.6 International Standard-Setting Agencies 
The existing standard-setting agencies, such as the OECD, the International Organization 
of Securities Commission (IOSCO) and the BCBS, have issued numerous guidelines on 
governance and risk management for financial institutions. The OECD has issued 
Guidelines on Corporate Governance, the IOSCO on Capital Market and the BCBS on 
Basel Committee I, II and possibly III in the future. Nevertheless, these standard 
guidelines have failed to address specific issues of Islamic finance. As the nature and 
financing model of Islamic finance are different those in its conventional counterparts, 
the need for an independent standard-setting agency specifically for Islamic finance is 
really crucial. Hence, with the initiative of several IFIs and regulatory authorities, the 
AAOIFI and the IFSB were established in 2002 and 2004 respectively. The difference 
between the two is that the IFSB is more concerned with regulators while the AAOIFI 
focuses on the individual IFI level. Although the guidelines and governance standards of 
the AAOIFI and the IFSB are not officially binding, the principles embedded in those 
documents are certainly taken into consideration by policy makers and practitioners.  
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4.6.1 The AAOIFI Governance Standards 
 
The AAOIFI has issued 81 standards and guidelines, including 25 accounting standards, 
6 auditing standards, 7 governance standards, 41 Sharīʿah standards and 2 codes of ethics 
(IFSB, 2010). In the absence of any corporate governance framework for IFIs in the late 
1990s, the AAOIFI took the initiative to provide basic guidelines for Sharīʿah 
governance in its governance standards Nos. 1–5. It is important to note that these five 
standards must not be read in isolation as they complement each other.  
 
(i) Governance Standard for IFIs No. 1: Sharīʿah Supervisory Board: 
Appointment, Composition and Report 
 
Governance Standard No.1 was adopted by the Accounting and Auditing Standard Board 
(AASB) in its meeting No. 13 held on 15–16th June 1997 (AAOIFI, 2005). It consists of 
eight parts, namely introduction, definition, appointment, composition, selection and 
dismissal, basic elements of report, publication of the report, publication of Sharīʿah 
rulings and guidelines, and the effective date. Section 2 represents the most important 
provision in Governance Standard No.1. It has three elements which define the term 
‘Sharīʿah board’. Firstly, a Sharīʿah board is an independent body of specialized jurists 
in fiqh al muāmalāt. This section allows the appointment of Sharīʿah board members 
who are not specialized in fiqh al muāmalāt but who are expert in the field of Islamic 
finance. Secondly, it elaborates the role of the Sharīʿah board to ensure compliance with 
Sharīʿah principles by having the authority to direct, review and supervise the activities 
of IFIs. Thirdly, it indicates the binding authority of the Sharīʿah board upon the IFIs.  
 
Sections 3–6 mention the process of appointment and remuneration of the Sharīʿah 
board. With the motive of ensuring the independence of the Sharīʿah board, the AAOIFI 
prefers appointments as well as dismissals to be made by the shareholders in the AGM 
upon recommendation of the BOD. In view of the practicalities in actual market practice, 
the appointment of the Sharīʿah board as recommended by the AAOIFI may not always 
be appropriate. The researcher considers that the appointment of board members may 
also be made by the BOD with the consideration that there are other mechanisms to 




ensure independence and to manage any potential conflict of interest, such as 
appointment and termination being subject to the approval of the regulatory authorities. 
The terms of the appointment must be agreed by the Sharīʿah board and need to be 
recorded. In terms of remuneration, the BOD, with the authorization of the shareholders, 
has the authority to fix appropriate remuneration for the Sharīʿah board. The AAOIFI 
requires the composition of a Sharīʿah board to be a minimum of three members. The 
directors or significant shareholders of the IFIs cannot be appointed as Sharīʿah board 
members, even if they are qualified. Sections 9–26 specify the format of the Sharīʿah 
report, which must be published in the annual report of the IFI. 
 
(ii) Governance Standard for IFIs No. 2: Sharīʿah Review  
 
Governance Standard No.2 was adopted by the AASB in its meeting No. 15 held on 21st–
22nd June 1998 (AAOIFI, 2005a). It consists of eight parts with eighteen sections. Section 
3 explains the Sharīʿah review as an examination of the extent of the IFIs’ Sharīʿah 
compliance. While this section further confirms the Sharīʿah board’s authority to access 
all necessary information for the Sharīʿah review, section 5 on the other hand puts the 
responsibility for compliance upon the management. The Sharīʿah board is only 
responsible for forming and expressing opinions on the extent of Sharīʿah compliance. 
Sections 7–13 detail the Sharīʿah review procedures, which involve planning, designing, 
executing, preparing and reviewing. The Sharīʿah review report should be submitted to 
the AGM.  
 
(iii) Governance Standard for IFIs No. 3: Internal Sharīʿah Review  
 
Governance Standard No. 3 was adopted by the AASB in its meeting No. 17 held on 13–
14th June 1999 (AAOIFI, 2005b). It consists of eleven parts and thirty sections which 
complement Governance Standard No. 2. Standard No. 3 aims at establishing standards 
and guidance on the internal Sharīʿah review. As the management of IFIs is responsible 
for the extent of Sharīʿah compliance, it is incumbent upon them to have a proper 
mechanism of internal Sharīʿah review. While the AAOIFI requires IFIs to carry out an 




internal Sharīʿah review, it does not specify the requirement of establishing a separate 
internal Sharīʿah audit department. The internal Sharīʿah review can be carried out by 
either an independent department or part of the internal audit division.  
 
The AAOIFI insists that the internal Sharīʿah review must be conducted independently 
and comply with the Code of Ethics for Accountants and Auditors of IFIs. The 
management and the BOD must give full and continuous support to the internal Sharīʿah 
reviewers. In this aspect, the head of the internal Sharīʿah reviewers is accountable to the 
BOD. Since the nature of the internal Sharīʿah review is different to the normal auditing 
process, the internal Sharīʿah reviewer must be proficient and have the appropriate 
academic background and necessary training relevant to Sharīʿah review, particularly 
proficiency in Sharīʿah and fiqh al muāmalāt. The reporting structure requires the head of 
the internal Sharīʿah review to discuss the findings with the management and the final 
report must be addressed to the BOD and copied to the Sharīʿah board and management. 
Any disputes between management and internal Sharīʿah reviewers should be referred to 
the Sharīʿah board for determination. 
 
(iv) Governance Standard for IFIs No. 4: Audit and Governance Committee  
  
Governance Standard No. 4 was adopted by the AASB in its meeting No. 21 held in May 
2001 (AAOIFI, 2005c). To complement the corporate governance framework for IFIs, 
the AAOIFI strongly recommends the establishment of an Audit and Governance 
Committee (AGC) at the board level. The AGC should consist of a minimum of three 
members, appointed by the BOD from its non-executive and independent board 
members, who are knowledgeable about the affairs of the institution and applicable 
regulations and laws, including Sharīʿah rules and principles. 
 
On top of the Sharīʿah board and the BOD, the AGC has the specific function of 
preserving the integrity of financial reporting, processes, safeguarding the interest of 
stakeholders, providing additional assurance on the reliability of information and acting 
as an independent link between the management and other stakeholders. It is incumbent 




upon the AGC to conduct reviews of internal controls, accounting practices and audit 
plans, interim and annual accounts, financial reports, compliance with Sharīʿah 
principles, and the use of restricted investment accounts’ funds in accordance with the 
AAOIFI’s Code of Ethics for Accountants and Auditors of IFIs. The AGC report should 
then be submitted to the BOD and copied to the CEO.  
 
(v) Governance Standard for IFIs No. 5: Independence of Sharīʿah Board  
 
Governance Standard No. 5 was adopted by the AASB in its meeting No. 29 held on 7–
8th June 2005 and is aimed at providing guidelines for its independence and mechanisms 
to resolve issues of independence (AAOIFI, 2005d). There are nine sections with an 
appendix of an example of a possible issue of independence impairment. The state of 
independence of the Sharīʿah board is of the essence in enhancing public confidence on 
the aspect of Sharīʿah compliance. Section 3 restricts the Sharīʿah board to subordinating 
their judgment on Sharīʿah supervision to third parties. The Sharīʿah board is not 
recommended to consist of employees of the same IFIs or be involved in managerial 
decisions and operational responsibilities. The Sharīʿah board is required to conduct 
continuous assessment of the IFIs and do anything necessary to resolve any issues of 
independence impairment.110  
 
4.6.2 The IFSB Guiding Principles 
The IFSB is another standard-setting agency with the exclusive aim of supporting the 
Islamic finance industry in terms of regulations, guidelines, training, research, databases 
and standard practices, and promoting greater uniformity. The IFSB does not have its 
own Sharīʿah board as it plays a different role to internal and external Sharīʿah boards 
and it does not issue any fatwa or rulings pertaining to Islamic banking and finance. The 
objectives of the IFSB include establishing various standards and recommending them 
for adoption, providing supervisory and regulatory guidelines, encouraging cooperation 
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among its members, facilitating training and development, undertaking research, and 
establishing databases of participants in the Islamic finance industry (IFSB, 2008a).  
The IFSB has issued ten guiding principles for IFIs: two for capital adequacy 
requirements,111 one for risk management,112 and seven for governance, disclosure and 
supervisory review processes.113 The need for a Sharīʿah governance mechanism has 
already been addressed in the IFSB-1 and the IFSB-5, which both insist IFIs establish 
appropriate policies and institutional arrangements to manage operational risks, 
specifically Sharīʿah-compliance risks, as well as specifying the mechanism of the 
supervisory review process. In addition, the IFSB-3, IFSB-6 and IFSB-8 specify the 
governance standards for IFIs, Islamic Collective Investment Schemes and Takāful 
respectively. All of these earlier guidelines only address the general framework of 
corporate governance without specifying its relevance to the Sharīʿah governance matter 
exclusively. The IFSB then initiated the IFSB-10, which specifically addresses the issue 
of the Sharīʿah governance system in IFIs. The basic premise of the IFSB-10 is to 
promote best practice of Sharīʿah governance by emphasizing four key elements, which 
can be summarized as follows: 
                                                 
111
 The IFSB-2: Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions (other than Insurance Institutions) offering only 
Islamic Financial Services (IFSB, 2003) and the IFSB-7: Capital Adequacy Requirements for Sukuk, 
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Table 4.2: Key Elements of Sharīʿah Governance in the IFSB-10 
 
Key Element Principle Operational Framework 
Fit and proper criteria 
Professional training 
Competence 
Formal assessment  
Ex ante: Screening process 
Ex post: Review and assessment 





and timely information  
Ex ante: Appointment, disclosure and full 
mandate 
Ex post: Review and assessment  
Confidentiality Strictly observe the 
confidentiality 
Ex ante: Undertaking secrecy 
Ex post: Review and assessment 
Consistency Fully understand the 
legal and regulatory 
framework strictly 
observes the said 
framework 
There must be consistency in all ex ante and 
ex post Sharīʿah governance processes 
 
Source: IFSB (2009): modified. 
 
The Sharīʿah governance framework of the IFSB-10 tends to cover the overall aspects of 
Sharīʿah compliance processes by invoking the very important elements necessary for an 
effective Sharīʿah governance system. At this point, it is the duty of regulatory 
authorities to determine the adoption of the IFSB-10 as this guiding principle on the 
Sharīʿah governance system is strongly commendable. Nevertheless, there is some 
inconsistency between the IFSB-10 and the AAOIFI governance standards which needs 
to be resolved. Since some jurisdictions, such as Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar, have 
already adopted the AAOIFI governance standards while others have remained silent, the 
IFSB-10 may be irrelevant to these jurisdictions. In addition, the IFSB-10 seems to fail to 
provide adequate framework for a Sharīʿah advisory firm. With the trend for Sharīʿah 
advisory firms being likely to increase in time, it is of the utmost importance to have 
adequate guidelines and guiding principles for such a practice.  
4.7 Sharīʿah Governance Process 
The most important element of Sharīʿah governance refers to its process. The Sharīʿah 
governance process represents the instrumental functions of the Sharīʿah board as part of 




the internal governance structure of corporate governance in IFIs. This section provides a 
brief explanation of the Sharīʿah governance process and this includes the appointment, 
composition and qualification of the Sharīʿah board, the Sharīʿah compliance process, 
Sharīʿah coordination, the Sharīʿah compliance review and the Sharīʿah report.  
4.7.1 Appointment 
In contemporary practice, the members of the Sharīʿah board are appointed by the 
shareholders in the annual general meeting (AGM) or by the BOD. The IAIB document 
mentions that, in order to ensure freedom and independence, the Sharīʿah board members 
must not be working as personnel in the bank and are not subject to the authority of BOD 
(Rammal, 2006: 205). In addition, the AAOIFI governance standard provides that the 
shareholders have the authority to appoint members of the Sharīʿah board during the 
AGM but the BOD does not have this authority.114 This is to ensure the independence of 
the Sharīʿah board because the management board does not have power to appoint or to 
dismiss any members of the board as the authority is vested in the shareholders. In the 
case of appointment made by the shareholders during the AGM with the recommendation 
by the BOD, the Sharīʿah board is allowed to attend the BOD meetings to discuss the 
religious aspects of their decisions (Nathan and Ribiere, 2007: 472). 
In actual practice, numerous IFIs appoint members of their Sharīʿah board through their 
BOD, as in the case of Jordan, Malaysia and Pakistan.115 Section 27 (a) of the Jordanian 
Islamic Banking Law provides that the BOD will appoint a Sharīʿah advisor amongst the 
experts on Sharīʿah for a maximum period of five years (Bakar, 2002: 78).116 In Pakistan, 
the appointment of the Sharīʿah board should be approved by the BOD in the case of 
domestic IFIs and, in the case of foreign banks having Islamic banking subsidiaries, the 
appointment should be made by the management (SBP, 2008: 1). The practice is different 
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 For instance, in the case of the Sharīʿah board of Al Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia, the appointment is 
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 Of sixty-nine IFIs, 86% indicate that their Sharīʿah board members are represented in other institutions 
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in the case of the appointment of Sharīʿah board members at the national level where the 
power is vested in the government, as in the case of the Sharīʿah board of the Central 
Bank of Sudan117 and Malaysia. In Malaysia, the Sharīʿah board of the BNM is appointed 
by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the recommendation of the finance minister pursuant to 
the CBA. On this basis, it can be concluded that there are various practices of the method 
of appointment of the Sharīʿah board across jurisdictions.   
4.7.2 Composition 
 
At present, a Sharīʿah board is normally comprised of Sharīʿah scholars who are experts 
in fiqh al muāmalāt and usul al fiqh. The composition of the Sharīʿah board members 
varies from one IFI to another. The Sharīʿah board at the international institutions and at 
the national level is usually comprised of leading internationalist  and regional scholars, 
whereas Sharīʿah boards of individual IFIs consist of regional and local scholars, with 
some of them also having so-called internationalist scholars sitting on their Sharīʿah 
board.118  
 
By and large, most IFIs appoint three to six members on their Sharīʿah board. The 
AAOIFI Sharīʿah board is composed of not more than twenty members who are 
appointed by the Board of Trustees for a four-year term from among Sharīʿah scholars. 
The AAOIFI governance standard requires at least three members at IFI level and this is 
followed by a few countries such as Bahrain, Dubai, Jordan,119 Lebanon,120 the UAE121 
and Malaysia. For instance, Sharīʿah governance in Indonesia puts a requirement of a 
minimum of two persons and maximum of not more than half the number of members of 
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the BOD of the IFI.122 The Sharīʿah board of the SBP is comprised of two Sharīʿah 
scholars and three experts in the areas of banking, accounting and law and at each 
individual IFI there must be at least one Sharīʿah advisor and the Sharīʿah board may be 
set up at the bank’s discretion (Ayub, 2007: 473). 
4.7.3 Qualification 
It is contended that the ideal Sharīʿah board members are those who are experts in 
Sharīʿah and law, specifically in the area of fiqh al muāmalāt and usul al fiqh. The reason 
behind this is that the Sharīʿah board mostly deals with the issues related with 
commercial transactions (Bakar, 2002: 74–89). The AAOIFI governance standards and 
the IFSB-10 allow the appointment of an inexpert person in fiqh al muāmalāt to be a 
Sharīʿah board member123 with the purpose of strengthening the ability of the Sharīʿah 
board to scrutinize and understand banking business and its operations, as in the case of 
the SBP and BNM.  
The Sharīʿah boards of the SBP and the BNM consist of experts from various fields, 
including Sharīʿah scholars, chartered accountants, lawyers, judges and central bankers. 
The SBP has gone even further by putting very strict conditions on its Sharīʿah board 
members. In terms of educational qualification, any board member must have a minimum 
of a 2nd Class Bachelor Degree in Economics or a degree with Takhassus Fil Fiqh and 
sufficient understanding of banking and finance or a postgraduate degree in Islamic 
jurisprudence or Usuluddin or LL.M (Sharīʿah) from any recognized university with 
exposure to banking and finance (SBP, 2007: 1). In the aspect of experience and 
exposure, any members must have at least three years’ experience of giving Sharīʿah 
rulings or at least five years’ experience in research and development in Islamic banking 
and finance (SBP, 2007: 1). The SBP also insists on the capability of mastering or having 
reasonable knowledge of Arabic and English languages (SBP, 2007: 1). All of these 
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 The Act No. 7 of 1992 of the Republic of Indonesia as amended by Act 10 of 1998, Regulation 
4/1/PBI/2002 is the governing law on the aspect of Sharīʿah governance (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006: 31). 
See also Ilyas, (2008).  
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 Those Sharīʿah board members, however, need to have a certain degree of knowledge of Islamic 
commercial law. In this regard, the majority of the Sharīʿah board members must be Sharīʿah scholars in 
order to avoid the dominance of inexpert Sharīʿah advisors in the decision-making process (Bakar, 
2002:77–78). 




requirements will enable the board to establish a higher standard of practice of Sharīʿah 
governance in IFIs, which is extremely important. 
4.7.4 The Sharīʿah Compliance Process 
Every IFI has its own procedures for its Sharīʿah governance system. There is currently 
no specific standard guideline for Sharīʿah governance as to the aspects of management, 
products approval, and ex ante and post ante auditing. The practice is that there is a 
Sharīʿah secretariat or department to coordinate and handle Sharīʿah matters. The officer 
in the Sharīʿah department mostly handles clerical and office works pertaining to 
Sharīʿah board matters, such as compiling and handling documents that need to be 
presented during the Sharīʿah board meeting.  
In terms of meeting, the Sharīʿah board normally has a weekly or monthly meeting 
depending on the needs of the individual IFI. Research conducted by Aboumouamer 
(1996: 188) reveals that of forty-one Sharīʿah boards, ten or 24.4% have a weekly 
meeting, three or 7.3% have a monthly meeting, twenty or 48.8% have a quarterly 
meeting and one or 2.4% has a biannual meeting. The meeting varies from one Sharīʿah 
board to another and it may be attended by the CEO, management, bank officers, legal 
officers, lawyers and representatives from the IFI’s branches. The range of attendees 
depends on the Sharīʿah issues involved, whether they relate to operational, product, 
legal documentation or any other matters.  
 
A Sharīʿah board meeting involves discussion of various Sharīʿah issues including the 
concept and structure of new and existing products, documentations, operations and 
investment portfolios. Sharīʿah board members will receive all relevant documents from 
the IFI at least a week before the date of the meeting to give them sufficient time to read 
and study the documents. The meeting will be chaired by the chairman of the Sharīʿah 
board and the decisions are usually made unanimously. Some Sharīʿah boards allow 
decisions to be made by a simple majority and this happens mostly in the case of sukuk 
issuance by an international IFI (Ayub, 2007: 472). A certain Sharīʿah board practice 
requires one of its members to be the administrative member. The administrative board 




member acts as a selection committee who has the authority to exercise discretion over 
whether to convene discussion on specific issue or not (McMillen, 2006: 141). Another 
practice grants power to the Sharīʿah officer to decide the matter. The determination of 
the Sharīʿah board in the meeting will then be distributed to the relevant parties in the IFI 
for reference and they are bound to follow all of its decisions.  
4.7.5 Sharīʿah Coordination 
 
Sharīʿah coordination is vital to the Sharīʿah governance system and is as important as 
the company secretary is to the BOD. The Sharīʿah coordinator acts as a secretary or 
liaison officer that coordinates the Sharīʿah governance process, including the interaction 
with the Sharīʿah board, internal or external review, and other organs of governance. This 
study identifies several models of Sharīʿah coordination which can be classified into the 
following: secretary of the Sharīʿah board serving as the Sharīʿah coordinator, internal 
Sharīʿah coordinator, Sharīʿah compliance officer, Sharīʿah coordination department, 
external Sharīʿah coordination, Sharīʿah advisory firm as external Sharīʿah coordinator, 
internal Sharīʿah liaison officer (Dar, 2009). The most prevalent practice of Sharīʿah 
coordination is having a secretary of the Sharīʿah board or a Sharīʿah compliance officer 
serving as the Sharīʿah coordinator. In fact, some Sharīʿah compliance officers in IFIs 
play many roles and not only act as Sharīʿah coordinators but also have the responsibility 
of handling the Sharīʿah review process.  
4.7.6 Sharīʿah Compliance Review 
 
Unlike conventional banks, IFIs are required to undertake a Sharīʿah review and internal 
Sharīʿah review process for the purpose of ensuring that all transactions are in 
conformity with Sharīʿah principles. In the former, the Sharīʿah board examines the 
extent of Sharīʿah compliance of the IFIs’ products, activities and business transactions, 
whereas the latter refers to the examination of the extent of Sharīʿah compliance by an 
independent internal Sharīʿah audit or as part of the internal audit based on the Sharīʿah 
rulings, guidelines and instructions issued by the Sharīʿah board. The Sharīʿah board is 




normally assisted by this internal audit unit to review the Sharīʿah compliance aspects in 
IFIs.  
 
The chief purpose of the Sharīʿah review exercise is to ensure compliance with the 
Sharīʿah rules and principles as reflected in the rulings and instructions issued by the 
Sharīʿah board. In this regard, the AAOIFI governance standards lay down several 
procedures for Sharīʿah reviews and these include planning review procedures, executing 
review procedures, preparing and reviewing working papers as well as procedures in 
documenting conclusions and preparing the Sharīʿah review report (AAOIFI, 2005a). In 
actual practice, there is no standard format for Sharīʿah review procedures or the 
Sharīʿah compliance report. The IFSB survey shows that more than 90% of sixty-nine 
IFIs undertake a Sharīʿah compliance review (IFSB, 2008b: 27). As the main objective of 
the Sharīʿah review is to ensure that the management of the IFI is discharging its 
responsibilities in compliance with Sharīʿah rules and principles, the scope of a Sharīʿah 
review is different from a normal auditing task as it specifically concerns the Sharīʿah 
aspects and the process is guided by Islamic principles.  
 
The Sharīʿah review addresses the Sharīʿah compliance matters of products offered and 
this process needs a sound Sharīʿah internal control system. The Sharīʿah review process 
requires an internal auditor to review every stage of the Sharīʿah governance process and 
this includes the conception of a product, product design, product documentation, product 
testing, product implementation and product review. The Sharīʿah review practice 
nevertheless indicates that the majority of IFIs are not involved in a review of their 
products (IFSB, 2008b: 29). In most IFIs, the Sharīʿah review is carried out by the 
internal auditors either as part of the regular internal audit or as a separate part of the 
Sharīʿah audit. Some IFIs prefer to use the external auditor for its Sharīʿah review 
requirements.124 The IFSB demonstrates that 41% of IFIs adopt an external review and 
89% an internal review (IFSB, 2008b: 34). The Sharīʿah compliance framework in 
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 The current practice indicates that the external review panel consists of 19% auditors, 13% Sharīʿah 
board and 21% supervisory authority while the internal review comprises of 73% Sharīʿah board, 37% 
internal auditors and and 17% audit committee (IFSB, 2008b: 35). 




Pakistan puts a mandatory requirement for an annual Sharīʿah review and auditors of the 
SBP conduct periodical Sharīʿah compliance inspections in every individual IFI. On top 
of that, the SBP has issued a manual for Sharīʿah reviews for IFIs to ensure a uniform 
review process, Sharīʿah compliance and to enhance the credibility of the Islamic finance 
system (Ayub, 2007: 474).  
 
Basically, the Sharīʿah board has a responsibility to perform pre-audit, audit and post-
audit functions. This is evident in Aboumouamer’s (1996: 285–288) findings, which 
show that 78% of the Sharīʿah board members perform pre-audit work, 80.5% during the 
audit work and 61% post-audit work. Some Sharīʿah boards do not engage directly in the 
Sharīʿah auditing process due to their small size and most of them are not employees of 
the respective IFIs and have limited time and material resources to do the job. Moreover, 
they are also not qualified to perform the auditing task because of lack of audit skills and 
required knowledge on the operational side of IFIs’ activities (Banaga et al., 1994: 65). 
Typically, the Sharīʿah board will only be involved in the Sharīʿah auditing process 
when there is dispute or issue over Sharīʿah matters which need its deliberation. This 
requires that the auditor who is responsible for undertaking the Sharīʿah auditing process 
possesses adequate religious knowledge to be able to identify Sharīʿah issues and give 
opinions on compliance with Sharīʿah rules.  
 
Khan (1985: 36–38) suggests that the specific areas in which the Sharīʿah auditor would 
report to include bakhs (decrease in the quality of the product), taṭfīf (causing damage to 
the other party in weights and measures), uqūd (contract), ihtikār (hoarding), khiyānah 
(embezzlements), isrāf (extravagance), tanājush (bidding up prices in auction by planting 
a fake bidder) and speculation. The scope of the Sharīʿah review proposed by Khan 
seems to cover a very wide area of audit which is ambiguous and complex. In actual 
practice, the Sharīʿah review contains of observations and assessments of systems and 
controls for Sharīʿah compliance, recommendations for potential improvements, 
corrective actions need to be taken (SBP, 2008: 2) and the audit of zakah funds 
(Aboumouamer, 1996: 79–80). In the event of disputes or conflict of opinion between 
management and Sharīʿah auditors, the matters may be referred to individual Sharīʿah 




boards. Similarly to the normal review process, the Sharīʿah review report should be 
presented before the Sharīʿah board, the audit committee, the BOD and the shareholders 
of the IFIs.  
4.7.7 Sharīʿah Report 
 
Sharīʿah governance favours fair and true disclosure and transparency. The fundamental 
concept of governance in Sharīʿah is accountability and hence requires IFIs to make true 
disclosure and to provide accurate necessary information. This is in line with the spirit of 
al-Qur’an where Allah says “O ye who believe! When ye deal with each other in 
transactions involving future obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing 
and let a scribe write down faithfully as between the parties” (Al-Qur’an, 2: 282). This 
verse mandates and strongly encourages that any business dealing or transaction should 
be recorded and written down in a proper way. In the context of Sharīʿah governance, it 
refers to the duty of the Sharīʿah board to produce a Sharīʿah report either periodically or 
annually.125 
 
The Sharīʿah board is expected to prepare and issue a report on its activities, information 
on duties and services, Sharīʿah pronouncements and declaration of Sharīʿah compliance. 
As a general practice, the Sharīʿah report will be submitted to the BOD. Some IFIs 
submit the Sharīʿah report to the BOD and even further seek the endorsement of the 
shareholders.126 Current practice shows that only 49% of IFIs present the Sharīʿah report 
to the shareholders for approval and 48% to the audit committee (IFSB, 2008b: 35). This 
position perhaps reflects the mode of appointment of the Sharīʿah board and whether it 
was made through the BOD or the shareholders. 
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 A survey conducted by Al Hajj on fourteen institutional investors, thirty-three IFIs and thirty IFI 
customers in 2009 revealed that the customers and the IFIs were very concerned about the Sharīʿah report 
and ranked it as very important compared to the institutional investors (Al Hajj, 2003: 228–229). Another 
study carried out by Sulaiman Al Mehmadi (2004: 228) revealed that 57% to 86% of 117 investors in IFIs 
in Saudi Arabia considered the Sharīʿah report as an important componet for making investment decisions. 
These findings indicate that the IFIs as well as investors generally understand the importance of the 
Sharīʿah report. At this point, IFIs are expected to be more transparent in providing adequate and reliable 
information in the Sharīʿah report.  
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 In the case of IFIs in Pakistan, the Sharīʿah boards of Islamic banks should report to their BOD while 
the Sharīʿah boards of foreign banks that have Islamic banking branches should report to the CEO or 
country head of the bank (SBP, 2008).  




The content of the annual Sharīʿah report is generally information as to the duties and 
services of the IFI, fatwa issuance, the Sharīʿah board’s activities, and a declaration on 
Sharīʿah compliance (Banaga et al., 1994:11–13). Haniffa and Hudaib (2007: 102–103) 
view that the Sharīʿah report should contain more information, including names, pictures 
and remuneration of the Sharīʿah board, number of meetings held, disclosure as to the 
defects in the products offered and recommendations to rectify the defects including 
actions taken by management, basis of examination of the documents, declaration of 
Sharīʿah compliance, and signatures of all Sharīʿah board members. 
 
Practice indicates that most Sharīʿah reports are concerned with the aspect of product 
compliance rather than emphasizing the efficiency of the internal Sharīʿah control system 
(IFSB, 2008b: 48). The Instructions for Sharīʿah Compliance in Islamic Banking 
Institutions of Pakistan states specific requirements for the Sharīʿah report and these 
include examining all transactions, relevant documentation and procedures, observing 
whether the IFI has complied with Sharīʿah rules and principles, scrutinizing whether the 
allocation of funds, profit sharing ratios, profits and charging of losses is in accordance 
with Sharīʿah, and ensuring that any earnings that have been realized from illegitimate 
sources have been credited to the charity account (SBP, 2008: 4–5).  
 
In terms of the format of the Sharīʿah report, the AAOIFI governance standards provide 
specific guidelines and a format for the Sharīʿah report. In actual practice, the format and 
content of the Sharīʿah report are nevertheless different and even some of the Sharīʿah 
boards do not issue an annual report. A survey conducted by Grais and Pellegrini (2006: 
8) found that four out of thirteen IFIs failed to issue a Sharīʿah report. Other research 
carried out by Maali et al. (2006: 285) discovered that, from a sample of twenty-nine 
banks, only 72% or twenty-one banks issued a Sharīʿah report. The Sharīʿah report is 
very important as an endorsement of the compliance of an IFI with Sharīʿah principles 
and it is considered a crucial means by which the general public and interested parties can 
find information about to what extent services and products of the IFI meet the Sharīʿah 
requirements. For this reason, due to the very essence of the Sharīʿah report, the Sharīʿah 




board should issue the annual Sharīʿah report in accordance with the specific format laid 
down by the AAOIFI governance standards.  
4.8 Issues and Challenges  
 
The cross-border practice of Islamic finance raises significant issues and poses great 
challenges to the Islamic finance industry, in particular to its Sharīʿah governance 
system. Since Sharīʿah compliance aspects cannot be compromised at any time, these 
unresolved issues and challenges must be properly addressed. This study identifies six 
main issues and challenges pertaining to the Sharīʿah governance system which are of the 
essence to the Islamic finance industry.127  
4.8.1 Independence of Sharīʿah Board 
There has long been debate on the issue of the independence128 of the Sharīʿah board. 
One of the reasons is that Sharīʿah board members receive remuneration from the IFIs129 
and there exists a potential of conflict of interest by which members could legitimize 
unlawful or dubious operations to ensure they remain in the Sharīʿah board (Rammal, 
2006: 207). Even though such an assumption is not truly accurate, as the Sharīʿah board 
members are expected to be guided by moral beliefs and religious values,130 it still needs 
a proper framework in the form of policy or regulation because the credibility of IFIs 
depends on the perceived independence of the Sharīʿah board.131 In fact, with the 
                                                 
127
 Grais and Pellegrini (2006b: 20) identified five major corporate governance issues, namely 
independence, confidentiality, competence, consistency and disclosure. This study adds other significant 
unresolved issues specific to the Sharīʿah governance system. 
128
 The IFSB-10 explains the independence of the Sharīʿah board as the ability to exercise sound judgment 
after fair consideration of all relevant information and views without influence from management or 
inappropriate outside interests. Section 2 of the AAOIFI Governance Standard No. 5 defines independence 
as “an attitude of mind which does not allow the view points and conclusions of its possessor to become 
reliant on or subordinate to the influences and pressures of conflicting interests. It is achieved through 
organizational status and objectivity” (AAOIFI, 2005d). 
129
 The remuneration of the Sharīʿah board is normally fixed by the BOD and authorized by the 
shareholders (Gooden, 2001: 12–15). 
130
 Karim (1990: 39–40) states that the Sharīʿah board’s framework is guided by their moral beliefs and 
obligations to religious peers and community. A commitment to religious values and obligations do indeed 
provide strong incentives to be independent. 
131
 There are two types of independence, i.e. practitioner independence and professional independence; the 
former is important to maintain a proper attitude toward planning, performing and reporting on an audit and 
the latter to avoid any appearance which may reduce the perceived independence of the auditors (Mautz 




tremendous growth of the Islamic finance industry, it is expected that the number of 
conflicting fatwa is likely to increase. With this in mind, it is imperative to examine the 
method of appointment of the Sharīʿah board.  
According to a survey by Aboumouamer (1996: 185), it is found that most Sharīʿah 
board members, out of forty-one surveyed, felt that the Sharīʿah board’s authority is 
derived from the shareholders (75%) and their relationships with the management and 
directors only related to coordination and advisory roles. This research finding, however, 
only illustrates the perception of the BOD upon the appointment of the Sharīʿah board 
and cannot be regarded as conclusive. Despite the above finding, other research carried 
out by the International Institute of Islamic Thought in 1996 seems to demonstrate a 
different scenario as it found that almost 80% of the appointments of Sharīʿah board were 
done by the BOD and only 39% were made by the shareholders (Bakar, 2002: 78). These 
two surveys establish that the practice of the appointment of the Sharīʿah board in actual 
fact differs amongst the IFIs and is contrary to the assumption that the board’s 
independence can only be guaranteed if the appointment is made by the shareholders. 
The notion of assuming that the independence of the Sharīʿah board can be assured with 
appointment by the shareholders is not truly convincing per se. Even if the appointment is 
made by the shareholders, the BOD may still influence the shareholders in the process of 
selecting the Sharīʿah board members. In lieu to this, it is worth mentioning suggestions 
by Grais and Pellegrini (2006: 11), in which they discuss three possible approaches to 
resolving the issue of the independence of the Sharīʿah board. The approaches seem to 
focus on the issues of power and authority and they are: to define clearly the 
responsibilities and powers of the Sharīʿah board in the articles of association; to grant 
the board sufficient powers, proper organizational status and audit responsibilities; and to 
provide adequate authority as enjoyed by independent directors in the audit committee.132  
                                                                                                                                                 
and Sharaf, 1961). The Sharīʿah governance system is more concerned with professional independence as 
it involves public perception and stakeholders’ confidence in the IFIs. 
132
 Principle 1.2 of the IFSB-10 requires that the Sharīʿah board must have clear terms of reference 
regarding its mandate and responsibility, well-defined operating procedures and lines of reporting and good 
understanding of, and familiarity with, professional ethics and conduct (IFSB, 2009c: 9).  




4.8.2 Competence, Conflict of Interest and Confidentiality 
In terms of the qualifications of Sharīʿah board members, a survey on Islamic banking 
practices shows that 76.6% of the members have training and qualifications, 8.6% are 
well versed in Sharīʿah and commercial law, and only 11.4% have expertise in Sharīʿah, 
law and economics (Bakar, 2002: 78). Another study found that from the members of 
forty-one Sharīʿah boards, only ninety-two people have Islamic law training and 60% 
had studied non-religious subjects (Abomouamer, 1989: 226). This result indicates that 
there are issues on the different criteria and qualifications of the Sharīʿah board.133 
Moreover, the education of Sharīʿah board members is not properly coordinated and 
there are no established specific curricula for them134 (McMillen, 2006: 139). This 
position may affect the effectiveness of the Sharīʿah board’s function, particularly in 
providing solid and concrete Sharīʿah rulings, as they must have the necessary 
professional knowledge and training as well as expertise in Sharīʿah.  
For many years, numerous Sharīʿah scholars have enjoyed the right to sit on different 
Sharīʿah boards without any sort of restriction, such as those in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar. In fact, the existing practices in many countries show that 
there is no restriction on the members of a Sharīʿah board to stop them serving in any 
other IFI’ boards. This situation denotes a negative perception of the Sharīʿah board as it 
raises the issue of conflict of interest as well as confidentiality. As an illustration, we may 
refer to the possible situation of conflict of interest and breach of confidentiality in the 
case of a new Islamic banking product of the IFI being brought up for approval to the 
Sharīʿah board at the central bank’s level, where the same advisors that are sitting on the 
central bank’s Sharīʿah board at the same time also serve that particular IFI. In this case, 
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 Sheikh Mohamad El Gari, one of the prominent Sharīʿah scholars pointed out his concern on the issue 
of the competence of the Sharīʿah board. He admitted that there were many mistakes in Sharīʿah rulings 
issued by Sharīʿah boards (Parker, 2009). 
134
 The AAOIFI has initiated a four-month training programme for Sharīʿah scholars known as Certified 
Sharīʿah Adviser and Auditor (CSAA), which is specifically designed to equip Sharīʿah scholars with the 
requisite technical understanding of and professional skills for Sharīʿah compliance and review processes 
(AAOIFI, 2008). The IBFIM also offers a Sharīʿah Scholars’ Introduction Program that has been endorsed 
by the BNM, which is specifically designed for Sharīʿah officers and advisors (MIFC, 2008: 21). Another 
programme available is the Scholar Development Program initiated by the Islamic Finance Council and the 
Securities and Investment Institute, which provides Sharīʿah scholars with knowledge of the conventional 
system (HM Treasury, 2008: 26). 




the Sharīʿah advisors who have access to proprietary information about different features 
of financial products in various IFIs are not supposed to represent either both or one of 
the Sharīʿah boards since they have a common interest and redundant contractual duties.  
 
The absence of restrictions on the multiple appointments of Sharīʿah board members may 
also contribute to the issue of the shortage of Sharīʿah scholars. According to a survey of 
the Sharīʿah Network in GCC – A Network Analytic Perspective conducted by 
Funds@Work – of 94 scholars sat on the boards of 467 IFIs, only 20 of them are heavily 
utilized; they represent 339 board positions equalling a total of 17 board positions per 
scholar.135 This position may seriously negate public confidence in the Sharīʿah board’s 
credibility and there are even allegations of Sharīʿah arbitrage being practised by some 
Sharīʿah scholars.136 The fact there is a lack of a pool of expert, experienced and 
competent Sharīʿah scholars should not be an everlasting justification for employing the 
same scholars on numerous Sharīʿah boards.  
 
In order to avoid any issues or a perception of conflict of interest, it is necessary to have a 
legal provision that states clearly a restriction on sitting on more than one Sharīʿah board 
at one particular time. For instance, section 19 of the BNM/GPS1 provides that IFIs are 
not allowed to appoint any member of a Sharīʿah board in another IFI in the same 
industry. Besides avoiding any element of conflict of interest, this requirement is also 
important in the aspect of guaranteeing secrecy in confidential matters and able to 
stimulate further Sharīʿah research by allowing more potential Sharīʿah scholars to be 
involved directly in the Islamic financial sector. This policy also ensures the full-time 
availability of the Sharīʿah board to guide and monitor IFIs more effectively. In parallel 
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 Shaikh Nizam Mohammed Saleh Yaaqubi from Bahrain sits on boards in 46 IFIs; Shaikh Dr. Abdul 
Satar Abdul Karim Abu Ghuddah and Dr Mohamed Eid El Gari from Syria sit on boards in 45 and 31 IFIs 
respectively; Dr Abdulaziz Khalifa Al Qassar from Kuwait and Dr Mohamad Daud Bakar from Malaysia 
both sit on 22 boards; Shaikh Abdulla Bin Sulaiman Al Manea from Syria in 20 IFIs; Shaikh Dr Hussein 
Hamid Hassan from UAE in 19 IFIs; Shaikh Dr Ali Mohi Eldinne Al Qaradaghi from Syria and Dr Essa 
Zaki Essa from Kuwait both sit on boards in 17 IFIs; and Shaikh Ajeel Jasim Al Nashmi from Kuwait in 15 
IFIs (Unal and Ley, 2009). 
136
 El Gamal (2006: 175) explains Sharīʿah arbitrage as an act of “identifying a captive market, with 
religious injunctions that forbid a given set of financial products and services, and synthesizing those 
products and services from variations on those pre-modern nominate contract”. The Sharīʿah arbitrage 
increases transaction costs, which justify the high related fees and excessive profit rate charged by IFIs. 




with the rapid expansion of the Islamic finance industry and the increasing numbers of 
Sharīʿah boards, the issues of competence of Sharīʿah advisors and conflict of interest 
may be solved by having a legal framework pertaining to their qualifications and certain 
limitations on their practice. 
4.8.3 Disclosure and Transparency 
 
The crucial element of the Sharīʿah governance system is disclosure and transparency.137 
Transparency is of the utmost importance for IFIs so as they comply with Sharīʿah as al-
Qur’an specifically forbids concealing of evidence. As Allah says, “If ye are on a 
journey, and cannot find a scribe, a pledge with possession (may serve the purpose) and 
if one of you deposits a thing on trust with another, let the trustee (faithfully) discharge 
his trust and let him fear his Lord. Conceal not evidence for whoever conceals it, his 
heart is tainted with sin and Allah is knoweth all that ye do” (Al-Qur’an, 2: 283).138 
According to the IFSB, IFIs must ensure that their financial and non-financial reports 
meet the requirements of the internationally recognized accounting codes and complies 
with Sharīʿah principles (IFSB, 2006: 5). The various Sharīʿah governance practices 
demonstrate that disclosure of information is currently minimal and even information on 
the Sharīʿah resolutions are hardly available for public viewing.  
 
In addition, surveys conducted by Grais and Pellegrini (2006: 34) and Maali et al. (2006: 
285) indicate the shortcomings and weaknesses of the current disclosure of information 
practice, in particular the Sharīʿah report. Numerous IFIs are still neglecting the 
requirement of the Sharīʿah report, even though it is very important as an endorsement of 
their compliance with Sharīʿah principles and it is considered a crucial means by which 
the general public and interested parties can find information as to what extent the 
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 The IFSB-4 defines transparency in IFIs “an environment where material and reliable information is 
made available in a timely and accessible manner to the market at large and to all stakeholders. Such 
transparency can reduce asymmetric information and uncertainty in financial markets” (IFSB, 2007a: 30). 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007: 291) refer to disclosure as “the process and methodology of providing 
information and making policy decisions known through timely dissemination and openness” and 
transparency as “the principle of creating an environment where information on existing conditions, 
decisions and actions is made accessible, visible and understandable by all market participants”.  
138
 See also al-Qur’an (3: 187), where Allah says “You shall make it clear to people and not conceal it.” 




services and products of the IFI meets the Sharīʿah requirements. The ideal Sharīʿah 
governance system, then, must be able to address the issues of disclosure and 
transparency. 
4.8.4 Sharīʿah-Compliant versus Sharīʿah-Based 
 
Numerous criticisms of the current practices of Islamic finance has led to intensive 
debate, particularly on the issue of whether something is Sharīʿah-compliant or Sharīʿah-
based, where the latter can be defined as adhering to the Sharīʿah objectives and spirit, 
while the former is complying with the legal aspects of Sharīʿah law but not necessarily 
the spirit of Sharīʿah.139 Although there is no exact definition of Sharīʿah-compliant and 
Sharīʿah-based, the proponents of the Sharīʿah-based approach insist that Islamic 
financial products and services must not only be concerned about compliance with 
Islamic law but they should go beyond that, i.e. to fulfil the maqāsid Sharīʿah (Dar, 
2009a: 11). Another contention refers to Sharīʿah-based products as Islamic financial 
instruments which have no origin in the conventional market (ISRA, 2009: 2). In this 
regard, Siddiqi (2008: 76) insists that product innovation is really crucial, especially in 
designing financial ways that would serve the maqāsid Sharīʿah.140 
 
Some scholars indicate that there is no difference between a product being Sharīʿah-
compliant and Sharīʿah-based. As long as a financial product is deemed Sharīʿah-
compliant, in that it is free from interest, uncertainty, gambling and prohibited things and 
it fulfils the requirement of contracts, the product is said to be Sharīʿah-compliant, 
Sharīʿah-based or Sharīʿah-tolerant (ISRA, 2009: 2). Dar (2009a: 10–12), on the other 
hand, refers to the Sharīʿah-based approach as a combination of two dimensions, namely 
compliance with Sharīʿah principles and fulfilling social responsibilities. He further 
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 Sheikh Saleh Kamel, chairman and founder of the Dallah Al Baraka Group as well as chairman of the 
General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions, also states his concern about the existing 
practice of Islamic finance, where he personally opines that most of the Islamic financial products and 
services that are available in the market are not Islamic (Mahdi, 2008). 
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 With the existing mode of financing that replicates conventional banking, Islamic finance has failed to 
serve the objectives of Islamic law (El-Gamal, 2006: xiii). Asutay (2007) posits that the Islamic finance 
industry has failed to realize the very reason for its existence in providing socio-economic development for 
the larger parts of the Muslim world and communities. 




characterizes Islamic financial products as Sharīʿah-tolerant, such as tawarruq and bay 
al inah, Sharīʿah-compliant, like murābahah-based short selling and arbun-based short 
selling, and Sharīʿah-based, such as zakah, waqf-based financial products, Islamic private 
equity and Islamic venture capital. This general classification of Islamic financial 
products is based on the degree of Sharīʿah compliance.  
 
The diverse understanding of Sharīʿah-compliant and Sharīʿah-based products may 
affect the framework of the Sharīʿah governance system. If it is only a matter of Sharīʿah 
compliance, the scope of Sharīʿah governance will be the legal technicalities of Islamic 
financial products and IFIs’ operations, whereas if it goes beyond that, i.e. social 
responsibility, public interest and maṣlahah, the framework of the Sharīʿah governance 
system will be wider and more complicated.141 At this point the Sharīʿah-based approach 
requires IFIs to not only be concerned about the Sharīʿah compliance aspect but also to 
fulfil their social responsibilities.142 This may have certain implications for IFIs as it 
widens the scope and objective of the Sharīʿah governance system.  
4.8.5 Consistency  
 
In view of the diversity in Islamic finance practices in different jurisdictions, the 
likelihood of conflicting fatwa or Sharīʿah pronouncements is relatively high, which may 
undermine the stakeholders’ confidence in the industry.143 At this point, there must be 
continuous efforts to harmonize the Sharīʿah standards for the purpose of consistency. 
                                                 
141
 Interestingly, the Registration of Sharīʿah Adviser’s Guidelines issued by the SC uses the term 
Sharīʿah-based rather than Sharīʿah-compliant (SC, 2009). This indicates that IFIs in Malaysia need to 
address this issue specifically to Islamic capital market products to meet the Sharīʿah-based requirement. 
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 Haniffa and Hudaib (2007: 97–116) attempt to assess the strength and degree of the ethical identity by 
analysing annual reports of seven IFIs in the Gulf region in four different dimensions, namely: commitment 
to society, vision and mission; contribution and management of zakah; charity and benevolent loans; and 
information about top management. The survey results indicate that there was a serious lack of 
communication in IFIs on the socio-economic dimensions, which significantly failed to reflect their 
accountability and duty towards social justice (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007: 111).  
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 The CIBAFI reported that, out of 6,000 fatwa issued by different IFIs with over 100 Sharīʿah scholars, 
only 10% were not consistent across IFIs (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007: 290). Although this figure tends to 
show that the level of consistency is at an acceptable level, it is expected that greater inconsistencies are 
likely to happen in the future when the Islamic finance industry expands further.  




The idea of Sharīʿah harmonization, despite its pros and cons,144 would be a good 
approach to achieve a certain level of consistency that is crucial to the Islamic finance 
industry.145  
 
Besides, the adoption of the AAOIFI Sharīʿah standards would help to promote 
consistency in Islamic finance practices across jurisdictions as well as ensuring the 
enforceability of transactions. The IFSB survey demonstrates different countries’ 
perspectives on the adoption of the Sharīʿah standards, where IFIs from Brunei, Jordan 
and Qatar fully supported its adoption, Sudan and Indonesia viewed it as favourable and 
Pakistan, Malaysia and the UAE only indicated their fair support (IFSB, 2008b: 26). The 
survey further shows that 65% of IFIs (out of sixty-nine) do not recognize the importance 
of the AAOIFI Sharīʿah standards.  
 
Despite the need for common and high standards for Sharīʿah governance practices, the 
determination to adopt any international standards is a matter of political consideration. 
The current practice demonstrates that political will is of the essence in determining the 
direction of Islamic finance. In the meantime, it is also important to consider numerous 
factors from various perspectives in accordance with the legal, political and economic 
environment of certain countries. In this respect, the IFSB’s approach of no ‘single 
model’ or ‘one-size-fits-all’ is relevant. If internal and external factors of certain 
countries are against the adoption of such Sharīʿah standards, IFIs should at least have a 
set of adequate, effective and high standards of Sharīʿah governance that would be able 
to maintain their credibility as well as mitigate Sharīʿah non-compliance risks. 
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 It is contended that Sharīʿah harmonization may create rigidity and impede the development of Islamic 
finance particularly in the aspect of product innovation. The researcher is of the view that Sharīʿah 
harmonization with some flexible conditions is necessary to ensure consistency.  
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 Although, the idea of Sharīʿah harmonization is commendable, it is also important to look at another 
dimension on its implementation. In this regard, Peters, (2003: 92-93) critically analyse the effect of 
Sharīʿah codification. He mentions that the codification of Sharīʿah has actually transferred the authority to 
determine the Sharīʿah norms to the state and finally became a part of national politics. Vikor, (1998), 
points out similar observation where he states that the Sharīʿah codification is actually against the 
theological reason. In addition, he also mentions that historically, Sharīʿah is developed independently and 
always opposition to the power of state. In view of these arguments, any element of political interference in 
the process of Sharīʿah harmonization in Islamic finance must be avoided with appropriate measures.  




4.8.6 The Remit of Various Institutions of Sharīʿah Boards 
 
The establishment of Sharīʿah boards in numerous IFIs and at the national level may 
raise an issue of lack of coordination and overlapping jurisdiction. IFIs may need to get 
products approved by different levels of Sharīʿah boards. As an illustration, we may refer 
to the Malaysian Sharīʿah governance approach. As a general requirement, IFIs are 
expected to refer to their internal Sharīʿah board as well as to the national Sharīʿah 
advisory council for approval of any Islamic financial products. If it involves Islamic 
capital market products, IFIs are additionally required to get the approval of the Sharīʿah 
board of the SC. This long process may have certain implications to IFIs in terms of cost, 
time and effort, as well as potential conflicting fatwa.  
 
The IFSB survey discloses that there is a lack of communication amongst the Sharīʿah 
boards that facilitate the harmonization of Sharīʿah matters and practices. Only 65% of 
Sharīʿah boards communicate with the Sharīʿah boards of other IFIs and 45% of 
Sharīʿah boards at individual IFI level communicate with the national Sharīʿah board 
(IFSB, 2008b: 40). With this shortcoming, the Sharīʿah governance system must then be 
able to address the issue of the remit of Sharīʿah boards by having effective Sharīʿah 
coordination at micro and macro levels.  
4.9 Conclusion 
 
Sharīʿah governance adds additional values to the existing corporate governance 
framework. It inculcates transparency, trust, credibility, philosophy, values, beliefs 
(aqīdah), Sharīʿah and ethics (akhlāq) (Nathan and Ribieri, 2007: 477). While Sharīʿah 
governance is expected to add Islamic values, there are also criticisms of its current 
practice, particularly in relation to the affairs of the Sharīʿah board. Kahf (2004: 26) 
mentions that many Sharīʿah advisors of the IFIs are now being alleged to be “bankers’ 
window-dressers and overstretching the rules of Sharīʿah to provide easy fatwa for the 




new breed of bankers.”146 Although this allegation has not been proven by any empirical 
research, this negative perception of the Sharīʿah board should be obliterated with the 
implementation of strong and good Sharīʿah governance.147 
 
The need to have effective Sharīʿah governance is crucial as it would strengthen the 
credibility of IFIs. Such Sharīʿah governance framework must be able to address various 
issues pertinent to the foregoing discussion. The AAOIFI governance standards and the 
IFSB guiding principles are very important for the purpose of improving and bringing 
harmonization to the Sharīʿah governance practices. The standards are expected to 
effectively resolve numerous issues with respect to Sharīʿah governance. In conclusion, 
therefore, the foregoing discussion seems to suggest that the existing Sharīʿah 
governance framework needs further enhancement and improvement in order to reinforce 
the development and growth of the Islamic finance industry. This position hence calls for 
further research to study and examine the extent of Sharīʿah governance practice across 
jurisdictions with the purpose of identifying issues and providing guidelines for best 
practice of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs.  
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 See also El-Gamal (2006: 26–45). He heavily criticizes the practice of Sharīʿah arbitrage and the failure 
of Islamic finance to serve maqāsid Sharīʿah. Kuran (2004: xi) claims that Islamic finance is not any 
different from conventional banking except in name. He also criticizes that behavioral norms, as inspired 
by the doctrine of Islamic economics which is motivated by religious incentives, are unrealistic. The 
practice in Islamic finance evidences that IFIs are turning away from the normative concerns of Islamic 
economics (Kuran, 1983: 353–374). 
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 Sheikh Nizam Yaqubi, a prominent Sharīʿah scholar strongly refutes any allegation of fatwa shopping in 
Islamic finance. He clearly mentions that such an allegation is baseless and has no justification (Hanif, 
2010).  





REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF SHARĪAH GOVERNANCE SYSTEM IN 




The Sharīʿah governance system as defined by the IFSB-10 refers to a set of institutional 
and organizational arrangements to oversee Sharīʿah compliance aspects in IFIs. In this 
regard, the majority of IFIs have established their own Sharīʿah boards and some of them 
even have set up a dedicated internal Sharīʿah review unit or department to support the 
Sharīʿah board in performing its function. This indicates a positive development on the 
aspect of Sharīʿah governance system in IFIs. Looking at the different frameworks and 
styles of Sharīʿah governance in various legal environments and diverse banking models, 
it is worth examining the regulatory framework of Sharīʿah governance system in 
different jurisdictions.  
 
This chapter focuses on the regulatory framework of the Sharīʿah governance system in 
Malaysia, GCC countries149 and the UK as the case studies. Uniquely, it is a sine qua non 
for the significant differences of the Sharīʿah governance system, in particular from the 
regulatory overview, as Malaysia represents a model in a mixed legal jurisdiction, GCC 
in an Islamic and mixed legal environment and the UK in a non-Islamic legal 
environment. This chapter concludes with a brief review of the legal backgrounds and 
some observations on the Sharīʿah governance framework of the case countries.  
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 Major parts of this chapter were presented at the International Workshop on Islamic Economics, 
“Evaluating the Current Practice of Islamic Finance and New Horizon in Islamic Economic Studies” on 
23rd–24th July 2009 in Kyoto, Japan and published in the Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, 3–2, 
2010, 82–115. In addition, some of the legal updates on the CBA, as discussed in subsection 5.2, were 
published in the Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, Issue 3, 2010, 105–108. 
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 The value of Sharīʿah compliant assets for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait alone is 
worth over USD262.6 billion and accounts for 41% of the world’s total Sharīʿah compliant assets (Wilson, 
2009: 3). This simply demonstrates the emergence of the need for a strong and robust Sharīʿah governance 
framework to address the issues pertaining to Sharīʿah matters. 




5.1 The Sharīʿah Governance Model from a Regulatory Perspective 
 
The existing framework of Islamic finance in various jurisdictions demonstrates the 
diverse practices and models of the Sharīʿah governance system. Some jurisdictions 
prefer greater involvement of regulatory authorities and some countries favour otherwise. 
Until now, it is still debatable whether the former or the latter is more prevalent and 
appropriate for possible adoption.150 To illustrate these diverse approaches, this study 
identifies five Sharīʿah governance models in the context of a regulatory perspective. 
5.1.1 Reactive Approach 
 
This model is more prevalent in non-Islamic legal environment countries such as the UK 
and Turkey. Although several Islamic banking licences have been issued to IFIs, the 
regulatory authority is silent on the Sharīʿah governance framework. Like conventional 
banks, IFIs are required to comply with the existing legislation and regulations. On top of 
that, IFIs have a duty to make sure that all their business operations and products are 
Sharīʿah-compliant. There is no specific legislation governing IFIs or any directive from 
regulatory authorities specifying Sharīʿah governance requirements. At this point, the 
regulators will only react and intervene in Sharīʿah governance matters if there is any 
significant issue involved which may affect the finance sector. For instance, the UK 
Financial Services Authority only sees the role played by the Sharīʿah boards of IFIs as 
being advisory and supervisory and not as having executive authority as in the case of the 
BOD.  
5.1.2 Passive Approach 
 
This model is exclusive to the Sharīʿah governance model in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi 
Authority Monetary Agency (SAMA) treats IFIs as equal to their conventional 
counterparts. SAMA has yet to issue legislation pertaining to Islamic finance and 
guidelines on a Sharīʿah governance system. There is no national Sharīʿah advisory 
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 On the other hand, El Sheikkh (2000: 43–49) prefers that IFIs should not be regulated or supervised by 
any authorities. The researcher nevertheless disagrees with this contention and rather considers that the 
regulation is a necessity for the Islamic finance industry in view of its numerous inherent risks.  




board, nor are any institutions the sole authoritative body in Islamic finance. The existing 
Sharīʿah governance system, as practised by IFIs in the kingdom, is a product of self-
initiative rather than a regulatory requirement or at a regulator’s direction.  
5.1.3 Minimalist Approach 
 
This model is mainly practised by GCC countries, with the exceptions of Oman and 
Saudi Arabia. Unlike the reactive approach, the minimalist model allows slight 
intervention on the part of regulatory authorities. The regulatory authorities expect IFIs to 
have a proper Sharīʿah governance system without specifying the requirements in detail. 
There is no restriction on multiple appointments of the Sharīʿah board to sit on various 
institutions at one particular time. Some jurisdictions in GCC countries, such as Bahrain, 
the UAE and Qatar, favour the adoption of the AAOIFI governance standards. The 
minimalist approach prefers the market to develop its own Sharīʿah governance system 
rather than have greater intervention on the part of regulators. 
5.1.4 Proactive Approach 
 
This model is favoured by the Malaysian regulatory authority. The proponents of this 
model have strong faith in the regulatory-based approach to strengthen the Sharīʿah 
governance framework. With this motivation, the Malaysian regulator initiates a 
comprehensive Sharīʿah governance framework from regulatory and non-regulatory 
aspects. There were several laws passed and amended by the parliament such as the IBA, 
the BAFIA, the Takaful Act 1984 (TA) and the Securities Commission Act 1993. The 
CBA confirms the status of the SAC as the sole authoritative body in Islamic finance. To 
complement this, the BNM issued the BNM/GPS1 in 2004 as well as Sharīʿah 
Governance Framework for IFIs in 2010, and the SC issued the Registration of Sharīʿah 
Advisers Guidelines 2009, which set the criteria for the registration of a Sharīʿah advisor 
in the capital market sector.  




5.1.5 Interventionist Approach 
 
While the passive approach is exclusive to Saudi Arabia, the interventionist model is 
unique to the Sharīʿah governance model in Pakistan. The interventionist model allows 
third party institutions to make decisions on Sharīʿah matters pertaining to Islamic 
finance. In the case of Pakistan, the Sharīʿah Federal Court is the highest authority in 
matters involving Islamic finance, despite the establishment of a Sharīʿah board at the 
State Bank of Pakistan level.  
5.2 Sharīʿah Governance Systems in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the UK 
5.2.1 Malaysia 
 
(a) Regulatory Overview  
 
Malaysia has a unique legislative framework consisting of mixed legal systems, namely 
common law and Sharīʿah. The common law principles are applied in the civil court in 
almost all matters of jurisdiction. Islamic law, in contrast, is practised in the Sharīʿah 
court and only pertaining to family matters and laws of inheritance. The Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia puts Islamic banking matters under the jurisdiction of the civil 
court. This is due to the fact that Islamic banking is considered as being under the item 
‘finance’ in the Federal Constitution. As a matter of fact, the BNM, with the cooperation 
of the judicial body, has agreed to set up a special High Court in the Commercial 
Division known as the muamalāt bench. According to Practice Direction No.1/2003, 
paragraph 2, all cases under the code 22A filed in the High Court of Malaya will be 
registered and heard in the High Court Commercial Division 4 and this special high court 
will only hear cases on Islamic banking. 
 
The development of the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia involved two phases; the 
first phase was from 1983 until 1993 and the second phase began in 1994. Malaysia has 
liberalized its policy on the implementation of Islamic finance by allowing foreign 
entities to set up Islamic banks in the local market. These staggered developments are 
facilitated and supported by legal infrastructure through several legislation and directives. 




The first Sharīʿah board was set up in 1983 by Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. After ten 
years, on 4th March 1993, the BNM introduced an interest-free banking scheme, in which 
conventional banks could offer Islamic banking products through its windows. With that 
policy, many conventional banks set up Islamic windows and at the same time appointed 
selected Muslim scholars to be members of the Sharīʿah board. As part of the effort to 
streamline and harmonize the Sharīʿah interpretations, the SAC was established on 1st 
May 1997 under the BAFIA and is considered the highest Sharīʿah authority pertaining 
to Islamic banking, finance and takāful in Malaysia.  
The terms Sharīʿah committee, Sharīʿah supervisory council or Sharīʿah advisory 
council are used interchangeably in Malaysia. The IBA refers to the Sharīʿah board as the 
Sharīʿah supervisory council and the BAFIA as the Sharīʿah advisory council. With the 
issuance of the BNM/GPS1, all Sharīʿah boards of IFIs and takāful operators are 
recognized as Sharīʿah Committees (SHCs) and the SAC is used as a reference to the 
Sharīʿah board of the BNM. The establishment of an SHC is a statutory requirement of 
all banks offering Islamic banking products pursuant to section 3 (5) (b) of the IBA for 
Islamic banks and section 124 (7) of the BAFIA for Islamic banking scheme banks. The 
main objective of the establishment of an SHC is to advise IFIs on any Sharīʿah matter 
and to ensure compliance with the Sharīʿah tenets and requirements. Section 3 (5) (b) of 
the IBA makes the establishment of Sharīʿah board a mandatory requirement, which 
must be clearly stipulated in the articles of association of the bank.  
As a response to the positive demands of the conventional banks to open Islamic 
counters, section 124 (7) of the BAFIA was then introduced which regulated the 
establishment of SHCs for Islamic windows. Similar to the IBA and the BAFIA, section 
8 of the TA puts two conditions on the takāful licence, namely that the aims and 
operations of the takāful business are in line with the Sharīʿah principles and there is a 
clear statement for the establishment of the Sharīʿah board in the articles of association. 
Apart from institutions under the IBA, the BAFIA and the TA, SHCs also exist in 
institutions under the Development Financial Institutions Act 2002 (DFIA).  




(b) Sharīʿah Governance  
 
The BNM issued the BNM/GPS 1 that provides an appropriate governance framework 
for Sharīʿah boards.151 The amendment to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 
enhances the functions and jurisdiction of the SAC, where it will be the sole Sharīʿah 
authority in Islamic finance and will be referred to by the court or arbitrator in disputes 
involving Sharīʿah issues. Apart from that, the BNM has also issued the Guidelines on 
the Disclosure of Reports and Financial Statements of Islamic Banks known as 
BNM/GPS8-i. In April 2010, the BNM issued another guideline namely the Sharīʿah 
Governance Framework for IFIs which will replace the BNM/GPS1 and become 
officially effective in 2011.  
 
The BNM/GPS1 consists of ten parts with twenty-four sections and one appendix. Its 
contents consist of objectives, scope of application, establishment of the SHC, 
membership, restrictions, duties and responsibilities of the SHC and IFIs, reporting 
structure, effective date, and secretariat of the SAC. IFIs had to comply with the 
guideline by 1st April 2005 and the dateline was extended for development financial 
institutions prescribed under the DFIA that offered Islamic financial products and 
services as at 1st September 2005.  
 
The objective of BNM/GPS 1 is threefold, i.e. to set out the rules, regulations and 
procedures in the establishment of the SC; to define the role, scope of duties and 
responsibilities of the SHC; and to define the relationship and working arrangement 
between the SHC and the SAC (section 5). IFIs licensed under the IBA, the BAFIA, the 
DFIA and the TA are required to comply with this guideline (section 6). 
In terms of appointment of the Sharīʿah board, section 8 mentions that the BOD of IFIs 
should appoint the members of the SHC and the tenure should be valid for a renewable 
term of two years subject to the approval of the BNM. Section 12 requires the Sharīʿah 
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and was revised in 2007. The scope of this code nevertheless has failed to address specific corporate 
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board members to at least either have qualifications or possess the necessary knowledge, 
expertise or experience in Islamic jurisprudence or Islamic commercial law.152 To ensure 
that the SHC is able to function effectively, the SHC should consist of a minimum of 
three members and its activities and functions will be coordinated by the Sharīʿah 
secretariat of the respective IFIs (section 15).  
There are certain restrictions with regard to the Sharīʿah governance practice. With the 
purpose of mitigating the risk of potential of conflict of interest and confidentiality issues, 
IFIs are not allowed to appoint any member of the SC in another IFI of the same industry 
(section 19). An SHC member may be disqualified if he fails to satisfy that he is fit for 
the position, fails to attend 75% of meetings in a year without reasonable excuse, has 
been declared bankrupt, or a petition under bankruptcy laws is filed against him, was 
found guilty for any serious criminal offence or any other offence punishable with 
imprisonment of one year or more, or is subject to any order of detention, supervision, 
restricted residence or banishment (section 16). 
 
With regard to functions of the Sharīʿah board, section 20 provides the clear duties and 
responsibilities of the SHC and these include: to advise the BOD on Sharīʿah matters in 
its business operations; to endorse Sharīʿah compliance manuals; to endorse and validate 
relevant documentations; to assist related parties on Sharīʿah matters for advice upon 
request; to advise on matters to be referred to the SAC; to provide written Sharīʿah 
opinions; and to assist the SAC on reference for advice. Besides this, the IFIs must assist 
the SHC as well as possible in providing sufficient relevant information and this includes: 
to refer all Sharīʿah issues to the SHC; to adopt the SC's advice; to ensure that product 
documents are validated; to have a Sharīʿah compliance manual; to provide access to 
relevant documents; to provide sufficient resources; and to remunerate the members of 
the SHC accordingly (section 21).  
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 Paragraph 2 of the Guidelines on Islamic Private Debt Securities (1st July 2000), issued by the SC, 
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bonds must be of good reputation and well versed in fiqh al muāmalāt and usul al fiqh and having at least 
three years experience in Islamic financial transactions (SC, 2000). 




The SHC is legally required to produce a Sharīʿah report expressing their observations on 
IFIs’ compliance with Sharīʿah principles. In this aspect, the BNM/GP8-i specifies the 
minimum requirements of the Sharīʿah report. The BNM/GP8-i requires content of the 
Sharīʿah report to be at least, declaration of Sharīʿah compliance endorsed by the 
Sharīʿah committee members.153 In terms of reporting structure, the SHC will report 
functionally to the BOD as this reflects the status of the SHC as an independent body of 
the IFIs. The BOD is bound by any decision of the SHC and they have to consider their 
views on certain issues related to operational matters, policy or business transactions. 
The amendment to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 in 2003 enhances the role of 
the SAC. The SAC is then accorded to be the sole authoritative body on Sharīʿah matters 
pertaining to Islamic finance. The decision made by the SAC nevertheless is only binding 
upon the arbitration and not the court. Malaysian government took a further step in 
enhancing the framework of Sharīʿah governance by passing the CBA. The CBA was 
passed by the parliament in July 2009, received royal assent on 19th August 2009 and was 
gazetted on 3rd September 2009. Unlike the earlier act, the CBA inserts a new provision 
in Part VII which covers matters pertaining to Islamic finance. Chapter 1 of Part VII aims 
at resolving issues pertinent to Sharīʿah matters as demonstrated in several cases 
involving IFIs in Malaysia such as in the case of Affin Bank Berhad vs Zulkifli Abdullah 
(2006) 1 CLJ 447154 and Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd & 
Ors (Koperasi Seri Kota Bukit Cheraka Bhd, third party) [2008] 5 MLJ 631.155 The 
Central Bank of Malaysia (Amendment) Act 2003 seems to have failed to resolve the 
issue since the decision made by the SAC is only binding upon the arbitration and not the 
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 The BNM/GP8-i Sharīʿah report’s format is lacking several important pieces of information compared 
to the format of the AAOIFI Governance Standard No.1. The AAOIFI requires additional information on 
the Sharīʿah report, which should contain necessary information on Sharīʿah compliance matters such as 
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 In this case, the learned judge applied the equitable interpretation of the term ‘selling price’ as it referred 
to the sum calculated for the date when the facility was to be paid off. This is supported by the case of 
Malayan Banking Berhad v Ya’kup bin Oje & Anor [2007] 6 MLJ 398. The court applied the principle of 
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 The High Court decreed that the profit derived from the BBA facility was unlawful and rendered the 
transaction null and void. This decision will notably affect IFIs in Malaysia since the judgment obviously 
declared that defaulters in the BBA facility were only liable as to the original facility amount and not the 
selling price.  




court156 Moreover, in view of the huge potential implications of Sharīʿah non-compliance 
risks, the need for clear and precise Sharīʿah governance framework is also crucial to the 
Islamic finance industry.   
Realizing this, section 51-58 of the CBA clarifies and enhances Sharīʿah governance 
framework for IFIs in Malaysia in the following aspects:  
(i) It grants authority to the BNM to establish the SAC and to specify its 
distinctive functions as well as the secretariat to assist the SAC in carrying out 
its definitive roles. This vividly clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the 
SAC as the highest and sole authority in Islamic financial matters.  
(ii) In parallel with the status of the SAC as the highest authority in matters 
pertaining to Islamic banking, finance and Takāful, the appointment of the 
SAC members shall be made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The SAC’s 
remuneration and the terms of reference shall then be determined by the 
BNM.  
(iii) It sets the minimum fit and proper criteria of the SAC members. The 
candidate must be at least knowledgeable and qualified in Sharīʿah or have 
appropriate knowledge and experience in banking, finance and law. Section 
53 of the CBA also allows experts in other related disciplines, as well as 
judges of the civil and Sharīʿah courts, to be the SAC members. This 
provision is unique as a combination of mixed expertise amongst the SAC 
members would potentially contribute towards more sound and integrated 
Sharīʿah rulings.  
(iv) The repealed section 16B of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Amendment) Act 
2003 merely provides that Sharīʿah rulings issued by the SAC are binding 
upon the arbitration. Section 57 of the CBA then clarifies the legal status of 
the Sharīʿah pronouncement issued by the SAC to be binding upon both the 
court as well as arbitration.  
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 The learned judge in the case of Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd v Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd & Ors 
[2008] 5 MLJ viewed that the court did not have to refer to the SAC for any ruling or deliberation as there 
was no dispute on the validity of the BBA facility since BBA was one of the products approved by the 
SAC.  




(v) The court or arbitrator is not obligated to refer to the SAC to resolve any 
Sharīʿah issue under the previous regulation.157 Section 58 of the CBA, on the 
other hand, makes it mandatory for the court or arbitrator to refer to the SAC 
for deliberation on any Sharīʿah issue, as well as taking into account its 
existing Sharīʿah rulings. 
(vi) It clarifies the status of the Sharīʿah rulings issued by the SAC in the event 
that they contradict the Sharīʿah pronouncement of a Sharīʿah committee at 
an individual IFI. The Sharīʿah rulings of the SAC shall prevail and have 
binding force over the Sharīʿah resolutions of the Sharīʿah committees of 
IFIs. 
Despite the recent legal development, it is worth noting that the CBA has jurisdiction 
only in matters that fall under the auspices of the BNM, which therefore excludes the 
Sharīʿah board in the SC. The SC has its own Sharīʿah board and, in August 2009, it 
issued the Registration of Sharīʿah Adviser’s Guidelines under section 377 of the Capital 
Markets and Services Act 2007. This guideline specifically provides rules and procedures 
for registration of Sharīʿah advisors in matters regulated and supervised by the SC (SC, 
2009).  
5.2.2 GCC Countries 
 
The GCC was established on 26th May 1981 in Abu Dhabi, with the aim of fostering and 
furthering cooperation amongst the member states (n.a., 1987). The IFIs158 in the GCC 
region159 have their own framework of Sharīʿah governance system.160 The monetary 
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 In the case of Tan Sri Khalid Ibrahim v Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad [2009] 6 MLJ 416, it was the first 
time in the history of the Malaysian court that the learned judge made reference to the SAC for Sharīʿah 
deliberation on BBA agreement.  
158
 Previously, the establishment of IFIs in the Gulf states was done by decree from the ruler. For instance 
the Dubai Islamic Bank by the Decree from the Ruler of Dubai in 1975, the Kuwait Finance House by the 
Decree No. 72/1977 from the Emir of Kuwait, the Bahrain Islamic Bank by the Decree No. 2/1979 from the 
Emir of Bahrain, the Masraf Qatar al-Islami by the Decree No. 45/1982 and the Qatar International Islamic 
Bank by the Decree No. 52/1990 from the Emir of Qatar. The UAE was the first Gulf state that introduced 
a specific law to govern the establishment of IFIs in its Law No. 6 of 1985 (Al-Suwaidi, 1993: 300). 
159
 The Central Bank of Oman has reiterated its rejection of Sharīʿah -compliant banking due to its policy 
of allowing only universal banks as there is less demand for IFIs compared to their conventional 
counterparts (MEED, 2007). These two sets of justifications for not having Islamic finance indicate the 
failure of the Oman authorities to appreciate the very reason for the existence of Islamic finance. Islamic 




agencies or financial authorities are responsible for the regulation and supervision of the 
IFIs, including in matters of Sharīʿah governance.  
 
It is imperative to understand the legal background of GCC countries, particularly the 
application of Islamic law in their judicial system, before discussing their Sharīʿah 
governance framework.161 With the fact that not all GCC countries’ constitutions 
prescribe Sharīʿah as a source of legislation, there is an issue around to what extent 
Sharīʿah applies or could apply, in particular in relation to Islamic finance.162 At this 
point, this subsection not only discusses laws and regulations pertaining to Sharīʿah 
governance in GCC countries, but also provides some basic information on their legal 
backgrounds. The study explores the application of Sharīʿah and tries to relate it to the 
implementation of Islamic finance in GCC countries.  
 
Generally, the Sharīʿah governance approach in GCC countries can be classified into two 
types: either it is regulated via legal and supervisory requirements, as in the cases of 
Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar, or through self-regulation as in the case of Saudi 
Arabia. This section presents the diverse Sharīʿah governance systems within GCC 
countries and therefore enables the study to highlight and identify essential issues that 
would be useful for further analysis.  
                                                                                                                                                 
finance is not only concerned with market demand and is not material in nature, but it is more concerned 
with the fundamental aspects of Sharīʿah. Unfortunately, as of today, Oman is the only state in the GCC 
countries that does not permit Sharīʿah-compliant banking activities. Perhaps the situation will be different 
in the future as the first company in Oman, namely Sohar Alumunium, has raised USD260 million for the 
first Greenfield aluminium smelter project via Citi Islamic Investment Bank in Dubai. This indicates 
positive interest in Islamic finance in Oman (Alam, 2006). 
160
 There are a few corporate governance codes or regulations already in place, such as the Corporate 
Governance Regulations (2006) of Saudi Arabia, the Abu Dhabi Securities Market Corporate Governance 
Code (2006), the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (2007), Abu Dhabi Securities Market 
Corporate Governance Listing Rules (2006) of the UAE, and the Corporate Governance Code for Listed 
Companies of Bahrain. In the event of absence of specific corporate governance codes and regulations, the 
company law of the countries provides rules and guidelines for their corporate governance framework. 
These codes and regulations do not, however, specifically tackle the issue of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs. 
161
 Prior to 1961, the majority of the Gulf states, except Saudi Arabia, were under the extra-territorial 
jurisdiction of the British Crown. After independence (Kuwait in 1961, Oman in 1971, Bahrain, the UAE 
and Qatar in 1971) all of them developed their own codified legal system (Al-Suwaidi, 1993: 289–301). On 
the other hand, Saudi Arabia has never fallen under the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the British and is 
therefore less influenced by the common law. 
162
 The constitutions of Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE clearly state that Sharīʿah is a source of legislation; 
Qatar’s constitution is silent on this position and Saudi Arabia has no written constitution since it considers 
al-Qur’an and al-Sunnah as its only constitution.  






(a) Regulatory Overview  
Bahrain was exposed to the English system more than other GCC countries (Al-Suwaidi, 
1993: 292–293). However, after independence in 1971, Bahrain developed several 
substantive and procedural laws and at the same time put Sharīʿah as a main source of 
legislation, as stated in Article 2 of the Constitution of Bahrain. This position created 
difficulties for commercial sectors, particularly financial institutions, because interest-
based transactions would have been declared illegal. In view of this, Bahrain developed 
its own laws, such as the Law of Civil and Commercial Procedure of 1971, the Law on 
the Establishment of the Bahrain Monetary Agency of 1973, the Companies Registration 
Act of 1983, and the Commercial Law of 1987, which are based mainly on the Egyptian 
code. Article 76 of the Commercial Law of 1987 clearly allows interest charges in 
commercial loans but subject to the rate determined by the Bahrain Monetary Agency 
(Al-Suwaidi, 1993: 292). As such, the Civil Court of Bahrain has comprehensive 
jurisdiction over civil and commercial matters, except those relating to Sharīʿah 
disputes.163 
With reference to the Islamic finance industry, Bahrain is known as one of the leading 
players in Islamic finance. Besides initiating the establishment of the Bahrain-based 
Liquidity Management Centre, Bahrain also hosts two international institutions for 
Islamic finance, namely the AAOIFI and the International Islamic Financial Market 
(IIFM). The Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) is the sole regulator of the financial sector164 
The CBB is responsible for regulating and supervising all financial institutions, the 
insurance sector and capital markets. There are five main pieces of legislation that govern 
the financial system of Bahrain, namely the Central Bank of Bahrain and Financial 
Institutions Law 2006, the Bahrain Stock Exchange Law 1987, the Commercial 
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 For further reading, it would be beneficial to refer to Radhi (2003), who presents a comprehensive legal 
development and judicial background of Bahrain and divides it into three stages, namely the period of 
Islamic law, the mixed common and Islamic law period, and the period of mixed Romano-Germanic and 
Islamic law.  
164
 The CBB was established in 2006 by virtue of the Central Bank of Bahrain and Financial Institutions 
Law (Decree Law No. 64/2006) (Ross, 2008: 26). 




Companies Law 2001, The Anti Money Laundering Law 2001, and the Financial Trust 
Law 2006. The legal provision for the implementation of Islamic finance in Bahrain is 
provided in the CBB Rule Book Volume 2, Islamic Banks. 
(b) Sharīʿah Governance 
 
The CBB Rule Book Volume 2, Islamic Banks, Part A, High Level Control, section 
1.3.15 provides that the CBB requires all banks to establish an independent Sharīʿah 
board complying with the AAOIFI governance standards for IFIs No. 1 and No.2. This 
section provides a clear legal requirement for the establishment of a Sharīʿah board in 
IFIs in Bahrain and failure to do so will constitute non-compliance with the CBB’s 
directive.  
 
Unlike the other GCC countries, Bahrain has established a National Sharīʿah Advisory 
Board of the CBB with the purpose of serving and verifying Sharīʿah compliance (Hasan, 
2007). The Sharīʿah board of the CBB is nevertheless different to the other national 
Sharīʿah boards of Malaysia, Sudan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Brunei, as it does not have 
authority at institutional level. With regard to the Sharīʿah governance system, Bahrain 
follows the AAOIFI governance standards, where it requires all IFIs to establish a 
Sharīʿah board. Section 1.3.16 of the CBB Rule Book requires IFIs to adopt the AAOIFI 
governance standards as well as having a separate function of Sharīʿah review for the 
purpose of ensuring Sharīʿah compliance as stipulated in the AAOIFI Governance 
Standard No.3. The legal requirement for the adoption of the AAOIFI governance 
standards reflects the role of Bahrain as the host of the AAOIFI since its establishment in 
2001.165  
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 This position positively influences the level of compliance of IFIs in Bahrain to the AAOIFI governance 
standards. A study conducted by Vinnicombe (2010: 61–63) on twenty-six IFIs in Bahrain revealed that the 
level of compliance was very high with respect to governance standards relating to in-house supervisory 
boards and reporting of the Islamic mudaraba contract. 




5.2.2.2 United Arab Emirates 
 
(a) Regulatory Overview 
 
On 2nd December 1970, seven emirates decided to form a federal union consisting of Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Quwain, Al Fujairah and Ras Al-Khaima, 
known as the United Arab Emirates or UAE (Al Muhairi, 1996a: 119). After 
independence in 1971, the government passed the UAE Provisional Constitution of 1971 
with the aim of preserving the internal autonomy of the seven emirates (Al-Muhairi, 
1996a: 118). In the meantime, Article 7 of the UAE Constitution recognized Sharīʿah as 
a main source of legislation and the religion of the state is Islam.166 In addition, Article 75 
of the Federal Law No. 10/1973 provides that “the Supreme Court shall apply the 
provisions of the Sharīʿah, Federal Laws and other laws in force in the member Emirates 
of the Union, conforming to the Islamic Sharīʿah. Likewise it shall apply those rules of 
custom and those principles of natural and comparative laws which do not conflict with 
the principle of the Sharīʿah.” In terms of the banking and finance sectors, the Union 
Law No. 10 of 1980 Concerning the Central Bank, the Monetary System and 
Organization of Banking is the main governing law for the financial sector in the UAE. 
This legislation grants power to the UAE Central Bank to regulate and supervise the 
financial institutions.  
 
At the beginning of the financial regulation development of the UAE, any kind of interest 
in respect of civil transactions is prohibited by virtue of Article 714 of Federal Law No. 5 
of 1985. This provision implicates interest-based transactions to be void and 
unenforceable. In 1987, the Civil Transactions Law was amended by Federal Law No. 1 
which excluded commercial transactions from being governed by the civil transactions 
law and, finally, the Federal Law No. 11 of 1992 invalidated all previous laws with 
respect to the interest prohibition. As a result, the charging of interest in commercial 
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 There are two views on the interpretation of article 7 of the UAE Constitution. Islamists tend to interpret 
that Sharīʿah shall be the supreme law above all other laws, while liberalists place Sharīʿah on an equal 
footing with other laws. The reality, however, shows a different situation, where Sharīʿah rules are made 
obligatory in criminal cases and are not strictly applicable in commercial matters, especially in relation to 
banking and finance disputes (Al-Muhairi, 1996b: 219–244). 




transactions is now permissible in the UAE.167 Federal Law No. 18 of 1993 grants the 
bank’s right to charge interest in respect of a commercial loan as per the agreed rate in 
the contract (Tamimi, 2002: 51).168 This position was taken in view of the necessity or 
dharuriyah for economic stability and the needs of the people. Moreover, during this 
time, the implementation of Islamic finance in the UAE was still in its infancy and could 
not cater for the market needs.169 The civil court has jurisdictions in banking matters and 
any financial transactions that involve issues pertaining to the legality of interest fall 
under its jurisdiction (Ballantyne, 1985: 14). 
 
Despite the above, the UAE at the same time makes numerous efforts to promote the 
Islamic finance and Dubai is leading the way as a centre for Islamic finance. In 1985, the 
UAE government passed a specific law in relation to Islamic finance – Federal Law No. 6 
of 1985 Regarding Islamic Banks, Financial Institutions and Investment Companies. 
Article 1 of this Federal Law requires the IFIs to conduct business in accordance with 
Sharīʿah, which should be stated in the articles and memorandum of associations.  
Dubai presents a unique position in comparison with other parts of the UAE. The UAE 
authority passed a separate law with Federal Law No. 6 of 1985, known as the Dubai 
International Financial Centre Law No. 13 of 2004, and the Islamic Financial Business 
Module of the Dubai Financial Services Authority provides a legal framework for 
regulating Islamic financial business as well as regulation of the Sharīʿah board. The 
DIFC Law No 13 led to the establishment of the DIFC which enjoys certain privileges 
and economic incentives from the government.170 All institutions and corporate entities 
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 This was affirmed by the Constitutional Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of No. 14, 
Year 9 (June 1981). The Supreme Court held that articles 61 and 62 of the Civil Procedure Law of Abu 
Dhabi No. 3/1970 concerning interest charges were unaffected by article 7 of the constitution since they 
were in existence before the application of the constitution dated 2nd December 1971 (Al-Suwaidi, 1993: 
293). 
168
 See Article 61 and 62 of the Civil Court Procedures Law of Abu Dhabi as amended by Law No. 3 and 
Law No. 4 of 1987. In the case of Petroleum Development (Trucial Coasts) Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi 
[1951] 18 ILR 144, the Arbitrator, Lord Asquith, rejected the application of Islamic law to regulate a 
modern commercial transaction. Although the arbitrator’s arguments are highly debatable, his remarks at 
least clarified the position of interest in commercial transactions in the UAE.  
169
 This was confirmed by the Constitutional Department of the Federal Supreme Court of Dhabi in its 
interpretation Decision No. 14/9 issues on 28th June 1981 (Tamimi, 2002: 50–51).  
170
 The DIFC is a financial-free zone established in the UAE by Federal Decree Number 35 for the year 
2004. IFIs registered under the DIFC enjoy the privilege of 100% foreign ownership (normal companies in 




under the jurisdiction of the DIFC are governed by the DIFC Law and are subject to the 
DIFC Court and the DIFC Arbitration Centre. 
(b) Sharīʿah Governance  
 
The Sharīʿah governance system in the UAE, except in Dubai, is governed by the Federal 
Law No. 6 of 1985. Article 5 of the Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 requires the establishment 
of a “Higher Sharīʿah Authority” under the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs to 
supervise Islamic banks, financial institutions and investment companies and to provide 
Sharīʿah opinion on matters pertaining to Islamic banking and finance. This Article 5 
clearly states the position of the Higher Sharīʿah Authority as binding. Besides Higher 
Sharīʿah Authority, which is a government established body, it is worth mentioning here 
that Sharīʿah scholars in the UAE have voluntarily initiated the establishment of a central 
committee of the Sharīʿah board for the purpose of harmonizing and standardizing 
Sharīʿah practice (Dar, 2009b). This voluntary arrangement is at least able to assure the 
consistency of Sharīʿah rulings. 
 
In terms of composition of the Sharīʿah board, Article 6 requires all IFIs to clearly 
stipulate the establishment of the Sharīʿah board in the articles and memorandum of 
association. This provision further puts a condition of a minimum of three members. The 
articles and memorandum of association must contain the manner and governance of the 
Sharīʿah board, such as its duties, responsibilities, functions and appointment. In the 
aspect of appointment, members of the Higher Sharīʿah Authority are appointed by the 
government and at the individual IFI level by the BOD or the shareholders. The IFIs 
cannot simply appoint their Sharīʿah board members but are required to submit the 
proposed names of the Sharīʿah advisors to the Higher Sharīʿah Authority for approval.  
 
IFIs registered under the DIFC have to comply with the DIFC law and regulations, 
particularly the Law Regulating Islamic Financial Business DIFC Law No.13 of 2004 
                                                                                                                                                 
the UAE must have at least 51% of the company’s shares owned by a UAE national), a 0% tax rate on 
income and profits, the freedom to repatriate capital and profits without restrictions (Al Tamimy & Co., 
2008: 6–7). Article 3 (3) provides the establishment of three centers under the DIFC namely the DIFC 
Authority, the DIFC Services Authority and the DIFC Judicial Authority.  




and the DIFC Services Authority (DFSA) Rulebook on Islamic Financial Business 
Module (ISF).171 As a general requirement, the DFSA requires IFIs to adopt the AAOIFI 
governance standards to ensure consistency and compliance with the Sharīʿah 
(Praesidium and DIFC, 2007: 40–44). With respect to Sharīʿah governance, section 13 of 
the law requires IFIs to establish a Sharīʿah board and the DFSA has the power to make 
rules prescribing its appointment, formation, conduct and operation. In this instance the 
ISF specify the requirements of the Sharīʿah governance system of the DIFC. 
 
Section 5.1.1 of the ISF requires the composition of Sharīʿah board to be of at least three 
members who are competent to perform their functions. The ISF does not specify the 
appropriate body for the appointment of the Sharīʿah board; it only states that 
appointment should be made by the governing body of the IFIs. The practice indicates 
that some of the appointments are made by the shareholders and some by the BOD. The 
ISF restricts the Sharīʿah board members from being directors or controllers of any IFIs 
they serve in order to avoid any conflict of interest.  
 
While section 5.1.1 deals the issue of appointment, composition and restrictions 
pertaining to the Sharīʿah board, section 5.1.2 addresses the issue of transparency and 
disclosure, in which it requires the IFIs to document its policy in relation to 
appointments, dismissals or changes, the process, qualification and the remuneration of 
the members of the Sharīʿah board. In this respect, the IFIs are required to maintain six 
years’ records of their assessment of the competence of Sharīʿah board members and the 
agreed terms of reference for each of them. In dealing with the issue of conflict of 
interest, the IFIs must have a mechanism in the form of a policy and procedures to 
manage any potential conflict of interest of the Sharīʿah board. Besides, the IFIs shall 
also provide reasonable assistance to the Sharīʿah board in terms of access to relevant 
records and information and should not at any time provide misleading information or 
interfere with the Sharīʿah board’s ability to perform its duties.  
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 On top of that, the DFSA also issued Islamic finance tailored handbooks in five areas of Islamic finance: 
Islamic Banking, Islamic Insurance, Islamic Investment Business Other than Operating Funds, Islamic 
Insurance Intermediation and Management and Operation of Islamic Funds (DFSA, 2010). These 
handbooks are designed to create further understanding and awareness of the DFSA’s rulebooks pertaining 
to Islamic finance. 




Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of the ISF clearly stipulate the requirement to adopt the AAOIFI 
governance standards by which the IFIs are obligated to produce a Sharīʿah annual report 
which must be submitted to the DFSA. Section 5.3 further requires that the IFIs conduct 
an internal Sharīʿah review and must ensure that the internal Sharīʿah review is 
performed by the internal audit function or the compliance function, either as part of the 
existing internal audit or compliance department or the independent internal Sharīʿah 
audit department of the IFIs. The IFIs must also ensure that the internal Sharīʿah review 




(a) Regulatory Overview 
 
The legal system of Kuwait is based on French and Egyptian models, particularly its 
commercial codes, such as the Commercial Companies Law of 1980 and the Commercial 
Code of 1981 (Gerald, 1991: 322).172 Article 2 of the constitution of Kuwait vividly puts 
Sharīʿah as a main source of legislation and Islam as the official religion. This can be 
referred in Article 547 of the Civil Code Law of Kuwait of 1980, which prohibits the 
practice of charging interest on loans,173 and Article 305, which declares such 
transactions to be void. Nevertheless, within the same year the Kuwait Authority issued 
specific legislation to exclude commercial transactions from the application of the code 
(Ballantyne, 1985: 5). As a result of the issuance of the Commercial Code of 1981, 
interest charges on loans by financial institutions are expressly permissible (Ballantyne, 
1987: 12–28).174  
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 The original Commercial Code of Kuwait 1961 was drafted by Al-Sanhouri, an Egyptian jurist, and 
contained more principled of Western secular law than of the Sharīʿah (Ballantyne, 1988: 317–328).  
173
 Al-Moqatei (1989: 138–148) points out that Kuwait is considered the leader among the GCC countries 
in the process of Islamization of the legal system due to its adoption of some Islamic laws in the form of 
legislation since the 1980s. 
174
 Article 102 of the Commercial Code provides that the creditor has the right to interest in accordance 
with the terms of contract; in the absence of a specified contract, the interest shall not exceed 7% and if the 
debtor delays in payment the interest shall then be calculated on the agreed basis rate. In addition, article 
115 further states that interest shall not be paid for a frozen interest.  




The principal ministerial authority for enforcement of commercial laws is the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry and the Central Bank is the sole regulator for monetary financial 
system in the State of Kuwait. The Central Bank of Kuwait Law No. 32 of 1968 (CBK 
Law), amended by Law 130/1977, is the governing legislation that provides the 
regulatory framework for currency, grant authority to the CBK to supervise the financial 
institutions and matters of the organization of banking business (Ross, 2008: 86). In spite 
of that, financial institutions including IFIs must also strictly comply with the 
Commercial Code and Commercial Companies Law of Kuwait (Al-Suwaidi, 1993: 291–
292). The judicial system of Kuwait places the civil court as having jurisdiction over 
commercial matters and this includes banking and finance disputes. 
 
With regards to Islamic finance, section 10 of the CBK Law (Article 86-100) addresses 
the legal provision pertaining to the rules and controls of IFIs. Article 86 states that the 
CBK is responsible for regulating and controlling the activities of IFIs. The definition of 
an Islamic bank in general can be found in Article 86 of the CBK Law, which considers 
an Islamic bank as a business entity that exercises activities pertaining to banking 
business which should comply with the Sharīʿah principles. This general and wide 
provision on the activities of Islamic banks, without a definition of every single contract 
or transaction in Islamic law, creates flexibility for IFIs in relation to Islamic financial 
services and products in Kuwait.  
 
(b) Sharīʿah Governance 
 
The Sharīʿah governance practice in Kuwait is regulated by virtue of Article 93 of the 
CBK Law, which provides a legal basis for the regulations of the Sharīʿah board. Article 
93 requires all IFIs to establish an independent Sharīʿah board, which shall be appointed 
by the bank’s general assembly. Unlike the other Sharīʿah governance approaches, which 
allow the appointment of the Sharīʿah board by the BOD, this Article 93 specifically 
requires the appointment to be made only by the general assembly. In terms of 
composition of the Sharīʿah board, the CBL Law puts a condition of a minimum of three 
members; this requirement is similar to the AAOIFI governance standards as well as the 
Sharīʿah governance requirements in Bahrain and the UAE. IFIs are also required to 




mention the establishment of the Sharīʿah board in their articles and memorandum of 
association and both documents must specify the powers, workings and governance of 
the Sharīʿah board. 
 
There is no Sharīʿah board in the CBK to act as the highest Sharīʿah authority in Islamic 
banking and finance. This may raise an issue of dispute settlement in the case of a 
conflict of opinion amongst members of the Sharīʿah board. To address this issue the 
CBK Law recognizes the Fatwa Board in the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs as 
the final authority for any Sharīʿah dispute involving Islamic banking and business. The 
BOD of IFIs has the responsibility to refer the dispute to the Fatwa Board. The CBK Law 
nevertheless is silent about the status of the decision of the Fatwa Board, which should be 
made binding to all IFIs. Interestingly, Article 100 of the CBK Law clearly provides the 
supremacy of Islamic law, where it states that IFIs shall be subject to the provision of the 
CBK Law and subject to the Islamic Sharīʿah principles. This is a strong legal proviso 
which places Sharīʿah as the supreme law in relation to Islamic banking and finance in 
Kuwait.  
 
With regard to the reporting structure, the Sharīʿah board has a duty to submit a Sharīʿah 
report to the bank’s general assembly since they are also appointed by the shareholders. 
The CBK Law specifies that the Sharīʿah report must contain the Sharīʿah opinion on the 
bank’s operation in terms of Sharīʿah compliance, including comments and views on 
Sharīʿah issues. This Sharīʿah report must be included in the IFIs’ annual report. 
5.2.2.4 Saudi Arabia 
 
(a) Regulatory Overview 
 
The history of banking system in Saudi Arabia began in the 20th century with the first 
commercial bank, the Dutch Commercial Company, which was established in 1926 
(Hamed, 1979: 167). As a general overview, banking and finance activities in Saudi 
Arabia are controlled by the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA), established by 
Royal Decree M/23 of 23.05.1377 on 15th December 1957, which functions under the 




Banking Control Law 1966 as amended by Decree 2/ 1391 (Pepper, 1992: 34). Sharīʿah 
is a main source legislation for Saudi Arabia and the Sharīʿah court is the highest body in 
the judicial system.175 Commercial matters, however, are put under the jurisdiction of the 
commercial court, which is more like a commercial council set up by Order 32/1350 
1931 (Pepper, 1992: 33).  
 
The development of Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia is considered unique and 
distinctive.176 The legal framework of the financial system is governed by the Banks 
Control System by virtue of Royal Decree No. 5 on 12th June 1966 and this law is silent 
on the issue of usury or interest (Sfeir, 1988: 729–759). As a result, the majority of 
financial institutions have been conducting business in the conventional banking 
manner.177 For instance, Articles 8 and 9 consider money lending as perfectly legitimate.  
 
Despite the Banks Control System 1966, the legal system of Saudi Arabia is actually 
based on Islamic law. Vogel, (2000: 2) clearly mentions that the paramount legal system 
in Saudi Arabia is Sharīʿah. This means the IFIs in Saudi Arabia operate under a strange 
legal framework since the existing law of the Banks Control System 1966 is still 
applicable and has not been repealed or amended to regulate the establishment or 
existence of IFIs. This is supported by a statement made by Al Sayari (2004), who 
mentions that, as of 2004, no law had been passed by the Saudi authority and not a single 
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 Although Sharīʿah is considered as the main source of legislation, the other sources of law such as 
customary law, world case law and doctrine and jurisprudence are also acceptable (Ballantyne, 1986: 13–
14). In the case of Aramco Arbitration, Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Company (1958) 27 ILR 117, 
the arbitrator held that the proper law of the Concession Agreement was Islamic law but it is necessary to 
refer to other laws in order to fill the lacunae in the existing legal frameworks. 
176
 Unlike the other GCC countries, Saudi Arabia has deliberately avoided the usage of term ‘constitution’ 
as al-Qur’an is considered as its constitution. Nizam Asasiy or Basic Law of Rule of 1992 is considered as 
the main law or the constitution of the Kingdom (Marar, 2004: 111). The administrative structure of Saudi 
Arabia was established by the Organic Instructions of the Hijazi Kingdom 1926, which is supplemented by 
the Statute of the Council of Deputies 1932 and the Constitution of the Council of Ministers 1958 (Pepper, 
1992: 33). 
177
 Despite there being no specific regulation to penalize financial institutions involved in interest-based 
transactions, any claims for interest are not enforceable. Interestingly, in Saudi the religious sentiment is so 
strong it is reported that deposits attracting interest only reached 49% in 1988 compared to 80% in Bahrain 
and 85% in Kuwait in the same year. This illustrates that there is a significantly strong natural antipathy 
and awareness of the prohibition of interest amongst Saudi people (Reumann, 1995: 218–219). A more 
recent study by Ernst and Young in 2008 reported that 70–90 % of Saudi Arabian mass affluent investors 
prefer Sharīʿah investment products over conventional products (Hamedanchi and Altenbach, 2009: 58–
61). 




Islamic banking licence had been granted from the SAMA to any companies in Saudi 
Arabia. Despite the Capital Market Laws of 2003, fifteen sukuk issuances in 2000–2008 
and huge Islamic mutual funds in the kingdom, there is no single legislation specifically 
regulating the implementation of Islamic finance (Wilson, 2009: 10). As part of the 
government’s policy for legal reform, it is anticipated that several new and revised 
regulations will be promulgated to boost the economy and increase foreign investment 
such as the redraft of the companies law, settlement of the jurisdictional conflict between 
the Capital Market Authority and Ministry of Commerce and Industry in relation to the 
securities in public offering and financial sector regulation (Al-Abduljabbar and Marshal, 
2010: 731),  In fact, the SAMA has also consulted a group of consultants, legal and 
banking specialists and appointed a steering committee to study the feasibility of Islamic 
finance in Saudi Arabia and hence to provide the required legal framework (Al Sayari, 
2004). 
 
With regard to banking disputes, SAMA set up a specific institution in October 1987 to 
hear cases pertaining to banking matters, including Islamic finance, known as the the 
Committee of Settlement for Banking Disputes (CSBD) (Reumann, 1995: 230). The 
establishment of the CSBD is governed by the CSBD Regulations (Marar, 2004: 114). 
With the purpose of giving exclusive jurisdiction to the BDC, another Resolution of the 
Council of Ministers No. 732/8 of 10.07.1407 (10 March 1987) was issued via a Circular 
of the Minister of Justice No. 12/138T of 28.07.1407 (28th March 1987), which 
specifically instructs the Sharīʿah court not to hear any more banking disputes (Reumann, 
1995: 230–237). To date, the banking disputes in Saudi Arabia are heard in the CSBD 
and not in the Sharīʿah court as practised pre-1987 unless authorizes by the Ministerial 
Council (Marar, 2004: 114). 
 
(b) Sharīʿah Governance 
 
Since there is a lacuna in the regulatory framework pertaining to Islamic finance in Saudi 
Arabia, the nature of the Sharīʿah governance system is different to other jurisdictions. 
The notion of having a Sharīʿah governance system within the IFIs is not due to any legal 




and supervisory requirement but rather as a voluntary initiative and indirect influence 
from the market. In other words, the Sharīʿah governance model in Saudi Arabia is much 
more based on a self-initiative approach.178 As an illustration of the Sharīʿah governance 
system in Saudi Arabia, it would be beneficial to refer to the Al Rajhi model. The 11th 
General Assembly of the Al Rajhi established the Sharīʿah board and its charter (Al 
Rajhi, 2008). The provision of the establishment of the Sharīʿah board was clearly 
stipulated in the articles of association as well as Al Rajhi internal rules and guidelines. 
The Sharīʿah board of Al Rajhi is deemed to be independent of all organs of governance, 
such as the management and BOD, since the appointment is made by the shareholders.  
 
The Al Rajhi Sharīʿah board plays four major roles to ensure and promote Sharīʿah 
compliance and these include monitoring the activities and implementation of Sharīʿah 
rulings with the assistance of the Sharīʿah department, assisting the bank to develop 
products and services, promoting and creating awareness about Islamic finance to all 
stakeholders, and finally ensuring proper selection of employees, particularly senior 
management (Al Rajhi, 2008). Unlike the other Sharīʿah boards, interestingly Al Rajhi 
has granted additional authority to the Sharīʿah board to assist the management in the 
process of selecting employees who have capacity and are well qualified to implement 
Islamic banking practice.  
 
There are three main specific organs that support the function of the Sharīʿah board, 
namely its secretariat, the Sharīʿah Control Department and the Control and Information 
Unit.179 The secretariat deals with the Sharīʿah board meeting and its operational 
procedures. The Sharīʿah control department assists the Sharīʿah board in performing the 
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 It is worth noting that the Sharīʿah governance system in Saudi Arabia must take into consideration the 
influence of other Sharīʿah scholars who do not even sit on any Sharīʿah boards of IFIs. For instance, if a 
negative fatwa is issued by Sheikh Al-Mani’a on a certain Islamic banking product, it would be very 
difficult to sell the product in the market (Selvam, 2008: 12–14). 
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 Another Saudi Bank, namely Bank Al Bilad, has established a Sharīʿah board, preparatory committee 
and Sharīʿah group as its institutional arrangement for Sharīʿah compliance purposes. The Sharīʿah board 
plays a role as a fatwa issuing body while the preparatory committee acts as a research unit that studies 
Sharīʿah-related issues and enquiries before they are forwarded to the Sharīʿah board for deliberation. 
Another function emanating from the Sharīʿah board is the Sharīʿah group, consisting of the Sharīʿah 
secretariat and the Sharīʿah audit department. The former acts as a Sharīʿah coordinator and the latter 
conducts periodic Sharīʿah reviews (Al Bilad, 2008: 13–14).  




Sharīʿah review while the Control and Information Unit specifically provides information 
and creates awareness to promote Sharīʿah compliance (Al Rajhi, 2008). Besides that, Al 
Rajhi has gone even further to develop its own Sharīʿah governance arrangement by 
setting up an executive committee to oversee the functions of the Sharīʿah Control 
Department, to appoint Sharīʿah controllers, and to study issues submitted to the Sharīʿah 
board (Al Rajhi, 2008).180  
 
Since there is no standard guideline for Sharīʿah governance issued by the regulatory 
authority, the Al Rajhi has issued its own Sharīʿah guidelines and procedures, known as 
the Sharīʿah Monitoring Guide and Sharīʿah Control Guidelines, with the purpose of 
ensuring the proper monitoring and implementation system of Sharīʿah rulings (Al Rajhi, 
2008). These Sharīʿah guidelines make it very clear that the Sharīʿah board’s rulings are 
considered binding. Therefore, all products or services must be approved by the Sharīʿah 
board before they can be offered in the market.  
5.2.2.5 Qatar 
 
(a) Regulatory Overview 
 
Qatar celebrated its independence in 1971 with its first Provisional Constitution on 2nd 
April 1970; this was replaced by the Amended Provisional Constitution of 19th April 
1972 (Hamzeh, 1994: 83). Article 1 of the 1972 constitution clearly states that Islamic 
law is the main source of legislation and Islam is the religion of the state. Although the 
constitution of Qatar specifically puts Sharīʿah as a main source of legislation, 
nevertheless in the aspect of commercial transactions, Sharīʿah is acceptable as one of the 
main sources of legislation but not as a primary consideration.181 Moreover, there is a 
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 This committee consists of three members; two of them are Sharīʿah board members (one of them is a 
committee chairman) and the third is the general secretary of the Sharīʿah board. This executive committee 
will then have to submit its reports to the Sharīʿah board (Al Rajhi, 2008). 
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 In the case of Ruler of Qatar v International Marine Oil Company Limited (1953) 20 ILR 534, the 
arbitrator rejected the application of Islamic law as the proper law of the Concession Agreement, despite its 
acknowledgment of Islamic law as a source of legislation. It was decided that Islamic law is inappropriate 
to govern modern oil concessions. Ballantyne (1987: 16–17) claims that the true reason behind this case 
was not because Islamic law was inappropriate but that the concession agreement was full of irregularities 
that would make it invalid. 




contradiction between the Qatar Civil and Commercial Codes and its constitution,.182 For 
instance, article 4 of the Civil and Commercial Code states that Sharīʿah shall apply in 
the absence of express legislation provision or custom (Ballantyne, 1985: 9).  
 
This position puts Sharīʿah as a secondary source of legislation with respect to 
commercial transactions, which contradicts Article 7 of the constitution. In view of the 
similar situations that happened in Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain, it is presumed that the 
Qatar Civil and Commercial Code is excluded from the application of Article 7 and hence 
permits interest-based transactions in Qatar’s financial sector. In fact, Law No 7 of 1973, 
amended by Law No. 7 of 1975, granted power to the Qatar Monetary Agency to 
determine the interest rates on deposits and loans. The government of Qatar then 
established the Qatar Central Bank (QCB) that inherited all functions of the Qatar 
Monetary Agency in 2006 by Decree Law No. 33 of the Banking Law of Qatar 2006 
(Ross, 2008: 134). The QCB is the regulatory body that supervises and manages the 
financial sector in Qatar, while the Doha Securities Market serves as the securities market 
regulator. The judicial system of Qatar has the civil court hearing cases pertaining to 
commercial, banking and finance disputes. 
 
In early 2005, the government of Qatar established the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC), 
with the purpose of creating an independent regulatory body for the financial sector, and 
the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) to manage the securities market (QFC, 
2010a). The establishment of the QFC was regulated by the QFC Law (Law No. 7 of 
2005) and the QFMA by Law No. 33, where both laws are regarded as the main 
legislation governing the basic construction of the QFC. The QFC Law establishes four 
different independent bodies, namely the QFC Authority, the QFC Regulatory Authority, 
the Appeals Body and the QFC Tribunal. The QFC has the power to regulate the financial 
sector, including Islamic financial business. As the QFC is inspired by the DIFC model 
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 It is reported that, since the 1960s, the application of Islamic law in Qatar has been confined to family 
and personal matters, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. Hamzeh (1994: 79–90) describes the 
development of the Qatar legal system in three different stages, namely tribal law, Islamic law and modern 
law.  




that has separate judicial and federal systems, the QFC also has its own civil and 
commercial court and regulatory tribunal as part of its legal infrastructure. 
 
In parallel with the expansion of Islamic banking in Qatar’s financial market, the QFC 
Regulatory Authority issued the Islamic Finance Rule Book 2007 (ISFI) in July 2007 
(QFC, 2010b). The ISFI provides rules and regulations pertaining to Islamic financial 
business, such the endorsement of IFIs and Islamic windows, disclosure requirements, 
constitutional documents, systems and control, conduct of business standards, and 
Sharīʿah boards. With the issuance of the ISFI, all IFIs and Islamic windows must 
comply with the ISFI and they are subject to the supervision of the QFC Regulatory 
Authority. 
 
(b) Sharīʿah Governance 
 
There are two sets of frameworks of Sharīʿah governance system for the IFIs in Qatar, 
namely under the auspices of QCB and the QFC.183 The QCB issued prudential 
regulations for banking supervision known as Instructions to Banks (IB) in March 2008 
and Part Seven of the Banking Supervision Instructions provides the guidelines for IFIs. 
Meanwhile, the QFC has its own rules and regulations pertaining to the Sharīʿah 
governance system, as stipulated in the ISFI. 
 
Chapter 1 of Banking Risk, Credit and Financing Risk of the IB requires IFIs to establish 
a Sharīʿah board. The Sharīʿah board must consist of not less than two qualified Muslim 
members appointed by the BOD and approved by the general assembly. It further states 
that the Sharīʿah board has a duty to supervise activities and to approve products and 
services. As such, contracts and documentations of any transactions must be ratified by 
the Sharīʿah board. In carrying out this duty, the Sharīʿah board shall be assisted by a 
Sharīʿah internal auditor and the Sharīʿah audit report shall be submitted to the Sharīʿah 
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 IFIs in Qatar must also comply with the regulations pertaining to corporate governance, such as the 
Commercial Companies Law No. 5 of 2002 (CCL). The CCL mainly provides guidelines for management 
and control of Qatari companies in terms of transparency and disclosure as part of its corporate governance 
measures (Ross, 2008: 146). 




board. For purpose of standardization of practice, the IB requires the IFIs to adopt the 
AAOIFI governance standards.  
 
The IB contains two unique features which differentiate its position from other Sharīʿah 
governance frameworks. Firstly, the IB restricts the Sharīʿah board members to receive 
credit facilities for commercial purposes (QFC, 2009: 160). This position raises an issue 
as to the reasonability of such a restriction. If the purpose of such a restriction is to ensure 
the independence of the Sharīʿah board and to avoid conflict of interest, the prohibition 
should include receiving credit facilities for both personal and commercial purposes. 
Secondly, the IFIs are required to appoint directors and senior management who are 
highly qualified, experienced and trained in the field of Islamic financial services (QFC, 
2009: 197). This is a unique provision which cannot be found in any rules and regulations 
of other jurisdictions.  
 
The ISFI specifies the Sharīʿah governance framework for IFIs registered with the QFC. 
Section 5 of the ISFI requires IFIs to establish and maintain systems and controls to 
ensure the Sharīʿah compliance of all their Islamic financial business. Section 5.2.1 (1) 
details this requirement to include the Sharīʿah compliance aspect, the Sharīʿah board 
and internal Sharīʿah review matters. With respect to Sharīʿah governance, section 6 of 
the ISFI provides a comprehensive provision pertaining to the Sharīʿah board. Section 
6.1.1 places a mandatory condition on IFIs to establish their own Sharīʿah board. 
Although there is no Sharīʿah board at the QCB or the QFC, the government of Qatar has 
established the Supreme Sharīʿah Council attached to the Ministry of Awqaf as the 
highest Sharīʿah authority. The Supreme Sharīʿah Council is the final authority in cases 
of Sharīʿah disputes pertaining to Islamic finance. 
 
With regard to the composition of the Sharīʿah board, the ISFI includes a condition of a 
minimum of three members who are appointed by the governing body of the institution. 
Section 3 of the Interpretation and Application Rulebook 2008 defines the governing 
body as the BOD, the management or other governing body of an authorized firm. In this 




context, the appointment, as well as the dismissal and changes, of the Sharīʿah board 
members will be made by the BOD. 
 
In terms of qualifications, the ISFI does not specify the exact criteria for the appointment 
of Sharīʿah board members. Section 6.1.1 (B) (ii) mentions that the members appointed 
must be competent to perform their functions as Sharīʿah board members by considering 
their qualifications and previous experience. In addition, the ISFI forbids the Sharīʿah 
board members to be appointed as directors or controllers of the IFIs. This restriction is 
perhaps intended to clarify the role of the Sharīʿah board members, which is supervisory 
and advisory in nature. Section 6.1.2 requires IFIs to have a set of policies on the 
Sharīʿah board with regard to method of appointment, dismissals, changes and 
remuneration. The ISFI also makes it compulsory for IFIs to retain records of its 
assessment of the Sharīʿah board members and the agreed terms of engagement of each 
member for at least six years from the date on which the individual ceased to be a 
member of the Sharīʿah board.184 
 
A unique position of the ISFI is that the IFIs have legal responsibilities to take reasonable 
steps to ensure that the members of the Sharīʿah board are independent and not subject to 
any conflict of interest. This position then requires IFIs to provide the QFC Regulatory 
Authority with information on the qualifications, skills, experience and independence of 
the Sharīʿah board. In fact, the ISFI also emphasizes the IFIs’ duty to take reasonable 
measures, to provide assistance to the Sharīʿah board, and to ensure their right of full 
access to relevant records and information for the purpose of Sharīʿah compliance. 
 
The ISFI clearly mentions the requirement for the adoption of the AAOIFI governance 
standards, particularly in the aspect of the Sharīʿah review. Section 6.2 requires IFIs to 
ensure that all Sharīʿah reviews are undertaken in accordance with the AAOIFI Standards 
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 Section 6.1.4 of the ISFI requires that records of the assessment of competence of Sharīʿah Supervisory 
Board members must include at a minimum: (A) the factors that have been taken into account when making 
the assessment of competence; (B) the qualifications and experience of the Sharīʿah Supervisory Board 
members; (C) the basis upon which the Authorized Firm has deemed that the proposed Sharīʿah 
Supervisory Board member is suitable; and (D) details of any other Sharīʿah supervisory boards of which 
the proposed Sharīʿah Supervisory Board member is, or has been, a member. 
 




on Governance No. 2 and to submit a Sharīʿah report as stipulated in the AAOIFI 
Standards on Governance No. 1. The Sharīʿah report must be submitted within four 
months of the financial year end. To complement the process of the Sharīʿah review in 
accordance with the AAOIFI Governance standard No. 3, the IFIs must perform an 
internal Sharīʿah review to audit the extent to which the IFIs comply with fatwa, rulings 
and guidelines issued by the Sharīʿah board. The internal Sharīʿah review should be 
conducted by the internal audit team and the individuals or departments involved in 
performing the review must be competent and sufficiently independent to assess 
compliance with Sharīʿah.  
5.2.3 United Kingdom 
 
(a) Regulatory Overview  
The attempt to introduce Islamic financial services to the UK began in the 1980s when Al 
Barakah Bank endeavoured to form a fully-fledged Islamic bank in 1982 but 
unfortunately it was forced to close in June 1993 by the Bank of England after failing to 
satisfy certain requirements of the regulators (Housby, 2005: 69).185 In 2000, the Bank of 
England, with the cooperation of HM Treasury, set up a working group to study the 
feasibility of Islamic finance in the UK. This working group was set up by Sir Edward 
George, the then Governor of the Bank of England and the members comprised 
representatives from the Treasury, the Financial Services Authority, the Council of 
Mortgage Lenders, banks and Muslim organizations including the Muslim Council of 
Britain (Briault, 2007). Since then several legislative measures have been introduced by 
HM Treasury in relation to the tax and regulatory systems to enable the development of 
Islamic finance in the UK and, in August 2004, the first full Sharīʿah-compliant retail 
Islamic bank, the Islamic Bank of Britain, was authorized.  
According to a report produced by International Financial Services London, at the 
beginning of 2008 the UK hosted five Islamic banks, more than twenty Islamic windows, 
one Takāful operator, nine fund managers and one Sharīʿah-compliant hedge fund 
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 This is one the main reasons why the UK authorities are very careful and vigilant in the implementation 
of Islamic finance in the UK. Despite that, Islamic retail products have been appearing in the UK market 
since the 1990s (HM Treasury, 2008: 12). 




manager (HM Treasury, 2008). In the meantime, the UK authorities have continued to 
develop Islamic finance in the UK by establishing the Islamic Finance Council based in 
Scotland in 2005 and a special subgroup in early 2007 to study and produce a strategy for 
the promotion of the UK as a centre for Islamic financial services.186 In April 2007, the 
HM Treasury and the UK Debt Management Office also undertook a feasibility study for 
sovereign sukuk issuance. This positive development further enhances the growth of the 
Islamic finance industry in the UK and may stimulate its expansion into other European 
countries. 
 
(b) Sharīʿah Governance 
Although Islamic banking is considered new to the UK, there is already a well-developed 
Islamic financial structure and governance framework. Basically, the UK authority 
implements equal legal treatment and framework for conventional banks and IFIs. With 
regard to Sharīʿah governance, there is no legal requirement for IFIs to establish a 
Sharīʿah board, either at individual bank or national level. The UK authorities 
nevertheless are concerned with the issue of Sharīʿah governance as the FSA mentions 
that it needs to clarify from financial and operational aspects the role of the Sharīʿah 
board in IFIs (Briault, 2007). 
Actually, the major concern of the FSA about Sharīʿah governance is whether the 
Sharīʿah board has an executive or directorial role in IFIs. As long as it does not have an 
executive role, there will be no significant issue from the FSA’s perspective. The 
practices of the five existing Islamic banks in the UK show that the Sharīʿah governance 
is managed by the individual IFIs and they are free to adopt their own Sharīʿah 
governance without adhering to any national or other higher level of Sharīʿah board. HM 
Treasury clearly mentions that the UK government does not intend to follow the Sharīʿah 
governance approach of other jurisdictions, since the UK authorities are secular bodies 
and not religious regulators.  
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 This subgroup was set up by UK Trade & Investment (UKTI), through their Financial Services 
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With respect to the composition of the Sharīʿah board, current practice shows that the 
Islamic Bank of Britain and the European Finance House consist of three Sharīʿah 
advisors, the Bank of London and the Middle East and the European Islamic Bank with 
four Sharīʿah advisors and Gate House Capital with one Sharīʿah advisor. The variety of 
Sharīʿah board compositions amongst the IFIs indicates that there are no legal or policy 
requirements from the FSA or other UK authorities which creates flexibility for the IFIs 
in the UK to organize and manage their own Sharīʿah governance.  
 
The FSA is also concerned about the aspect of confidentiality and the shortage of 
Sharīʿah scholars. Some of the Sharīʿah advisors are sitting on more than three different 
Sharīʿah boards at one particular time and this position may raise potential issues of 
confidentiality and conflict of interest. At the moment, the individual IFIs tackle this 
issue internally as there is no specific guideline for Sharīʿah boards. HM Treasury has, 
however, highlighted its concern on this aspect by recommending the standardization of 
products and practices of Islamic finance services. In this regard, the UK government 
supports the roles played by the international standard-setters, such as the AAOIFI, the 
IFSB and the IIFM (HM Treasury 2008: 19–25). The standardization of products and 
practices guarantees the further growth of the Islamic finance industry as it may reduce 
cost and time, improve documentation and confidence, lessen the burden on Sharīʿah 
scholars (HM Treasury, 2008: 23) and mitigate the potential of Sharīʿah risk. In order to 
address the problem of the shortage of Sharīʿah scholars in the UK, the Islamic Finance 
Council, in collaboration with the Securities and Investment Institute (SII), offers a 
Scholar Development Programme specifically for Sharīʿah advisors or potential Sharīʿah 
scholars. This programme provides a wide range of subjects with knowledge of the 
conventional system that Sharīʿah scholars need to be able to practice in the UK or 
elsewhere (SII, 2008). 
 
Even though the UK authorities are silent on many aspects of Sharīʿah governance, the 
situation is different in the case of sukuk. HM Treasury (2008a: 39) highlights the need 
for the appointment of internationally recognized Sharīʿah scholars to ensure Sharīʿah 




compliance of the Government Sterling Sukuk Issuance. Furthermore, there was a 
suggestion to incorporate British Sharīʿah scholars onto the board to approve the sukuk 
issuance (HM Treasury, 2008a: 24). This position indicates that the UK authorities have 
started to look into a possible framework of Sharīʿah governance. It is expected that the 
growth of the Islamic finance industry, in parallel with the sophistication of its products, 
may force the UK authorities to consider introducing a comprehensive Sharīʿah 
governance framework in the future, which may be a good model for countries with a 
non-Islamic legal environment.187  
5.3 Regulatory Issues  
 
Regardless of the positive developments on the Sharīʿah governance framework in the 
case countries, it is observed that there are a few significant regulatory issues which are 
inherently essential to the Sharīʿah governance system, such as the legal status of the 
Sharīʿah pronouncements, court’s jurisdiction, addressing issues on differences of 
Sharīʿah rulings and the Sharīʿah board’s advisory and executive roles. This section 
attempts to highlight these regulatory issues in order to enlighten further discussion on 
the legal framework of Sharīʿah governance.  
5.3.1 Legal Status of Sharīʿah Pronouncements  
 
One of the debatable issues on Sharīʿah governance is the status of Sharīʿah rulings. The 
issue refers to whether the Sharīʿah rulings are binding on IFIs, courts or any other 
related institutions. To illustrate this important issue, we may refer to a survey conducted 
on the perception of Sharīʿah rulings, which found that only 56.6% of IFIs consider 
Sharīʿah rulings to be binding, 20% as merely advisory and 22.4% gave no response 
(Dawud, 1996: 43). The result of this survey indicates that there are loopholes and 
shortcomings in the Sharīʿah governance framework, particularly in positioning Sharīʿah 
board decisions as binding and mandatory. Ironically, the IFSB survey on Sharīʿah 
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boards across jurisdictions demonstrates that 60% of respondents agreed that the national 
Sharīʿah authority should be the highest authority in Islamic finance, yet only a few 
jurisdictions have affirmed this practice (IFSB, 2008b: 18).  
 
With reference to the existing Sharīʿah governance framework in some countries, they 
have already provided clear legal provision on the superiority of Sharīʿah board 
decisions. This is in parallel with the AAOIFI governance standard, which stresses that 
fatwa issued by the Sharīʿah board shall be binding and fully enforceable (AAOIFI, 
2005: 4). It is a similar situation in the case of the IAIB Sharīʿah board as all the board’s 
decisions for Sharīʿah supervision are binding on the banks which are members of the 
institute (Wilson, 1997: 83–93).  
 
In Malaysia, sections 57 and 58 of the CBA vividly provide clear provision on the status 
of Sharīʿah pronouncements issued, which are binding to IFIs, courts and arbitration. 
Similarly, in the case of the UAE, by which Article 5 of the Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 
provides the establishment of the Higher Sharīʿah Authority (HSA) as the final authority 
in Sharīʿah matters pertaining to Islamic banking and finance. All determination and 
decisions made by the HSA are binding and mandatory to all IFIs in the UAE. Paragraph 
A (ix) of the Instructions for Sharīʿah Compliance in Islamic Banking Institutions makes 
it clear that all fatwa or rulings issued by Sharīʿah boards are binding upon IFIs (SBP, 
2008: 1). While the legal frameworks of Malaysia, the UAE and Pakistan have provided 
clear positions on Sharīʿah rulings, the situation is different in other countries such as the 
UK, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, since the status of Sharīʿah 
pronouncements is still ambiguous. 
 
In light of the above, laws and legal arrangements in certain jurisdictions, such as the 
UAE and Malaysia, seem capable of providing a clear position on the status of the 
Sharīʿah board decisions to be binding and mandatory, whereas in many other countries 
the situation is otherwise. With this in mind, there must be a practical solution to resolve 
the issue by examining and studying the respective countries’ legal environments and 




structures.188 Proactive efforts and continuous endeavours should be carried out to place 
Sharīʿah as the supreme law and authority and to ensure that Sharīʿah board rulings are 
binding and mandatory upon the IFIs, the arbitrators and the courts of justice.  
5.3.2 Court Jurisdiction 
 
Section 5.2 clearly explains that Islamic finance cases often fall under the jurisdiction of 
non- Sharīʿah courts, as in the cases of Malaysia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, the 
UK and the BDS in Saudi Arabia. Basically, this is not appropriate, since Islamic finance 
is part of Islamic law and ideally it should be under the jurisdiction of a Sharīʿah court in, 
which does not happen in some jurisdictions, particularly the UK. In this instance, two 
issues might be significant in respect to the Sharīʿah governance system, peculiarly 
judges’ ability to decide Islamic finance cases and to what extent the judges’ attitude is to 
refer Islamic finance disputes to a Sharīʿah board for deliberation.  
 
The significance of the former issue can be illustrated in the case of Arab Finance 
Malaysia Berhad v Taman Ihsan Jaya and Ors (2008) 5 MLJ, in which the High Court 
ruled that the profit derived from the BBA facility was unlawful and illegitimate as it 
involved an element of interest and therefore IFIs may only claim the principal amount of 
financing. This judgment will seriously affect the Islamic finance industry in Malaysia as 
the BBA represents more than 80% of total financing in Malaysia. By referring to the 
inadequate arguments of the learned judge, particularly in explaining riba and elaborating 
the BBA from a Sharīʿah point of view, it indicates that the court may need the 
deliberation of an expert who specializes in Sharīʿah, particularly fiqh al muāmalāt. In 
this context the Sharīʿah board is the ideal institution to be referred to by the court. 
Hitherto, after more than a decade of the implementation of Islamic finance with 
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 It is worth noting the recommendations of the Council of Islamic Fiqh Academy for the purpose of 
Sharīʿah enforcement in its Fifth Meeting in Kuwait in 1988. The council provides five recommendations 
to solve the problem of enforcing the Sharīʿah rules namely: to continuously conduct thorough and 
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programmes and various means of communication in order to mobilize them towards the enforcement of 
Sharīʿah; and to widen the training ground of research in order to prepare human resources for the 
application of Sharīʿah (IFA and IRTI, 2000: 96–97). 




numerous cases reported, there was only one case the court has referred to a Sharīʿah 
board. This indicates the court’s passive attitude towards having the deliberation of a 
Sharīʿah board pertaining to Sharīʿah matters involving Islamic finance cases, in spite of 
its limited knowledge of the subject.  
5.3.3 Addressing Issues of Differences of Sharīʿah Resolution 
The absence of a comprehensive set of regulatory frameworks on Sharīʿah governance 
may cause problems to the development of Islamic finance. The issue on the differences 
of various fatwa rulings189 amongst the Sharīʿah boards may affect Islamic finance, 
especially when it involves international entities and cross-border transactions. The IFSB 
survey indicates the low percentage of reconciled Sharīʿah issues pertaining to different 
Sharīʿah resolutions in which Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Sudan indicate issue 
resolution of less than 20%, the UAE slightly more than 20%, and Malaysia 40% (IFSB, 
2008b: 42). This crucial finding denotes that most of the Sharīʿah issues related to 
resolution of Sharīʿah differences are not reconciled in many countries.  
The diversity of interpretation of Sharīʿah may affect the determination of certain rulings 
on particular issues, where one IFI would accept a new product as being Sharīʿah-
compliant while others would decide it is non-compliant (McMillen, 2006: 139–140). To 
tackle this issue, there are a few approaches that can be possibly implemented and these 
include establishing a Sharīʿah board at national level, providing legal provision on the 
final authority of the Sharīʿah board rulings, allowing interdisciplinary experts to be 
appointed as Sharīʿah board members, and issuing universal Sharīʿah prudential 
standards. 
In the case of conflict of opinions amongst members of the Sharīʿah boards in Kuwait, 
the BOD of the designated IFIs may transfer the matter to the Fatwa Board in the 
Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs and the Fatwa Board shall be the final authority on 
the matter (Article 93 of the CBK Law 32/1968). Similarly in Malaysia, section 51 of the 
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 Sheikh Mohammed Taqi Usmani claims that there has been near consensus amongst the Sharīʿah 
scholars on Sharīʿah related issues in Islamic banking and finance and only about 10% of disputed opinions 
which are yet to be resolved (New Horizon, 2004: 15). According to the CIBAFI, who sampled about 6,000 
fatwa, it was found that 90% were consistent across the IFIs (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006: 11). 




CBA grants the power to the SAC as the sole Sharīʿah authority that will be referred to 
by the court or arbitrator in disputes involving Sharīʿah issues in Islamic banking, finance 
and takāful cases. In Pakistan, the Instructions for Sharīʿah Compliance in Islamic 
Banking Institutions provides that, in the case of difference of opinion arising between 
Sharīʿah boards of IFIs, the matter shall be referred to the SBP Sharīʿah board and any 
deliberation made by them board shall be final and binding (SBP, 2008: 3).  
 
Another possible approach to address the issue of various legal opinions is to allow 
interdisciplinary experts or professionals to be appointed as Sharīʿah board members. A 
combination of interdisciplinary experts in the composition of a Sharīʿah board may 
enable the board to come out with more integrated Sharīʿah rulings. For instance, the 
Sharīʿah board members of the BNM consist of Sharīʿah scholars, chartered accountants, 
lawyers, judges190 and central bankers. This approach is preferable because any issues 
discussed in the Sharīʿah board deal not only with Sharīʿah matters but also legal and 
financial aspects.  
 
It is also crucial to see some uniformity and standards are set to ensure that the 
differences of legal opinion are addressed effectively. In this respect, the issuance of 
Sharīʿah standards is really necessary with the purpose of bringing diverse Sharīʿah 
opinions to a universally acceptable practice. The AAOIFI Sharīʿah standards 
nevertheless have been adopted by only a few countries since the standards are not made 
obligatory except in Bahrain, Jordan, Sudan, Qatar and Dubai. The standards are used as 
guidelines in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Lebanon and Indonesia. It is expected that 
numerous IFIs will adopt the AAOIFI Sharīʿah standards in order to address any 
Sharīʿah issues arising from differences in Sharīʿah rulings. 
5.3.4 Executive, Advisory and Supervisory Roles of the Sharīʿah Board 
The Sharīʿah board plays a significant role in ensuring Sharīʿah compliance in all 
products, transactions and operations of IFIs. The issue here is whether the Sharīʿah 
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 On 1st November 2004 the BNM appointed Tun Abdul Hamid Haji Mohamad, then Chief Justice of 
Malaysia, as a member of the National Sharīʿah Advisory Council for Islamic Banking and Takāful (New 
Horizon, 2005: 5).  




board has an executive role in exercising its power or whether it is just an advisory 
authority. This issue is very significant, especially in non-Islamic legal environments 
such as the UK, where the FSA has a standard requirement to authorize a person to be a 
director who has an executive role in the company. There are two main consequences if 
Sharīʿah board members are seen to have executive power or a directorship role in IFIs in 
the UK, i.e. it is possible that many Sharīʿah scholars may not meet the fit and proper 
criteria required by the FSA and the existing practice of multiple membership of Sharīʿah 
boards in various IFIs may be considered as contrary to the rule of conflict of interest 
(Ainley et al., 2007: 13). At the moment, there is no controversial issue on this matter 
since the FSA’s perspective of the role of the Sharīʿah board is that it is advisory and the 
board does not interfere in the management of the IFI.191 It is assumed that potential 
conflict is likely to exist due to the increasing numbers of Sharīʿah boards in IFIs and the 
rapid growth of the Islamic finance industry in the UK192 and Europe.  
On the other hand, if the role and responsibilities of the Sharīʿah board are considered 
neither executive nor supervisory but merely advisory, it raises another significant issue 
as to the actual function of the Sharīʿah board and to what extent its deliberations bind 
the IFIs. If it is merely advisory, the IFIs may ignore the decisions made by the Sharīʿah 
board since it does not have the authority to enforce its deliberations. It gives the 
impression that the decisions made by the Sharīʿah board are not binding upon the court 
or the respective IFIs or even in alternative dispute resolution such as arbitration. In fact, 
the absence of a supervisory role for the Sharīʿah board may negate the efficiency of ex 
post monitoring of Sharīʿah compliance aspects. This issue hence needs proper 
deliberation and indeed the Sharīʿah board must be given full authority to have 
supervisory and advisory roles that address the Sharīʿah compliance aspects of IFIs.  
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 The FSA considers that the Sharīʿah board has an advisory role based on the existing governance 
structure, reporting lines, fee structure and the terms and conditions of the Sharīʿah boards of IFIs in the 
UK (Ainley et al., 2007: 13–14). 
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 Kahf (1999: 454) mentions that the failure of Al Barakah Bank in London to clearly clarify the 
relationship of its management and Sharīʿah board to the Bank of England is one of the factors that 
contributed to its closure in 1995.  






The Sharīʿah governance system in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the UK can be 
classified into two types, namely regulated via legal and supervisory requirements, as in 
the cases of Malaysia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar, or through self-regulation, as 
in the cases of Saudi Arabia and the UK. In terms of classification from a regulatory 
perspective, Malaysia is identified as strong proponent of a ‘regulatory-based approach’, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar as a ‘minimalist approach’, Saudi Arabia as a 
‘passive approach’ and the UK as a ‘reactive approach’. In view of numerous legal issues 
involved in the existing Sharīʿah governance framework, the need to have a 
comprehensive legal framework and an effective Sharīʿah governance system is really 
crucial. Failure to provide efficient Sharīʿah governance either through law or legislation 
on the part of regulators and the players would impede the future development of the 
Islamic finance industry.  
 
In this aspect, the AAOIFI Sharīʿah standards are an important effort to standardize 
Sharīʿah practices, while the IFSB guidelines on governance would be able to guide and 
promote the best practice of a Sharīʿah governance system. Referring to the diverse 
perception and acceptability of the AAOIFI standards and IFSB guidelines, there must be 
strong mechanisms to guarantee their universal adoption and one of them is through 
having a proper legal framework. For this purpose, thorough and intense studies need to 
be conducted to examine, analyse and scrutinize the possible adaptation of the AAOIFI 
standards and the IFSB guidelines in various markets and legal environments.  
 
The foregoing discussion seems to suggest that the existing regulatory framework of 
Sharīʿah governance needs further enhancement and improvement in order to reinforce 
the development and growth of the Islamic finance industry. This brings into focus the 
measures and efforts that need to be taken to strengthen the IFIs through enhancing the 
Sharīʿah governance framework. It is important that some common and fundamental 
legal elements underlying and promoting good governance and best practices are to be 
drawn up to facilitate the creation of and optimize a healthy and viable environment for 










Selection of appropriate research methodology is a prerequisite for good research, 
whether social or scientific. It is also imperative for the purpose of ensuring the 
originality and quality of the research. Philip and Pugh (1994: 61) provide guidelines on 
the originality of work within the context of PhD research and these include carrying out 
empirical work that has not been done before, making new interpretations of existing 
material, introducing substantial new evidence to old issues, being cross-disciplinary and 
using different methodologies, and studying something in a particular area that has not 
been carried out in that area before. In view of these guidelines and to ensure the 
originality and quality of the research, the researcher employed triangulation research 
methods to carry out the study.  
 
The researcher humbly claims that this study is indeed original, since the empirical work 
in this research is conducted in different countries with a mixed method approach, which 
represents the research’s distinctiveness and uniqueness. In fact, the study offers a new 
interpretation of the existing secondary data as well as the primary sources that 
significantly introduce substantial new evidence and findings that would be beneficial for 
players in the Islamic finance industry, including policymakers and regulators to enhance 
and improve the Sharīʿah governance framework. This chapter hence aims at providing 
elaboration and embellishment on the research methodology used in this study. It 
explains specific methods of data collection and data analysis including research design, 
reliability and validity, data collection, sampling and data analysis methodology. Apart 
from that, this chapter also provides detailed information about the research instruments, 
the process of data collection and data analysis approaches. In summary, the overall 
research processes are illustrated and explained in this chapter, which attempts to 






6.1 Research Methodology 
 
Research methodology refers to “a way of thinking about and studying social reality” 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 3). The term ‘methodology’ may be taken to be inclusive of 
“research design, theoretical frameworks, the selection and analysis of literature, and 
justified preferences for particular types of data gathering activities” (Murray and 
Lawrence, 2000: 218).  
 
In the social sciences, there are two main types of research methodologies, namely 
quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative research methodology is mainly deductive and 
it emphasizes procedures and statistical measures of validity (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996: 554).  On the other hand, qualitative research methodology usually 
emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data 
(Bryman, 2001: 264). Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996: 554) view that, unlike 
quantitative methodology, the qualitative approach is inductive and descriptive in 
character and involves participant observations, case studies and fieldwork research 
methods. At this point, it is clear that the qualitative approach is useful to indicate as to 
“how the observation prompted the study to analyze and isolate variables (induction) and 
how in turn these variables may be developed into a theory” (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996: 554). 
 
It is important to note that, although qualitative research is mostly concerned with the 
generation of theories, there are qualitative studies that have been employed to test the 
theories rather than to generate them (Bryman, 2001: 21). With this motivation, this study 
employed qualitative research methodology to answer the research questions and to test 
the hypothesis formulated from the literature review. Since this study is classified as 
social research, the researcher considers that the qualitative research approach is an 
appropriate methodology to ensure the originality and quality of the study. It is also 
important to state that this research is mainly based on primary data gathered through 
questionnaires and interviews, which reveals the preceptions and opinions of the 
participants.  This hence implies also that it should be considered as a qualitative 





fieldwork and empirical study to analyse the perceptions, opinions and practices of the 
research participants. In fact, a qualitative methodology would be able to meet the 
research aims, questions and objectives in view of the small sample size and scarce 
information as well as offer reliable findings on the area of study (Silverman, 2004: 6). 
6.2 Research Design 
 
With regard to research strategies, there are six major strategies in the mixed-method 
approach, namely sequential explanatory strategy, sequential exploratory strategy, 
sequential transformative strategy, concurrent explanatory strategy, concurrent 
exploratory strategy and concurrent transformative strategy (Creswell, 2003: 215). This 
study used the sequential exploratory strategy to gather data and information; this 
involved two phases, with the priority given to the qualitative data collection and 
analysis, which was then followed by a phase of quantitative data collection and analysis 
(Creswell, 2003: 215). In terms of data collection and analysis, several instruments were 
used to ensure the validity and reliability of the data. 
 
Preliminarily, the study utilized a descriptive research method in collecting secondary 
data and information for the literature review. The study chose a theoretical and 
methodological rather than an integrative form of literature review. In these forms of 
literature review, the researcher focuses on the theoretical aspects and conceptual 
frameworks that relate to the issues involved in the study (Creswell, 2003: 32). The 
literature review was conducted intensively and critically to justify the viability of the 
research topic as well as to identify gaps and issues related with the research. Since the 
availability of primary data on the research topic is very limited, this study used 
questionnaires to generate data and feedback from the research participants. In the light 
of several weaknesses and disadvantages of the questionnaires, this study also conducted 
semi-structured interviews and content analysis methods in order to provide additional 
evidence and to strengthen the justification of the research findings. In the content 
analysis approach, the researcher developed disclosure indices to generate and interpret 






6.3 Research Methods 
 
A research method is a technique and procedure used for data collection and analysis 
(Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2007: 47). There are two main types of research method, 
namely qualitative and quantitative; the former mainly refers to a research strategy that 
emphasizes words and has non-numerical characteristics, whereas the latter emphasizes 
quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2001: 20). This study 
employed both quantitative and qualitative research methods in collecting and analysing 
the qualitative and quantitative data known as triangulation, multiple methods and mixed 
methods. Creswell (2003: 19–20) defines mixed methods as “strategies of inquiry that 
involve collecting data either simultaneously or sequentially”, which normally involves 
gathering both numeric and textual data in which the findings represent both quantitative 
and qualitative information. 
 
Madey (1982) notes that the mixed-method approach is very useful, particularly to “assist 
the researcher to develop a conceptual framework, to validate quantitative findings and to 
construct indices from qualitative data that can be used to analyze qualitative data” 
(Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005: 384). It also enhances the credibility of the research 
account by providing an additional way of generating evidence to support the research 
findings (Seale, 1999: 53–72). Axxin and Pearce (2006: 2) add that a mixed-method 
strategy enables the study to develop a comprehensive empirical record and to 
counterbalance the strengths and weaknesses of other research methods. Bryman (2001: 
449–450) uses the term triangulation to explain the mixed-method approach and views 
that qualitative research facilitates quantitative research and vice versa in terms of 
providing hypotheses and aiding measurements. Realizing these advantages, the research 
adopted a mixed-method approach that would be able to verify the findings from one 






6.4  Data Collection Methods 
6.4.1 Questionnaire  
 
A questionnaire is a self-administered interview, which requires self-explanatory 
instructions and question design (Smith, 1981: 153). It is very useful in qualitative 
research as an effective tool for data collection and serves the function of measurement 
(Oppenheim, 1992: 100). Since this study is exploratory in character, and with the view 
of the scarcity of the primary data on the research topic, the study employed the survey 
method to generate fresh data to answer the research hypothesis and questions.  
 
Simon (1969: 242–244) discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the survey 
method. This method is often used in social research studies and has remained the 
preferable way of retrieving information about the respondents’ background, history and 
perceptions, as well as being able to provide techniques for the study of attitudes, belief 
and motives (Simon, 1969: 244–248). It is also preferable because it has high amounts of 
data standardization due to its data and collection efficiency (Smith, 1981: 184–186). On 
the basis that the advantages of survey questionnaires overwhelm the disadvantages, the 
study chose this approach to generate the primary data that would be able to fulfil the 
research aim and objectives. 
6.4.1.1 Questionnaire Design 
 
The questionnaire design is important to determine and shape the research data and 
information. There are two main types of survey questions, namely open-ended questions 
that leave the respondent free to respond in an unrestricted manner and closed-ended 
question that restrict the choice of responses by providing answers in terms of given 
categories or alternatives (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: 253–254). The 
survey questions in this study were designed to be closed-ended and specific enough to 
reveal all the desired answers from the research participants. 
 
In designing the questionnaires, the researcher first developed research questions based 





the research topic, six hypotheses were formulated. From these hypotheses, fifty survey 
questions were generated to specifically answer all of the research questions. With the 
purpose of improving the quality and viability of the survey questions, the study relied on 
several international guidelines and standards on corporate governance and Sharīʿah 
governance including the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Guidance by the 
BCBS on Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations, the AAOIFI 
governance standards and the IFSB-3, the IFSB-5 and the IFSB-10.  
 
Several approaches were taken to ensure the clarity and readability of the survey 
questions. Firstly, the sentence structure of the survey questions was kept simple and 
fewer than twenty words long. Secondly, comments and feedback from colleagues and 
experts were obtained to ensure that the survey questionnaires were clear and precise as 
well as to mitigate the potential for errors and misleading questions. Thirdly, the survey 
questions were divided into six sections and each question contained only one research 
issue. Finally, the survey questions were structured in a way so that the respondents 
would be able to answer them by clicking the appropriate box in the survey form. These 
processes are imperative not only to ensure the readability of the survey questions but to 
minimize any potential for invalidity or unreliability of the data collected.  
6.4.1.2 Layout of the Questionnaires 
 
The formulation of proper research questions and an accurate layout of the questionnaires 
will improve the quality of the responses. The study developed six research questions on 
the basis of identified issues and gaps analysed in the literature review. The survey 
questions were then structured in a way that would be able to meet all of the research 





Table 6.1: The Linkage between the Questions and Research Objectives 
Questions Linked to Objectives Questions 
i. To investigate the different approaches of IFIs to 
Sharīʿah governance 
Q1–Q7 
ii. To study the regulatory framework and internal policies 
or by-laws∗ of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs 
Q8–Q11 
iii. To examine the roles and functions of the Sharīʿah 
board in IFIs 
Q12–Q15 
iv. To examine the attributes of Sharīʿah board members 






v. To examine the operational procedures of Sharīʿah 
governance in IFIs 
Q34–Q45 




The layout of the questionnaire is very important for both research participants and the 
researcher. As to the research participants, proper layout of the questionnaire enables 
them to understand the objectives, topics and survey questions of the research, while for 
the researcher, it guarantees the quality and quantity of the data and information. In this 
aspect, the researcher used unambiguous and brief survey questions and each question 
covered only one issue. The survey was divided into six sections consisting of the general 
approach to Sharīʿah governance, regulatory and internal frameworks, roles of the 
Sharīʿah board, attributes of the Sharīʿah board with regards competence, independence, 
disclosure and transparency, operational procedures, and the Sharīʿah board’s 
assessment. These sections represent the main elements of a sound and proper Sharīʿah 
governance system, as laid down by the AAOIFI governance standards and the IFSB-10. 
 
With regard to the types of survey questions, two types of survey question, namely open-
ended and closed-ended, are commonly used in survey questionnaires. As part of the 
research strategy to improve the response rate and feedback from the respondents, all the 
survey questions were drafted and structured as closed-ended questions. Closed-ended 
questions can be further classified into Likert scale, multiple choice questions, ordinal 
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questions, categorical questions and numerical questions. Sections 1–7 of the survey 
questionnaires utilized categorical questions, which requested answers from explicitly 
mentioned answer categories (Saris and Gallholfer, 2007: 126). An additional remarks 
column was provided in the survey questionnaire in order to enable the respondents to 
highlight or to comment on the survey questions. While sections 1–7 used categorical 
questions, section 8 utilized ordinal questions, where answers were to be ranked in order 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree and Strongly Agree) to measure the general 
perception of IFIs on the Sharīʿah board’s performance. In summary, the survey 
questions were meticulously prepared and organized by taking into account all relevant 
factors that may improve the validity, practicability and reliability of the data collected as 
well as the research findings.  
6.4.1.3 Validity and Reliability 
 
There are various potential errors that could happen while carrying out the research 
process. These potential errors may lead to the invalidity or unreliability of the data 
acquisition, data processing analysis and interpretation of the research findings. In this 
regard, validity and reliability are important to determine whether the findings are 
accurate from the viewpoint of researcher, the research participants and the readers of an 
account (Creswell, 2003: 195–196). Basically, reliability is concerned with issues of 
consistency of measures and validity refers to the issue of whether an indicator that is 
devised to gauge a concept really measures that concept (Bryman, 2001: 72). The study 
seriously took into account the validity and reliability aspects of the research. 
 
In terms of validity, the researcher used the construct validity method (Bryman, 2001: 72-
73). The study minimized invalidity at the design stage by carefully scrutinizing the 
selection of methodologies for answering the questions and instrumentation for gathering 
the data. The extent of validity then was managed through a process of careful sampling 
and appropriate instrumentation by using a simple statistical analysis of the data. At the 
stage of data gathering, in view of the impossibility of getting a 100% response rate, the 
researcher took several steps to improve the research participants’ feedback by sending 





telephone call (Cohen et al., 2007: 144). All of these measures would be able to ensure 
the validity of the research data and findings. 
6.4.1.4 Administration of the Questionnaire  
 
The process of data collection involves several exercises and instruments. The survey 
questionnaires used mixed-mode data collection and instruments to improve the response 
rate and these included ordinary mail surveys, email surveys, telephone interviews and 
self-administered questionnaires. The telephone interviews, ordinary mail surveys and 
email surveys are much more preferable ways of data collection as they are convenient 
and produce a significant cost and time saving (Saris and Gallholfer, 2007: 165). Despite 
the advantages of these instruments, it was found that not all respondents were willing to 
respond and give feedback via ordinary mail, email or telephone. As such, personal 
interviews were also conducted in order to get responses from some respondents who 
preferred to be interviewed personally. Nevertheless, most of the survey questionnaires 
were distributed through ordinary mail and email and only a few respondents were 
personally interviewed because of cost and time factors.  
 
Cover letters and follow-up letters or reminder notices are other important instruments 
that can be used to improve the response rate of survey questionnaires. The need for these 
is not a new phenomenon as some researchers have already reported that responses rates 
to social surveys are declining in many countries (Bryman, 2001: 95). Realizing this, the 
researcher issued a specific cover letter attached together with the survey questionnaire to 
all the research participants. This cover letter contained several essential points and 
explanations about the research including the purpose of the survey, the potential value of 
the research, the importance and benefit of the research, the simplicity of the survey 
questions, an assurance of confidentiality and a note of appreciation (Cohen et al., 2007: 
339). On top of that, three reminders were sent out to respondents by ordinary mail and 
email as well as following up with personal telephone call. Accurate and precise 
information in the cover letter and appropriate reminder notices and follow-up letters will 
help the respondents to really understand and appreciate the importance and significance 





Since the survey target group was internal Sharīʿah officers or compliance officers in 
Sharīʿah departments, the survey was only distributed to IFIs’ head offices, therefore 
excluding the participation of branches. The researcher began the survey in the UAE 
when he was offered a position as an intern in the Dubai International Financial Centre 
and this was followed by Malaysia and the UK respectively. In the UAE and Malaysia, 
the researcher conducted personal interviews as well as distributing the questionnaires by 
ordinary mail and email. As to the other GCC countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Kuwait and Bahrain and the UK, only ordinary mail and email instruments were used to 
get feedback from the respondents.  
6.4.1.5 Response Rate 
 
Since the availability of secondary data on Sharīʿah governance practices is very limited, 
a detailed survey questionnaire was generated in order to source primary data from IFIs, 
excluding Islamic insurance institutions. The survey was distributed to eighty IFIs in 
Malaysia (20), GCC countries (Bahrain 12, the UAE 13, Qatar 10, Kuwait 10 and Saudi 
Arabia 9) and the UK (6).  
 
The response rate of 43.8% out of eighty IFIs is relatively satisfactory and significant. 
This is affirmed by Sekaran (2003: 237), who considers that a response rate of 30% is 
acceptable. The survey was launched on 1st April 2009 and ended on 1st June 2009 and 
the timeline for the survey was extended to 30th December 2009 due to the small response 
rate. In view of the difficulties in getting responses from the industry players and 
practitioners due to some inherent factors, the feedback of thirty-five IFIs from Malaysia, 
GCC countries and the UK is considered significant and acceptable for this research.193 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the percentage of the response rate according to the case countries.  
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 This is affirmed by other surveys such as Chapra and Ahmed (2002), where the response rate of the 
study was only 23.3% (fourteen IFIs out of sixty). A study conducted by Aboumouamer (1996) 
demonstrated a very minimal response rate where only fifteen IFIs from twenty different countries 
participated in the survey. In addition, only sixty-nine IFIs from eleven countries responded to the IFSB 
Survey on Sharīʿah Boards of Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services across Jurisdictions, despite 





Figure 6.1: The Response Rate 
 
6.4.2 Semi-Structured Interview 
 
The interview method is one of the prominent data collection strategies and has been used 
in a wide variety of social movement studies (Blee and Taylor, 2002: 93). As part of the 
qualitative research strategies, the study conducted semi-structured interviews with 
Sharīʿah scholars who are members of the Sharīʿah boards in IFIs. Unlike structured 
interviews, semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to vary the sequence of 
questions as well as to ask further questions whenever he thinks necessary (Bryman, 
2001: 110). All interviewees were given the same questions that would be able to answer 
the research questions of the study. These semi-structured interviews were conducted 
face to face with the Sharīʿah scholars to find out their views and opinions on selected 
Sharīʿah governance issues.  
6.4.2.1 Interview Design 
 
There are four types of semi-structured interview, namely oral history interviewing, life 
history interviewing, focus group interviewing and key informant interviewing (Blee and 
Taylor, 2002: 105). The study used the key informant interviewing approach in designing 
the interview questions. In the key informant interviewing method, the study selected the 



















Taylor, 2002: 105). In this regard, the study chose Sharīʿah board members in IFIs, 
considering their essential functions in Sharīʿah governance. 
 
Based on the research questions formulated in this study, the researcher generated 
nineteen interview questions which are segmented into seven parts. The majority of the 
questions were open-ended, to which all the interviewees could answer in whatever way 
they wished; only a few of them were closed-ended. Open-ended questions are very 
useful in getting clean and unbiased feedback because the interview participants can 
answer in their own terms, it allows unusual responses to be derived and enables the 
potential to explore new areas in which the researcher has limited knowledge (Bryman, 
2001: 143). The few questions that were closed-ended were for the researcher to confirm 
and validate certain Sharīʿah governance issues with an option for respondents to 
elaborate their affirmative or negative answers.  
 
Similar to the method used in designing the questionnaires, the study generated nineteen 
questions which were divided into seven parts to answer the research questions and to 
fulfil all of the research objectives; they can be summarized as follows: 
Table 6.2: The Linkage between the Questions and Research Objectives 
Questions Linked to Objectives Questions 
i. To investigate the different approaches of IFIs to 
Sharīʿah governance 
Q1–Q4 
ii. To study the internal policy of Sharīʿah governance in 
IFIs 
Q5 
iii. To examine the roles and functions of the Sharīʿah 
board in IFIs 
Q6–Q7 
iv. To examine the attributes of Sharīʿah board members 






v. To examine the operational procedures of Sharīʿah 
governance in IFIs 
Q15–Q17 








All the interview questions were standardized and drafted in short sentences. Each 
question represents only one specific issue. This enables the respondents to understand 
exactly the context of the questions and therefore provide good quality answers. In 
addition, proper selection of question design is very important for the purpose of 
processing the data. The study took into consideration this aspect and all questions were 
generated, structured and arranged in a way that all the data could be analysed easily 
through a coding and thematic approach.   
6.4.2.2 Mitigating Error in Interview 
 
The study used two approaches to reduce the potential for errors during interview, 
namely the standardization of asking questions and the recording of answers (Sekaran, 
2003: 107). The interviewees were given a copy of the interview questions and the 
researchers posed the questions to them and, if necessary, explained their meanings and 
objectives. This approach is significant to the validity of the interview findings since it is 
able to reduce interviewer variability and thereby to mitigate any potential for errors. The 
study only addressed the issue on intra-interviewer variability and not inter-interviewer 
variability as the interviews were conducted solely by the researcher.   
6.4.2.4 Administration of Interview Survey 
 
The researcher prepared a list of potential respondents consisting of Sharīʿah scholars in 
Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. Several attempts were made to contact the 
respondents via email and telephone. Despite numerous problems and constraints in 
getting Sharīʿah scholars for interview, the researcher successfully interviewed fourteen 
Sharīʿah scholars representing IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. Two 
interviews were conducted in Dubai, one in London and eleven in Kuala Lumpur. 
 
At the beginning of each interview, the researcher introduced himself, explained about 
the background of the study and stated the purpose and objective of the interview. The 
researcher also explained the significance of the study and the reason why the 





establishing rapport and motivating the respondents to offer quality answers (Sekaran, 
2003: 230). In order to reduce potential sources of error, the respondents were given a 
copy of the questions and the researcher kept exactly to the wording of the questions with 
some explanations and clarifications.  
 
The researcher employed two methods to record the interviews, namely taking notes and 
tape recording. As a matter of courtesy, the researcher asked for permission from the 
respondents to record the interview on tape and if they refused the researcher just made 
written notes. It is important to record all the answers either in writing or on tape because 
information recalled from memory is imprecise and likely to be incorrect (Sekaran, 2003: 
231). After all of the answers were recorded and gathered, the data was transferred onto 
the computer in the form of tables and was analysed using a coding and thematic 
approach. 
6.4.3 Unobtrusive Method of Data Collection: Documents  
  
The present study, by nature, is exploratory research to evaluate and measure the level of 
disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices. An exploratory approach is adopted by 
analysing information and data available on websites and annual reports as well as the 
financial statements of IFIs through an unobtrusive method of data collection. 
Unobtrusive method refers to any method of observation that derives from official 
statistics and information and these include annual reports, financial statements, websites, 
media articles and diaries (Bryman, 2001: 209). This unobtrusive method is used in this 
study as an additional research strategy to basically examine the level of disclosure and 
transparency of Sharīʿah governance through official documents already published by the 
sampled IFIs. It presents some descriptive data which is not derived or obtained by 
interview or questionnaire.  
 
By employing the unobtrusive method of data collection, various types of secondary data 
could be a potential source of information and these include written documents as well as 
information on websites. This study used annual reports and financial statements as well 





communication through websites is now becoming popular as it provides easy access to 
information (Bondy et al., 2004: 452). In view of the prevalence of information available 
on the Internet, the examination of websites will make a valuable contribution to the 
extent of disclosure practice of Sharīʿah governance. The study nevertheless was limited 
to searching databases and information available on IFIs’ websites and knowledge 
provider websites, such as zawya.com, that provide the researcher with easy access to all 
necessary documents and materials.  
 
Annual reports of 2007–2008 were also used to obtain the data and information used in 
this study. In cases where the annual reports were not available, the study referred the 
financial statements of 2007–2008. The annual reports and financial statements are very 
useful tools in gaining data and information, while websites provide quick and real time 
access to information. The study took the initiative to analyse the annual reports and 
financial statements on top of the websites because more information and data could be 
extracted from them that would be able to further support and justify the research 
findings.  
 
The study undertook systematic processes in collecting the data. All the data gathered 
from these resources was coded and classified as qualitative information. The electronic 
version of the annual report was downloaded from each IFI’s website. In the case of the 
absence of annual reports or financial statements on the websites, the researcher 
downloaded these documents from knowledge provider websites such as zawya.com. If 
the annual reports and financial statements of IFIs could not be obtained by either means, 
the researcher either requested a hard copy of these documents from the IFIs or requested 
them personally at the IFI’s premises.  
 
Sixty-three annual reports and seventeen financial statements out of eighty of the 
respondents were successfully gathered via these processes. With regard to the websites, 
all respondents have developed their own websites that helped the researcher to gather 
and extract the necessary information for the research. The information derived from the 





collecting and gathering all the data, the reports and information were carefully examined 
and the relevant pieces of information and disclosure were extracted for each of the six 
categories of disclosure indicators. The data was then transferred onto the computer in the 
form of a scoring sheet. Finally, all the data collected and recorded was processed by 
simple statistical analysis utilizing Microsoft Excel. From this process, histograms, 
charts, graphs and tables were generated to clearly illustrate the research findings.  
6.5 Sampling 
 
Sampling is important in order to make sure that the sample is representative of the 
population (Sekaran, 2003: 266). The researcher undertook several approaches in 
selecting and developing an appropriate and valid research sample, including determining 
the type and size of the sampling and the instruments used to identify the research 
participants. The aim of this research sampling process is to get an accurate estimate of 
the population’s characteristics from measuring the sample’s characteristics (Simon, 
1969: 423).  
 
There are two main types of sampling, namely probability and non-probability sampling. 
This study used non-probability sampling in selecting the research respondents as the 
sample was selected not in accordance with the rules of probability sampling (Bryman, 
2001: 97). There are four main types of non-probability sampling: the convenience 
sampling that is simply available to the researcher by virtue of its accessibility; the 
snowball sampling that uses initial contact with a small group of people to establish 
connections with others; the quota sampling that reflects a population in terms of relative 
proportions of people in different categories; and the purposeful sampling that identifies a 
specific group of respondents that would be able to reflect the purpose and objectives of 
the research (Bryman, 2001: 97–100). This study utilized the method of purposeful 
sampling, which is a kind of non-probability sampling, in selecting and choosing the 
research respondents.  
 
Based on the above sampling process, eighty IFIs were selected for the survey and the 





structured interviews. Those eighty IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK were 
chosen from the list of the top 500 financial institutions published by The Banker, 
including the list of IFIs from websites of the respective central banks and regulatory 
authorities. The Banker has published quite a comprehensive analysis of the Islamic 
finance industry comprising 500 financial institutions from forty-seven countries. From 
these various lists, the study selected only eighty IFIs from seven countries, namely 
Malaysia, GCC Countries (Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) and the 
UK, consisting of commercial banks, investment banks and asset management companies 
that offer Islamic financial services and regulatory authorities. Takāful operators and 
mutual funds firms were excluded from the study. The choice of these IFIs was based on 
the grounds that they significantly represent the Islamic finance industry in the case 
countries. 
 
With regard to sample size estimation, the study used the Roscoe approach that a sample 
size of 30–500 is appropriate for most research (Sekaran, 2003: 295). Although the 
research sample is relatively small in this study, it is sufficient to represent IFIs in the the 
case countries. In fact, Simon (1969: 423) claims that accuracy is slightly greater in a 
smaller research sample. Table 6.3 and Figure 6.2 illustrate the research sample 
descriptions, which are as follows: 
 











Malaysia 18  2 20 
Bahrain 8 4  12 
UAE 11 2  13 
Kuwait 5 5  10 
Qatar 6 4  10 
Saudi Arabia 5 4  9 
United Kingdom 2 4  6 
























Most of the IFIs sampled are fully-fledged Islamic banks (55), followed by investment 
bank/asset management companies (23) and regulatory authorities (2). Malaysia 
represents 24% of the overall sample, the UAE 16%, Bahrain 15%, Saudi Arabia 11%, 
Kuwait and Qatar both 13%, and the UK 8%. The sample of IFIs in this study varied in 
terms of size and market capitalization and this enabled the study to evaluate and measure 
the level of transparency and disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices within each 
individual IFI in various jurisdictions of the case countries.  
6.6 The Analysis of Data  
 
Valid research findings are not only dependent upon a proper choice of research 
methodology but also the reliability of the data gathered and the applicability of the 
statistical tools used (Walker, 1997: 157). This subsection elaborates on the data analysis 
methodology employed in this study. The data analysis methodology used illustrates the 
process of giving further meaning to the data gathered from the whole research process 
and provides justification and verification for the research findings. 
6.6.1 Analysis of the Questionnaires  
 
The process of data analysis involves several research exercises. It involves organizing 





(Cohen et al., 2007: 461). In order to eliminate errors and to reduce deficiencies, the 
researcher carried out meticulous checking of the responses and feedback so as to ensure 
that all findings are accurate, valid and reliable.  
 
Data needs to be edited before it can be analysed and this involves a process of coding, 
categorizing and creating a data file programme (Sekaran, 2003: 301). In the early 
process of data analysis, the data was organized categorically and chronologically, 
reviewed repeatedly and continually checked. The researcher then manually keyed the 
data into the computer in a specific form. This form was specifically designed to ensure 
that all data gathered was stored, structured and organized efficiently. The information 
and data were codified in a grid format. In the grid, each row represents each IFI and 
each column represents specific variables. Since the research sample is relatively small 
and the data is fairly small in size, the study used Microsoft Excel to process all the 
information for analysis.  
 
In terms of data analysis presentation, Cohen et al. (2007: 467–472) describe four ways 
of organizing and presenting data analysis: data presentation by people, either 
respondents or individuals, data presentation that is relevant to a particular issue, data 
presentation by instrument, and data presentation by research question. The researcher 
employed data presentation by research question in organizing the data analysis in this 
study. This method is very useful to enable the research findings to be clearly and 
systematically presented.    
 
In analysing the data, the study utilized descriptive analysis and an interpretative method 
to provide examination of the data derived from the survey. The study also constructed a 
specific Sharīʿah governance index to measure and to quantify the extent of Sharīʿah 
governance practices. This Sharīʿah governance index enables the study to rank and rate 
IFIs according to the level of practices, which either fall into ‘Underdeveloped Practice’, 
‘Emerging Practice’, ‘Improved Practice’, ‘Good Practice’ and ‘Best Practice’. With the 
descriptive analysis, the study illustrates all the research findings with frequency of 





questions and discover the significant differences in respondents’ answers. In addition, 
the interpretative method is utilized to provide further meaning to the data as part of the 
qualitative analysis. To provide integrated and comprehensive data analysis, both 
descriptive and interpretative approaches are employed by highlighting the aggregate 
behavioural responses as well country-specific behaviour responses of the research. 
6.6.2 Analysis of the Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Interpretation of the semi-structured interviews involved several research processes and 
these included transferring answers on to the computer, search and extraction of the 
answers, pattern identification and highlighting important themes in the answers. In 
analysing the data, the study employed systematic procedures of coding and categorizing 
(Blee and Taylor, 2002: 111). The process of coding and categorizing was done 
systematically in a specific format on the computer.  
 
In the coding process, all the answers given by the respondents were coded descriptively 
following the sequence of research questions which were divided into six parts, namely 
general approach to Sharīʿah governance, internal policy on Sharīʿah governance, 
attributes of Sharīʿah board on independence, competence, and transparency and 
confidentiality, operational procedures, roles of Sharīʿah board, and its assessment. From 
this coding, the researcher summarized the answers given and developed a theme for each 
interview question.  
6.6.3 Content Analysis 
 
There are several methods of analysing IFIs’ annual report and financial statement 
narratives and these can be summarized into subjective analyst ratings, disclosure indices, 
readability studies, linguistic analyses and content analyses (Beattie, McInners and 
Fearnley, 2004: 208–213). In light of the disadvantages of the survey194 and the interview 
methods, the content analysis method attempted to complement the research findings in 
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present distorting influences, surveys depend heavily on the subject’s motivation and ability to respond and 





Chapters 7 and 8, which raise several important issues concerning the Sharīʿah 
governance system. Unlike these previous two chapters that discuss results derived from 
primary data through questionnaires and interviews, the method used in this chapter was 
of a library research character. The study predominantly utilized the content analysis 
approach and disclosure indices in extracting and analysing the data and factual input 
derived from websites, annual reports and financial statements. These methods are very 
useful and the most appropriate approaches to provide a description of the extent of 
corporate disclosure and these include the disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices.  
 
Krippendorff (1980: 21) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from data” and Berelson, 1952: 18) refers it as “a research 
technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest 
content of communication” (Berelson, 1952: 18).195 In the context of this study, content 
analysis is used because disclosure, particularly non-financial disclosure as in the case of 
Sharīʿah governance, is largely disclosed qualitatively. This method enabled the 
researcher to capture the extent, nature, volume and size of the data collected. The 
researcher analysed all the Sharīʿah governance disclosures on selected sections of the 
annual reports and financial statements, including the notes on the financial statements.  
 
In analysing the data, the researcher undertook several structured exercises. Firstly, the 
researcher organized, read and transferred all the data on to the computer in the form of a 
scoring sheet through a coding method. Secondly, the researcher calculated the average 
assessment scores for each of the six disclosure categories for each respondent. Thirdly, 
tables, histograms, charts and graphs were generated from the data for analysis. Finally, 
the researcher analysed all the data and the results of the research to provide further 
meaning to the data analysis. 
 
The content analysis method used in this study specifically aims at measuring the level of 
transparency of Sharīʿah governance practices in IFIs. In this regard, the study employed 
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the disclosure indices approach. This research approach has been described as a useful 
tool for measuring the extent of company disclosure (Beattie, McInners and Fearnley, 
2004: 210). In analysing the annual reports, financial statements and websites, the study 
first identified research questions and then used the literature, especially the principles set 
forth in relevant corporate governance guidelines and Sharīʿah governance guiding 
principles, to formulate disclosure indices. The study introduces unique Sharīʿah 
governance disclosure indices to assess the extent of transparency of Sharīʿah 
governance practices as formulated in the research objectives.  
 
Table 6.4: The Linkage between the Disclosure Indicators and Research Objectives 
Disclosure Indicators Linked to 
Research Objectives 
Indicators  
Disclosure of Commitment to Sharīʿah 
Governance (D1–D3) 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Board Information 
(D4–D18) 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Board 
Remuneration (D19–D20) 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Report (D21–D24) 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Pronouncements  
(D25–D27) 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Compliance Review 
(D28) 
i. To ascertain the extent of disclosure 
practice of Sharīʿah governance practices 
in IFIs 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Report 
(D29–D30) 
 
There are several approaches to develop a theoretical concept and operational measure of 
disclosure indices. Patton and Zelenka (1997: 606) suggest four methods of developing 
disclosure indices: extending the index from the normative decision model to ascertain 
the usefulness of the disclosures; expert evaluation of the disclosure quality; selection of 
disclosure that may significantly affect the market reaction; and fulfilment of disclosure 
regulation. The study used the normative decision model and fulfilment of disclosure 
regulation to develop the indices. At this point, the researcher relied on the same 
international guidelines for corporate governance as well as Sharīʿah governance guiding 





these international benchmarks, the study is able to evaluate and measure the level of 
disclosure and transparency of IFIs pertaining to Sharīʿah governance matters. 
 
The measurement of this Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice purely relied on 
information from the annual report, financial statements and websites. The study first 
identified a comprehensive list of disclosure indicators and subsequently selected only 
thirty of the most meaningful, available and accessible parameters. These indicators were 
then divided into five sections: Commitment to Good Sharīʿah Governance, Sharīʿah 
Board Information, Sharīʿah Report, Sharīʿah Pronouncements, Sharīʿah Review, and 
Products and Services Information. To standardize the measurement of the extent of 
disclosure amongst the respondents, the researcher developed a scoring sheet to list down 
all thirty indicators. This scoring sheet simplified the indices and enabled the researcher 
to easily make comparisons of the disclosures practice. These thirty indicators would be 
able to adequately provide the quantitative and qualitative aspects of Sharīʿah 
governance disclosure and transparency.  
 
In order to quantify the extent of Sharīʿah governance disclosure practices, the study used 
a quantitative measure to rank IFIs into five categories: 1–5 disclosures is ranked as 
‘Underdeveloped Practice’, 6–10 as ‘Emerging Practice’, 11–15 as ‘Improved Practice’, 
16–23 as ‘Good Practice’ and 24–30 as ‘Best Practice’. The study also used a qualitative 
measure to analyse the data since the indicators are based on the previous data and 
records. Finally, frequencies and cross-tabulation techniques were used to discover the 
significant difference in disclosure practices in IFIs. In this regard, the study interpreted 
and gave further meaning to the data by using simple calculation through frequency 
tables and figures. 
 
The study was also concerned with the issues of reliability and validity of using content 
analysis method. In this aspect, reliability issues may arise due to ambiguity of meanings 
or category definitions while validity problems are related to the “extent to which a 





In view of these issues, precautionary measures have been taken to improve both 
reliability and validity.  
 
Generally, there are three approaches to measuring validity and reliability, namely 
content, contextual and internal validity methods. The study used the content validity 
method to enhance the validity of the data. In this aspect, all Sharīʿah governance indices 
and categories were carefully developed from the review of Sharīʿah governance 
literature. The researcher considers that the Sharīʿah governance disclosure indices in this 
research have acceptable content validity since the indices are derived from authoritative 
resources and international guidelines. 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented an overview of the research methodology and methods used in 
this study. It provides an insight into the whole research process, which is imperative for 
the purpose of ensuring the originality and quality of the research. Since the mixed-
method approach is the most appropriate research strategy in this study, the researcher 
chose this methodology in organizing, structuring and designing the whole research 
process, including research design, development of research questions, reliability and 
validity, mitigating potential of errors, data collection, sampling and data analysis. These 
overall research processes demonstrate the extent of the quality and originality of this 
study. 





LOCATING THE ASPECTS OF SHARĪAH GOVERNANCE SYSTEM IN 




Sharīʿah governance is peculiarly important to IFIs as part of its corporate governance 
arrangement. In view of the scarcity literature on this subject, this study is considered as a 
small effort to contribute to development of a Sharīʿah governance system by presenting 
its current practices across jurisdictions. This chapter hence presents the research findings 
derived from the survey, which constitutes one of the methods of getting factual input of 
the state of the current Sharīʿah governance framework and practices in this study. The 
survey aims at understanding the extent of current Sharīʿah governance practices by 
examining its general approach, regulatory and internal framework, roles of the Sharīʿah 
board, attributes of the Sharīʿah board in terms of independence, competence, 
transparency and confidentiality, operational procedures, and assessment of the Sharīʿah 
board. 
It is worth to mention that this study is conducted for researching the Islamic finance 
industry’s internal perceptions of Sharīʿah governance. This is significant to the study as 
the IFIs’ perceptions will be able to demonstrate the extent and actual practices of 
Sharīʿah governance. For this purpose, the questionnaire was distributed via ordinary 
mail and email to the selected commercial banks, investment banks, asset management 
companies and regulatory authorities that offer Islamic financial services in Malaysia, 
GCC countries (the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait) and the UK. 
Personal interviews were also conducted in order to get responses from some IFIs. The 
study limited the scope of the survey to IFIs that offer Islamic financial services, 
including regulatory authorities that have established their own Sharīʿah board.  
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7.1 Searching the Particularities of Sharīʿah Governance in Islamic Banking: 
Research Findings∗ 
7.1.1 Sharīʿah Board Members 
 
It is clear from the survey that most of the Sharīʿah boards in IFIs meet the minimum 
requirement of the AAOIFI governance standards and the IFSB-10 as a majority of them 
consist of three board members (40%); 22.8% of Sharīʿah boards comprise four 
members, 17.1% five members, 5.8% six members, 5.8% ten members, and only 2.9% of 
IFIs engaged one or two Sharīʿah scholars. In Malaysia, the Sharīʿah board of the BNM 
and the SC consists of ten members, while the trend at individual IFI level shows that 
having three members is the most preferable practice. Significant numbers of Sharīʿah 
board members of the BNM and the SC indicate their functional roles and position as 
being the highest Sharīʿah authority. On the other hand, in GCC countries practice shows 
that there are significant variations of the number of Sharīʿah board members practised in 
IFIs, where the majority of them prefer five or three members. This is similar to the 
practice of IFIs in the UK, where it was found that their Sharīʿah boards consist of four 
or three members. 
 
With regard to female Sharīʿah board members, only six out of thirty-five IFIs (17.1%) 
have female board members and all of them are from Malaysia. This indicates that the 
boardrooms in GCC countries and the UK are still male territory. The study presumes 
that the issue of the shortage of Sharīʿah scholars specialized and experienced in Islamic 
finance and muamalāt may be overcame by liberalizing the practice of accepting female 
Sharīʿah scholars as Sharīʿah board members as in the case of Malaysia.197  
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 It is important to note that the percentages on a comparative overview to illustrate country-specific 
behavior practices in this section refer to the total group of IFIs and not to the IFIs in the individual 
jurisdictions 
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 Qudeer Latif, a prominent corporate lawyer in the Islamic finance industry agrees that the market is 
experiencing a shortage of scholars with expert knowledge of finance as he he had to travel to several 
countries to meet just one Islamic scholar for Sharīʿah advisory services (Devi, 2008). Mohammad Masum 
Billah, a prominent Sharīʿah scholar from Malaysia also indicates the same and he personally finds that 
Islamic finance industry is about 80% short of having enough qualified and competent Sharīʿah scholars 
(El Bataji, 2010). 




7.1.2 Sharīʿah Governance Approach 
 
This section attempts to examine the different approaches of IFIs to Sharīʿah governance. 
The study identified seven questions to explore the state of Sharīʿah governance practices 
in the case countries. Table 7.1 illustrates the overall findings of IFIs’ approaches to 
Sharīʿah governance and Figure 7.1 represents its comparative overview. 
Table 7.1: Sharīʿah Governance Approach 
Questionnaires Percentage 
Q1. Adoption of AAOIFI governance standards 45.7% 
Q2. Aware of the IFSB Guiding Principles on Sharīʿah Governance 
System 
77.1% 
Q3. Standards for Sharīʿah governance set for Islamic financial 
institutions 
57.1% 
Q4. IFIs’ requirement to provide any guidelines for Sharīʿah 
governance 
60% 
Q5. Develop standard processes for Sharīʿah compliance, audit and 
review of the Sharīʿah rulings 
68.5% 
Q6. Professional code of ethics and conduct for members of the 
Sharīʿah board 
71.4% 
Q7.1 Internal Sharīʿah board 85.7% 
Q7.2 Sharīʿah advisory firm 2.8% 
Q7. Organizational 
arrangement for Sharīʿah 




The majority of IFIs (54.3%) did not adopt the AAOIFI governance standards and some 
of them (22.9%) were even unaware of the existence of the IFSB-10. A total of 57.1% of 
IFIs claimed that there are Sharīʿah governance standards set for Sharīʿah governance at 
the national level. 68.5% of IFIs showed good commitment to Sharīʿah governance by 
having a standard process for Sharīʿah compliance, audit and review and 60% of IFIs 
provided guidelines on Sharīʿah governance. In general, 71.4% of IFIs indicated that they 
have a professional code of ethics for their Sharīʿah board. This demonstrates that 28.6% 
of IFIs’ Sharīʿah boards are not guided by a code of ethics. More than 85% of IFIs had 
established their own internal Sharīʿah board while 2.8% of IFIs appointed a Sharīʿah 
advisory firm for advisory services and 11.4% of IFIs had both an internal Sharīʿah board 
and used a Sharīʿah advisory firm. Investment banks preferred to engage a Sharīʿah 
advisory firm rather than to have their own Sharīʿah board. 
 


















As a general observation, Malaysia presents a slightly better general framework of 
Sharīʿah governance by scoring higher in every question asked as compared to GCC 
countries and the UK. An interesting observation is that, despite having less interference 
from regulatory authorities than Malaysia, IFIs in GCC countries and the UK proactively 
developed their own Sharīʿah governance framework. In fact, the majority of IFIs in 
GCC countries have developed their own Sharīʿah guidelines and standard processes on 
Sharīʿah compliance. Although some GCC countries clearly stated in their regulations 
the adoption of the AAOIFI governance standards, it was found that only 22.8% had 
implemented them. In spite of the absence of any provision on the AAOIFI governance 
standards, 22.8% of IFIs in Malaysia had indicated the adoption of the standards based on 
voluntary practices.  
7.1.3 Sharīʿah Governance and Regulation 
 
The literature in Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive overview of the regulatory 
framework of Sharīʿah governance in the case countries. The study classifies Malaysia as 
the proponent of a ‘Regulatory-based Approach’, Saudi Arabia as a ‘Passive Approach’, 
Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain as a ‘Minimalist Approach’, and the UK as a 
‘Reactive Approach’. This section hence tries to explore the general understanding and 
perception of IFIs of the regulatory and internal framework of Sharīʿah governance as 
illustrated in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2. 




Table 7.2: Regulatory Frameworks and Internal Policies on Sharīʿah Governance 
Questionnaires Percentage 
Q8. Are there separate rules and regulations concerning Sharīʿah 
governance? 
37.1% 
Q9. Does the bank have any written policies or by-laws specifically 
referring to the conduct of the Sharīʿah board? 
57.1% 
Q10.1 Civil court 91.4% 
Q10.2 Sharīʿah court 14.2% 
Q10.3 Arbitration 51.4% 
Q10. What type of dispute 
settlement is there to redress 
legal matters concerning 
Islamic finance (e.g. 
conflict of laws)?∗ 
Q10.4 Sharīʿah authority of the central 
bank or the ministry of religious affairs∗∗ 
20% 
Q11.1 Binding 94.2% Q11. What is the legal 
position of the Sharīʿah 
board’s rulings? 
Q11.2 Non-binding 5.7% 
 
∗ Some of the research participants ticked more than one answer provided in the questionnaire form, which 
indicates that there are several legal avenues to redress matters concerning Islamic finance as highlighted in 
Q10.1–Q10.4. 
∗∗ Q10.4 is an additional answer given by the respondents. 
 
Only 37.1% of IFIs indicated that there were separate rules and regulations concerning 
Sharīʿah governance. This figure shows that Malaysia is a strong proponent of the 
regulatory-based approach to a Sharīʿah governance system while GCC countries prefer 
less regulator interference. In terms of internal policies or by-laws on the affairs of the 
Sharīʿah board, 57.1% of IFIs indicated that they have written policies on it. With regard 
to jurisdictions on Islamic finance, almost all IFIs (91.4%) indicated that the civil court 
has jurisdiction pertaining to cases on Islamic finance, 14.2% of IFIs refer cases to the 
Sharīʿah court, 51.4% of IFIs to arbitration, and 20% of IFIs to a Sharīʿah authority such 
as the central bank or Ministry of Awqaf.  
 
All countries put Islamic finance cases under the civil court’s jurisdiction and this may 
lead to some legal and Sharīʿah issues. While acknowledging this important issue, only a 
few countries provided other alternative legal avenues, such as arbitration or a national 
Sharīʿah board as the highest Sharīʿah authority. Another important aspect on regulation 
is the legal status of Sharīʿah rulings, by which it was found that almost all IFIs (94.2%) 
indicated that the Sharīʿah rulings are binding upon them and only 5.7% of IFIs view 
them as non-binding. It is clear from the findings that IFIs are generally bound by the 
rulings or pronouncements of their Sharīʿah board.  




Figure 7.2: Comparative Overview on Regulatory Framework and Internal Policy 












Out of 37.1% of the total percentage on Q8, most IFIs in Malaysia (25.7%) indicated that 
there is a comprehensive set of rules and regulations concerning Sharīʿah governance, 
while only 5.7% of IFIs in GCC countries and the UK indicated the same. With reference 
to internal policies or by-laws, IFIs in Malaysia (40%) claimed that they had written 
policies specifically referring to the conduct of the Sharīʿah board. On the other hand, 
IFIs in GCC countries (14.2%) and in the UK (2.8%) indicated that they have specific by-
laws on it. All IFIs rightly viewed that Islamic finance cases were put under the auspices 
of the civil court198 and most of them agreed that there were other alternative legal 
avenues available such as arbitration. With respect to alternative dispute resolution, 
51.4% of IFIs posit that there are alternative legal avenues for Islamic finance disputes in 
the form of arbitration and 20% in the form of a Sharīʿah authority. IFIs in Malaysia 
(17.1%) and GCC countries (2.8%) indicated that, despite arbitration being a possible 
legal avenue to redress disputes on Islamic finance, the Sharīʿah authority at the national 
level also offers alternative dispute settlements. In the aspect of the legal position of 
Sharīʿah rulings, IFIs in Malaysia (48.5%) and GCC countries (42.8%) affirmed that they 
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 In the case of Malaysia, a specific High Court Division known as the Muāmalāt Bench was established 
to hear cases pertaining to Islamic finance cases. The information retrieved from the record of the High 
Court Commercial Division 4 from 2003 until November 2009 states that there are 233 muāmalāt cases 
registered with code 22A before the learned judge Dato’ Rohana Yusuf and, as at December 2009, only 
seventy-seven cases had been resolved (Saiful, 2010). This position indicates that Malaysia has established 
a comprehensive Islamic finance framework and this includes how it handles issues related to Sharīʿah 
governance.  




are bound by the Sharīʿah board’s pronouncements. Only a small percentage of IFIs in 
the UK and GCC countries (2.8%) respectively indicated otherwise.  
7.1.4 Role of Sharīʿah Board 
 
The ideal roles of the Sharīʿah board involve ex ante and ex post aspects of Sharīʿah 
governance and these include Sharīʿah pronouncements, supervision and review. The 
survey attempts to clarify the actual functions of the Sharīʿah board in various IFIs in the 
case countries. Table 7.3 and Figure 7.3 illustrate the overall findings and a comparative 
overview of the roles of the Sharīʿah board. 
 
Table 7.3: Roles of the Sharīʿah Board 
Questionnaires Percentage 
Q12.1 Advisory  77.1% 
Q12.2 Supervisory 51.4% 
Q12. What are the 
roles of the 
Sharīʿah board?∗ Q12.3 Executive   2.8% 
Q13.1 Sharīʿah pronouncements? 100% 
Q13.2 Sharīʿah review or audit? 68.5% 
Q13.3 Endorsing and validating documentations 
pertaining to the products and services, as well as the 
internal policies, manuals and marketing 
advertisements, etc.? 
74.2% 
Q13.4 Endorsement of Sharīʿah compliance? 100% 
Q13.5 Overseeing the computation and payment of 
zakah? 
71.4% 
Q13.6 Examining any enquiries referred to by the IFIs? 74.2% 
Q13.7 Developing Sharīʿah approved instruments? 51.4% 
Q13.8 Acting as the Sharīʿah highest authority 
pertaining to Islamic finance? 
71.4% 
Q13.9 Approving model agreements of Islamic modes 
of financing? 
68.5% 
Q13. Do the 
functions of the 
Sharīʿah board 
include∗∗: 
Q13.10 Achieving harmonization in the concepts and 
applications amongst the Sharīʿah boards? 
62.8% 
Q14. Does the Sharīʿah board perform the Sharīʿah audit? 34.2% 
Q15. Does the Sharīʿah board have the power to delegate some of its 
functions to the internal Sharīʿah compliance unit? 
74.2% 
 
∗ Some of the research participants ticked more than one answer provided in the questionnaire form, which 
indicates that the Sharīʿah board has both advisory and supervisory functions. 
∗∗ Some of the research participants ticked more than one answer provided in the questionnaire form, 
which indicates that the Sharīʿah board has numerous functions, as highlighted in Q13.1–Q13.10. 
 




The survey illustrates that IFIs had different perspectives on the roles and responsibilities 
of the Sharīʿah board. Around 77.1% of IFIs considered the Sharīʿah board as advisory, 
51.4% as supervisory and, interestingly, 2.8% of IFIs viewed them as having executive 
power. The majority of IFIs considered their Sharīʿah board to have advisory and 
supervisory powers in which they had responsibility to undertake ex ante and ex post 
responsibilities. With respect to advisory functions, all IFIs agreed that the Sharīʿah 
board plays a role in issuing Sharīʿah pronouncements and declaration of Sharīʿah 
compliance. On the other hand, there are different views of IFIs concerning the 
supervisory function of the Sharīʿah board, where more than 21% of IFIs asserted that 
the Sharīʿah board does not have Sharīʿah review responsibility and does not oversee the 
computation of zakah payments.199 
 
The survey also found an inconsistency in the responses pertaining to Sharīʿah review or 
audit. While most Sharīʿah boards had the function of conducting the Sharīʿah audit, 
only 34.2% of IFIs indicated that their Sharīʿah board undertook Sharīʿah audit 
responsibilities. In the event that the Sharīʿah board did not undertake the Sharīʿah 
review task, 74.2% of IFIs granted authority to the Sharīʿah board to delegate its function 
of Sharīʿah review to the internal Sharīʿah compliance unit. This position demonstrates 
that numerous Sharīʿah boards do not conduct Sharīʿah reviews as they are only 
concerned with the ex ante aspects of Sharīʿah governance. We can see from this finding 
that there are shortcomings in the existing practices of Sharīʿah governance, particularly 
with regards the clear mandate and authority of the Sharīʿah board’s functions and 
responsibilities.  
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 This finding significantly shows the different practices of IFIs in late 1980s. A study conducted by 
Aboumouamer (1989: 285–288) demonstrates that the majority of Sharīʿah boards performed Sharīʿah 
audit functions, where 78% of the Sharīʿah board members carried out the pre-audit function, 80.5% the 
audit work and 6% the post-audit function. 




Figure 7.3: Comparative Overview on the Roles of the Sharīʿah Board 










































The survey on the roles of the Sharīʿah board indicates some interesting observations. 
Most IFIs in Malaysia (40%), GCC countries (31.4%) and the UK (5.7%) pointed out that 
the Sharīʿah board has only advisory authority, while 2.8% of IFIs in GCC countries has 
executive power. This position denotes that the Sharīʿah board is an independent body 
within the IFIs’ governance structure that has advisory and supervisory authorities. The 
executive power is still in the hands of the BOD. The overall findings show that the 
majority of IFIs’ Sharīʿah boards undertake ex ante tasks of the Sharīʿah governance 
process. On the other hand, only 11.4% of IFIs in Malaysia, 17.1% of IFIs in GCC 
countries and 5.7% in the UK carried out ex post duties of the Sharīʿah governance 
process, namely the Sharīʿah review. This position demonstrates a weak Sharīʿah 
governance practice with respect to the Sharīʿah review process, particularly in Malaysia. 
This weak position nevertheless is compensated with another approach where 45.7% of 
IFIs in Malaysia and 5.7% of IFIs in the UK have delegated the Sharīʿah board’s audit 
functions to their internal Sharīʿah compliance unit. Unlike Malaysia and the UK, only 
22.8% of IFIs’ Sharīʿah board in GCC countries indicated that the functions had been 
delegated to the internal Sharīʿah compliance unit. 
7.1.5 Attributes of Sharīʿah Board Members 
7.1.5.1 Appointment Criteria for Sharīʿah Board Membership 
 
IFIs in various jurisdictions adopt different processes and fit and proper criteria for 
Sharīʿah board members. This section specifically demonstrates the appointment criteria 




of the Sharīʿah board as a mechanism to ensure the competence of the IFIs in the case 
countries. Table 7.4 and Figure 7.4 illustrate general and comparative overviews of the 
mechanism of competence of Sharīʿah boards in the case countries.  
 
Table 7.4: Mechanism of Competence∗ 
 
Questionnaires  Percentage 
Q16. Does your institution have policies on the fit and proper criteria for the 
members of the Sharīʿah board? 
77.1% 
Q17.1 Academic qualification 77.1% 
Q17.2 Experience and exposure (knowledge 
and skills in financial services industry) 
74.2% 
Q17. If yes, what are 
those criteria? 
Q17.3 Track record 60% 
Q18.1 Specialized in muamalāt 74.2% 
Q18.2 Specialized in Islamic jurisprudence  71.4% 
Q18.3 Knowledge of Arabic and English 54.2% 
Q18. What are the 
requirements in terms of 
academic qualifications? 
Q18.4 Knowledge of banking 2.8% 
Q19.1 Understanding of Sharīʿah rules and 
principles 
80% 
Q19.2 Understanding of general legal and 
regulatory framework 
65.7% 
Q19.3 Understanding of the impact of the 
Sharīʿah pronouncements 
77.1% 
Q19. What are the 
requirements in terms of 
experience and exposure?  
Q19.4 Skills in the financial services industry 65.7% 
Q20.1 Good character 74.2% 
Q20.2 Competence, diligence, capability and 
soundness of judgment 
71.4% 
Q20. What are the 
requirements in terms of 
track record? 
Q20.3 Suitability in and exposure to muamalāt. 2.8% 
Q21.1 Well-versed in law 40% 
Q21.2 Well-versed in economy  28.5% 
Q21.3 Well-versed in finance 34.2% 
Q21.4 Basic Sharīʿah 2.8% 
Q21. In the event your 
institution allows a non- 
Sharīʿah background 
individual as a member 
of the Sharīʿah board, 
what is the qualification 
for such appointment? 
Q21.5 Strategic objective such as representative 
from religious council 
2.8% 
Q22. Do the Sharīʿah board members receive adequate training to 
understand their role in the internal control process? 
51.4% 
Q23. Is there any evaluation of the Sharīʿah board? 57.1% 
 
∗Some of the research participants ticked more than one answer provided in questions 17-21 
 




Most of IFIs (77.1%) indicated that they have clear internal fit and proper criteria to 
access the competence of Sharīʿah board members prior to their appointment. These 
criteria nevertheless vary from one IFI to another. More than 77% of IFIs have the 
criteria of academic qualification, 74.2% of experience and exposure, and 60% of track 
record and good character. In terms of academic qualification, IFIs were more concerned 
with the requirement pertaining to knowledge of muamalāt (74.2%) and Islamic 
jurisprudence (71.4%). Meanwhile, in the aspect of experience and exposure, they 
preferred the candidates who have good understanding of Sharīʿah rules and principles 
(80%) as well as understanding the impact of Sharīʿah pronouncements (77.1%). 
Generally, IFIs agreed that they are also concerned with the requirement of track record, 
particularly good character (74.2%) and soundness of judgment (71.4%).  
 
While acknowledging the need for expert, experienced and well-known scholars to be 
part of the Sharīʿah board, only 51.4% of IFIs provided professional training, especially 
in the matters of finance and banking, to their Sharīʿah board. Moreover, more than 
42.9% of IFIs do not evaluate or assess the performance of the Sharīʿah board. This 
figure illustrates that significant numbers of IFIs do not assess the Sharīʿah board’s 
contribution and performance, even in the event of renewal of their contracts. 
 
The issue of lack of training and exposure on the part of Sharīʿah board members has 
already been highlighted many years ago. An earlier study on Islamic banking practices 
revealed that the majority of Sharīʿah board members did not have proper training in or 
exposure to technical aspects of banking and finance; it was found that the majority of 
Sharīʿah board members had qualifications in Sharīʿah, only 8.6% were well-versed in 
Sharīʿah and commercial law, and only 11.4% had expertise in Sharīʿah, law and 
economics (Bakar, 2002: 78). Another earlier study also found that more than 40% of 
forty-one Sharīʿah board members had had no exposure to or proper training in banking 
and finance (Abomouamer, 1989: 226). The findings in this recent study further indicate 
that improving the competence of Sharīʿah board members needs serious attention from 
regulators, supervisors and IFIs. For this purpose, there must be significant effort and 
continuous endeavour to develop programmes and training for Sharīʿah boards as well as 
allocation of funds to produce talented and knowledgeable Sharīʿah scholars. 















































































Most IFIs in Malaysia had comprehensive mechanisms for Sharīʿah boards’ competence 
with an average of 40% of IFIs having fit and proper criteria, as well as criteria of 
academic qualification, experience and exposure, and track record. IFIs in GCC countries 
(31.4%) and the UK (5.7%) demonstrated a quite similar situation except with regards 
admitting non- Sharīʿah background individuals as members of Sharīʿah boards. Only 
IFIs in Malaysia would appoint a non-Sharīʿah scholar as a member of a Sharīʿah board 
such as the BNM or the SC. Interestingly, the BNM also has added the extra criterion of 
strategic objective to its Sharīʿah board member requirements. In this regard, the BNM 
has appointed different personnel from various institutions, such as courts and religious 
councils.200 As a general observation, this implies that IFIs prefer to have only Sharīʿah 
scholars as members of a Sharīʿah board and not other individuals who are not 
specialized in fiqh al muamalāt or usul al fiqh.  
 
In terms of a Sharīʿah board’s training to strengthen their understanding of internal 
control processes and knowledge of technical aspects of banking and finance, most IFIs 
in Malaysia (42.8%) indicated that they had allocated funds and necessary training for 
such a purpose. A small number of IFIs in GCC countries (8.5%) and none in the UK 




have initiated the same things. The study presumes that the good practice of initiating 
training for the Sharīʿah board by IFIs in Malaysia is influenced by the requirement laid 
down in the BNM/GPS1. With respect to assessment of the performance of the Sharīʿah 
board, 37.1% of IFIs in Malaysia, 20% of IFIs in GCC countries and none in the UK 
conduct assessments of the Sharīʿah board’s performance and evaluate their contribution 
to Sharīʿah compliance aspects. This significant finding demonstrates that the majority of 
IFIs do not evaluate their Sharīʿah board. This position presents a weak governance 
practice as the assessment and evaluation on contract of service by each individual 
Sharīʿah board is crucial with the purpose of maintaining standards of competence and to 
avoid any potential conflict of interest.  
 
7.1.5.2 Independence  
 
There are various ways of ensuring the professional independence of the Sharīʿah board. 
The survey identifies four important elements of independence, namely method of 
appointment, remuneration, Sharīʿah board mandate and means of mitigating potential 
conflict of interest. Table 7.5 and Figure 7.5 present the market practice as to how IFIs 
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 The BNM appointed non- Sharīʿah experts, such as a judge and the director general of the Department 
of Islamic Development of Malaysia, for the purpose of coordinating the various government agencies and 
judicial bodies (Ismail, 2009). 




Table 7.5: Mechanism of Independence∗ 
 
Questionnaire Percentage 
Q24.1 Shareholders  40% 
Q24.2 BOD 74.2% 
Q24.3 Management 5.7% 
Q24.4 Government 11.4% 
Q24. Who has the power to 
approve the appointment 
and dismissal of the 
Sharīʿah board? 
Q24.5 Nomination committee 2.8% 
Q25.1 One year 2.8% 
Q25.2 Two years 45.7% 
Q25.3 Five years 2.8% 
Q25.4 Three years 11.4% 
Q25. How long is the 
tenure of the appointment? 
Q25.5 Permanent  20% 
Q26.1 Shareholders 51.4% 
Q26.2 BOD 57.1% 
Q26.3 Management 14.2% 
Q26.4 Government 5.7% 
Q26. What do you think is 
the appropriate body for the 
Sharīʿah board to be 
accountable to? Q26.5 National Sharīʿah board 2.8% 
Q27.1 Shareholders  2.8% 
Q27.2 BOD 60% 
Q27. Who determines the 
Sharīʿah board’s 
remuneration? Q27.3 Management 22.8% 
Q28.1 Restriction on multiple 
appointment 
34.2% 
Q28.2 Disclosure on Sharīʿah board’s 
information  
48.5% 
Q28.3 Declaration in writing  48.5% 
Q28. What mechanisms are 
in place to mitigate conflict 
of interest in relation to 
Sharīʿah scholars sitting in 
various boards?  Q28.4 Integrity 2.8% 
Q29.1 Articles of association 17.1% 
Q29.2 Memorandum of association 20% 
Q29. Is the power and 
authority of the Sharīʿah 
board clearly mentioned in 
the following documents?  
Q29.3 Letter of appointment 62.8% 
∗ Some of the research participants ticked more than one answer provided in questions 24 and 26 
 
Despite the AAOIFI governance standards’ requirement of appointments being made by 
the general assembly, more than 74% of the appointments were made by the BOD and 
only 40% by the shareholders.201 With regard to the Sharīʿah board at the national level, 
the appointments were made by the government in Malaysia. Only 2.7% of IFIs 
appointed Sharīʿah board members through its nomination committee. The survey finds 
inconsistency in the actual practice of appointment of Sharīʿah board members and the 
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 Earlier findings in a study carried out by the International Institute of Islamic Thought in 1996 also 
indicated the same thing, where 80% of the appointments of the Sharīʿah board were done by the BOD and 
a survey by Hasan in the same year also discovered that only 39% were made by the shareholders (Bakar, 
2002: 78).  




IFIs’ perception as to who the Sharīʿah board should be accountable to. At this point, 
51.4% of IFIs viewed that Sharīʿah board should be accountable to shareholders and 
57.1% to the BOD, although the actual practice showed that 74% of the appointments 
were made by the BOD and 40% by the shareholders. The survey reveals that the 
majority of IFIs grant authority to the BOD (60%) to determine the Sharīʿah board’s 
remuneration, whilst a minority of IFIs i.e. 5.7% and 2.8% respectively, indicated that the 
government or the national Sharīʿah board could exercise such powers. 
 
Although most IFIs acknowledged a potential conflict of interest in the event of Sharīʿah 
board members holding numerous positions in various institutions, more than 50% of 
IFIs do not have a mechanism to mitigate such potential conflict. The survey 
demonstrates that multiple appointments are a common occurrence in IFIs in GCC 
countries and this may raise concerns for Sharīʿah scholars in the aspects of conflict of 
interest and maintaining confidentiality. In order to manage this kind of potential conflict, 
34.2% of IFIs claimed that they would not appoint Sharīʿah board members who hold 
numerous board positions, 48.5% of IFIs made open disclosures on the Sharīʿah board’s 
composition to the public and made declarations in writing.  
 
Most Sharīʿah board members served IFIs on a contractual or part-time basis and only 
20% of IFIs’ Sharīʿah board members were permanent employees. This position seems to 
contradict the AAOIFI governance standards, which restrict the appointment of Sharīʿah 
board members who work in the same institution. With regard to mandate, more than 
37.2% of IFIs did not specify the authority in the letter of appointment and more than 
80% of IFIs did not specify it, in the articles or memorandum of association. This figure 
illustrates that there are uncertainties about the actual authority and mandate of the 
Sharīʿah board on the part of Sharīʿah scholars, employees, management, BOD, 
shareholders and even the public at large.  
 
 










































Figure 7.5 demonstrates a comparative overview of the mechanism of independence 
practised by the IFIs in the case countries. The overall findings present significant 
differences in the mechanism of independence by IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and 
the UK. Most IFIs (42.8%) in Malaysia indicated that the appointment of members is 
made by the BOD, only 5.7% of IFIs by shareholders, 2.8% of IFIs by management, and 
8.5% of IFIs by government. On the other hand, most IFIs in GCC countries indicated 
that the appointment is made by shareholders, 31.4% of IFIs by the BOD, and 2.8% of 
IFIs by either the management or government.202 In the case of the UK, the appointment 
is made by the BOD (5.7%). While most IFIs in GCC countries (31.4%) indicated that 
the appropriate body for the Sharīʿah board to be accountable to was shareholders, the 
practice showed that 28.5% of Sharīʿah boards were appointed by the BOD and 17.1% of 
IFIs indicated that their remuneration was also determined by the BOD. This position 
shows inconsistency between the ‘ideal’ and ‘actual’ Sharīʿah governance practice, 
particularly with regards the mechanism of independence. Although, the practice in 
Malaysia seems to raise an issue of potential conflict of interest, such conflict is mitigated 
by requiring all the appointments and dismissals to be made subject to the approval of the 
BNM.  
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 This position supports the finding by Aboumouamer (1989: 185), where 75% of forty-one Sharīʿah 
board members indicated that their authority is derived from the shareholders. 




In terms of other mechanisms in place to mitigate conflict of interest, 28.5% of IFIs in 
Malaysia indicated that they have a restriction on multiple appointments, 22.8% of IFIs a 
restriction on disclosure of Sharīʿah board information and 20% of IFIs a declaration of 
confidentiality in writing. This position demonstrates that Sharīʿah governance practice 
in Malaysia has initiated various means of mitigating any potential conflict of interest of 
the Sharīʿah board. Interestingly, the enforcement of the restriction on multiple 
appointments has significantly produced more Sharīʿah scholars and more than 100 have 
registered as qualified Sharīʿah advisors with the BNM (Ismail, 2009). In the case of 
GCC countries, 5.7% of IFIs indicated that they had policy of restriction on multiple 
appointments,203 20% of IFIs on disclosure on Sharīʿah board information, and 22.8% of 
IFIs on declaration in writing. IFIs in the UK indicated that they only had a policy on 
disclosure of Sharīʿah board information and written declaration (5.7% respectively). 
 
With regard to the issue of mandate and authority, most IFIs in Malaysia (37.1%) and 
20% of IFIs in GCC countries indicated that the power and authority of the Sharīʿah 
board are mentioned in the letter of appointment. A total of 5.7% of IFIs in Malaysia 
indicated that the authority is confirmed in the articles of association and 14.2% of IFIs in 
the memorandum of association, while less than 9% of IFIs in GCC countries indicated 
the same. IFIs in the UK indicated that mandate and authority were clearly stipulated in 
the articles of association (2.8%) and the letter of appointment (5.7%). In summary, the 
overall findings imply that some IFIs do not grant a full mandate or fail to provide a clear 
mandate and authority to the Sharīʿah board.  
7.1.5.3 Transparency and Confidentiality 
 
The existing literature indicates that Sharīʿah governance practices in IFIs are less than 
transparent. The survey attempts to explore the mechanism used by IFIs to ensure 
transparency and to observe confidentiality on the part of their Sharīʿah board. The 
survey included one question on the aspect of confidentiality and three questions on 
transparency, i.e. written policy on preparation and dissemination of Sharīʿah 
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 A survey of Unal (2009) supports the above finding where the top ten listed Sharīʿah scholars have 
monopolized more than 58% of 956 Sharīʿah board positions in 271 organizations in twenty-two countries. 




information, right to access to all documents and necessary information and publication 
of Sharīʿah rulings. Table 7.6 and Figure 7.6 demonstrate the Sharīʿah governance 
practices of the case countries on the mechanisms of transparency and confidentiality. 
 
Table 7.6: Mechanisms of Transparency and Confidentiality 
 
Questionnaires Percentage 
Q30. Does the Sharīʿah board have a written policy in respect to the 
preparation and dissemination of Sharīʿah information? 
51.4% 
Q31. Does the Sharīʿah board have access to all documents, information, 
records, etc.? 
80% 
Q32. Are the Sharīʿah pronouncements published and made known to the 
public? 
31.4% 
Q33. Is the Sharīʿah board fully aware of the issue of confidentiality and 
sensitive information obtained in the course of performing their duties? 
74.2% 
 
Surprisingly, Table 7.6 shows that more than 49% of IFIs do not have a written policy on 
preparation and dissemination of Sharīʿah information. In addition, not all IFIs (80%) 
grant authority to the Sharīʿah board to have access to all documents, information and 
records for the purpose of Sharīʿah compliance. This is a serious issue, since the Sharīʿah 
board is expected to endorse a declaration of Sharīʿah compliance in the annual report. 
This position may disrupt the effectiveness of the Sharīʿah review and its impact is likely 
to be of material significance to IFIs, particularly with respect to the Sharīʿah compliance 
process.  
 
Moreover, more than 68% of IFIs do not publish Sharīʿah pronouncements, which are of 
the essence to all organs of governance, customers, depositors and the public. These 
overall responses demonstrate that IFIs are less than transparent. In the aspect of 
confidentiality, 74.2% of IFIs indicated that the Sharīʿah board is fully aware of its 
fiduciary duty to observe confidentiality and to handle any sensitive information 
professionally. In spite of this positive finding, it was nevertheless found that more than 
25% of IFIs viewed that their Sharīʿah board is not aware of such confidentiality issues.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Some Sharīʿah scholars even hold more than 70 Sharīʿah board memberships. It is observed that the 
majority of the Sharīʿah board positions were represented by IFIs in GCC countries.  









Figure 7.6 illustrates the Sharīʿah governance practices with regard to transparency and 
confidentiality. These two elements are very important for a good and sound Sharīʿah 
governance system. The survey demonstrates that 34.2% of IFIs in Malaysia and only 
17.1% of IFIs in GCC countries indicated that they had a written policy in respect of the 
preparation and dissemination of Sharīʿah information. All IFIs in Malaysia indicated 
that they granted full authority to the Sharīʿah board to have access to all documents and 
information, while only 28.5% in GCC countries and 2.8% in the UK did the same. A 
small number of IFIs in Malaysia (7.16%), GCC countries (14.2%) and none in the UK 
indicated that they had published Sharīʿah rulings and made them known to the public.  
 
In terms of confidentiality, all IFIs in Malaysia, 22.8% in GCC countries and 2.8% in the 
UK indicated that their Sharīʿah boards are fully aware of sensitive information obtained 
in the course of performing their duties. The survey shows that IFIs in the UK are less 
concerned about the issue of transparency and confidentiality with respect to Sharīʿah 
governance. Presumably IFIs in the UK are bound to comply with the existing corporate 
laws and related regulation concerning transparency and confidentiality without the need 
for a separate internal policy on Sharīʿah governance. The overall findings tend to 
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suggest that there are several shortcomings in the existing Sharīʿah governance practice 
with regard to the issues of transparency and confidentiality.  
7.1.6 Operational Procedures 
 
Different IFIs adopt various processes and procedures with respect to the Sharīʿah 
compliance process. The survey attempted to discover the state of operational procedures 
in the context of Sharīʿah governance practices, particularly standard operational 
procedures, Sharīʿah board meetings, quorum, basis of decision, voting rights, 
preparation and dissemination of documents to Sharīʿah board, Sharīʿah report and its 
content, and the institutional arrangement for Sharīʿah review. Table 7.7 and Figures 7.7, 
7.8 and 7.9 illustrate the different practices of IFIs pertaining to the operational 
procedures of the Sharīʿah compliance process. 
 




Q34. Is there any standard operational procedure for the Sharīʿah board? 
 
54.2% 
Q35.1 Weekly  5.7% 
Q35.2 Monthly 37.1% 
Q35.3 Quarterly 22.8% 
Q35.4 Twice a month 2.8% 
Q35.5 Ad hoc 14.2% 
Q35.6 Every two months 2.8% 
Q35. Does the Sharīʿah 







Q36.1 Three 48.5% 
Q36.2 Seven 2.8% 
Q36.3 Six 2.8% 
Q36. What is the 
quorum for the 
Sharīʿah board 
meeting? Q36.4 Two 20% 
Q37.1 Simple majority 31.4% 
Q37.2 Two-thirds majority 11.4% 
Q37. On what basis are 
decisions made at the 
Sharīʿah board 
meeting?  
Q37.3 Consensus 45.7% 
Q38. In the event of the Sharīʿah board including non- Sharīʿah 










Q39.1 A week in advance  54.2% 
Q39.2 Two weeks in advance 11.4% 
Q39.3 A month in advance 5.7% 
Q39.4 Ten days in advance 2.8% 
Q39. Is an agenda 
prepared and 
distributed in advance 
of Sharīʿah board 
meetings? Q39.5 Three days in advance 
 
2.8% 
Q40.1 Internal Sharīʿah officer 74.2% 
Q40.2 Company secretary 2.8% 
Q40.3 Head of product development 2.8% 
Q40.4 Head of the legal department 2.8% 
Q40.5 Capital market department 2.8% 
Q40. Who is 
responsible for dealing 
with the organization of 
the Sharīʿah board 
meetings? 
Q40.6 Outsource company 2.8% 
Q41.1 Representative from the internal 
Sharīʿah compliance unit 
77.1% 
Q41.2 Representative from the risk 
management department 
17.1% 
Q41.3 Representative from the legal department 20% 
Q41.4 Representative from the product 
department 
34.2% 
41.5 Representative from an external legal firm  5.7% 
41.6 Representative from the IFI  8.5% 
41.7 Management 5.7% 
41.8 Executive director 2.8% 
41.9 Managing director 2.8% 
41.10 Board risk committee 2.8% 
41.11 Chief internal auditor 2.8% 
41.12 Company secretary 2.8% 
Q41. Besides the 
Sharīʿah board, who 
attends the meeting? 
41.13 CEO 5.7% 
Q42. Are the Sharīʿah pronouncements reviewed whenever necessary? 74.2% 
Q43. Is the Sharīʿah board required to submit a Sharīʿah report? 68.5% 
44.1 Information on duties and services of the 
Sharīʿah board 
40% 
44.2 Sharīʿah pronouncements 42.8% 
44.3 Sharīʿah board activities 31.4% 
Q44. What are the 
contents of the 
Sharīʿah report? 
44.4 Declaration of Sharīʿah compliance 68.5% 
45.1 Independent division/ department 80% 
45.2 Part of the internal audit department 25.7% 
45.3 Outsource company 2.8% 
45.4 Sharīʿah division 2.8% 




Sharīʿah review? 45.5 Sharīʿah compliance unit  2.8% 
 
∗ Some of the research participants ticked more than one answer provided in questions 41, 44 and 45. 
 




The majority of IFIs (54.2%) have standard operational procedures for Sharīʿah 
governance; 5.7% of IFIs conduct weekly Sharīʿah board meetings, 37.1% monthly, 
22.8% quarterly, 2.8% twice a month, 2.8% every two months, 14.2% on an ad hoc basis, 
and 5.7% biannually. Most Sharīʿah board decisions are made by consensus (45.7%) and 
31.4% by simple majority. In the event of a Sharīʿah board including non-Sharīʿah 
background members, only 20% of IFIs viewed that they should have a voting right in 
decision-making. The majority of IFIs agreed that those members should not be granted 
such voting rights.  
 
With regard to Sharīʿah coordination, the majority of IFIs (74.2%) appointed their 
internal Sharīʿah officer to deal with and handle Sharīʿah governance matters and this 
includes Sharīʿah board meetings. Some IFIs employed their company secretary, head of 
product development, head of legal department, officer in the Islamic capital market 
department or an outsource company to coordinate Sharīʿah governance-related matters. 
This position indicates that most of IFIs have a proper internal arrangement for Sharīʿah 
coordination. 
 
Interestingly, 5.7% of IFIs submit the agenda and documents to the Sharīʿah board a 
month in advance and all of them are from GCC countries, while most IFIs (54.2%) do 
the same thing a week in advance. The Sharīʿah board meetings are attended by various 
parties including the executive director, CEO, managing director, board’s risk committee, 
internal auditor and legal advisor. The majority of IFIs (77.1%) indicated that the normal 
attendees of the Sharīʿah meeting include the respresentative of the internal Sharīʿah 
compliance unit.  
 
According to the survey, 68.5% of IFIs confirmed that the Sharīʿah board is required to 
submit a Sharīʿah report but the survey also indicated that more than 31% of IFIs do not 
issue a Sharīʿah report.204 With respect to the contents of the report, most IFIs (68.5%) 
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 This finding demonstrates a negative indication of IFIs’ commitment to Sharīʿah governance, 
particularly the preparation of the Sharīʿah report. Two earlier studies show weak practice with regards the 
Sharīʿah report. Maali et al. (2006: 285) revealed that 72% of twenty-five IFIs provide the report of the 
Sharīʿah board and a survey conducted by Grais and Pellegrini (2006: 34) found that 30.8% of thirteen IFIs 




just publish a declaration of Sharīʿah compliance rather than details of Sharīʿah 
compliance activities. This illustrates poor disclosure on the part of IFIs upon Sharīʿah-
related information. In spite of the Sharīʿah report, it is also found that more than 25% of 
IFIs do not review the Sharīʿah board pronouncements.  
 
In terms of the Sharīʿah compliance review, 80% of IFIs set up an independent 
department, 25.7% of IFIs delegate the function to the existing internal audit department 
and 2.8% of IFIs to an outsource company.205 A sound Sharīʿah internal audit mechanism 
is a tool to deter malpractice and to mitigate Sharīʿah non-compliance risk. Realizing 
this, most IFIs have set up an independent internal Sharīʿah review department to 
conduct a Sharīʿah compliance review, which is commendable and in line with the best 
practice of Sharīʿah governance. 
 












































Significant variations were found across the case countries on the operational aspect of 
Sharīʿah governance practices. Most IFIs in Malaysia (34.2%) indicated that they had 
standard operational procedures for the Sharīʿah governance process while 5.7% of IFIs 
                                                                                                                                                 
failed to issue a Sharīʿah report. The finding of the recent survey in this study indicates that there has been 
no major improvement on the part of Sharīʿah report practice in IFIs. 
205
 This finding supports the study conducted by the IFSB, which showed that more than 90% of sixty-nine 
IFIs undertook a Sharīʿah compliance review (IFSB, 2008b: 27). This position indicates a positive 
development in Sharīʿah governance in IFIs. 




in the UK and 14.2% of IFIs in the GCC countries indicated the same. IFIs in GCC 
countries indicated slightly lower standards of practice in terms of providing clear 
operational procedures for the Sharīʿah governance process. In terms of Sharīʿah board 
meetings, most IFIs in the case countries conduct more than four meetings a year; 35.2% 
of IFIs in Malaysia and 5.7% of IFIs in GCC countries indicated that they conduct 
monthly meetings, and 8.5% of IFIs in Malaysia, 11.4% in GCC countries and 2.8% in 
the UK conduct quarterly meetings.206 A small percentage of 2.8% of IFIs in both GCC 
countries and the UK indicated that they conduct meetings fewer than four times 
annually.  
 
With regard to the quorum for Sharīʿah board meetings, 17.1% of IFIs in GCC countries 
and 28.5% of IFIs in Malaysia indicated three board members as their quorum. Only a 
minority of IFIs indicated a quorum of six or seven. With respect to the decision-making 
process, most IFIs in Malaysia (20%), 5.7% of IFIs in GCC countries and 2.8% in the UK 
indicated that decisions made at the Sharīʿah board meeting were based on a simple 
majority, while 28.5% of IFIs in Malaysia and 17.1% of IFIs in GCC countries make 
decisions by consensus. This practice demonstrates that the majority of IFIs prefer 
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 The survey witnesses a slightly different trend in GCC countries to the study conducted by 
Aboumouamer (1996: 188), which revealed that 24.4% of forty-one Sharīʿah board members have a 
weekly meeting, 7.3% have a monthly meeting, 48.8% have a quarterly meeting and 2.4% have a biannual 
meeting.  











































Figure 7.8 presents a continuation of the survey results pertaining to operational 
procedures with respect to voting rights, agenda, coordinator and attendees of Sharīʿah 
board meetings. In terms of voting rights for non-Sharīʿah experts, most of IFIs did not 
prefer such appointment; although 17.1% of IFIs in Malaysia and 2.8% of IFIs in GCC 
countries indicated that they may have voting rights, the majority of IFIs preferred to give 
such a right solely to Sharīʿah scholars.  
 
Most IFIs in Malaysia (42.8%), 8.5% in GCC countries and 2.8% in the UK indicated 
that the agenda and documents for Sharīʿah board meeting are prepared and distributed a 
week in advance. Interestingly, 5.7% of IFIs in GCC countries indicated that they submit 
the agenda and documents to the Sharīʿah board a month in advance. With regard to 
Sharīʿah coordination, most IFIs in Malaysia (45.7%),207 22.8% of IFIs in GCC countries 
and 5.7% of IFIs in the UK indicated that their internal Sharīʿah officer is responsible for 
handling the Sharīʿah board meeting and Sharīʿah-related matters. A minority of IFIs 
grant the responsibility to the company secretary, head of product development, head of 
legal department, and a representative from the capital market or outsource company.  
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 In the case of Malaysia, the issue of the remit of various Sharīʿah boards at individual IFI level as well 
as the SAC and Sharīʿah board of the SC is resolved by having proper coordination amongst the Sharīʿah 
officers of these different institutions, led by the officers at the Islamic Banking and Takāful Department of 
the BNM (Ismail, 2009). 





With respect to the attendees of the Sharīʿah board meeting, all IFIs in Malaysia, 22.8% 
of IFIs in GCC countries and 3.7% of IFIs in the UK indicated that a representative from 
the internal Sharīʿah compliance unit is a permanent attendee. Besides that, there were 
some other parties who were invited to attend the meeting, such as representatives from 
the risk management department (14.2% of IFIs in Malaysia and 2.8% of IFIs in GCC 
countries), the legal department (11.4% of IFIs in Malaysia, 5.7% in GCC countries and 
2.8% in the UK) and product development (20% of IFIs in Malaysia, 11.4% of IFIs in 
GCC countries and 2.8% in the UK). The survey found some interesting observations on 
Sharīʿah governance practice in Malaysia and the UK where some IFIs invite the CEO, 
managing director, executive director, board risk committee and chief internal auditor to 
attend the Sharīʿah board meeting. 












In the aspect of review of Sharīʿah rulings, almost all IFIs in Malaysia (45.7%), 22.8% of 
IFIs in GCC countries and 5.7% of IFIs in the UK indicated that they conduct such 
reviews. On another aspect of review, namely the Sharīʿah compliance review, 34.2% of 
IFIs in Malaysia and 40% of IFIs in GCC countries indicated that they have established 
an independent division for that purpose. A small number of IFIs in the case countries 
indicated that the Sharīʿah compliance review was conducted by the existing internal 
audit department and some of them have even appointed a Sharīʿah advisory firm to 
perform that task. 
 




Despite the regulatory requirement to submit a Sharīʿah report in Malaysia, only 37.1% 
of IFIs indicated that the Sharīʿah board is required to submit a Sharīʿah report. Even in 
the absence of such a regulatory requirement, 25.7% of IFIs in GCC countries and 2.8% 
of IFIs in the UK indicated that the Sharīʿah report is part of their internal requirement. 
In terms of the content of the Sharīʿah report, 17.1% of IFIs in Malaysia indicated that 
the Sharīʿah report contains information on the duties and services of the Sharīʿah board, 
25.7% of IFIs on Sharīʿah pronouncements, 17.1% of IFIs on Sharīʿah board activities 
and 37.1% of IFIs on a declaration of Sharīʿah compliance. A similar situation is 
apparent in the case of GCC countries and the UK, by which a majority of IFIs indicated 
that the content of the Sharīʿah report is just a declaration of Sharīʿah compliance.  
 
7.1.7 Assessments of the Sharīʿah Board 
 
There have been numerous critisms and negative allegations about the roles and functions 
of the Sharīʿah board. The problem with all sorts of criticism is that such allegations have 
not been proven or supported by any empirical evidence or reliable data. The survey 
included five questions to specifically address this important issue. These questions 
consist of a general assessment of IFIs of their Sharīʿah board in terms of organizational 
accountability, communication with other organs of governance, ability to identify and 
evaluate Sharīʿah non-compliance risk, contribution to promotion of Islamic ethics and 
values as well as Sharīʿah control processes. Table 7.8 and Figure 7.10 illustrate the IFIs’ 
perception of the performance of their Sharīʿah boards in the case countries. 
 










Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q46. The Sharīʿah board has 
demonstrated effective 
organizational accountability. 
  20% 45.7% 34.2% 
Q47. The Sharīʿah board has 
communicated effectively with other 
organs of governance, including the 
BOD, management and auditors. 
  25.7% 45.7% 28.5% 
Q48. The Sharīʿah board has 
properly identified and evaluated the 
organization’s exposure to Sharīʿah 
non-compliance and reputational 
risk, and effectively communicates 
that risk information to appropriate 
bodies in the organization. 
 2.8% 22.8% 42.8% 31.4% 
Q49. The Sharīʿah board promotes 
Islamic ethics and values within the 
organization. 
 5.7% 20% 40% 34.2%% 
Q50. The Sharīʿah board promotes 
continuous improvement of the 
organization’s Sharīʿah control 
processes. 
 2.8% 17.1% 51.4% 28.5% 
 
Regardless of the numerous criticisms of Sharīʿah boards, the overall responses 
demonstrate that most IFIs are satisfied with the performance of their Sharīʿah board. 
Only 2.8% of IFIs viewed that the Sharīʿah board had failed to identify and evaluate 
Sharīʿah compliance risk and to promote continuous improvement of Sharīʿah control 
processes and 5.7% of IFIs had neglected the duty to promote Islamic values and ethics. 
With understanding that the responses might be biased on the part of IFIs since they 
engage advisory services from the Sharīʿah board, the findings on the failure of Sharīʿah 
boards to identify and evaluate Sharīʿah non-compliance risk and to promote Islamic 
ethics and values is considered slightly significant. 
 




Figure 7.10: Comparative Overview of Perception of Performance of Sharīʿah Board 
 




























































 Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Q46. Q47. Q48. Q49. Q50.
 
 
Figure 7.10 demonstrates IFIs’ perception of the roles and functions played by the 
Sharīʿah board in five aspects, namely accountability, organizational communication, 
Sharīʿah non-compliance risk, Islamic ethics and values, and Sharīʿah control processes. 
The overall findings in Malaysia indicated that IFIs are generally satisfied with the 
performance of Sharīʿah boards, as 22.8% of IFIs ‘Strongly Agree’ on Q46, Q47 and 
Q49, 28.5% of IFIs ‘Agree’ on Q48 and Q50, and 2.8% of IFIs are ‘Neutral’ on Q46–50. 
None of the IFIs in Malaysia indicated a negative perception of the assessment of their 
Sharīʿah board. Similarly, IFIs in the UK were positively satisfied with the performance 
of their Sharīʿah boards by indicating ‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ on Q46–Q50.  
 
Unlike Malaysia and the UK, some interesting observations were found on the perception 
of IFIs in GCC countries. While the majority of IFIs ‘Strongly Agree’ on Q46 (11.4%) 
and Q48–50 (11.4%), a small percentage of IFIs indicated that they are dissatisfied with 
the performance of the Sharīʿah board, as 2.8% of IFIs ‘Disagree’ on Q47, Q48, and Q50 
and 5.7% of IFIs ‘Disagree’ on Q49. This interesting finding tends to show that some 
IFIs have identified that their Sharīʿah board has neglected some important aspects of 
Sharīʿah governance, particularly with respect to the effectiveness of organizational 
communication, identifying Sharīʿah non-compliance risk, contributing to Islamic ethics 




and values, as well as Sharīʿah control processes. It is clear from the finding that the 
assessment and evaluation of the Sharīʿah board’s performance is of the essence to IFIs.  
 
7.2 Developing Sharīʿah Governance Index  
 
The survey reveals that significant numbers of IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the 
UK do not have an adequate framework of the best or ideal Sharīʿah governance 
practices as laid down by the AAOIFI governance standards and the IFSB-10. Based on 
the findings from the survey, the study summarizes the state of the overall Sharīʿah 
governance practices in the case countries by classifying them into five different levels of 
practice, namely ‘Underdeveloped Practice’, ‘Emerging Practice’, ‘Improved Practice’, 
‘Improved Practice’ and ‘Best Practice’.  
 
For the purpose of clarity, the study illustrates the extent of the implementation of 
Sharīʿah governance in IFIs by constructing specific Sharīʿah governance indicators 
using a scoring method. These indicators allow the study to quantify and rank the IFIs 
according to their Sharīʿah governance scores. The study has generated fifty key 
principles for best Sharīʿah governance practices which are divided into six sections: 
approach to Sharīʿah governance (seven indicators), regulation and internal framework of 
Sharīʿah governance (four indicators), roles of Sharīʿah board (five indicators), attributes 
of Sharīʿah board with respect to competence (eight indicators), independence (five 
indicators), transparency and confidentiality (four indicators), operational procedures 
(twelve indicators), and assessment of Sharīʿah board (five indicators). These fifty 
indicators represent the key principles of best practice of Sharīʿah governance as 
promoted in the AAOIFI governance standards and the IFSB-10, including the existing 
literature pertaining to Sharīʿah governance. The overall key principles of best Sharīʿah 
governance practices are summarized in Table 7.9. 




Table 7.9: Sharīʿah Governance Indicators 
Key Principles of Sharīʿah Governance Indicators 
 
Approach to Sharīʿah Governance 
P1. IFIs that adopt the AAOIFI governance standards. 
P2. IFIs that are sensitively aware of the development of Sharīʿah 
governance such as the IFSB-10.  
P3. IFIs that have standards or guidelines for Sharīʿah governance. 
P4. IFIs that develop standard processes for Sharīʿah compliance, audit 
and review of the Sharīʿah board’s legal rulings. 
P5. IFIs that have a professional code of ethics for the Sharīʿah board. 
P6. IFIs that have an internal Sharīʿah board. 
P7. IFIs that have at least three Sharīʿah board members. 
7 
Regulatory and Internal Framework of Sharīʿah Governance  
P8. IFIs that have specific rules and policies concerning Sharīʿah 
governance. 
P9. IFIs that have written policies or by-laws specifically referring to the 
conduct of the Sharīʿah h board. 
P10. IFIs that have good understanding of types of dispute settlement to 
redress legal matters concerning Islamic finance. 
P11. IFIs that have good understanding of the legal position of the 
Sharīʿah board’s rulings. 
4 
Roles of Sharīʿah Board 
P12. IFIs that provide clear advisory and supervisory authority to their 
Sharīʿah board. 
P13. IFIs whose Sharīʿah board performs ex ante and ex post Sharīʿah 
governance processes. 
P14. IFIs that grant authority to the Sharīʿah board to oversee the 
payment and computation of zakah. 
P15. IFIs whose Sharīʿah board performs the Sharīʿah audit function. 
P16. IFIs that delegate Sharīʿah review functions to the internal Sharīʿah 
compliance unit to assist the Sharīʿah board. 
5 
Attributes of Sharīʿah Board (Competence) 
P17. IFIs that have policies on the fit and proper criteria for the members 
of the Sharīʿah board. 
P18. IFIs that put conditions of academic qualification, experience and 
track record on their Sharīʿah board members. 
P19. IFIs that put requirements of being specialized in muamalāt, Islamic 
jurisprudence and knowledge of Arabic and English in terms of academic 
qualifications on their Sharīʿah board members. 
P20. IFIs that put requirements on their Sharīʿah board members of 
understanding of Sharīʿah and general banking law as well as the impact 
of Sharīʿah rulings in terms of experience and exposure. 
P21. IFIs that put requirements of good character and competence and 
diligence in terms of track record. 
8 




Key Principles of Sharīʿah Governance Indicators 
 
P22. IFIs that allow non-Sharīʿah background individuals as members of 
the Sharīʿah board who are well-versed in law, economy and finance. 
P23. IFIs that organize adequate training for the Sharīʿah board. 
P24. IFIs that have proper assessment of the Sharīʿah board. 
Attributes of Sharīʿah Board (Independence) 
P25. IFIs that appoint the Sharīʿah board through their shareholders. 
P26. IFIs that appoint the Sharīʿah board on a contractual basis. 
P27. IFIs that determine the Sharīʿah board’s remuneration through the 
BOD but subject to the approval of shareholders. 
P28. IFIs that have a mechanism in place to mitigate conflict of interest in 
relation to Sharīʿah scholars sitting on various boards. 
P29. IFIs that clearly provide full mandate and authority to the Sharīʿah 
board. 
5 
Attributes of Sharīʿah Board (Transparency and Confidentiality) 
P30. IFIs that have a written policy in respect to the preparation and 
dissemination of Sharīʿah information. 
P31. IFIs that grant full authority to Sharīʿah board to have access to all 
documents, information and records. 
P32. IFIs that publish the Sharīʿah pronouncements and ensure they are 
available to the public. 
P33. IFIs that ensure their Sharīʿah board is fully aware of the issue of 
confidentiality and sensitive information obtained in the course of 
performing their duties. 
4 
Operational Procedures 
P34. IFIs that have standard operational procedures for their Sharīʿah 
board. 
P35. IFIs that hold a Sharīʿah board meeting at least once a month. 
P36. IFIs that have a requirement of at least three as their quorum for the 
Sharīʿah board meeting. 
P37. IFIs that have a requirement of a simple majority as a basis for the 
decisions of Sharīʿah board meetings. 
P38. IFIs that do not grant voting rights to non- Sharīʿah background 
members of the Sharīʿah board. 
P39. IFIs that ensure their agenda is prepared and distributed at least a 
week in advance of Sharīʿah board meetings. 
P40. IFIs that set up a Sharīʿah department/unit/division to coordinate the 
Sharīʿah governance process. 
P41. IFIs that require the attendance of management or directors in the 
Sharīʿah board meeting. 
P42. IFIs that require their Sharīʿah board to review the previous rulings. 
P43. IFIs that have a mandatory requirement for a Sharīʿah report. 
P44. IFIs that detail the contents of the Sharīʿah report to include 
information on duties and activities, Sharīʿah pronouncements and a 
declaration of Sharīʿah compliance. 
12 




Key Principles of Sharīʿah Governance Indicators 
 
P45. IFIs that set up independent organizational arrangements for the 
internal Sharīʿah audit. 
Assessment of Sharīʿah Board 
P46. IFIs whose Sharīʿah board demonstrates effective organizational 
accountability. 
P47. IFIs whose Sharīʿah board communicates effectively with other 
organs of governance, including the BOD, management and auditors. 
P48. IFIs whose Sharīʿah board properly identifies and evaluates the 
organization’s exposure to Sharīʿah non-compliance risk and reputational 
risk, and effectively communicates that risk information to appropriate 
bodies in the organization. 
P49. IFIs whose Sharīʿah board promotes Islamic ethics and values within 
the organization. 
P50. IFIs whose Sharīʿah board promotes continuous improvement of an 
organization’s Sharīʿah control processes. 
5 
Total Indicators 50 
 
Based on the above fifty formulated key principles of Sharīʿah governance, the study 
ranks IFIs into five levels of Sharīʿah governance practices. IFIs that score 1–15 key 
principles of Sharīʿah governance are ranked as ‘Underdeveloped Practice’, 16–25 as 
‘Emerging Practice’, 26–35 as ‘Improved Practice’, 36–45 as ‘Good Practice’ and 46–50 
as ‘Best Practice’. This classification will provide a clear illustration of the extent of 
Sharīʿah governance implementation as practised by IFIs in the case countries. The 
ranking process and scoring method used in this study is further explained in Table 7.10.  
Table 7.10: Sharīʿah Governance Scoring Method 
 
Level of Practice Score Explanation 
Underdeveloped 
Practice 
1–15 IFIs that have a minimal score of best Sharīʿah 
governance practices and need immediate reform. 
Emerging Practice 16–25 IFIs that have a minimal score of best Sharīʿah 
governance practices but indicate positive development. 
Improved Practice 26–35 IFIs that have a fair score of best Sharīʿah governance 
practices and indicate strong improvement. 
Good Practice 36–45 IFIs that have a good score of best Sharīʿah governance 
practices and generally adhere to most of its key 
principles. 
Best Practice 46–50 The ideal IFIs that represent the best practice of Sharīʿah 
governance. 




7.2.1  The Overall Score of Sharīʿah Governance 
 
The study illustrates the overall scores of Sharīʿah governance in Malaysia, GCC 
countries and the UK in Figure 7.11. This illustration provides an overview of the extent 
of Sharīʿah governance practices in IFIs.  
 
Figure 7.11: The Overall Scores of Sharīʿah Governance 
 






















Figure 7.11 demonstrates that the average Sharīʿah governance score is 30.1 best 
indicators. The majority of IFIs (40%) fall into the ‘Improved Practice’ category, with an 
average of 32.9 best indicators. Meanwhile 8.6% of IFIs fall into the ‘Emerging Practice’ 
category and 17.1% into ‘Underdeveloped Practice’. This finding indicates that a 
significant number of IFIs (more than 25%) scored less than 25 of the best indicators of 
Sharīʿah governance, indicating very weak practice and 40% of IFIs show some positive 
improvements. The survey reveals that only 34.2% of IFIs fall into the ‘Good Practice’ 
category and none of the IFIs were categorized as ‘Best Practice’. This position indicates 
that only a minority of IFIs are categorized as having ‘Good Practice’ of Sharīʿah 
governance while the remaining majority of IFIs urgently need further enhancement and 
improvement to their Sharīʿah governance frameworks and practices. On the whole, the 
overall scores of Sharīʿah governance above affirm that there are gaps and shortcomings 
in the existing frameworks and practices of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs, in spite of the 
available international guiding principles and governance standards.  




7.2.2 Sharīʿah Governance Scores for IFIs in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the 
UK 
 
The overall Sharīʿah governance scores affirm that more than 65% of IFIs are ranked in 
the ‘Improved Practice’, ‘Emerging Practice’ and ‘Underdeveloped Practice’ category, 
while less than 35% of IFIs were ranked in the ‘Good Practice’ category. This section 
further illustrates a comparative overview of the Sharīʿah governance scores according to 
the country’s specific behaviour. Figure 7.12 and Table 7.11 demonstrate the different 
and average Sharīʿah governance scores for IFIs in the case countries. This comparative 
perspective is very useful in explaining the effectiveness of diverse Sharīʿah governance 
approaches as practised by IFIs.  
 
Figure 7.12: Comparative Overview of Sharīʿah Governance for IFIs in Malaysia, 
GCC Countries and the UK 
Shari'ah Governance Scores for IFIs in Malaysia, GCC 



















Malaysia GCC Countries UK
 























(17 IFIs)   202 430  632 37.1 
GCC 
Countries 
(16 IFIs) 62 66 227   355 22.2 
UK  
(2 IFIs)   32 37  69 34.5 
Total  62 66 461 467  1056 30.1 
 
∗ The scores are generated from 50 indicators of Sharīʿah governance key principles as illustrated in table 
7.9. The total scores of each IFI are 50. IFIs in Malaysia score 632 out of 850 (17x50), GCC Countries, 355 
out of 800 (16x50) and the UK, 69 out of 100 (2x50). The ‘average’ is formulated as the scores divide by 
the number of IFIs. 
 
Figure 7.12 and Table 7.11 illustrate that there are significant differences in the state of 
Sharīʿah governance practices in IFIs. Basically, IFIs in Malaysia presented a slightly 
better score compared to GCC countries and the UK. Most of the IFIs in Malaysia 
(31.4%) fall into the ‘Good Practice’ category and only 17.1% into the ‘Improved 
Practice’ category. This finding demonstrates that the overall score of IFIs in Malaysia is 
relatively good, with an average of 37.1 best indicators for each IFI, which can be 
categorized as ‘Good Practice’. The researcher presumes that the finding of good 
Sharīʿah governance practice in IFIs in Malaysia is contributed to by several external and 
internal factors. With regard to external factors, well-conceived regulation and the 
proactive approach of the regulatory and supervisory authorities, such as the issuance of 
the BNM/GPS1, have contributed to better development of the Sharīʿah governance 
system. Meanwhile, the internal factors refer to the positive initiative at the individual IFI 
level to facilitate the implementation of Islamic finance by emphasizing the requirements 
of Sharīʿah compliance. It was found that the BNM, as well as individual IFIs, have 
organized training for the Sharīʿah board and practitioners and allocated a significant 
amount of funds to develop various programmes pertaining to Sharīʿah governance.  
 
Unlike Malaysia, the overall finding for IFIs in GCC countries demonstrates that they 
have a slightly weak Sharīʿah governance practice with an average of 22.2 best 




indicators, which can be ranked as ‘Emerging Practice’; 20% of IFIs fall into the 
‘Improved Practice’ category, 8.6% into the ‘Emerging Practice’ category and 17.1% into 
the ‘Underdeveloped Practice’ category. This position indicates that more than 50% of 
IFIs in GCC countries scored less than 25 best indicators, which demonstrates very weak 
practice of Sharīʿah governance. Moreover, it was found that several IFIs have failed to 
comply with the AAOIFI governance standards as well as the directives or guidelines of 
their regulatory and supervisory authorities. The researcher presumes that weak 
supervision and monitoring by the supervisory authorities as well as less initiative at 
individual IFI level are amongst the contributory factors that have led to these negative 
findings.  
 
The study did not expect too much in terms of Sharīʿah governance scores for IFIs in the 
UK as the implementation of Islamic finance is within a purely secular legal 
environment. The findings, on the other hand, surprisingly demonstrate that IFIs in the 
UK scored slightly better than GCC countries, as 2.8% fall into each of the ‘Improved 
Practice’ and ‘Good Practice’ categories with an average of 34.5 best indicators. This 
phenomenon suggests that strong regulation and supervision is not the sole factor that 
may positively influence Sharīʿah governance practice. In the absence of regulations and 
directives from the FSA, IFIs in the UK have proactively developed their own Sharīʿah 
governance system that falls into the ‘Improved Practice’ category. 
 
In view of the absence of any specific study to measure and evaluate the extent of 
Sharīʿah governance practice in IFIs, this study has introduced Sharīʿah governance 
indicators to rank IFIs according to their Sharīʿah governance scores. With fifty 
identified key principles of best Sharīʿah governance practices, the research evaluates 
and examines the state of Sharīʿah governance practice based on the feedback from the 
survey. The overall findings demonstrate that more than 25% of thirty-five IFIs fall into 
the ‘Underdeveloped Practice’ and ‘Emerging Practice’ categories, while the majority of 
them fall into the ‘Improved Practice’ category. Only 32.4% of IFIs fall into the ‘Good 
Practice’ category and the majority of them are from Malaysia. In spite of some 
shortcomings and weaknesses of Sharīʿah governance practices, the 40% of IFIs that fall 
into the ‘Improved Practice’ category is a positive sign and points to a growing awareness 




of Sharīʿah governance. These findings strongly indicate that there is a huge potential for 
improvement and enhancement on the part of IFIs to develop their Sharīʿah governance 
framework. 
7.2.3  Sharīʿah Governance Scores According to Year of Incorporation  
 
This section attempts to further demonstrate the extent of Sharīʿah governance practices 
in IFIs by classifying them into four different clusters. Unlike section 7.2.2 which 
presented Sharīʿah governance scores from a country-specific behaviour perspective, this 
section highlights the level of Sharīʿah governance scores on the basis of the year of 
incorporation. In the case of Islamic windows, the study refers to the year they started 
offering Islamic financial products and services. The majority of IFIs established their 
Sharīʿah board in the same year of their incorporation and some of them set up their 
Sharīʿah board later on, particularly when they started offering Islamic financial products 
and services. Table 7.12 illustrates the details of the classification.  
 
Table 7.12: Classification of IFIs According to Year of Incorporation 
  
IFIs Malaysia GCC 
Countries 
UK Total  Percentage 
Cluster 1: 1975–1990 1 3  4 11.40% 
Cluster 2: 1991–2000 7 2  9 25.70% 
Cluster 3: 2000–2005 8 3  11 31.40% 
Cluster 4: 2006–2010 3 6 2 11 31.40% 
 
The IFIs are classified into four clusters. Cluster 1 refers to the IFIs that were established 
between 1975 and 1990, Cluster 2 between 1991 and 2000, Cluster 3 between 2000 and 
2005, and Cluster 4 between 2006 and 2010. There are 11.4% of IFIs classified as Cluster 
1, 25.7% as Cluster 2, 31.4% as Cluster 3 and 31.4% as Cluster 4. These figures indicate 
that the IFIs in Clusters 3 and 4 represent the majority of the research sample. Based on 
the above classification, the study quantifies the Sharīʿah governance scores and ranks 
them into ‘Underdeveloped Practice’, ‘Emerging Practice’, ‘Improved Practice’, ‘Good 
Practice’ and ‘Best Practice’ categories, as explained in Table 7.10. Details of the 
findings are illustrated in Figure 7.13.  




Figure 7.13: Sharīʿah Governance Scores According to Cluster 














Improved Practice Good Practice Best Practice
Cluster 1: 1975-1990 Cluster 2: 1991-2000 Cluster 3: 2000-2005 Cluster 4: 2006-2010
 
 
It is clear from Figure 7.12 that there are significant differences between the Sharīʿah 
governance practices in IFIs. IFIs in Clusters 2 and 3 represent better Sharīʿah 
governance scores compared to their counterparts in Clusters 1 and 4. The majority of 
IFIs (40%) fall into the ‘Improved Practice’ category, while a minority of them fall into 
the ‘Emerging Practice’ (8.6%) and ‘Underdeveloped Practice’ (17.1%) categories. A 
total of 14.2% of IFIs in Cluster 2 fall into the ‘Good Practice’ category, while the 
majority of IFIs (14.2%) in Cluster 3 fall into the ‘Improved Practice’ category. IFIs in 
Cluster 1 show slightly lower Sharīʿah governance scores, with most of them falling into 
the ‘Improved Practice’, ‘Emerging Practice’ and ‘Underdeveloped Practice’ categories. 
IFIs in Cluster 4 indicated positive improvement in Sharīʿah governance matters, where a 
significant percentage of 11.4% are ranked as being in the ‘Improved Practice’ category.   
 
The above figures demonstrate interesting findings which are contrary to the research 
expectations that IFIs in Cluster 1 will have better Sharīʿah governance scores than IFIs 
in Clusters 3 and 4. IFIs in Cluster 1, which are considered pioneers in Islamic finance, 
indicated weak Sharīʿah governance practices. The majority of them are ranked in the 
‘Emerging Practice’ and ‘Underdeveloped Practice’ categories. On the other hand, IFIs in 
Cluster 4, which are considered new to the Islamic finance industry, show positive 
improvement and slightly better Sharīʿah governance practices than the IFIs in Cluster 1. 




These results affirm that the early establishment of IFIs is not the determining factor for 
the extent and quality of Sharīʿah governance practices. The level of Sharīʿah 
governance practices is much more influenced by external and internal factors, where the 
former refers to the regulatory framework and commitment by the regulatory and 
supervisory authorities and the latter concerns well-conceived by-laws and internal 
policies on Sharīʿah governance, as well as voluntary initiatives by the IFIs themselves.  
7.3 Conclusion 
 
In view of the lack of available data and information on Sharīʿah governance practices in 
IFIs, the researcher employed the survey research method to investigate and examine the 
extent of Sharīʿah governance practices in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. The 
survey response rate of 43.8% clearly indicates that the research findings in this study are 
acceptable and significant. The survey responses affirm that IFIs in the case countries 
have different and diverse Sharīʿah governance practices and further acknowledge that 
there are shortcomings and weaknesses to the present governance framework in the 
following main areas: approach to Sharīʿah governance, regulatory frameworks and 
internal policies on Sharīʿah governance, roles of Sharīʿah board, attributes of Sharīʿah 
board members with respect to independence, competence, transparency and 
confidentiality, operational procedures, and assessment of Sharīʿah board.  
 
To sum up, the Sharīʿah governance scores of the thirty-five IFIs in the case countries 
demonstrate that more than 65% of them require significant enhancement and 
improvement as they are ranked in the ‘Improved Practice’, ‘Emerging Practice’ and 
‘Underdeveloped Practice’ categories. With a small percentage of 35% of IFIs falling 
into the ‘Good Practice’ category with an average of 30.2 best indicators, the study 
concludes that the overall Sharīʿah governance practices are still in the stage of 
development and need immediate attention by policymakers and regulatory authorities as 
well as the internal organs of governance in the IFIs, such as shareholders, the BOD and 
senior management. 
 




The need for the above enhancement of Sharīʿah governance practice is crucial as it 
would then strengthen the performance and credibility of IFIs. In this regard, regulatory 
authorities should take the initiative to establish Sharīʿah governance standards or to 
adopt the existing Sharīʿah governance guidelines for IFIs. In the meantime, IFIs should 
initiate efforts to create well-conceived by-laws for their Sharīʿah governance system. A 
sound Sharīʿah governance practice would enhance the potential role of Islamic finance 
in contributing towards corporate reform and mitigating certain types of risk exclusive to 
IFIs. 
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SEARCHING FOR THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SHARĪAH SCHOLAR ON 
SHARĪAH GOVERNANCE SYSTEM IN ISLAMIC BANKING: ANALYSIS OF 
THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The Sharīʿah board is the most important organ of governance in the Sharīʿah 
governance system. It plays an essential role in ensuring that all objectives of Sharīʿah 
governance are met and these include directing, reviewing, supervising the activities of 
IFIs and issuing legal rulings. In this regard, the study decided to explore Sharīʿah board 
members’ views and opinions pertaining to Sharīʿah governance issues. This chapter 
hence aims at examining their views in six different areas: namely issues on Sharīʿah 
governance, internal policy framework, role of the Sharīʿah board, attributes of the 
Sharīʿah board in terms of mechanisms of independence, competence, transparency and 
confidentiality, operational procedures, and assessment of Sharīʿah board.  
 
As part of the qualitative research strategies, the study conducted semi-structured 
interviews with Sharīʿah scholars from different IFIs. Despite facing numerous problems 
and constraints in getting Sharīʿah scholars for interview, the study successfully 
interviewed fourteen Sharīʿah scholars (two in Dubai, one in London and eleven in Kuala 
Lumpur) representing IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. The researcher 
considers that the interview findings from those fourteen Sharīʿah scholars are acceptable 
and significant.  
 
The interviews were conducted specifically to explore the Sharīʿah scholars’ perception 
on selected issues pertaining to Sharīʿah governance. It is worth mentioning that the 
findings presented in this chapter are integrated and dependent on the views and issues 
raised in each part of the interview section. In this regard, the findings will be more 
useful if analysed as a whole and not read in isolation. For the purpose of clarity, the 
findings are summarized in a coded and thematic way, using the content analysis method.  
The results of the coding analysis are then discussed in detail after the presentations of 
the main findings in the tables. 
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8.2 Research Findings 
 
8.2.1 Issues of Sharīʿah Governance 
 
Four questions were posed to Sharīʿah scholars in this section. The study generated these 
questions in order to examine Sharīʿah scholars’ views on Sharīʿah governance issues, 
the AAOIFI governance standards, the IFSB-10 and the impact of poor Sharīʿah 
governance practices.  
 




(i) Coding 1: Regulatory and supervisory authorities; 
(ii) Coding 2: Regulation; 
(iii) Coding 3: Sharīʿah rulings; and 
(iv) Coding 4: Management and internal officers of IFIs 
Theme: There are four main Sharīʿah governance issues that need to be appropriately 
addressed, namely the function of regulatory and supervisory authorities, the extent of 
regulation, the Sharīʿah rulings, and the role of management in IFIs.  
 







• Regulator does not actually understand or 
appreciate the nature of the Sharīʿah board’s duty.  
• The regulator tries to intervene and question the 
role played by the Sharīʿah board. 
Interviewee 
2 









• Regulator looks more from a macro perspective 





• Restriction on multiple appointments has led to the 
issue of a shortage of Sharīʿah advisors. Some IFIs 
have to take individuals who are not specialized in 
muāmalāt. Therefore IFIs have to train them and 
this incurs time and cost. 
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• Some people are still not clear about the position of 
S16B of the Central Bank of Malaysia 
(Amendment) Act 2003, and whether it is 
persuasive or not. The SAC should be the highest 
position of fatwa in muāmalāt in Malaysia. The 
idea that the rulings made by the SHC should be 
endorsed by National Fatwa Council should not be 
the way to resolve the issue. It is advisable that the 




• The main issue is regulation, i.e. lack of regulation.  
• The Central Bank should come out with rules and 
regulations and set up its own Sharīʿah board. 
• The regulations must consist of auditing, reviewing 




• The procedure of fatwa. 




• Standardization and harmonization of IFIs’ 
practices.  
• Problems with the differences in Sharīʿah rulings. 
Interviewee 
5 
• There is a gap between Sharīʿah board’s 
understanding and the actual practice. 
Interviewee 
7 
• To address the micro issues that meet the market 
and industry needs. 
Interviewee 
9 
• There are issues that are not real issues, such as 
conflict of interest. There is no conflict of interest 
because Sharīʿah scholars perform the job for the 
sake of Allah. With regard to the allegation that 
Sharīʿah scholars are just a rubber stamp, this is not 
true and it is a baseless allegation. The existing 
practice of Islamic banking such as murābahah and 
mushārakah is actually the practice of the Prophet. 
There is no problem in practising either debt 





• Consistency and transparency. 
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• Since the chairman of the Sharīʿah board is a 
Sharīʿah scholar from the Middle East and another 
member is originally from the subcontinent, many 
decisions and views are much influenced by their 
school of thought and interpretations. Nevertheless, 
it is a good form of harmonization of Sharīʿah 
interpretations between Malaysia and other regions. 
Interviewee 
14 
• Focusing on substance and not only on form. 
Interviewee 
2 








• Advisor is given insufficient time to peruse and go 
through the documents and product’s detail. 
• Lack of skill of the bank’s officials in explaining 
products to the Sharīʿah advisor. 








• Sharīʿah governance structure within the financial 
group is still minimal compared to the fully-fledged 
IFIs, such as no internal Sharīʿah officer and no 
internal Sharīʿah audit.  
 
Question 2: Do you think the adoption of the AAOIFI governance standards may 
resolve issues of Sharīʿah governance? 
 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: It positively resolves Sharīʿah governance issues; and 
(ii) Coding 2: There are some weaknesses and constraints within the AAOIFI 
governance standards. 
Theme: The AAOIFI governance standards may positively resolve the Sharīʿah 
governance issues but there are some weaknesses and constraints on its implementation. 
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Interviewee 2 • Yes, it resolves some issues such as the 
qualification of Sharīʿah advisors. 
Interviewee 3 
and 14 
• Partly, yes. 
Interviewee 
12 
• Certainly adopting the AAOIFI governance 
standards would be a step in the right direction. 







• It might resolve some issues of Sharīʿah 
governance by using the same standards across 
the board. However, in terms of 
implementation, it would still depend on the 
structure of the Islamic and financial sector of 
the country, the policies, regulations and also 
the readiness of various market players. It is 
basically back to the issue of divergence and 
convergence in the industry. 
Interviewee 1 • Sharīʿah boards are generally not well-versed 
in the AAOIFI standards. They are written in a 
way that Sharīʿah boards are not familiar with. 
The document is written as accounting 
standards. It may resolve some issues but will 
not resolve them completely. 
Interviewee 4  • It may resolve some issues but the problem is 
the AAOIFI standard itself. It may be a good 
reference only. The AAOIFI may not be 
appropriate in some jurisdictions. 
Interviewee 5 • It may resolve Sharīʿah governance and 
procedural issues but not substantive issues.  
Interviewee 6 • It should be an option to adopt it. There are 
certain standards that are not appropriate to 
Malaysia. Let Malaysia develop its own 
standards because of its different legal 
environment. 








Interviewee 7 • The adoption of the AAOIFI governance 
standards will not resolve issues and is 
insufficient but it is a good step and effort 
towards resolving Sharīʿah governance issues. 
• The AAOIFI standards must be reviewed by 
professionals, bankers, accountant, lawyers, 
etc. This is because the AAOIFI standards have 
never been reviewed so far. 
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Interviewee 9 • Yes it may resolve some issues. But the 
problem with the AAOIFI is that the majority 
of Sharīʿah scholars are Malikis and its 
Sharīʿah standard may not be applicable in 
certain jurisdictions, such as in Malaysia. For 
example, in the case of bay al dayn and bay 
al inah, the standards may not be applicable or 
appropriate in Malaysia. 
Interviewee 
10 
• I am not sure whether it tackles the issue of 
Sharīʿah governance. As far as Sharīʿah 
parameters and rules are concerned, the 






Question 3: What is your view on the IFSB-10? 
 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: The IFSB-10 is comprehensive and good for Sharīʿah governance; 
and 
(ii) Coding 2: There are some challenges for its implementation. 
Theme: The IFSB-10 is a good reference but there are some challenges with respect to its 
implementation. 
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Interviewee 2 • It is quite comprehensive.  
Interviewees 
1, 5, 8, and 10 
• Not yet read the draft. 
Interviewee 3 • It is a good attempt. 
Interviewee 6 • There are some similarities with the BNM/GPS1 
and the AAOIFI governance standards. It could 
be a main reference for Sharīʿah governance 
system. 






• It is excellent guidance for IFIs to follow, with a 
view to further improvements. 
Interviewee 
13 
• In my point of view, the recent IFSB Sharīʿah 
governance guidelines is a well-drafted standard 
to strengthen the Sharīʿah board’s functions and 
roles in IFIs.  
• Apart from safeguarding the independence of the 
Sharīʿah board, it also highlights the ideal 
structure of the Sharīʿah board by appointing 
Sharīʿah advisors with diverse backgrounds that 
hold board positions in different countries, 
madhāhib, experience levels and qualifications.  
• It is also a good move if there are more female 
Sharīʿah board members to break the stigma of 










• A step in the right direction. 
 
Interviewee 2 • There should be different approaches to Sharīʿah 
governance in different jurisdictions. 
• The issue of advisory or supervisory role of 
Sharīʿah board at national and international level.  




implementation Interviewee 4 • It is a good guideline but there are a lot of 
challenges to implement it. The difference with 
the IFSB and the AAOIFI governance standards 
refer to the target audience where the former 
relies upon the regulators and the latter upon the 
individual IFIs. 
• A big challenge to the IFSB refers to the 
enforcement issue, whether the guidelines are 
acceptable in various jurisdictions.  
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Question 4: Are you aware any of any failure or serious impact on the IFIs directly 
or indirectly attributable to poor Sharīʿah governance practices? 
 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: Failure to promote Islamic values; 
(ii) Coding 2: Communication gap between IFIs and the Sharīʿah board; and 
(iii) Coding 3: The impact upon the image, credibility and reputation of IFIs 
Theme: There are some discrepancies in the practice of Islamic finance that may impede 
the development of its image, credibility and reputation, such as failure to promote 
Islamic values, lack of communication in Sharīʿah supervision and failure to mitigate the 
Sharīʿah non-compliance risk. 
 






• Yes. For instance in the aspect of Sharīʿah 
supervision and monitoring. Islamic values are part 
and parcel of the business. My observation is that 
the IFIs’ objective is to make profit and maximize 
the customer’s satisfaction. There is a lack of 
Islamic values. 
• To have a minimum standard of Islamic values. 
Interviewee 
8 
• The failure of the Sharīʿah board is to give input in 
formulating pure and original Islamic products. At 
the moment, the existing products are only 
mimicking conventional products. 





• Yes, since Sharīʿah compliance is the backbone of 
IFIs and their very reputation. 
Interviewee 
2 
• Poor level of communication between Sharīʿah 
board and IFIs. The documents do not really 
translate the contract. For instance, in the case of 
bay al inah, there are terms that contradict the 
conditions of the contract. The Sharīʿah board must 








• Another issue is the understanding of the Sharīʿah 
board of certain issues deliberated upon during the 
board meetings. Once again it depends on the IFI’s 
duty to disclose all relevant information to the 
Sharīʿah board and then the board can deliver solid 
Sharīʿah rulings.  
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• Oversight. Issues on how products are approved, 
marketed, etc. For example, equity financing 
products such as mudhārabah. Basically, the bank 
cannot guarantee profit. When the product is 
marketed, the product is presumed to be guaranteed. 
The management thinks this might not be serious. 
We have seen complaints from customers. Sharīʿah 




• Yes. For example, tawarruq; the problem with 
tawarruq is that the Sharīʿah board does not 
monitor the implementation of Sharīʿah rulings. 
Reversed tawarruq is prohibited but organized 
tawarruq is permissible if it follows the conditions. 
Interviewee 
9 
• Yes, Sharīʿah scholars have already warned IFIs 
about the issues of Sharīʿah non-compliance risk. 
But sometimes, the IFIs do not hear what the 
Sharīʿah scholars say. The Sharīʿah rulings are 
properly made but there are problems with 
implementation. There were cases where the IFIs 
did not comply with the Sharīʿah and this was really 
unethical. I am of the view that the credibility of 
Sharīʿah scholars also plays an important role. For 
example, in the case of LRT Project Financing 
based on istisnā` and ijārah, where the Sharīʿah 
board is comprised of Sheikh Yusof al Qaradhawi 
and Sheikh Taqi Usmani, it was found that the 
company followed strictly all the advice given. 
Interviewee 
1 
• From the Sharīʿah board's perspective, there is no 




• The impact is more on the decision made by the 
Sharīʿah board.  
Interviewee 
6 
• From my perspective it does not have much impact 
but puts more pressure on the industry to find a 
better alternative. 
3) The impact 







• Yes, since Sharīʿah compliance is the backbone of 
IFIs and their reputation. 
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8.2.1.1 Analysis of the Issues of Sharīʿah Governance 
 
In the analysis of the interviews, the study identifies four main issues pertaining to 
Sharīʿah governance, namely roles of regulators, regulation, IFIs’ management and 
Sharīʿah rulings. Sharīʿah scholars have admitted that there are gaps between the 
regulator, IFIs’ management and the Sharīʿah board in terms of communication and 
understanding. While regulators try to impose a series of regulations upon the Sharīʿah 
board, some Sharīʿah scholars consider it unnecessary since they are bound by Islamic 
ethics. Sharīʿah scholars also highlighted that some IFIs’ management failed to 
understand the extent of Sharīʿah non-compliance risk. At this point, Sharīʿah scholars 
insisted on the need to strengthen the Sharīʿah functions and break down the 
communication barrier between the IFIs’ stakeholders and these include regulators, 
shareholders, management, Sharīʿah board, employees and consumers. 
 
In terms of the AAOIFI governance standards and the IFSB-10, the majority of answers 
tend to show that they may only resolve certain Sharīʿah governance issues, such as 
procedural issues, but not the substantive issues. Some Sharīʿah scholars questioned the 
acceptability of both documents being suitable for various jurisdictions. The AAOIFI 
governance standards also have credibility issues, and one of the Sharīʿah scholars 
complained that the standards have not been reviewed. They further criticized that the 
standards were approved by the same Sharīʿah scholars who advised numerous IFIs in 
various jurisdictions. The study also reveals that some Sharīʿah scholars are not sensitive 
and alert to the development of Sharīʿah governance. It is found that four of them were 
unaware of or had not yet read the IFSB-10.  
 
With regards the impact of poor practice of Sharīʿah governance, the majority of 
Sharīʿah scholars highlighted their concerns on this matter. In fact, a few of them have 
expressed their concerns on the impact of poor Sharīʿah governance, particularly the 
perception of the public of the IFIs’ credibility. Three Sharīʿah scholars highlighted that 
the current practice of Sharīʿah governance to a certain extent has failed to promote 
Islamic values, while the rest of them have expressed their concerns about the 
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communication gap between them and IFIs. Both these factors may contribute to the 
negative impact of Sharīʿah governance upon the image and credibility of IFIs. At this 
point, the study indicates that Sharīʿah scholars have admitted that there were 
discrepancies and weaknesses in the existing practice of Sharīʿah governance. These 
findings nevertheless indicate that Sharīʿah scholars have a lack of understanding of the 
actual impact of poor Sharīʿah governance upon IFIs. The implication of poor Sharīʿah 
governance actually goes beyond the aspects of credibility and the image of IFIs. An 
inappropriate Sharīʿah governance system will not only negate the public confidence in 
the legitimacy of the products and services but also will expose IFIs to Sharīʿah non-
compliance risk, which may have numerous impacts, both financial and non-financial, on 
IFIs. 
8.2.2 Internal Framework of Sharīʿah Governance 
 
This section identifies one question pertaining to by-laws or internal policies of IFIs to 
carry out a Sharīʿah review. This question attempts to demonstrate the state of IFIs’ 
internal policies framework to ensure the effectiveness of Sharīʿah governance 
implementation.  
  
Question 5: Do the bank by-laws allow you to carry out a Sharīʿah review to ensure 
that the bank’s operation is in accordance with Sharīʿah? 
 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: Affirmative; and 
(ii) Coding 2: Negative.  
Theme: There are significant differences in the Sharīʿah review frameworks and some 
IFIs do not have specific by-laws or formal internal policies on Sharīʿah review. 
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• Yes, generally in Malaysia. But not in the Middle 
East where the Sharīʿah reviews are conducted on 
the IFIs’ own initiatives. Neither jurisdiction, 




• Yes, in terms of reference. IFIs have a Sharīʿah 




• Takāful Malaysia has started to do its Sharīʿah 
review based on its own initiative. 
Interviewees 







• The new Sharīʿah governance framework will be 
issued this year and become effective in year 2011 
will replace the BNM/GPS1. It is clearly stated that 
every Sharīʿah board decision, view and opinion 
related to the IFI is binding and the management is 
responsible for observing and implementing those 
decisions. At the same time, any pronouncement 
issued by the SHC which is validated by the SAC is 
legally binding upon the court by virtue of the CBA. 
Interviewees 
2 
• In principle yes but in practice no. Decisions are 
based on Sharīʿah board meetings and assumptions. 
We sign the declaration of Sharīʿah compliance in 
the annual report.  
Interviewees 
3 and 8 
• No. 
2) Negative  
Interviewee 
5 
• I have not seen any. Sharīʿah compliance reviews 
are conducted but not very often. 
8.2.2.1 Analysis of the Internal Framework of Sharīʿah Governance 
 
There are significant differences in Sharīʿah governance practices with respect to the 
internal regulation of IFIs pertaining to the Sharīʿah review. Basically, Sharīʿah scholars 
unanimously agreed that IFIs should have an internal policy or by-laws relating to the 
Sharīʿah review. Sharīʿah scholars nevertheless highlighted that some IFIs have by-laws 
on the Sharīʿah review while the other IFIs simply ignore this matter. The study also 
reveals that some Sharīʿah scholars do not perform a Sharīʿah review function but only 
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focus on the ex ante functions of Sharīʿah governance. In fact, they only sign the 
declaration of Sharīʿah compliance in the annual report without carrying out a proper 
Sharīʿah review process. 
 
This finding indicates that there are some weaknesses in the existing internal framework 
of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs. While the Sharīʿah board is expected to perform Sharīʿah 
review functions to ensure Sharīʿah compliance, the majority of IFIs have not issued by-
laws or policies to detail with the processes, authorities, scopes and framework of the 
Sharīʿah review. In line with the AAOIFI governance standards and the IFSB-10, IFIs 
are recommended to have specific by-laws or internal policies that provide 
comprehensive guidelines on the whole process of Sharīʿah governance. These by-laws 
should be the main reference for the internal use of IFIs to help the Sharīʿah board, 
internal Sharīʿah audit and all organs of the governance structure of IFIs to carry out their 
functions effectively. 
8.2.3 Roles of the Sharīʿah Board 
 
Considering the AAOIFI governance standards, the IFSB-10 and any other standards on 
Sharīʿah governance that specifically elaborate the roles of the Sharīʿah board, the study 
identified two questions pertinent to this issue. The first question explores Sharīʿah 
scholars’ understanding of their functions as Sharīʿah board members while the second 
question highlights their views on the framework of Sharīʿah-compliant and Sharīʿah-
based finance. 
 
Question 6: What are the roles of the Sharīʿah board? 
 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: Advisory roles; and 
(ii) Coding 2: Advisory and supervisory 
Theme: The Sharīʿah board has advisory and supervisory roles as well as conducting 
Sharīʿah-related training for IFIs. 
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Interviewee 1 • To advise upon Sharīʿah matters and sometimes other 
matters. There are two types of IFIs. Firstly, IFIs that 
are obsessed with profit maximization and, secondly, 
IFIs that have made some efforts to instil values and to 
affect economic growth.  
Interviewee 2 • To ensure Sharīʿah compliance for all functions of 
IFIs. 
• All views must be supported with reliable evidence and 
circulated internally with detail reasons. 
• To attend all Sharīʿah board meetings. 





Interviewee 9 • To advise upon Sharīʿah compliance matters.  
Interviewee 3 • Consultancy, training, product approval and product 
review. 
Interviewee 4 • To endorse all operations and products in line with 
Sharīʿah as well as complying with Islamic ethics. 
Interviewee 5 • To ensure that the bank products are actually Sharīʿah-
compliant.  
Interviewee 6 • To oversee operations and products for Sharīʿah 
compliance. 
Interviewee 8 • Advisory and supervisory. 
Interviewee 9 • To advise on Sharīʿah compliance.  
Interviewee 
10 
• The BNM/GPS 1 states that the Sharīʿah committee 








• To endorse, approve and review all products and 
services offered by IFIs. The Sharīʿah board’s approval 
is thus required on all product programme documents, 
product development documents, country addenda and 
other similar documents. The Sharīʿah board has a duty 
to periodically review all of these documents.   
• To advise and review the IFIs’ operation and to ensure 
that it is in compliance with the Sharīʿah. 
• To guide, review and approve all legal contracts, 
agreements and documentations including all 
marketing material, sales illustrations, advertisements 
and brochures. 
• To satisfy itself that the formulated endorsements, 
approvals, advice and guidelines are being properly 
implemented by IFIs. 
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• To provide guidance and advice upon request to the 
IFIs’ legal council, auditors, consultants, etc.  
• To provide written opinions on Sharīʿah matters. 
• To advise the chairman on matters that require 
consultation with the BNM. 
Interviewee 
12 
• Advisory, supervisory and regular Sharīʿah audit. 
Interviewee 
13 
• To advise IFIs on issues related to Sharīʿah and to 
review the products and services to ensure Sharīʿah 
compliance. 
• To vet various types of documents which require the 
endorsement of the Sharīʿah board. 
• To attend Sharīʿah board meetings.  
• To deliver lectures or presentations to IFIs’ personnel 
on topics related to Sharīʿah, fiqh al muāmalāt and 
Islamic banking.  
• To liaise with relevant advisors, including accountants, 
tax advisors, rating agencies and Sharīʿah advisors 
from other institutions.  
Interviewee 
14 
• To develop products and to oversee product delivery, 
sales force and execution. 
 
Question 7: What is your opinion on the issue of Sharīʿah-compliant and Sharīʿah-
based finance?  
 
Focused Coding:  
(i) Coding 1: There is no difference between Sharīʿah-compliant and Sharīʿah-
based finance; and 
(ii) Coding 2: The Sharīʿah board should look beyond the legal and mechanistic 
aspects of fiqh. 
Theme: Some Sharīʿah scholars viewed that Sharīʿah-compliant and Sharīʿah-based 
products and services are the same, while the rest acknowledged the difference by 
highlighting that the Sharīʿah board should also be concerned with and give 
consideration to larger issues than the fiqh aspect. 
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Interviewee 2 • Sharīʿah-compliant means anything related to all 
Sharīʿah principles. The terms Sharīʿah-compliant and 
Sharīʿah-based products confuse the public. 
• Sharīʿah-compliant products also take into 
consideration the element of maqāsid Sharīʿah. 
Sharīʿah-compliant and Sharīʿah-based products are 
the end result of ijtihād. 
Interviewee 3 • Both are equally important. 
Interviewee 5 • Ideally it should be the same. Maqāsid Sharīʿah is the 
end result of Sharīʿah-compliant products.  
• No dichotomy between the two. 
Interviewee 6 • It is the same. Be it Sharīʿah-compliant, Sharīʿah-
based or Sharīʿah-tolerant. It should not be an issue. 
For example, only 5% of Islamic financial products are 
not unified. The remaining 95% are unified. 
Interviewee 7 • Sharīʿah scholars are concerned with the issue of fiqh. 
As fiqh scholars, the Sharīʿah board focuses on the 
illah (ratio decidendi) rather than hikmah (wisdom). 
These two things should not be mixed as the latter 
provides uncertainty to the rulings.  
• The problem here is that Sharīʿah scholars are more 
concerned with the micro issues, i.e. specific issues of 
certain unresolved fiqhi problems. While the major 
criticisms by economists are more concerned with the 
macro aspects of it. Sharīʿah scholars make decisions 
based on the science of fiqh.  
• I am of the opinion that what Islamic finance needs 
nowadays is a solution and added value. Let us say that 
the customer needs cash to purchase something, to 
what extent can Islamic financial products meet this 
customer's need? A criticism and allegation is that 
Islamic finance concentrates on debt financing rather 
than equity is also based on assumption and no clear 
textual injunction on it. 
Interviewee 9 • It should not be the issue. In fiqh, the element of 
maqāsid Sharīʿah is there. Sharīʿah scholars have 
already applied this.  
• I disagree with the allegation that Sharīʿah scholars 
have neglected the element of maqāsid Sharīʿah. 
 












• They should be concerned with both. 
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• Both are acceptable and I am of the view that 
differentiating both terminologies is not really 
necessary since rules in fiqh al muāmalāt are open to 
new contracts and arrangements as long as they do not 
contravene the Islamic principles. Any of the Sharīʿah-
compliant products must also be approved based on its 
objective and not limited to their structure and 
documentation only. 
• There is no standard and clear definition of these 
terminologies. Scholars may vary in understanding 
such terminologies. 
• I also do not agree with the statement which proclaims 
that Sharīʿah-based products absolutely adhere to 
Sharīʿah objectives, whereas, in contrast, Sharīʿah-
compliant product do not.  
• Yes, any Sharīʿah resolution should pay great attention 
to the maqāsid Sharīʿah but it will not be based on 
whether or not it is Sharīʿah-compliant or Sharīʿah-
based. This is not the indicator. I am of the view that 
there might be a product which is based on the classical 
fiqhi concept but still contradicts with the Sharīʿah 
objectives, for example an Islamic bank offered an 
equity-based (mudhārabah) product to a client without 
proper due diligence on the business and the reliability 
of the customer. In such a case, although the product is 
Sharīʿah-based, it is still not satisfying the Sharīʿah 
objectives. Fulfilling Sharīʿah objectives is also an 
ijtihādi matter which differs from one scholar to 
another. It depends on how they look into things and 
scrutinize information given. There is no way to make 
a simple conclusion that a Sharīʿah -based product will 
adhere to maqāsid, while the other will not.  
Interviewee 
12 
• There are no distinctions between Sharīʿah -compliant 
and Sharīʿah -based. Everything should be approved 
within the parameters of Sharīʿah with the view to 










Interviewee 1 • Yes, the Sharīʿah board must play its role to instil the 
values and spirit of the Sharīʿah. The proponents of 
turning the institution into a welfare and profit-making 
institution are not giving strong reasons and dalil for 
their claim and view. IFIs as banking and financial 
insitutions should also play their role in promoting 
social welfare and ethical values. 
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Interviewee 4 • Islamic finance now has moved a step forward 
pertaining to Sharīʿah pronouncement. Sharīʿah 
opinion should not be confined to legal aspects only 
but must go beyond that. It does not mean that the 
previous practice has neglected maqāsid Sharīʿah but 
the situation during that time has influenced decisions 
since Islamic finance is relatively new to the market. 
Now is the time to move to a new phase of Islamic 
finance.  
• Once again it still depends on jurisdiction. In some 
jurisdictions, Islamic finance is still relatively new. 
 
Interviewee 8 • I prefer the latter because Islamic finance is not about 
fiqh alone. I refer to the Ibnu Abbas story when he gave 
two different fatwa upon the same issue, namely hukm 
on murder. In the first fatwa, Ibnu Abbas gave a fatwa 
that the murderer did not have the right to repent 
because he knew that the man was asking for fatwa to 
validate his future action. In the second fatwa, Ibnu 
Abbas gave a fatwa that the murderer could be 
pardoned by Allah because he knew that man sincerely 








• Personally, in my opinion, the issue of Sharīʿah-
compliant and Sharīʿah-based finance is more a debate 
of terminology akin to substance over form. It will go 
nowhere. Even if we look at Islamic banking itself, 
there are still many people who are sceptical about its 
practices because of the capitalist system.  
• However, amid the banking and financial sector 
moving forward to emphasize Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Social Responsibility Investment, 
the Sharīʿah board also has to look into the spirit of 
Sharīʿah in terms of the aims and impacts of the 
products and services that are being offered to the 
community at large. 
Interviewee 
14 
• We are a Sharīʿah-based institution. Islamic banking 
must offer an added value to the consumer and not just 
verbal and financial engineering of contracts to make 
them look ‘Islamic’. 
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8.2.3.1 Analysis of the Roles of the Sharīʿah Board 
 
Sharīʿah scholars classified their functions as being advisory and supervisory and these 
include giving advice, conduct training, approving and reviewing products and 
endorsement of Sharīʿah compliance. Only two Sharīʿah scholars mentioned that 
Sharīʿah board have a duty beyond giving ordinary advice on Sharīʿah matters, where 
they stated that it is important for them to promote and instil Islamic ethics and values.208 
This finding indicates that majority of Sharīʿah scholars are actually focused on advising 
IFIs upon the legitimacy of products and services from a fiqh perspective, rather than 
going further to educate IFIs about the ethics and values.   
 
Some Sharīʿah scholars even further classified IFIs into two types, namely IFIs that are 
obsessed with profit maximization and IFIs that insist on values and are concerned about 
economic growth. In this regard, Sharīʿah scholars have problems with the former type of 
IFIs. This finding reveals that Sharīʿah scholars face difficulties in promoting the socio-
economic function of IFIs when their aims and objectives are solely motivated by profit 
maximization. This indicates that the corporate governance model adopted by majority of 
IFIs is based on the shareholder-oriented value system. Contrary to the ideal model of 
Islamic corporate governance that is founded on the epistemology of Tawhīd and the 
stakeholder value orientation, some IFIs have failed to expand their corporate objectives 
dimension beyond the maximization of shareholders’ profit.  
 
There are significant differences of opinions amongst Sharīʿah scholars with respect to 
the issue of Sharīʿah-compliant and Sharīʿah-based finance. Some of them view that both 
terms carry the same meaning while some scholars think otherwise. This position creates 
a paradox in the actual framework of the Sharīʿah board’s roles in IFIs, where the former 
                                                 
208
 This is what is expected by the industry where the Sharīʿah board should not only play its advisory, 
approval and audit roles but should also contribute to the development of the industry in terms of social 
responsibilities and ethical behaviour (Schoon, 2009: 138–140). For instance, the Sharīʿah board members 
of LARIBA allocate their time and effort to educate the company as well as the customers by spending 
approximately 3,000 minutes a month on their mobile phones to answer enquries and questions pertaining 
to Sharīʿah and Islamic financial products (Abdul-Rahman, 2010: 234). The Sharīʿah board of LARIBA 
not only has fiduciary duties on the aspect of product approval but also includes participation in the design 
and hands-on implementation of training programmes in Sharīʿah compliance, as well as educating the 
employees about the religion of Islam (Abdul-Rahman, 2010: 78). 
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concentrate on fiqh issues and the latter view that fiqh and other aspects of Islam, such as 
ethics, values and maqāsid Sharīʿah, must also be taken into consideration.  
 
Based on the above finding, the study classifies Sharīʿah scholars into two types, namely 
‘Conservative’ and ‘Pragmatic’. The ‘Conservative’ scholars consider the legitimacy of 
Islamic financial products and services to be based on the legal and mechanistic aspects 
of Sharīʿah. The products and services are classified as lawful and Sharīʿah-compliant or 
Sharīʿah-based if they meet the conditions of a valid muāmalāt transaction after going 
through the ordinary process of usul al fiqh.209 On the other hand, the ‘Pragmatic’ 
scholars admitted that the Sharīʿah board should not confine their function by solely 
emphasizing the fiqh aspect. The ‘Pragmatic’ scholars acknowledged that Islamic 
financial products and services should not only be valid and lawful but must fulfil the 
spirit of maqāsid Sharīʿah. Inspired by the foundational dimension of governance in 
Islam that puts maqāsid Sharīʿah as the central objective, the study strongly recommends 
the view of the ‘Pragmatic’ scholars. In view of the lack of concentration on social 
welfare and socio-economic development in IFIs, Sharīʿah scholars, as the key players of 
Sharīʿah governance, should play a significant role to educate IFIs not only in matters 
pertaining to Sharīʿah but also to expand this dimension towards a more holistic Islamic 
approach. 
8.2.4 Attributes of Sharīʿah Board Members  
 
Questions on the attributes of Sharīʿah board members are divided into three aspects, 
namely mechanisms of competence, independence, and transparency and confidentiality. 
Three questions were posed to Sharīʿah scholars with regard to competence, two 
questions pertaining to independence and two questions on transparency and 
confidentiality issues. Sharīʿah scholars’ views on these three aspects are extremely 
important as the Sharīʿah board plays a significant role in the Sharīʿah governance 
                                                 
209
 Sheikh Saleh Kamel raised his concern about the Islamic finance industry when he highlighted that the 
majority of Islamic financial products and services available in the market are unIslamic (Mahdi, 2008). 
This is affirmed by Jawad Ali, a prominent lawyer in a Dubai-based legal firm, who claims that 40–50% of 
Islamic financial products in the areas of capital guarantees, fixed income and derivatives are considered as 
merely form over substance (Pasha, 2010). 
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(i) Coding 1: Affirmative; and 
(ii) Coding 2: Negative.  
 
Theme: While Sharīʿah scholars are expected to have a high standard of competence, 
only some IFIs have initiatives to improve the competence of the Sharīʿah board by 
organizing training on the technical aspects of banking and finance or allocating funds for 
such a purpose. 
 







• IFIs sponsor Sharīʿah board members to attend 
conferences and seminars. Sometimes fund managers 
and financial analysts are asked to explain their work 





• Yes, in fact Sharīʿah scholars also give them training 




• The BNM organizes training for Sharīʿah scholars but 
not IFIs. The BIMB group, however, has started to 
train their Sharīʿah scholars. In fact it is the demand 




• There is a fair budget for Sharīʿah board members to 






• Yes, on a continuous basis. 
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• If it refers to training on the aspect of Sharīʿah, it is 
not relevant because it is presumed that the Sharīʿah 
board is already well trained and has such 
qualifications. If it refers to the term of exposure it is 
relevant. As to my experience, there was no training at 
all for the Sharīʿah board in the aspect of finance and 
banking. In fact, the Sharīʿah board provides training 




• Yes, at least the Sharīʿah board is required to attend 
conferences and seminars.  
• There is no specific training pertaining to the technical 
and operational aspects of banking and finance. 
Interviewees 




• No training. Sharīʿah scholars need training, 
especially in aspects of modern banking. 
Interviewee 
10 
• It depends, some IFIs are not willing to spend money 




• No. It is upon the Sharīʿah board members to seek out 
and keep themselves up to date with the latest 
developments in the industry. Nevertheless, the 
Sharīʿah board members can apply to attend any 
related training courses to enhance their knowledge 
mostly in the new products, laws and regulations. 
 
 
Question 9: Is there any assessment or evaluation of the Sharīʿah board? 
 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: Affirmative; and 
(ii) Coding 2: Negative. 
Theme: The majority of IFIs do not assess or evaluate the Sharīʿah board. 
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Interviewee 4 • In Malaysia, the BNM will call the candidate for 
interview before he can be admitted and registered as 
a Sharīʿah scholar of IFIs. In Bahrain, the IFIs must 
get approval from the CBB. With regard to 
assessment of IFIs upon the Sharīʿah board, there is 
no formal evaluation. 
Interviewee 9 • The BIMB conduct an evaluation of the Sharīʿah 
board but this is a self-evaluation. The BOD then 
evaluates the assessment done by the Sharīʿah board. 
Interviewee 
13 
• Yes, by the BOD and bank personnel before the end 
of year contract based on their performances, meeting 














Interviewee 8 • The issue here is who has the capacity to evaluate the 
Sharīʿah board. No evaluation as to their knowledge 
but there is in the aspects of operational performance, 
attendance and commitment. 
• It is more preferable that the Sharīʿah board conducts 
a self-evaluation. For example, there was a case that 
a Sharīʿah scholar was always reserved in answering 
any queries and frequently asked other board 
members to give opinions. The chairman of the 
Sharīʿah board finally recommended for the 






• Perhaps the management will do that. 
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(i) Coding 1: It is an acceptable practice with some conditions; and 
(ii) Coding 2: It would create problems rather than benefit. 
 
Theme: The practice of the appointment of interdisciplinary members of the Sharīʿah 
board is acceptable with the condition that they must not have voting rights and the 
majority of the members consist of Sharīʿah scholars for the purpose of avoiding conflict 
and problems in the case of dispute. 
 







• It is a good idea to combine interdisciplinary members of 
the Sharīʿah board. My concern is only on the roles play 
by them. They can be invited and give their opinion but 
they must not have voting rights. My experience shows 
that all decisions made by the Sharīʿah board are made 
by consensus. The role play by the chairperson is 
important in order to convince the Sharīʿah board 
members who disagree on certain issues. 
Interviewee 
2 
• Good but preferably not to give them voting rights.  
Interviewee 
3 
• Agree, but better to have more experts of different areas 
to give a balanced decision. 
Interviewee 
4 
• Most welcome but the majority of Sharīʿah board 
members must be Sharīʿah scholars in order to avoid any 
problems in the future. 
• No problem to grant voting rights to non-Sharīʿah 
experts but the majority of the board must be Sharīʿah 
scholars.  








• It is good to have. However, if all the members are from 
a non-Sharīʿah background, there will be problems. 
Some IFIs have a Sharīʿah board where the majority of 
members are non-Sharīʿah experts and this has created 
problems. With regard to the voting rights, it depends, if 
the non-Sharīʿah members have necessary knowledge 
on Sharīʿah, they can have it.  
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• I agree but the majority of members should be Sharīʿah 
scholars and non- Sharīʿah background members must 
not have voting rights.  
Interviewee 
7 
• This practice is commendable. I am of the view that a 
non- Sharīʿah expert who sits on the Sharīʿah board 
should not have voting rights. In the event that there is 
equal voting, his vote should not be counted.  
• I am of the opinion that the decisions should be based on 
a simple majority rather than consensus. In Malaysia, 
the BNM, for example, opts to make decisions by 
consensus. This method means the Sharīʿah scholars 
who are dissenting against the majority must agree on 
the decision. This leads to less transparency. On the 
other hand, in the GCC a simple majority is enough. In 
the Sharīʿah report, you may see the Sharīʿah scholars 
who agree and disagree on certain issues. This makes 




• The BIMB is the first institution that did that. In 1983, 
the BIMB appointed Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, a law 
professor, as a Sharīʿah board member. 
Interviewee 
11 
• I agree but a proper mechanism should be in place. 
Interviewee 
13  
• It is acceptable but, from my point of view, the 
chairman of the Sharīʿah board should be well-versed 
and articulate in Sharīʿah especially fiqh al muāmalāt, 
from different schools of thought and Islamic 
jurisprudence. He must also be competent in modern 
banking and capable of delivering his services in both 
Arabic and English. 
Interviewee 
14 
• This is a must in order to exchange training and 
experience. 







• I disagree with this practice. The Sharīʿah board must 
consist of Sharīʿah scholars or jurist. 
• It is still acceptable if the non-Sharīʿah expert members 
do not have voting rights. They have the right to be 
involved in the meeting but their vote should not be 
counted. An example is the case of Majmaʿ Buhus 
Islamiah in Egypt. Previously, when all committee 
members were jurists, interest was not permissible. But 
as soon as the board members consisted of 
interdisciplinary experts, the Majma Buhus Islamiah 
declared that interest is lawful and Sheikh Tantawi, who 
was not a jurist, further declared the same thing. 
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• Sharīʿah members should only be those who are well 
trained in Sharīʿah disciplines; experts in other fields 
like economy, finance and law should be appointed as 
experts and not Sharīʿah members. 
8.2.4.1.1 Analysis of Competence 
 
The research findings reveal that Sharīʿah scholars admit that they need training to 
improve their competence, particularly on the technical aspects of banking and finance. 
The practice nevertheless showed that only some IFIs conduct training or allocate funds 
for such a purpose, while the majority of them have ignored this important aspect. The 
study also finds that Sharīʿah scholars in Malaysia are more exposed to and trained in the 
technical aspects of banking and finance and there are initiatives by both the BNM and at 
individual IFI level to organize specific training for Sharīʿah scholars.  
 
The study reveals that majority of IFIs did not assess or evaluate the Sharīʿah board’s 
performance and this was affirmed by Sharīʿah scholars. It was also found that many 
Sharīʿah boards do not conduct a self-evaluation or peer assessment. In the case of 
Malaysia, Sharīʿah scholars are evaluated by the BNM before they can be appointed as 
Sharīʿah board members but not afterwards. Some IFIs only evaluate the commitment of 
Sharīʿah scholars such as attendance. The overall answers given by Sharīʿah scholars 
indicate that it is not an established practice of IFIs to assess or evaluate the Sharīʿah 
board’s performance.  
 
Sharīʿah scholars have different views on the issue of interdisciplinary members of 
Sharīʿah board. The majority of them considered it as a good practice while some 
scholars viewed otherwise. Sharīʿah scholars who agreed on the practice nevertheless put 
two conditions, namely non-Sharīʿah experts on the Sharīʿah board should not be given 
voting rights and the majority of members must be Sharīʿah scholars. Those scholars that 
disagreed with the practice claimed that such a practice may create problems and 
confusion as to the actual function of Sharīʿah board, as in the case of Majmaʿ Buhus 
Islamiah in Egypt. The researcher considers that having interdisciplinary members on the 
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Sharīʿah board is a commendable practice provided that they also have a good 
knowledge of Sharīʿah. The appointment of economists, accountants, bankers, judges and 
others who have not adequate knowledge on Sharīʿah may create further problems for the 
Sharīʿah board in carrying out its functions effectively.  
 
To address this competence issue, Sharīʿah scholars are in favour of the idea of 
establishing a professional body for Sharīʿah advisors. This professional body will have 
the authority to grant licences for Sharīʿah advisors, to offer professional courses and 
qualifications and to regulate the ethical principles of Sharīʿah advisors. In this respect, 
Malaysia has already made an effort to establish the Association of Sharīʿah Advisors, a 
professional body for Sharīʿah scholars regulated by specific laws and regulations. The 




Question 11: Who has the power to appoint and dismiss the Sharīʿah board? 
 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: Shareholders or regulator; and 
(ii) Coding 2: CEO and BOD. 
Theme: The method of appointment should not be the sole mechanism to ensure the 
independence of Sharīʿah board but the extent of transparency and disclosure and any 
other approaches should also be given due consideration.  
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Interviewee 8 • Shareholders. 
Interviewee 2 • It must come from the regulator. 





Interviewee 14 • The shareholders based on recommendations of 
Sharīʿah board. 
 
Interviewee 1 • Generally, the BOD appoints the Sharīʿah board. 
Ideally it should be the shareholders who appoint the 
Sharīʿah board. It is good practice if there is a search 
committee on the part of regulators to identify potential 
Sharīʿah board members. 
Interviewee 3 • CEO. 
Interviewee 4 • In Malaysia, the BOD with the approval of the BNM. 
In the Middle East, the Sharīʿah board is either 
appointed by the BOD or shareholders. My view is that 
Sharīʿah board must be accountable at least to the BOD 
and not lower than that. 
Interviewee 5 • It can be either the shareholders or BOD. The important 
things are to ensure accountability, mandate and 
Sharīʿah compliance. In the context of Malaysia, the 
appointment made by the BOD is proper since the 
nature of IFIs is that they are not much concerned with 
shareholders’ activism. Moreover, the Sharīʿah board 
just has an advisory role and is not treated as an 
employee of the company. 
Interviewees 
6, 9, and 10 
• The BOD should be the proper body. 
2) BOD and 
CEO 
Interviewee 7 • In GCC countries, some IFIs appoint the Sharīʿah 
board through the shareholders but the majority of them 
do it through the BOD. I am of the view that the 
shareholders are the right body to appoint the Sharīʿah 
board. Nevertheless, some mechanisms may be 
imposed to guarantee Sharīʿah board independence. 
• With regard to the issue of the independence of the 
Sharīʿah board, in the event that they are appointed by 
the BOD, this should not be a reason to say that they 
are not independent. If it is so, the whole professional 
body will collapse. It is because the appointment per se 
does not guarantee the state of independence but the 
mechanism and transparency should be more important.  
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• On the idea of a centralized Sharīʿah board, I am of the 
view that it is more concerned with the administrative 
issues. The more important thing is that the Sharīʿah 
board is able to meet the needs of the industry in terms 
of delivery of Sharīʿah rulings and compliance. The 
administrative issues can be left to either a centralized 
or decentralized Sharīʿah board, both are acceptable.  
Interviewee 11 • The BOD has the power to renew the contract or not. 
 
Interviewee 13 • The BOD appoints the Sharīʿah board based on the 








(i) Coding 1: The restriction on multiple appointments is necessary to mitigate 
potential of conflict of interest and to resolve the issue of shortage of scholars; 
and 
(ii) Coding 2: The practice of Sharīʿah scholars sitting on numerous Sharīʿah 
boards is acceptable. 
 
Theme: The practice of Sharīʿah scholars sitting on numerous Sharīʿah boards is 
acceptable but it is also necessary to mitigate potential of conflict of interest and to 
resolve the issue of shortage of scholars by having some limitations. 
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• The regulators look from a different angle and they 
claim that there is conflict of interest. I disagree 
with the notion of to the restriction of one IFI for 
one scholar. As long as they can perform honestly 
and responsibly, there will be no problem. 
• However, there must be certain limits for the 
Sharīʿah board to sit on any IFIs. There are pros 
and cons about this issue. There will be harm to IFIs 
if they appoint inexperienced Sharīʿah scholars who 
may give wrong rulings. 
Interviewee 
3 
• I disagree if the multiple appointments are made in 
the same category of IFIs due to the potential for 
conflict of interest. 
Interviewee 
4 





• There are advantages and disadvantages. If there is 
no limitation, it may lead to the issue of shortage of 




• It depends. Sometimes it is not good since Sharīʿah 
scholars do not have time to monitor a number of 




• There should be an upper limit based on the 
capacity of an individual. 
Interviewee 
13 
• There are good and bad points. In negative ways, 
the same Sharīʿah scholars will be overloaded with 
work and end up sitting on a Sharīʿah board for the 
sake of their name being used as a marketing 
















• It is not a healthy practice. It may raise an issue of 
conflict of interest. 
Interviewee 
2 











• There is no harm provided that they can allocate 
time but should be at reasonable numbers.  
• Conflict of interest can be managed in many ways 
such as by confidentiality agreements. Perhaps 
three board positions at one particular time is 
enough. 
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• There are advantages and disadvantages. The 
advantages are that rulings will be made by very 
experienced Sharīʿah scholars and there is less 
potential for difference of opinions. As long as the 
Sharīʿah scholars can do their jobs accordingly that 
would be fine. 
Interviewee 
9 




• It is aparrently not an ideal situation but to appoint 
unspecialized (in fiqh al muāmalāt and modern 
finance) scholars to the board would bring more 
harm to the industry. So it depends on the scholar 
to know his limit. 
Interviewee 
13 
• There are good and bad implications. In positive 
ways, the experienced Sharīʿah scholars can be 
mentors to the less experienced Sharīʿah scholars 
who are sitting on the same board. Thus, it is a 
good platform to transfer the expertise and 
knowledge to the young generation of Sharīʿah 
scholars. 
8.2.4.2.1 Analysis of ‘Independence’ Factors  
 
The study reveals that the majority of Sharīʿah scholars view that the BOD is the proper 
body to appoint and dismiss Sharīʿah board members, while some of them prefer 
shareholders or even regulators. Sharīʿah scholars mentioned that the appointment issue 
should not be the sole mechanism to ensure the independence of the Sharīʿah board but 
the extent of transparency and disclosure and any other approach should be given more 
consideration. The answers given by Sharīʿah scholars indicate that the extent of their 
independence does not solely depend on the method of appointment.  
 
The above finding denotes that some Sharīʿah scholars have a lack of understanding on 
the actual meaning of independence in the context of Sharīʿah boards in IFIs and they 
failed to differentiate between independence, professional independence and practitioner 
independence. The independence of the Sharīʿah board refers to practitioner 
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independence and professional independence, in which it is very important to maintain a 
proper attitude toward planning, performance and reporting when conducting their 
functions and to avoid any appearance which may negate the perception of independence. 
Any element that may negate the public perception of its independence, such as the 
method of appointment, must be eliminated. At this point, the method of appointment 
should be one of the main elements that ensures professional and practitioner 
independence as it involves public perception of and stakeholders’ confidence in the IFIs. 
 
With reference to the issue of conflict of interest due to Sharīʿah scholars sitting on 
numerous Sharīʿah boards at one particular time, the majority of them accepted this 
contention while the rest denied it.210 Those Sharīʿah scholars who deny any potential of 
conflict of interest viewed that this issue was not a real issue as they were bound by 
Islamic ethical principles. They nevertheless agreed that there should be limits to such a 
practice not because of conflict of interest but due to time factors211 and to overcome the 
problem of the shortage of Sharīʿah scholars.212 The researcher takes a different position 
on the answers given by those Sharīʿah scholars and is in favour of the Sharīʿah scholars 
who admitted that there is a potential of conflict of interest while performing their duties 
and functions. Ideally, Sharīʿah scholars are presumed to be honest and truthful because 
they are bound by the Islamic ethical principles and accountable to God. Nevertheless, 
considering they are human beings, in reality the issue of conflict of interest may happen, 
                                                 
210
 This view is supported by several prominent Sharīʿah scholars, such as Sheikh Hussein Hamid Hassan, 
Dr Mohammad Daud Bakar, Sheikh Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo and Dr Muhammad Akram Laldin, who opine 
that Sharīʿah scholars should be treated similar to other professionals such as lawyers, auditors, 
accountants and actuaries (Siddiqui, 2010). 
211
 Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, a US prominent Sharīʿah scholar, raised his concern on the issue of the 
quantity and quality of the Sharīʿah advisors. He reminds the Sharīʿah scholars who serve on multiple 
boards while at the same time working in another institutions, such as academicians, to be very careful and 
to balance their time and diligence to perfom their functions and responsibilities effectively (Siddiqui, 
2010). 
212
 Mohammad Akram Laldin, Executive Director of ISRA and a well-known Sharīʿah scholar,claims that 
the industry is actually not short of Sharīʿah advisors. He further raises his concern that those potential 
Sharīʿah advisors are not given a fair chance and opportunity to serve on a Sharīʿah board as the IFIs prefer 
to have well known and prominent figures (Siddiqui, 2010). A similar view was highlighted by Sheikh 
Hussein Hamid Hassan, who disagrees with any claim that there are a small number of Sharīʿah scholars 
that lead the Islamic finance industry (Siddiqui, 2010). This finding indicates that issue of lack of Sharīʿah 
scholars is to certain extent not true and perhaps the actual reason for IFIs engaging certain reputable 
Sharīʿah scholars is mainly for the purpose of increasing the marketability of their products and services. 
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especially when they sit on the boards of various IFIs.213 With this position, there must be 
certain limitations on multiple appointments of Sharīʿah scholars in order to mitigate the 
issue of conflict of interest as well as to ensure that the Sharīʿah board can perform its 
functions effectively.  
8.2.4.3 Transparency and Confidentiality 
 




(i) Coding 1: Negative; and 
(ii) Coding 2: The Sharīʿah board relies on the documents presented or submitted 
to them for approval. 
Theme: Some Sharīʿah board members have not been given due access to all documents, 
information and records. Most of them, nevertheless, have access to all documents for 
Sharīʿah compliance purposes but they rely heavily on the documents presented to them. 
 













• The ideal is that it should have that privilege. In 
practice, it does not actually happen. 
Interviewee 
1 
• The Sharīʿah board only has access to documents 
presented to them. It is unethical for IFIs to hide or 
not disclose documents for approval. 
Interviewee 
2 
• Yes, but it is focused more on products. In fact, all 
documents must be endorsed including forms, 











3, 4, 6, 10, 
11, 13, and 
14 
• Yes. 
                                                 
213
 The issue of conflict of interest may also arise in the case of Sharīʿah scholars who have Sharīʿah 
advisory firms where they have to balance between the interest of their companies as well as the interest of 
IFIs. 
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• Theoretically, yes. In practice, it depends on the 
IFI’s management disclosing it unless requested by 
the Sharīʿah board. We rely on the management to 
disclose. 
 
Question 14: Is the provision of confidentiality clearly mentioned in the terms of 
reference in the letter of appointment? 
 
Focused Coding:  
(i) Coding 1: Affirmative 
Theme: The provision of confidentiality is clearly mentioned in the terms of reference. 
 






1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 13, and 
14 
• Yes 1) 
Affirmative 
Interviewee 9 • Yes, but it is not necessary because in Islam the 
concept of secrecy and confidentiality must be 
preserved. Sharīʿah scholars know about all of this. 
 
8.2.4.3.1 Analysis of Transparency and Confidentiality 
 
In terms of transparency, Sharīʿah scholars theoretically have access to all documents, 
information and records for Sharīʿah compliance purposes. The study reveals that 
Sharīʿah scholars have rarely exercised this privilege but, in actual practice, they rely 
heavily on the documentation presented to them rather than proactively require any 
necessary documents for additional evaluation. Sharīʿah scholars put their trust in IFIs 
and expect that they will not hide any documents or information. This position indicates 
that decisions made by Sharīʿah scholars may be influenced and determined by the way 
IFIs present the documents.  
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With regards to confidentiality, the study finds that Sharīʿah scholars unanimously agree 
that such provision is clearly stipulated in the terms of reference of the letter of 
appointment. Some Sharīʿah scholars mentioned that they did not even need any terms of 
reference in the contract about the confidentiality and secrecy obligation because Islam 
itself requires them to do so. This finding denotes that IFIs have adequate mechanisms to 
ensure confidentiality and this is in line with the best practice of Sharīʿah governance 
system as laid down in the AAOIFI governance standards and the IFSB-10. 
8.2.5 Operational Procedures 
 
Standard operational procedures are of the essence for a sound Sharīʿah governance 
framework. In this aspect, the study identified three questions for Sharīʿah scholars on 
three different issues, namely the existence of standard operational procedures, Sharīʿah 
board meetings and the reliance of the Sharīʿah board on the internal Sharīʿah audit. 
 
Question 15: Is there any standard operational procedure for the Sharīʿah board? 
 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: Affirmative; and 
(ii) Coding 2: Negative. 
Theme: Most Sharīʿah boards have standard operational procedures but with certain 
differences in practice. 
 
Searching for the Perceptions of the Sharīʿah Scholar on Shari’ah Governance System in Islamic 










1, 3, 10, 11, 
and 12 
• Yes, internally. 
Interviewee 2 • Yes, for instance, in terms of product development, 
the Sharīʿah department will review the product 
proposal and all of its related documents will be 
circulated to Sharīʿah board members a week in 
advance of the meeting. 
Interviewee 4 • In Malaysia, we use the BNM GPS1. In the Middle 
East, they only have it internally. The Sharīʿah board 
even discusses it internally during the terms of 
reference of the first board meeting. 
Interviewee 5 • Some IFIs have a standard operational procedure and 
some of them still in the process of developing it. The 
BNM/GPS 1 will be used as a reference. 
Interviewee 6 • Sharīʿah compliance manual and operation manual. 
Interviewee 9 • Yes, there is a flowchart. The Sharīʿah officer filters 
any submissions for products approval. There are 
three types of document: rejected up front, accepted 





• Yes, and it has already been reviewed and endorsed 
by the BOD. 
2) Negative Interviewee 8 • No. 
 
Question 16: Does the Sharīʿah board hold its meetings regularly? How frequently? 
 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: The Sharīʿah board holds its meeting weekly, fortnightly, monthly, 
quarterly and sometimes on an ad hoc basis 
Theme: There is no standard requirement for Sharīʿah board meetings and different IFIs 
have dissimilar practices. 
 
Searching for the Perceptions of the Sharīʿah Scholar on Shari’ah Governance System in Islamic 










• Yes, the Sharīʿah board normally holds meetings at 
quaterly intervals, sometimes on an ad hoc basis, or via 
circular or even weekly meetings. It actually depends 
on the people who are sitting on the board. If the 
Sharīʿah scholars are amongst the most utilized ones, 
there will be fewer meetings. 
Interviewee 
2 
• Four times a year and we have calendar meetings. 
Interviewees 
3, 8, and 11 
• Once a month. 
Interviewee 
4 
• Once a month and sometimes once every three months. 




• The SAC holds a meeting once a month based on 
ongoing communication. We have calendar meetings, 
monthly meetings, special meeting and by circulation. 
Interviewee 
6 




• No calendar meetings. The articles of association 
require the Sharīʿah board to hold a compulsory 
meeting twice a year. In 1983 there were meetings 
almost every day and every week. After 1990, three 
times a year and depending on necessity. 
Interviewee 
10 
• Yes, the Sharīʿah board holds meetings on a weekly, 
fortnightly, monthly and ad hoc basis. 
Interviewee 
12 
• Yes, the Sharīʿah board holds meetings on a quarterly 
basis and the executive member of the Sharīʿah board 
communicate with the IFIs on a daily basis and may 













• Supposedly the Sharīʿah board holds meetings on a 
quarterly basis but sometimes it depends on the issues 
and products that need approval. 
 
Question 17: To what extent does the Sharīʿah board rely on the bank’s internal 
Sharīʿah audit? 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: The Sharīʿah board relies heavily on the internal audit. 
Theme: In carrying out their ex post function of Sharīʿah governance, the Sharīʿah board 
relies heavily on the internal audit.  
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• The Sharīʿah board relies very much on the internal 
audit. The internal audit should only audit the 
Sharīʿah compliance process.  
• Internal audit has no capacity to audit the rulings. 
Some IFIs outsource the Sharīʿah audit task to 
external firms and sometimes it is done by the 
internal audit department. 
Interviewee 
2 
• Yes, we rely on them very much. It is because the 
Sharīʿah officers that conduct the Sharīʿah audit 







• In the Middle East, generally, IFIs do not have 
internal Sharīʿah audit departments, except al Rajhi 
and Bank al Bilad. They use an internal audit 
department and some IFIs outsource to a Sharīʿah 








• Yes. We rely on them very much. All their findings 
must be presented before the Sharīʿah board for 
review. The Sharīʿah officer at the Sharīʿah 




• We rely heavily on the internal audit. 
Interviewee 
9 
• The Sharīʿah audit is not compulsory. It is carried 
out by the Sharīʿah department. They submit the 
details of the Sharīʿah report to the BOD. 
Interviewee 
10 
• We rely on them very much, about 90%. 
Interviewee 
12 
• Only as guidance to ease the process but the 









• So far, we still do not have an internal Sharīʿah 
audit but we outsource this task to an advisory firm. 
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8.2.5.1 Analysis of the Operational Procedures 
 
The majority of Sharīʿah scholars confirmed that there were standard operational 
procedures for the Sharīʿah board, either internally or regulated by certain guidelines, 
while only one of them indicated otherwise. Sharīʿah scholars also claimed that they 
were familiar with all of these procedures. The study finds that IFIs have good practice in 
terms of providing specific guidelines or operational procedures for the Sharīʿah board. 
 
With regards to Sharīʿah board meetings, the study clearly indicates the different 
practices amongst the Sharīʿah boards. Sharīʿah scholars indicated that their Sharīʿah 
boards hold their meetings on a monthly, quarterly, fortnightly or ad hoc basis. This 
practice indicates that the majority of Sharīʿah boards hold meetings more than four 
times a year, which is in line with the standard of good practice. It is also good practice 
that the majority of Sharīʿah scholars mentioned that the Sharīʿah board has annual 
calendar meetings. Although the Sharīʿah board is expected to supervise the ex post 
Sharīʿah governance processes, such as the Sharīʿah review, it is observed that Sharīʿah 
scholars rely heavily on the internal audit department of IFIs. This practice indicates that 
the ex post processes of Sharīʿah compliance are greatly determined by the internal audit 
function of IFIs and not the Sharīʿah board itself. 
8.2.6 Assessment of Sharīʿah Board 
 
In view of numerous criticisms of Sharīʿah boards, the study posed one question to 
Sharīʿah scholars pertaining to their roles in considering the social dimension of fiqhi 
rulings. This question enables the study to understand Sharīʿah scholars’ perceptions and 
practices in issuing any fiqhi verdicts pertinent to Islamic finance. 
 
Question 18: Do you think that the Sharīʿah board takes social dimensions into 
consideration in making their decisions? 
 
Focused Coding:  
 
(i) Coding 1: The Sharīʿah board stresses the social dimension in issuing its 
rulings. 
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Theme: Sharīʿah boards take into consideration social dimensions in promulgating 
Sharīʿah rulings and carrying out their functions but they face numerous challenges in 
materializing it and influencing the IFIs. 
 





Interviewee 1 • Yes. We stress the social dimension and economic 
growth as well as values. We try to accommodate 
the bank and at the same time try to promote the 
spirit of Sharīʿah. It is a little bit difficult if it 
involves a company owned by non-Muslims. It also 
depends on the IFI’s management. 




Interviewee 4 • Most Sharīʿah scholars do that, such as promoting 
consumer rights in products approval, but that is 
not to say that they doing it strongly. It is worth 
noting that Sharīʿah scholars do not make business 
decisions. Sharīʿah scholars can merely suggest but 
it is up to the management to decide. For instance, 
in the case of bay al inah, the Sharīʿah scholars 
had suggested an alternative solution but the 
management could not proceed due to certain legal 
constraints. 
Interviewee 5 • Yes to some extent. We think about what would be 
the effect on the customer. We emphasize the 
customer interest such as credit consumerism, 
poverty, financial distress and the role of zakah. 
Interviewee 6 • Yes but it is difficult to materialize it. There is a 
conflict between commercial and social motives. 
The bottom line is profit. We try to promote the 
social aspect of it by promoting Corporate Social 
Responsibility, zakah and fair prices. For example, 
we emphasize the aspect of full freedom of 










Interviewee 8 • Yes. For instance, the Sharīʿah board of the Dubai 
Islamic Bank (DIB) advised the management to 
allocate a special fund for social welfare purposes 
in the form of Qardhul Hasan. The DIB then 
allocated 10 million dirham for Qardhul Hasan 
financing. 
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• This refers to maṣlahah āmah (public interest). 
The social dimension is actually part of Sharīʿah 
scholars’ consideration in making decisions. 
Islamic banking products are approved based on 
this principle. It is the need of the community. It is 
worth mentioning that the BIMB in the early years 
of its practice tried to offer equity financing but 
failed due to moral hazards. That was why the 
BIMB moved from equity-based financing to debt-
based financing. In fact, the BNM has advised the 
BIMB to get involved in low-risk financing. To be 
fair, it is not only the burden of IFIs to think about 
social welfare but the public must also be educated, 
particularly entrepreneurs, to be trustworthy so that 
















• Based on my experience dealing with various 
Sharīʿah boards, I could observe that some 
Sharīʿah scholars are concerned with this and take 
the social dimension very seriously, but some are 
taking this for granted in making their decisions. 
 
8.2.6.1 Analysis of the Assessment of the Sharīʿah Board 
 
Sharīʿah scholars disagree with the allegation that they have neglected the social 
dimension in making any Sharīʿah decisions. All of the Sharīʿah scholars claimed that 
they took into consideration the aspects of maṣlahah and maqāsid Sharīʿah. They 
nevertheless highlighted several challenges in promoting this aspect, especially 
influencing IFIs to become more socially responsible. Sharīʿah scholars also contended 
that they face problems reconciling the conflict between profit and social motives as IFIs 
are commercial institutions and not charitable organizations.  
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Although Sharīʿah scholars have made numerous efforts to promote social responsibility 
in IFIs by emphasizing consumer rights, the role of zakah and corporate social 
responsibility, the existing literature tends to show that IFIs are still motivated by profit 
maximization values. This indicates that Sharīʿah scholars should multiply their efforts 
and initiatives in educating IFIs to expand their corporate objective dimension to be more 
socially responsible and fulfil the maqāsid Sharīʿah. On top of that, all these efforts 
should be made known to the public by improving corporate disclosure practices so as to 
rectify the negative perceptions of the roles played by the Sharīʿah board. 
8.2.7 Additional Insights Proposed by the Participants 
 
This section provides additional insights of the Sharīʿah scholars pertaining to the 
Sharīʿah governance system. Sharīʿah scholars were asked to give their views, 
suggestions, recommendations and arguments on any Sharīʿah governance issues.  
 
Question 19: Please provide any other insights which you think are relevant in 
relation to the Sharīʿah governance system. 
 
Focused Coding: 
(i) Coding 1: The need for strong regulatory frameworks and revision of the 
AAOIFI standards; 
(ii) Coding 2: Better communication environment through appropriate 
coordination amongst the institutions; and 
(iii) Coding 3: Institutional approach. 
 
Theme: There must be a reform of the Sharīʿah governance system with respect to 
regulation, revision of the AAOIFI standards, communication and institutional 
coordination as well as an institutional approach in ensuring the integrity, professionalism 
and competence of Sharīʿah scholars. 
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Table 8.19: Focused Coding 1, 2 and 3 for Question 19  
 




• There should be a proactive role for the BNM in 








• The AAOIFI standards were approved and 
endorsed by the same scholars who hold 
numerous board positions in the industry. The 
AAOIFI standards must be revised by external 
institutions and not by its own Sharīʿah scholars. 
1) The need for 
strong regulatory 
frameworks and 





• The BNM should play a more effective role to 
ensure that IFIs comply with Sharīʿah, to ensure 
that they conduct Sharīʿah audits and to take 











• To strengthen the Sharīʿah functions and to break 
the communication barrier down within the 




• Sharīʿah advisory services must have an 
international qualifications institution or 
professional body to give them a licence and to 
maintain standard of services. This idea can be 
started on a small scale basis like a professional 
Sharīʿah body at national level. 
Interviewee 
5 
• To have a professional body for Sharīʿah 
advisors. It can be started at country level and 
then followed with an international initiative.  
Interviewee 
12 
• Having the internal Sharīʿah capability at 
Gatehouse Bank, we can proudly say Sharīʿah 





• It is imperative to improve Sharīʿah board 
members’ integrity and credibility. Sharīʿah 
scholars should elevate their professional 
standards to at least be on a par with other 
professionals such as accountants and lawyers. In 
order to achieve this, more effort needs to be 
made to produce more Sharīʿah experts through 
training, qualifications and sponsorship.  
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• There must be an independent, inexpensive 
source of Sharīʿah scholars that are drawn from 
Western societies, who are familiar with the local 
laws and regulations to help develop the business 
in the West. Most Sharīʿah scholars are now busy 
serving the needs of the very rich GCC countries 
and other large mega banks in the West. They 
create, through financial engineering and 
structured finance lawyers, schemes that may 
look Islamic but which are very expensive and 
impossible to even be considered by smaller 
community-oriented Islamic banking institutions. 
 
The study finds that Sharīʿah scholars generally have admitted that there are weaknesses 
and discrepancies in the existing Sharīʿah governance practices. In view of these issues, 
they have given some recommendations for the purpose of improvement; these can be 
categorized into three aspects, namely regulatory frameworks, improving the 
communication environment and having an institutional approach. With respect to 
regulatory frameworks, Sharīʿah scholars highlighted the need for a strong regulatory 
environment and this includes supervisory and enforcement aspects. Sharīʿah scholars 
also raised their concern on the acceptability and credibility of the AAOIFI standards and 
they strongly viewed that the standards should be revised by independent institutions. 
 
Acknowledging the communication gap in Sharīʿah governance amongst the key 
stakeholders, such as regulators, supervisors, BODs, shareholders and others, the 
Sharīʿah scholars opined that there must be proper coordination to improve the 
communication environment. With this improvement, any misunderstanding or lack of 
information on certain issues pertaining to Sharīʿah governance may be mitigated and 
further resolved. In addition, Sharīʿah scholars also have strong faith in an institutional 
approach framework. They are of the view that Sharīʿah advisors need a specific 
professional body that can govern, direct and control their affairs and professionalism. In 
summary, all these recommendations indicate that Sharīʿah scholars are actually open for 
criticism and in fact they have admitted the defects and weaknesses of the existing 
Sharīʿah governance system.  
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The research findings from the semi-structured interviews highlight several important 
points pertaining to the Sharīʿah governance system. The analysis findings indicate that 
there are gaps and shortcomings in the existing Sharīʿah governance practices of IFIs in 
Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK, particularly the aspects of the general approach to 
Sharīʿah governance, the internal Sharīʿah governance framework, the attributes of the 
Sharīʿah board in terms of mechanisms of competence, independence, and transparency 
and confidentiality, operational procedures, and Sharīʿah board’s assessment. The study 
indicates that different Sharīʿah scholars have dissimilar views on particular issues and 
they have also admitted that there are serious gaps and weaknesses in all these six major 
areas of Sharīʿah governance. 
 
The answers given by the Sharīʿah scholars reveal that the existing practice of Sharīʿah 
governance needs further enhancement and improvement, at least in these six major 
areas. As highlighted by those Sharīʿah scholars, regulation plays very important role in 
providing a sound and proper framework for Sharīʿah governance. This must be followed 
with serious implementation, supervision and enforcement. In addition, any gaps or 
communication barriers amongst the stakeholders in IFIs must be eliminated. The 
insistence of Sharīʿah scholars of the establishment of a professional body for Sharīʿah 
advisors indicates that they are willing to compromise with any institutions and 
approaches for the betterment of Islamic finance.  
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INVESTIGATING SHARĪAH GOVERNANCE THROUGH UNOBTRUSIVE 
RESEARCH: ANALYSIS OF THE ANNUAL REPORTS, FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS AND WEBSITE FINDINGS 
9.0 Introduction 
 
Sharīʿah governance favours accurate and true disclosure and transparency as a 
prerequisite to accountability. The fundamental concept of governance in Sharīʿah is 
accountability and hence it requires IFIs to make true disclosures and to provide accurate 
and necessary information to all stakeholders. This is in line with the spirit of al Qur’an 
as mentioned in surah al Baqarah verse 282 about the importance of recording and 
putting in writing any business dealing and transaction in a very transparent way. In the 
context of Sharīʿah governance, Islam promotes greater transparency on Sharīʿah-related 
information in order to foster accountability and to strengthen the credibility of IFIs.  
 
This chapter is basically aimed at examining the level of disclosure and transparency of 
Sharīʿah governance in IFIs. This is in line with the IFSB-4 that provides guidelines for 
greater disclosure and transparency for IFIs. This study attempts to complement the 
research findings in Chapters 7 and 8, which raised several important issues concerning 
Sharīʿah governance system. Unlike the research findings in Chapters 7 and 8, which are 
derived from primary data through the questionnaires and the semi-structured interviews, 
the method used in this chapter is of a library research character. The study offers 
disclosure indicators on the state of Sharīʿah governance practices and illustrates the 
extent to which information on Sharīʿah governance has been disclosed.  
9.1 Research Findings 
 
Analyses of the research findings in this chapter are divided into macro and micro 
perspectives. The macro analysis provides a general overview of the overall scores of 
Sharīʿah governance disclosure and transparency by ranking them into five categories. 
Meanwhile, the micro analysis illustrates the extent of disclosure and transparency in 
each of the thirty disclosure indicators, which are divided into six main sections. A sound 
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and good Sharīʿah governance framework should assure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all matters regarding Sharīʿah compliance. Both macro and micro 
analyses demonstrate the level of transparency of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs by looking 
at the aggregate and country-specific behavioural responses.  
9.1.1 Macro Analysis 
 
This study attempts to rank IFIs in accordance with the level of disclosure of Sharīʿah 
governance practice. The study uses multiple indicator measures to measure the level of 
transparency of IFIs. There are thirty identified disclosure indicators of best practice of 
Sharīʿah governance which are divided into six sections, namely Commitment to Good 
Sharīʿah Governance, Sharīʿah Board Information, Sharīʿah Report, Sharīʿah 
Pronouncements, Sharīʿah Review, and Products and Services Information. The study 
indicates that these thirty indicators represent the best practice of disclosure on Sharīʿah 
governance-related information. The indicators are also able to adequately provide 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of Sharīʿah governance disclosure and transparency 
in IFIs. Table 9.1 illustrates the overall indicators of Sharīʿah governance disclosure 
practices.  
Table 9.1: Disclosure Indicators 
 
Disclosure Indicators  Number of 
Indicators 
 
Disclosure of Commitment to Sharīʿah Governance 
 
D1. The existence of guidelines/charter on Sharīʿah Governance 
D2. The existence of fit and proper criteria for the Sharīʿah board 
D3. Statement of Sharīʿah compliance 
3 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Board Information 
 
D4. Method of appointment  
D5. Organization chart of Sharīʿah board structure on the website 
D6. The list of Sharīʿah board members (names) 
D7. Details about Sharīʿah board members other than name and title 
D8. Details about other employment and position 
D9. When each Sharīʿah board member joined the board 
D10. A named chairman of Sharīʿah board listed 
15 
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Disclosure Indicators  Number of 
Indicators 
 
D11. Details about the chairman, other than name and title 
D12. Details about role of the Sharīʿah board 
D13. Sharīʿah board performs the Sharīʿah review 
D14. Board size is no fewer than three 
D15. Sharīʿah board members sit on more than three other IFIs 
D16. Attendance record of Sharīʿah board meetings 
D17. Board meets more than four times a year. 
D18. Tenure of appointment 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Board Remuneration 
 
D19. Who determines the Sharīʿah board's remuneration 
D20. The specifics of the Sharīʿah board’s pay 
2 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Report 
 
D21. Sharīʿah report published in the annual report 
D22. Information on duties and services 
D23. Sharīʿah board activities 
D24. Declaration of Sharīʿah compliance 
4 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Pronouncements 
 
D25. Sharīʿah pronouncements are made known to the public via 
website, etc. 
D26. Sharīʿah resolution only 
D27. Sharīʿah resolution with detailed Sharīʿah explanation 
3 
Disclosure of Sharīʿah Compliance Review 
 
D28. IFIs undertake Sharīʿah review 
1 
Disclosure of Information on Products and Services 
 
D29. List of Sharīʿah-compliant products and services 
D30. Sharīʿah concepts and principles of products and services 
2 
Total Indicators 30 
 
This chapter employs similar techniques of scoring methodology to Chapter 7, with slight 
modifications to quantify the disclosure practice of Sharīʿah governance. The above 
disclosure indicators enable the study to classify the IFIs into five categories of Sharīʿah 
governance disclosure practices, namely ‘Underdeveloped Practice’, ‘Emerging Practice’, 
‘Improved Practice’, ‘Good Practice’ and ‘Best Practice’. As an explanation to the 
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scoring methodology used in this chapter, Table 9.2 specifically elaborates the 
description of these five categories.  
Table 9.2: Sharīʿah Governance Disclosure Scoring Method 
 
Level of Practice Score Explanation 
Underdeveloped 
Practice 
1–5 IFIs that have a very minimal score of Sharīʿah 
governance disclosure and need immediate reform. 
Emerging Practice 6–10 IFIs that have a minimal score of Sharīʿah governance 
disclosure but indicate positive development. 
Improved Practice 11–15 IFIs that have a fair score of Sharīʿah governance 
disclosure and indicate strong improvement. 
Good Practice 16–23 IFIs that have a good score of Sharīʿah governance 
disclosure and generally adhere to key elements of 
good disclosure practice. 
Best Practice 24–30 The ideal IFIs that represent the best practice of 
Sharīʿah governance disclosure. 
 
As a general rule, IFIs that have more transparent and disclosure practices are more 
highly regarded and valued not only by investors but also by the public at large. IFIs that 
score 24–30 disclosure indicators are ranked as a ‘Best Practice’ and represent the ideal 
and best practice of Sharīʿah governance disclosure. IFIs that fall into the ‘Good 
Practice’ category indicate a good score of Sharīʿah governance disclosure while IFIs 
that have fair score but show some positive improvements are classified as an ‘Improved 
Practice’. The ‘Underdeveloped Practice’ category refers to IFIs that have a very minimal 
score that represents very weak Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice. This is followed 
by IFIs that have minimal score of 6–10 disclosure indicators, which are ranked in the 
‘Emerging Practice’ category.  
9.1.1.1 Sharīʿah Governance Disclosure in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK 
 
As an illustration of the general findings on the level of transparency of Sharīʿah 
governance in all eighty IFIs included in this study, Figures 9.1–9.4 demonstrate the 
significant differences of the extent of Sharīʿah governance disclosure practices by using 
frequencies and cross-tabulation techniques. The research findings affirm that there are 
significant differences in the extent of Sharīʿah governance disclosure practices, where 
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the majority of IFIs fall into the ‘Emerging Practice’ category and only 1.3% of IFIs can 
be ranked as in the ‘Best Practice’ category. 
 
Figure 9.1: Overall Sharīʿah Governance Disclosure  
 




















































Figure 9.1 demonstrates the overall disclosure of Sharīʿah governance-related 
information by IFIs in the case countries. Most IFIs (37.5%) are ranked in the ‘Emerging 
Practice’ category, followed by 30% in ‘Improved Practice’, 16.3% in ‘Underdeveloped 
Practice’, 15% in ‘Good Practice’ and 1.3% in ‘Best Practice’. This finding indicates that 
the overall level of transparency of Sharīʿah governance practices in IFIs is relatively 
low. Only 13% out of eighty IFIs fall into the ‘Good Practice’ and ‘Best Practice’ 
categories; the remaining 87% of IFIs fall into the ‘Improved Practice’, ‘Emerging 
Practice’ and ‘Underdeveloped Practice’ categories. These figures vividly indicate the 
failure of the majority of IFIs to seriously take into consideration the essence of 
disclosure and transparency in Islam within the context of Sharīʿah governance. While 
Islam promotes transparency to the extreme, the practice demonstrates a negative 
indication where only 1.3% of IFIs fall into the ‘Best Practice’ category. The low 
percentage of disclosure and transparency of Sharīʿah governance practices demonstrates 
that there are deficiencies and shortcomings in the current Sharīʿah governance 
framework of IFIs. 
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Figure 9.2: Sharīʿah Governance Disclosure for IFIs in Malaysia 
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Figure 9.2 illustrates the level of disclosure of IFIs in Malaysia. The graph demonstrates 
that IFIs in Malaysia are generally producing fair and better disclosure compared to GCC 
countries and the UK. A total of 50% of IFIs are ranked in the ‘Good Practice’ category, 
30% in ‘Improved Practice’, 15% in ‘Emerging Practice’ and 5% in ‘Best Practice’. This 
result indicates that the proactive approach of Malaysian regulatory authorities, who 
facilitate Sharīʿah governance practices through comprehensive regulatory frameworks, 
leads to better disclosure and transparency. In addition, IFIs in Malaysia also demonstrate 
serious commitment on the aspect of Sharīʿah governance, where the majority of the 
Sharīʿah governance disclosures that have been made were classified as voluntary 
disclosures and are not mandatory by law or regulation. These two external and internal 
factors have positively influenced the Sharīʿah governance practices in Malaysia, 
particularly in terms of transparency. In spite of these findings, it is worth noting that the 
level of transparency in the majority of IFIs in Malaysia are still in the ‘Good Practice’ 
category and this indicates that there are numerous efforts that could be initiated to 
improve and enhance the Sharīʿah governance practices to achieve the level of ‘Best 
Practice’.  
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Figure 9.3: Sharīʿah Governance Disclosure for IFIs in GCC Countries 
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The overall level of disclosure of Sharīʿah governance in GCC countries is minimal. The 
majority of IFIs (46.2%) are ranked in the ‘Emerging Practice’ category, followed by 
22.2% in ‘Underdeveloped Practice’ and 29.6% in ‘Improved Practice’. Only 1.9% of 
IFIs achieved the level of ‘Good Practice’ and none of them fall into the ‘Best Practice’ 
category. This position indicates that less interference from regulatory authorities and 
lack of regulatory frameworks on Sharīʿah governance contribute to the minimal 
transparency on the part of IFIs in GCC countries. Although the majority of GCC 
countries clearly mention the adoption of the AAOIFI governance standards as compared 
to Malaysia and the UK, the implementation of these governance standards nevertheless 
has not significantly increased the level of transparency with regards to Sharīʿah 
governance. In fact, the research findings reveal that the majority of IFIs only score 
between 6 and 10 Sharīʿah governance disclosure indicators, which demonstrates serious 
shortcomings and weaknesses with respect to Sharīʿah governance transparency in GCC 
countries.214  
                                                 
214
 These findings are contrary to the result found in the study conducted by Al-Baluchi (2006) on thirty-
four IFIs in Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan and Sudan. Al-Baluchi revealed that the implementation of the AAOIFI 
governance standards had significantly increased the level of voluntary disclosure in IFIs’ annual reports 
with an average of 35% improvement in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan (Al-Baluchi, 2006: 192). This position 
denotes that the adoption of the AAOIFI governance standards is not the sole factor that may improve the 
level of transparency of IFIs.  
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Figure 9.4: Sharīʿah Governance Disclosure for IFIs in the UK 
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Figure 9.4 presents the disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices of IFIs in the UK. 
Although, IFIs in the UK are relatively new, the level of disclosure and transparency is 
fair and better than GCC countries. The graph shows that 33.3% of IFIs are ranked in the 
‘Emerging Practice’ and ‘Improved Practice’ categories and 16.7% of IFIs in the ‘Good 
Practice’ category. As compared to IFIs in GCC countries, the fair disclosure practices of 
IFIs in the UK proves that the regulatory-based approach of Malaysia is not the sole 
factor in determining the level of disclosure and transparency of Sharīʿah governance. 
The reactive approach of the UK regulatory authorities, with less regulatory interference, 
lets IFIs develop their Sharīʿah governance framework independently. This finding 
proves that the internal factors within the IFIs are far more important than the external 
factors in influencing the level of transparency of Sharīʿah governance. Commitment and 
awareness of the IFIs’ management on the importance of transparency on Sharīʿah 
governance are actually the significant factors that could improve the extent of Sharīʿah 
governance transparency. 
9.1.1.2 Sharīʿah Governance Scores According to Year of Incorporation 
 
This section uses the same formula as section 7.2 of Chapter 7 to further demonstrate the 
extent of Sharīʿah governance practices in IFIs in four different clusters. Table 9.3 
illustrates the details of the classification of the eighty IFIs in the case countries. 
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Table 9.3: Classification of IFIs According to Year of Incorporation 
 
IFIs Malaysia GCC 
Countries 
UK Total  Percentage 
Cluster 1: 1975–1990 1 11  12 15% 
Cluster 2: 1991–2000 7 8  15 18.8% 
Cluster 3: 2000–2005 7 16 3 26 32.5% 
Cluster 4: 2006–2010 5 19 3 27 33.8% 
 
The IFIs are classified into four clusters. Cluster 1 refers to the IFIs that established their 
Sharīʿah board between the years of 1975 and 1990, Cluster 2 between 1991 and 2000, 
Cluster 3 between 2000 and 2005, and Cluster 4 between 2006 and 2010. A total of 15% 
of IFIs are classified as Cluster 1, 18.8% as Cluster 2, 32.5% as Cluster 3 and 33.8% as 
Cluster 4. These figures indicate that IFIs in Clusters 3 and 4 represent the majority of the 
research sample. This reflects the phenomenon from early 2000 until recent years where 
numerous IFIs were established worldwide because of the tremendous growth and 
opportunity in Islamic finance. On the basis of this classification, the study quantifies the 
Sharīʿah governance scores and ranks them into five categories as illustrated in Figure 
9.5 below.  
 
Figure 9.5: Sharīʿah Governance Score According to Cluster 
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Figure 9.5 presents an overview of the level of Sharīʿah governance disclosure practices 
in the four different clusters. The research finding shows that the majority of IFIs (54%) 
fall into the ‘Improved Practice’ category, 37.6% into the ‘Emerging Practice’ category, 
16.4% into the ‘Underdeveloped Practice’ category, 15.1% into the ‘Good Practice’ 
category and only 1.3% into the ‘Best Practice’ category. IFIs in Cluster 3 represent 
better Sharīʿah governance disclosure scores, where the majority of them are ranked in 
the ‘Good Practice’ category. On the other hand, IFIs in Cluster 2 demonstrate weak 
disclosure practices, where most of them are classified in the ‘Emerging Practice’ 
category. In fact, a significant percentage of IFIs in Cluster 2 fall into the 
‘Underdeveloped Practice’ category. In view of the emergence of good Sharīʿah 
governance disclosure practice, it was nevertheless found that only 1.3% of IFIs meet the 
ideal criteria for the ‘Best Practice’ category as formulated in this study. These findings 
affirm that the level of Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice in many IFIs is 
significantly low. This disclosure issue should be taken seriously by IFIs as well as 
regulators and supervisors because transparency is one of the prerequisites for a good and 
sound Sharīʿah governance framework in IFIs.  
9.1.2 Micro Analysis215 
9.1.2.1 Commitment to Sharīʿah Governance 
 
The study analyses IFIs’ commitment to Sharīʿah governance by examining the vision 
and mission, articles of association and memorandum of association, chairman’s message 
on the annual report, CEO’s statement, and any other statements indicating the IFIs’ 
commitment and devotion to Sharīʿah governance-related matters.  
Table 9.4: Disclosure of Commitment to Sharīʿah Governance 
Disclosure of Percentage 
D1. The existence of guidelines/charter on Sharīʿah 
governance 
8.8% 
D2. The existence of fit and proper criteria for the Sharīʿah 
board 
7.5% 
D3. Statement of Sharīʿah compliance 60% 
 
                                                 
215
 It is important to note that the percentages on a comparative overview to illustrate country-specific 
behavior practices in this section refer to the group of IFIs in the individual jurisdictions. 
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Table 9.4 demonstrates poor Sharīʿah governance practice on the part of IFIs’ 
commitment to Sharīʿah governance. Only 8.8% of IFIs indicated that they had 
guidelines or a charter on Sharīʿah governance and 7.5% of IFIs on the existence of fit 
and proper criteria for the Sharīʿah board. On the other hand, the majority of IFIs (60%) 
indicated their commitment to Sharīʿah compliance. Generally, it is observed that the 
level of disclosure on the aspect of commitment to Sharīʿah governance of IFIs is 
relatively low. The finding that more than 91% of IFIs do not have guidelines for 
Sharīʿah governance or fit and proper criteria for their Sharīʿah board clearly indicates a 
deficiency in Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice.  
 














Figure 9.6 illustrates the different Sharīʿah governance disclosures in Malaysia, GCC 
countries and the UK. Only 15% of twenty IFIs in Malaysia disclosed that they have 
guidelines or a charter on Sharīʿah governance, 25% of IFIs have fit and proper criteria 
for the Sharīʿah board and 45% of IFIs gave a statement of Sharīʿah compliance. A 
similar situation is found in GCC countries, where only 7.4% of fifty-four IFIs disclosed 
the existence of guidelines on Sharīʿah governance and 1.9% of IFIs disclosed the 
existence of Sharīʿah board requirements. A significant number of IFIs in GCC countries 
(64.8%) disclosed a statement of Sharīʿah compliance as compared to IFIs in Malaysia. 
In the case of the UK, none of the IFIs disclosed the existence of Sharīʿah governance 
guidelines or Sharīʿah board criteria and 66.7% of IFIs mention a statement on the 
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Sharīʿah compliance of their products and services. While IFIs in Malaysia are more 
transparent than IFIs in GCC countries and the UK in terms of disclosure of the existence 
of a charter or guidelines of Sharīʿah governance and fit and proper criteria for the 
Sharīʿah board, the situation is different in the aspect of disclosure of a statement on 
Sharīʿah compliance. On a whole, the overall level of transparency in IFIs in all the case 
countries with reference to their commitment to Sharīʿah governance is low and not 
significant.  
9.1.2.2 Sharīʿah Board Information 
 
Sharīʿah board information is of an essence to Sharīʿah governance in IFIs. The study 
identified fifteen indicators to measure the level of disclosure of Sharīʿah governance 
practices on the aspect of Sharīʿah board information. Tables 9.5–9.7 and Figures 9.7–9.9 
illustrate the disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices pertaining to Sharīʿah board 
information. Furthermore, Tables 9.8–9.12 demonstrate the state of Sharīʿah board 
meeting practices, the size of Sharīʿah boards and the Sharīʿah boards’ engagement in 
various IFIs.  
 
Table 9.5: Disclosure of Sharīʿah Board Information (D4–D6) 
 
Disclosure of Percentage 
D4. Method of appointment  16.3% 
D5. Organization chart on Sharīʿah board structure on the 
website 
11.3% 
D6. The list of Sharīʿah board members (names) 88.8% 
 
Table 9.5 demonstrates the disclosure practice of Sharīʿah governance in three different 
aspects. Only 16.3% of IFIs disclosed the method of appointment of their Sharīʿah 
boards while 11.3% published the organization chart of the Sharīʿah board structure on 
their website. In terms of the list of Sharīʿah board members, a significant number of 
88.8% of IFIs disclosed information on their Sharīʿah board members. The disclosure on 
the method of appointment is important in defining their relationship within the organ of 
governance and to maintain the state of independence of the Sharīʿah board, while 
publication of the organization chart will demonstrate the overall corporate structure of 
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IFIs. The disclosure of the list of Sharīʿah board members is also significant as it 
indicates the credibility of IFIs and the legitimacy of the products and services offered.  
 












Figure 9.7 shows the cross-border practice of Sharīʿah governance disclosure. Only 25% 
of twenty IFIs in Malaysia disclosed the method of appointment of their Sharīʿah board 
and 20% published the organization chart of the Sharīʿah board structure on their 
website. All IFIs in Malaysia disclosed the list of Sharīʿah board members. A similar 
practice is found in GCC countries, where 7.4% of IFIs disclosed the method of 
appointment, 9.3% the organization chart and 85% the list of Sharīʿah board members. 
Unlike Malaysia and GCC countries, all of the IFIs in the UK revealed the list of 
Sharīʿah board members and 66.7% disclosed the method of appointment. None of the 
IFIs in the UK published the organization chart of the Sharīʿah board structure either on 
the website or in the annual report or financial statements. 
 
Table 9.6: Disclosure of Sharīʿah Board Information (D7–D11) 
Disclosure of Percentage 
D7. Details about Sharīʿah board members, other than name 
and title 
52.5% 
D8. Details about other employment and position 51.3% 
D9. When each Sharīʿah board members joined the board 10% 
D10. A named chairman of Sharīʿah board listed 88.8% 
D11. Details about the chairman, other than name and title 52.5% 
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Information on the background of Sharīʿah board members provides important insights 
into the credibility of Sharīʿah governance. The public and all stakeholders deserve to 
know the background and necessary information of the Sharīʿah board members who are 
advising and supervising the institutions. Table 9.6 provides findings on the disclosure of 
Sharīʿah board information pertaining to the details and background of Sharīʿah board 
members. The majority of IFIs (52.5%) disclosed details about Sharīʿah board members, 
other than name and title, 51.3% of IFIs about other employment and position and 52.5% 
about the chairman, other than name and title. Only 10% of IFIs disclosed the date each 
Sharīʿah board member joined the board. A significant number of 88.8% of IFIs 
disclosed the name of the Sharīʿah board’s chairman. The disclosure of the name of the 
Sharīʿah board’s chairman is important because he plays an active role in tailoring and 
determining the direction and effectiveness of the Sharīʿah board. The normal practice in 
the industry shows that senior or prominent Sharīʿah scholars who have more experience 
and excellent academic qualifications will be appointed as the chairman of the Sharīʿah 
board.  
 







Malaysia GCC Countries UK
Comparative Overview (D7-D11)
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Figure 9.8 demonstrates the different levels of disclosure on the details and background 
of Sharīʿah board members. In Malaysia, all IFIs disclosed the details of Sharīʿah board 
members, other than name and title, including the name of the Sharīʿah board’s chairman 
and the details of the chairman, other than name and title, while only 35% disclosed the 
date each member joined the Sharīʿah board. A low level of disclosure is found in GCC 
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countries, where only 33.3% of IFIs disclosed on D7, 31.4% on D8, 33.3% on D11 and 
83.3% on D10. None of the IFIs in GCC countries or in the UK disclosed the date each 
Sharīʿah board member joined the board. Fair disclosure practice is found in the UK, in 
which 83.3% of IFIs disclosed on D7, D8 and D11 and 16.7% on D9. As in the case of 
Malaysia, 100% of IFIs in the UK disclosed the name of the Sharīʿah board’s chairman. 
 
Table 9.7: Disclosure of Sharīʿah Board Information (D12–D18) 
 
Disclosure of Percentage 
D12. Details about the role of the Sharīʿah board 53.7% 
D13. Sharīʿah board performs the Sharīʿah review 36.2% 
D14. Board size is no fewer than three 83.7% 
D15. Sharīʿah board members sit on more than three other IFIs 20% 
D16. Attendance record of Sharīʿah board meetings 6.3% 
D17. Board meets more than four times a year 7.5% 
D18. Tenure of appointment 6.3% 
 
Table 9.7 describes the level of disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practice on the aspect 
of roles of the Sharīʿah board, Sharīʿah review, size of Sharīʿah board, meetings and 
tenure of appointment. The majority of IFIs (53.7%) disclosed the details of the role of 
the Sharīʿah board, while 83.7% of IFIs disclosed that the board size is no fewer than 
three members. Only 36.2% of IFIs revealed that the Sharīʿah board performs the 
Sharīʿah review and 20% of IFIs disclosed that their Sharīʿah board members sit on the 
boards of more than three other IFIs. A low level of disclosure is found with respect to 
the attendance records of Sharīʿah board meetings (6.3%), whether the board meets more 
than four times a year (7.5%) and tenure of appointment (6.3%). 
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Figure 9.9 demonstrates the different levels of Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice 
on D12–D18. A significant number of 75% of IFIs in Malaysia disclosed the details of 
the Sharīʿah board’s role, 50% disclosed that the Sharīʿah board performs the Sharīʿah 
review, 100% that the size of the Sharīʿah board is not fewer than three members. On the 
other hand, a low level of disclosure is found on the aspect of Sharīʿah board members 
sitting on the boards of more than three other IFIs (35%), attendance record (25%), 
whether the board meet more than four times a year (20%) and tenure of appointment 
(20%). A different scenario is found in GCC countries, where 44.4% of IFIs disclosed on 
D12 and 83.3% on D14. In fact, poor disclosure of Sharīʿah practice was found on D13 
(35.1%), D15 (11.1%), D17 (3.7%) and D18 (1.9%) and none of the IFIs disclosed the 
attendance records of Sharīʿah board meetings. In the UK, disclosure was only made for 
D12, D14 and D15, i.e. 66.7% of IFIs disclosed the details of Sharīʿah board’s roles, 
100% disclosed that the board size is no fewer than three members and 50% that Sharīʿah 
board members sit on boards of more than three IFIs. Furthermore, it is found only six 
IFIs disclosed the details of Sharīʿah board meetings in the annual reports, as illustrated 
in Table 9.8.  
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Sources: BIMB (2008: 40), BMMB (2008: 24), MIB (2008: 23), RHB (2008: 16), CIMB 
(2007: 41–42), KIB (2008: 12) and Al Bilad (2008). 
 
Table 9.8 shows that there are significant differences in Sharīʿah board meeting practices 
based on the available information derived from seven IFIs in Malaysia (5) and Kuwait 
(1) and Saudi Arabia (1). The Sharīʿah board of the BMMB meets twenty-four times per 
year, followed by Bank Al Bilad with seventeen times per year, RHB with seven times 
per year, BIMB with six times per year, KIB with four times per year, and CIMB and 
MIB, both with three times per year. This position denotes that there is no minimum 
setting of standard practice for Sharīʿah board meetings. In view of the standard practice 
of BOD meetings being held at least four times a year, the above findings show that 
current Sharīʿah board meeting practices constitute good Sharīʿah governance practices, 
with the exception of the MIB and the CIMB.  
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The study is nevertheless of the view that a monthly Sharīʿah board meeting is the ideal 
practice for Sharīʿah governance. Unlike the BOD, who is responsible for setting the 
IFI’s direction and general policies, the Sharīʿah board is expected to perform ex ante 
and ex post functions of the Sharīʿah governance process, which requires more time, 
effort and due diligence from them. On the face of it, the Sharīʿah board is also 
anticipated to inculcate awareness and to educate the IFIs on the aspects of Sharīʿah 
principles as well as Islamic ethics and values. In this regard, the study suggests the 
practice of monthly meetings as the best practice for Sharīʿah board meetings. In view of 
the notion of this study to set the standard of best practice of Sharīʿah board meetings to 
be twelve times per year, the research reveals that only two out of seven IFIs currently 
meet that standard.  
 
In terms of attendance, the majority of Sharīʿah board members attended more than 70% 
of Sharīʿah board meetings, 45% attended 100% of the meetings, 17% attended more 
than 80% of the meetings, 11% attended more than 90% and 70% of the board meetings 
respectively and 6% of Sharīʿah scholars attended 17% of the board meetings. It is worth 
mentioning that five of eighteen Sharīʿah board members of IFIs in Malaysia have failed 
to attend more than 75% of Sharīʿah board meetings. In accordance with section 16 of 
the BNM/GPS1, those Sharīʿah board members may be disqualified unless they give a 
reasonable excuse for their absence. Despite that, the research findings appear to show 
that the general practice of the attendance and commitment of Sharīʿah board members is 
in line with what would be conceived as good practice, with 73% of Sharīʿah scholars 
attending more than 80% of the Sharīʿah board meetings. 
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Table 9.9: Board Position and Size of Sharīʿah Board 
 

























































Table 9.9 summarizes the findings on Sharīʿah board sizes. Basically, an appropriate size 
of a Sharīʿah board is important to enable them to hold productive and constructive 
discussions and make prompt Sharīʿah decisions. Having 3–5 Sharīʿah board members is 
considered as a good Sharīʿah board practice. There are 169 identified individual 
Sharīʿah scholars with eighty-two of them holding Sharīʿah board positions in twenty 
IFIs in Malaysia, seventy-six Sharīʿah Scholars in fifty-four IFIs in GCC countries and 
eleven Sharīʿah scholars in six IFIs in the UK. In GCC countries 2% of IFIs have only 
one Sharīʿah scholar, 4% of IFIs have two Sharīʿah board members, 52% of IFIs have 
three Sharīʿah board members, 15% of IFIs have six Sharīʿah board members, 15% of 
IFIs have five Sharīʿah board members and 13% of IFIs have four Sharīʿah board 
members. A similar scenario is found in Malaysia where 71% of IFIs have three Sharīʿah 
board members, 14% of IFIs have four Sharīʿah board members, 14% of IFIs have five 
Sharīʿah board members, 5% of IFIs have eight Sharīʿah board members and 5% of IFIs 
have ten Sharīʿah board members. In the UK, 40% of IFIs have three Sharīʿah board 
members, 40% of IFIs have four Sharīʿah board members and 20% of IFIs have only one 
Sharīʿah board member. The overall findings show that Sharīʿah boards in IFIs generally 
have the right board size and appear to be in line with the AAOIFI governance standards 
and the IFSB-10 with exception of three IFIs in GCC countries and one IFI in the UK. 
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Fewer Sharīʿah board members provide less leverage while a large Sharīʿah board size 
may increase the IFIs’ expenses. 
 
In addition, Table 9.9 also demonstrates that Malaysia has more individual Sharīʿah 
scholars with an average of 4.1 compared to the UK (average of 1.8) and GCC countries 
(average of 1.4). There are eighty-two individual Sharīʿah scholars for twenty IFIs in 
Malaysia, while there are only seventy-six Sharīʿah scholars for fifty-four IFIs in GCC 
countries and eleven Sharīʿah scholars for six IFIs in the UK. These figures indicate that 
GCC countries and the UK experience some degree of shortage of Sharīʿah scholars. The 
restriction on multiple appointments of Sharīʿah board members of IFIs at one particular 
time is one of the factors determining the numbers of individual Sharīʿah scholars and an 
average Sharīʿah board in Malaysia is larger than an average Sharīʿah board in GCC 
countries and the UK.216  
 
In order to illustrate the relationship of the Sharīʿah board size to the Sharīʿah 
governance disclosure practice, Table 9.10 demonstrates the correlation between these 
two aspects.  
 
Table 9.10: Correlation between the Sharīʿah board size and the State of Sharīʿah 
Governance Disclosure Practices 
 
State of Sharīʿah Governance Disclosure Practice Countries Average 
Sharīʿah 















15% 31.25% 20% 1.25%  
UK 2.5 1.25% 2.5% 2.5% 1.25%  
 
 
Table 9.10 clearly indicates the positive finding on the correlation of the board positions 
of Sharīʿah scholars and the extent of Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice. Although 
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 The BNM, (2009: 100) reports that the rules on the restriction on individuals sitting on more than one 
Sharīʿah board increased the total number of Sharīʿah experts in the period 2004-2009 to more than 100 
individual Sharīʿah scholars. 
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admittedly there are other factors that contribute to the state of Sharīʿah governance 
disclosure, the researcher considers that the size of the Sharīʿah board may also lead to 
better disclosure practices. The average size of Sharīʿah board in Malaysia is 4.5 (out of 
ninety board positions and eighty-two Sharīʿah scholars) and the result indicates that the 
majority of IFIs in Malaysia fall into the ‘Good Practice’ category, which is better than its 
counterparts in GCC countries and the UK. The situation is different in GCC countries 
where the average Sharīʿah board size is 3.6 (out of 199 board positions and seventy-six 
Sharīʿah scholars) and the majority of IFIs are ranked in the ‘Emerging Practice’ 
category. The same thing occurs in IFIs in the UK, where the average Sharīʿah board size 
is 2.5 (out of fifteen board positions and eleven Sharīʿah scholars) and most of them fall 
into the ‘Emerging Practice’ and ‘Improved Practice’ categories.  
 
The study suggests two main propositions that lead to findings of better disclosure 
practices in Malaysia as compared to GCC countries and the UK. Firstly, having a 
significant number of Sharīʿah scholars who can allocate more time and effort to 
performing their duties is a very important factor in improving Sharīʿah governance 
disclosure and transparency. Sharīʿah scholars are not only expected to approve or 
disapprove the Islamic financial products and services but also to go beyond that by 
promoting Islamic ethics and values, including insisting on the aspect of disclosure and 
transparency. Secondly, the practice of Sharīʿah scholars having numerous board 
positions without a certain limitation may negate the effort and initiative of good 
disclosure of Sharīʿah governance. Too many board positions for Sharīʿah scholars will 
in no way enable them to allocate sufficient time to put their efforts into improving and 
promoting disclosure and transparency in IFIs.  
 
To support the above two propositions, the study illustrates the board and chairman 
positions of the top ten Sharīʿah scholars in eighty IFIs of the case countries in Table 
9.11. This finding is substantiated with the Sharīʿah scholars’ network analysis of Unal 
and Ley (2009) and Unal (2009 and 2010), as illustrated in Table 9.12.  
 
Investigating Sharīʿah Governance through Unobtrusive Research: Analysis of the Annual Report, 




Table 9.11: Sharīʿah Board Members Engagement in the Research Sample 
 
GCC Countries Malaysia UK Sharīʿah Scholars 
 Member Chairman Member Chairman Member Chairman 
Sheikh Abdul 
Sattar Abu 
Ghuddah 16 4 1 1 3  
Sheikh Nizam 
Muhammad Saleh 
Yaquby 14  1  3 1 
Sheikh Muhammad 
Ali Elgari 11 2     
Sheikh Abdullah 
Sulaiman AlManea 8 7     
Sheikh Abdul Aziz 
Khalifa Al Qassar 6    1 1 
Sheikh Hussain 
Hamid Hassan 4 3     
Sheikh Abdullah 
Muhammad Al 
Mutlaq 4 1     
Sheikh Ali 
Mohyulddin Al 
Qarradaghi 8 2 1    
Sheikh Mohamad 
Daud Bakar 3  2 1   
Sheikh Ahmad 
Bazie Al Yaseen 5 5 1 1 1  
Sheikh Ajeel 
Jassim Al Nashmi 5  1    
Sheikh Yusuf Al 
Qaradawi 4 4     
Sheikh Walid Hadi 6 3 1  1  
Sheikh Fareed Hadi 3     1 
Sheikh Muhammad 
Taqi Usmani 3 3   1 1 
Sheikh Khaled 
Mathkour Al 
Mathkour 5 1     
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Based on the information available on the websites, annual reports and financial 
statements, the study has identified sixteen of the most utilized or top Sharīʿah scholars 
in the eighty sampled IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. Table 9.11 illustrates 
that those sixteen top Sharīʿah scholars have 105 Sharīʿah board positions in IFIs in GCC 
countries, with an average of 6.5 Sharīʿah boards for each scholar. The study also finds 
that the eleven top Sharīʿah scholars hold thirty-five positions as chairman of Sharīʿah 
boards, with an average of 3.1 for each scholar. Ten of those sixteen top Sharīʿah 
scholars also have Sharīʿah board positions in Malaysia and the UK. These figures 
indicate that Sharīʿah board positions in fifty-four IFIs in GCC countries and five IFIs in 
the UK (excluding Malaysia) are shared mainly by only sixteen top Sharīʿah scholars.  
 
Amongst the sixteen top Sharīʿah scholars, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah is ranked 
first as he holds sixteen Sharīʿah board positions in GCC countries, one in Malaysia and 
three in the UK, followed by Sheikh Nizam Muhammad Saleh Yaqubi with fourteen 
board positions in GCC countries, one in Malaysia and three in the UK, Sheikh 
Muhammad Ali Elgari with eleven board positions and Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman Al 
Manea and Sheikh Ali Mohyuldin Al Qarradaghi, both with eight board positions. With 
regard to the chairman position, Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman Al Manea holds seven 
chairman positions, followed by Sheikh Ahmad Bazie Al Yaseen with five chairman 
positions and Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah and Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi, both 
with four chairman positions. This finding is supported by the Sharīʿah scholars’ network 
analysis of Unal and Ley (2009) and Unal (2009 and 2010) . Table 9.12 illustrates the 
board and chairman positions of the top ten Sharīʿah scholars in 2008, 2009 and 2010 
based on the studies by Unal and Ley (2009) and Unal (2009 and 2010). 
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Table 9.12: Board and Chairman Positions of Top Ten Sharīʿah Scholars 
 
Data as of 
31.12.2008 
Data as of 
10.10.2009 
Data as of 12.04.2010 Sharīʿah Scholar 
467 Board 












Sheikh Nizam Mohammed 
Saleh Yaquby 46 77 78 10 
Sheikh Abdul Satar Abdul 
Karim Abu Ghuddah 45 72 77 21 
Sheikh Muhammad Ali Elgari 31 64 65 8 
Sheikh Abdulaziz Khalifa Al 
Qassar  22 37 38 9 
Sheikh Mohd Daud Bakar  22 35 38  
Sheikh Abdulla Bin Sulaiman 
Al Manea 20 37 38 20 
Sheikh Hussein Hamid 
Hassan  19 29 32 21 
Sheikh Ali Mohyuldin Al 
Qarradaghi 17 23 31 7 
Sheikh Essa Zaki Essa  17 25 25  
Sheikh Ajeel Jasim Al 
Nashmi  15 24 22  
Average Board and Chairman 
Position Per Scholar 25.3 42.3 44.4 9.6 
 
Sources: Unal and Ley (2009) and Unal (2009 and 2010): modified. 
 
These findings positively affirm that there are deficiencies in the current practice of 
Sharīʿah governance, particularly in the aspects of confidentiality, competence and 
accountability of the Sharīʿah board. Despite some advantages in serving multiple 
Sharīʿah boards, such as knowledge and experience, too many Sharīʿah board positions 
at one particular time in numerous IFIs may affect the efficiency of Sharīʿah scholars’ 
performance and raise the potential for conflict of interest.217 In fact, numerous chairman 
positions of Sharīʿah board may raise significant issues of confidentiality and 
accountability of the Sharīʿah scholars. 
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 This is highlighted by Jawad Ali who mentions that there were mistakes committed by Sharīʿah boards 
due to them merely focusing on the instruments being presented by the IFIs rather than monitoring and 
meticulously scrutinizing the whole implementation of certain Islamic financial products and services 
(Pasha, 2010). 
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The situation is different in the case of Malaysia by which there is regulatory restriction 
on multiple appointments to Sharīʿah boards, as stipulated in the BNM/GPS1. It is 
reported that the adoption of this kind of limitation on multiple appointments has 
produced more than 100 registered and qualified Sharīʿah advisors that are available to 
fill in the gap in the industry (Ismail, 2009). Besides this, the study also finds that non- 
Sharīʿah experts, such as judges and economists, are appointed as Sharīʿah board 
members. Furthermore, there are nine individual female Sharīʿah scholars holding 
Sharīʿah board positions in nine different IFIs in Malaysia, whereas the Sharīʿah boards 
of IFIs in GCC countries and the UK are still exclusively male territory. The distinct 
position of Sharīʿah board engagement in Malaysia is mainly due to the regulatory 
framework and moderate Sharīʿah approach, as well as the market initiative and 
motivation of having an effective and sound Sharīʿah governance system. These internal 
and external factors have significantly influenced the Sharīʿah governance practices of 
IFIs in Malaysia. 
9.1.2.3 Sharīʿah Board’s Remuneration 
 
The ideal Sharīʿah governance practice promotes more transparency and disclosure and 
this includes the Sharīʿah board’s remuneration. The researcher explores the disclosure of 
Sharīʿah board’s remuneration by IFIs in terms of the authority who determines the 
amount of remuneration and the specifics of the Sharīʿah board’s pay, as stated in their 
annual reports and financial statements. 
 
Table 9.13: Disclosure of Sharīʿah Board’s Remuneration 
Disclosure of Percentage 
D19. Who determines the Sharīʿah board's remuneration 25% 
D20. The specifics of the Sharīʿah board’s pay 23.8% 
 
Table 9.13 demonstrates that only 25% of IFIs disclosed the authority who determines 
Sharīʿah board’s remuneration, whether the BOD, management or shareholders in the 
annual general assembly. Interestingly, 23.8% of the sample disclosed the specifics of the 
Sharīʿah board’s pay indicating the growth of transparency and disclosure of Sharīʿah 
governance practice by IFIs. Setting an appropriate amount of remuneration is important 
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to safeguard the status of the Sharīʿah board as well as to mitigate the potential for the 
unhealthy practice of ‘shopping’ for Sharīʿah rulings. The disclosure on the amount of 
remuneration of the Sharīʿah board, apart from the BOD and external audit fees, is 
significant to investors, depositors and the public, particularly to provide an accurate 
perception of the roles played by the Sharīʿah board.  
 












Figure 9.10 illustrates a comparative overview of the disclosure of the Sharīʿah board’s 
remuneration in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. Malaysia represents a good 
Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice, where 85% of twenty IFIs disclosed the 
authority who determines the Sharīʿah board’s remuneration and 80% of IFIs disclosed 
the specifics of the Sharīʿah board’s pay. This contradicts the disclosure of IFIs in GCC 
countries and the UK of which only a small percentage of 3.7% of fifty-four IFIs in GCC 
countries disclosed D19 and D20 and only 16.7% of IFIs in the UK disclosed the same. It 
is clear from this finding that the level of disclosure of Sharīʿah governance in GCC 
countries and the UK is significantly low compared to Malaysia.  
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Table 9.14: Sharīʿah Board Remuneration 
 







Affin Islamic Bank Berhad USD 32,951 5 USD6,590 
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad USD 12,401 3 USD4,113 
Asian Finance Bank Berhad USD 40,971 3 USD13,657 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad USD 60, 018 6 USD10,003 
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad USD106,208 3 USD35,403 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank  USD 36,187 3 USD12,062 
KFH Malaysia Berhad  USD 91,792 3 USD30,057 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia 
Berhad 
USD 38,247 4 USD9,561 
Al Rajhi Banking and 
Investment Corporation 
Malaysia Berhad 
USD119, 447 4 USD29,861 
EONCAP Islamic Bank 
Berhad  
USD 25,007 3 USD8,836 
Maybank Islamic Berhad USD 22,947 3 USD7,649 
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad USD 76,199 5 USD15,239 
Bank Simpanan Nasional USD 15,004 4 USD3,751 
Malaysia 
HSBC Amanah Malaysia 
Berhad 
USD 10,003 3 USD3,334 
GCC 
Countries 
Bahrain Islamic Bank USD382,158 5 USD76,432 
United 
Kingdom 
Islamic Bank of Britain USD223, 659 3 USD74,553 
 
Sources: AIB (2008: 60), Alliance (2009: 58), AFB (2008: 33), BIMB (2008: 125), 
CIMB (2007: 126), HLIB (2008: 75), KFH (M) (2008: 61), BMMB (2008: 92), Al Rajhi 
(M) (2008: 48), EONCAP (2008: 50), MIB (2008: 75), RHB (2008: 81), BSN (2008: 
199), HSBC (M) (2008: 50), BIB (2008: 56) and IBB (2004: 27). 
 
Table 9.14 illustrates the amount of remuneration of the Sharīʿah board, as stated in the 
financial statements of sixteen of the eighty sampled IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and 
the UK. The average remuneration for the total sixty Sharīʿah board members is 
USD9834 a year, while the average amount of remuneration for the fifty-two Sharīʿah 
board members in Malaysia is USD9767 a year. The Sharīʿah board members of IFIs in 
Bahrain and the UK receive a larger amount of remuneration compared to their 
counterparts in Malaysia with averages of USD76,432 and USD74,553 respectively.  
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The overall figures are considered relatively small compared to the BOD and 
management’s remuneration. These figures also indicate and clearly prove that the 
allegation of Sharīʿah arbitrage by establishing Sharīʿah boards in IFIs, which increases 
transaction costs to certain extent, is not accurate as the amount of Sharīʿah board 
remuneration is not significant on an institutional level. Nevertheless, Sharīʿah board 
members of IFIs in the UK and GCC countries enjoy the privilege of sitting on the boards 
of numerous IFIs without any sort of restriction. The insignificant amount of 
remuneration of Sharīʿah board members will be very significant if they sit on the boards 
of numerous IFIs at one particular time.  
 
By using the same logic, inferences can be made for the whole sample. This position can 
be simply illustrated by referring to the average of 6.5 Sharīʿah board positions, which 
amounts to USD63,921 annually per scholar. In contrast, the global situation can be 
analysed by examining the surveys of Unal and Ley (2009) and Unal (2009 and 2010) on 
the world’s top ten Sharīʿah scholars. The surveys reveal that more than three Sharīʿah 
scholars sit on more than sixty-five Sharīʿah boards and seven Sharīʿah scholars sit on 
more than twenty-four boards. As an indication of the potential amount of remuneration 
for Sharīʿah scholars, the top five Sharīʿah scholars will earn more than USD582,172 
annually if the estimation is based on the average amount of remuneration of USD9,834 
with an average of 59.2 board positions. As shown by the study, the amount will be 
greater if the basis of the calculation is based on the average amount of remuneration in 
Bahrain, i.e. USD76, 432, in which the top five Sharīʿah scholars will earn more than 
USD4,524,774 annually.218  
 
The negative indication from the above finding may repudiate the credibility of Sharīʿah 
scholars and hence negate the image of IFIs when there is no limitation. Investors as well 
as the public may lose confidence in the legitimacy of Islamic financial products and 
services. This requires serious consideration on the part of regulators and IFIs to maintain 
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 It is worth mentioning that these figures may not represent the actual amount of remuneration of 
Sharīʿah board members in IFIs. Such estimation and simulation of Sharīʿah board members attempt to 
highlight the need for immediate measures to control and govern Sharīʿah board remuneration practices. 
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the confidence of the investors, depositors, customers and other stakeholders by having 
appropriate mechanisms to limit and govern the practice of Sharīʿah scholars. 
9.1.2.4 Sharīʿah Report 
 
The study analyses the Sharīʿah reports published in the annual reports and financial 
statements of 2007 and 2008. There are four indicators for good Sharīʿah governance 
disclosure practice pertaining to the Sharīʿah report, namely publication of the Sharīʿah 
report in the annual report, information on duties and services, Sharīʿah board activities 
and declaration of Sharīʿah compliance. 
 
Table 9.15: Sharīʿah Report 
Disclosure of Percentage 
D21. Sharīʿah report published in the annual report 52.5% 
D22. Information on duties and services 18.8% 
D23. Sharīʿah board activities 6.3% 
D24. Declaration of Sharīʿah compliance 53.8% 
 
The majority of IFIs disclosed the Sharīʿah report in the annual report (52.5%). With 
regards to the content of the Sharīʿah report, 53.8% of IFIs disclosed the declaration of 
Sharīʿah compliance while a small percentage of 18.8% of IFIs disclosed information on 
duties and services, and 6.3% on Sharīʿah board activities. These findings indicate that 
significant numbers of IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK do not meet the 
specification of the AAOIFI format of the Sharīʿah report as specified in sections 9-26 of 
the AAOIFI Governance Standard for IFIs No. 1: Sharīʿah Supervisory Board: 
Appointment, Composition and Report. In fact, the contents of the Sharīʿah reports 
reviewed are also very brief and inadequate. This issue should be taken seriously by IFIs 
as well as regulators since the Sharīʿah report in the annual report is the main available 
document and reference for the general public, consumers, investors and depositors.   
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Malaysia GCC Countries UK
Comparative Overview (D21-D24)
D21 D22 D23 D24
 
 
Figure 9.11 further illustrates the different levels of Sharīʿah governance disclosure 
practice pertaining to the Sharīʿah report. The majority of IFIs in Malaysia (80%), GCC 
countries (56%) and the UK (50%) disclosed the Sharīʿah report by publishing it in the 
annual report. With regard to the contents of the Sharīʿah report, only 45% of IFIs in 
Malaysia disclosed information on the duties and services of the Sharīʿah board and 
11.1% of IFIs in GCC countries. A small percentage of 5% of IFIs in Malaysia and 7.4% 
of IFIs in GCC countries disclosed Sharīʿah board activities in the Sharīʿah report while 
none of IFIs in the UK disclosed the same.  
 
The study has found that the majority of IFIs (80% in Malaysia, 44.4% in GCC countries 
and 50% in the UK) disclosed a statement of Sharīʿah compliance in the Sharīʿah report. 
This finding indicates the weaknesses of disclosure practices with respect to the contents 
of the Sharīʿah report in the IFIs’ annual report. While IFIs are expected to at least state 
the declaration of Sharīʿah compliance duly endorsed by their Sharīʿah board, a 
significant percentage of them have failed to comply with this requirement and in fact 
more than 47% of eighty IFIs have not published a Sharīʿah report in their annual report. 
This position requires immediate concern on the part of IFIs as the Sharīʿah report or the 
declaration of Sharīʿah compliance in the annual report is important. Since the annual 
report is the main reference providing financial and non-financial information on IFIs, 
therefore the Sharīʿah report should be a mandatory requirement of the annual report.   
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9.1.2.5 Sharīʿah Pronouncements 
 
Transparency in Sharīʿah pronouncements would strengthen the stakeholders’ confidence 
in the IFIs’ credibility on the state of Sharīʿah compliance. The study explores the extent 
of transparency of Sharīʿah governance in the aspect of Sharīʿah pronouncements. There 
are three selected indicators to measure the level of disclosure of Sharīʿah 
pronouncements, namely Sharīʿah rulings are made known to the public, the content of 
Sharīʿah resolution only and Sharīʿah rulings with detailed Sharīʿah explanations. 
Table 9.16: Disclosure of Sharīʿah Pronouncements 
Disclosure of Percentage 
D25. Sharīʿah pronouncements are made known to the public 
via website, etc. 
10% 
D26. Sharīʿah resolution only 8.8% 
D27. Sharīʿah resolution with detailed Sharīʿah explanation 3.8% 
 
Table 9.16 indicates the low level of disclosure practice of Sharīʿah pronouncements. A 
total of 90% of IFIs have not published or made known to the public their Sharīʿah 
rulings. In addition, with regard to the content of the Sharīʿah rulings, 8.8% of IFIs 
disclosed the Sharīʿah resolution only and 3.8% disclosed the Sharīʿah rulings with a 
detailed Sharīʿah explanation. These findings clearly indicate that the disclosure practice 
of Sharīʿah rulings in IFIs is still at a very minimal and weak level of practice. The 
finding that only 10% of eighty IFIs published Sharīʿah rulings demonstrates serious 
shortcomings in Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice. The declaration of Sharīʿah 
compliance in the annual report per se is not adequate or sufficient to educate and create 
awareness on the essence of Sharīʿah rules and principles to the consumers, investors, 
depositors and general public. At this point, IFIs are expected to provide reliable and 
appropriate information pertaining to the Sharīʿah pronouncements issued by their 
Sharīʿah board.  
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Figure 9.12 illustrates the different practices of disclosure of Sharīʿah pronouncements in 
Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. Generally, the majority of IFIs in the case 
countries have neglected the disclosure and transparency aspects of Sharīʿah 
pronouncements. In Malaysia, only 15% of IFIs’ Sharīʿah rulings were made known to 
the public. In terms of the content of the Sharīʿah rulings, 15% of IFIs disclosed the 
Sharīʿah pronouncements only while 5% disclosed them with a detailed Sharīʿah 
explanation. A significantly low level of disclosure practice of IFIs in GCC countries was 
found, by which only 7.4% of IFIs published the Sharīʿah rulings, 5.5% disclosed 
Sharīʿah rulings only and 3.7% disclosed rulings with a detailed Sharīʿah explanation. A 
similar situation is found for IFIs in the UK, where 16.7% of IFIs disclosed the Sharīʿah 
rulings and made them known to the public in the form of the Sharīʿah rulings only. No 
IFIs in the UK have published Sharīʿah resolutions with detailed Sharīʿah explanations. 
These findings appear to demonstrate that the disclosure pertaining to Sharīʿah 
pronouncements is lacking in all of the case countries. 
9.1.2.6 Sharīʿah Compliance Review 
 
The Sharīʿah compliance review is of the utmost important to ascertain that all 
transactions, operations and dealings implemented by IFIs comply with Sharīʿah 
principles. Although most of the IFIs have established specific institutional arrangements 
for the Sharīʿah compliance review, it is also essential for them to disclose and mention 
this exercise somewhere, whether in the annual report, financial statement or on their 
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website. In view of the limited information available on the Sharīʿah compliance review, 
the study only identified one indicator to indicate the level of disclosure practice with 
respect to the Sharīʿah compliance review.  
 
Table 9.17: Disclosure of Sharīʿah Compliance Review 
Disclosure of Percentage 
D28. IFIs undertake Sharīʿah review 38.8% 
 
A Sharīʿah compliance review is adopted by most of the IFIs in all the case countries. 
Table 9.17 nevertheless demonstrates that more than 61% did not mention their 
undertaking of a Sharīʿah compliance review exercise. Only 38.8% of the IFIs disclosed 
their undertaking of a Sharīʿah review, either on their website or in their annual report or 
financial statements. This denotes that the depositors, investors and the general public are 
unaware or uncertain of the Sharīʿah compliance review process undertaken by IFIs. 
While the Sharīʿah review is crucial to IFIs for the purpose of ensuring the legitimacy of 
Islamic financial products and services; the finding of no more than 39% of IFIs 
disclosing their undertaking of a Sharīʿah compliance review demonstrates their weak 
disclosure practices of Sharīʿah governance.  












Figure 9.13 provides a comparative overview of the disclosure practices of IFIs with 
respect to the Sharīʿah compliance review. A total of 50% of IFIs of twenty in Malaysia 
mentioned their undertaking of a Sharīʿah compliance review, while 37% of fifty-four 
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IFIs in GCC countries and none of the six IFIs in the UK did the same. This finding 
shows that IFIs in Malaysia are slightly more transparent than IFIs in GCC countries and 
the UK with respect to the Sharīʿah compliance review disclosure. 
 
9.1.2.7 Information on Products and Services 
 
The study analyses the level of disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices pertaining to 
information on products and services. Two indicators are identified to demonstrate the 
extent of disclosure and transparency of information on products and services by IFIs, 
namely a list of Sharīʿah-compliant products and services and the details of Sharīʿah 
concepts and principles of products and services. 
 
Table 9.18: Disclosure of Information on Products and Services 
Disclosure of Percentage 
D29. List of Sharīʿah-compliant Products and Services 91.3% 




Table 9.18 provides that a significant number of IFIs (91.3%) disclosed the list of their 
Sharīʿah-compliant products and services. On the other hand, only 33.8% of IFIs 
disclosed or mentioned the details of the Sharīʿah concepts and principles of products 
and services on the websites or in the annual reports. The lack of disclosure and 
transparency on the details of the concepts and structure of products and services 
demonstrates the low level of initiative on the part of IFIs to educate customers, 
consumers and the public at large about Islamic financial transactions. It is the duty of 
each IFI to create awareness, to inculcate understanding and to educate people about 
specific features of Islamic financial products and services, differentiating them from 
their conventional counterparts. 
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Figure 9.14 illustrates the cross-border disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices on the 
aspect of information on products and services. There is good disclosure and 
transparency of information on products and services by IFIs in Malaysia (100%), GCC 
countries (87%) and the UK (100%). Nevertheless, a slightly low percentage of 
disclosure is found on the details of Sharīʿah concepts and principles (60% of IFIs in 
Malaysia, 24% in GCC countries and 33.3% in the UK). These figures also indicate that 
the majority of IFIs in Malaysia have initiated efforts to educate the public and 
consumers about details of Islamic financial products and services, while these practices 
are not so popular in GCC countries and the UK. This indirectly demonstrates that 
Malaysian consumers have better access to information on the Islamic financial products 
and services compared to consumers in GCC countries and the UK. 
9.1.3 Summary of the Overall Sharīʿah Governance Scores 
 
This section provides a summary of the overall findings of Sharīʿah governance scores 
from a country-specific behaviour perspective as well as according to year of 
incorporation. Both perspectives demonstrate different indications as to the extent of 
Sharīʿah governance disclosure in IFIs in each of the thirty indicators.  
9.1.3.1 Country-Specific Behaviour 
 
The study attempts to highlight the significant differences in the Sharīʿah governance 
practices of IFIs in the case countries. Table 9.19 illustrates the state of Sharīʿah 
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governance disclosure practices by presenting the overall scores of Sharīʿah governance 
indicators for each country. The findings suggest that IFIs in Malaysia have better 
Sharīʿah governance scores compared to their counterparts in GCC countries and the UK.  







D1 3 4 0 7 
D2 5 1 0 6 
Commitment to 
Sharīʿah 
Governance D3 9 36 4 49 
D4 5 7 1 13 
D5 4 5 0 9 
D6 20 47 6 73 
D7 20 19 5 44 
D8 20 18 5 43 
D9 7 0 1 8 
D10 20 47 6 73 
D11 19 19 5 43 
D12 15 24 4 43 
D13 10 19 0 29 
D14 19 43 6 68 
D15 7 6 3 16 
D16 5 0 0 5 
D17 4 2 0 6 
Sharīʿah Board 
Information 
D18 4 1 0 5 
D19 17 2 1 20 Sharīʿah Board 
Remuneration D20 16 2 1 19 
D21 16 24 3 43 
D22 9 6 0 15 
D23 1 4 0 5 
Sharīʿah Report 
D24 16 25 3 44 
D25 3 4 1 8 
D26 3 3 1 7 
Sharīʿah 
Pronouncements 
D27 1 2 0 3 
Sharīʿah Review D28 10 21 0 31 
D29 20 48 6 74 Information on 
Products and 
Services D30 12 13 2 27 
Average Score  16 8.4 10.7 10.5 








∗ The scores are generated from 30 Sharīʿah governance disclosure indicators as illustrated in table 9.1. 
The total scores of each IFI are 30. IFIs in Malaysia score 320 out of 600 (20x30), GCC Countries, 452 out 
of 1620 (54x30) and the UK, 64 out of 180 (6x30). The total scores are 836 out of 2400. The ‘average’ is 
formulated as the scores divide by the number of IFIs. 
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Table 9.19 clearly shows the level of practice of Sharīʿah governance disclosure from a 
country-specific behaviour perspective. The overall findings reveal that IFIs in Malaysia 
have better Sharīʿah governance disclosure scores with an average of 16 that falls into the 
‘Good Practice’ category. On the other hand, IFIs in GCC countries fall into the 
‘Emerging Practice’ category with an average score of 8.4. This is followed by IFIs in the 
UK that fall into the ‘Improved Practice’ category with an average score of 10.7. The 
average score of 10.5 for all eighty IFIs indicates that the state of Sharīʿah governance 
disclosure practices is still at a minimal level as they just fall into the ‘Improved Practice’ 
category. 
 
Most of the IFIs (more than 50%) in Malaysia have disclosed information on sixteen 
indicators, namely D6, D7–D11, D12–D14, D19–D21, D24 and D28–D30. In contrast, 
most of the IFIs in GCC countries have disclosed Sharīʿah-related information on only 
five indicators, i.e. D3, D6, D10, D14 and D29. Interestingly, IFIs in the UK have better 
disclosure practices compared to IFIs in GCC countries in that most of them have 
disclosed information on twelve indicators, namely D3, D6–8, D10–D12, D14–D15, 
D21, D24 and D29. Generally, all of the IFIs have good disclosure practices for the 
information pertaining to products and services and very weak practices with respect to 
the disclosure of Sharīʿah pronouncements. These findings strongly affirm the research 
proposition of there being significant differences in Sharīʿah governance disclosure 
practices in the case countries.  
9.1.3.2 Sharīʿah Governance Score According to Cluster  
 
As well as analysing country-specific behaviour of IFIs in relation to Sharīʿah 
governance disclosure practices, the study further examines the disclosure practices from 
the year of incorporation perspective. It is worth noting that this section should be read 
together with section 9.1.1.2. Unlike the macro analysis presented in section 9.1.1.2, this 
section exhibits a micro analysis of the Sharīʿah governance disclosure index in the four 
different clusters of IFIs. Table 9.20 demonstrates the relationship between the ages of 
the IFIs and the extent of Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice in each of the thirty 
Investigating Sharīʿah Governance through Unobtrusive Research: Analysis of the Annual Report, 




indicators. The study finds that IFIs in Cluster 3, namely institutions which were 
incorporated in 2001–2005, have better disclosure practices compared to IFIs in Clusters 
1, 2 and 3.  



















D1 2 2 1 2 7 
D2 2 2 0 2 6 
Commitment to 
Sharīʿah 
Governance D3 8 3 16 22 49 
D4 3 3 4 3 13 
D5 1 3 4 0 9 
D6 10 14 26 23 73 
D7 10 2 16 16 44 
D8 2 9 16 16 43 
D9 1 3 3 1 8 
D10 10 14 26 23 73 
D11 2 10 16 15 43 
D12 8 4 15 16 43 
D13 7 3 12 7 29 
D14 8 14 24 22 68 
D15 1 3 6 6 16 
D16 1 1 1 2 5 
D17 1 1 2 2 6 
Sharīʿah Board 
Information 
D18 0 2 1 2 5 
D19 3 5 7 5 20 Sharīʿah Board 
Remuneration D20 3 5 7 4 19 
D21 10 9 15 9 43 
D22 2 1 8 4 15 
D23 1 0 2 2 5 
Sharīʿah Report 
D24 10 9 16 9 44 
D25 1 2 4 1 8 
D26 0 2 3 1 7 
Sharīʿah 
Pronouncements 
D27 0 1 2 0 3 
Sharīʿah Review D28 8 4 11 8 31 
D29 12 13 26 23 74 Information on 
Products and 
Services D30 6 5 9 7 27 
Average Score  11 9.9 11.5 9.4 10.5 










∗ The scores are generated from 30 Sharīʿah governance disclosure indicators as illustrated in table 9.1. 
The total scores of each IFI are 30. IFIs in Cluster 1 score 133 out of 360 (12x30), Cluster 2, 149 out of 450 
(15x30), Cluster 3, 299 out of 780 (26x30) and Cluster 4, 253 out of 810 (27x30). The total scores are 836 
out of 2400. The ‘average’ is formulated as the scores divide by the number of IFIs. 
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Table 9.20 reveals that there is a negative correlation between the age of the IFI based on 
year of incorporation and the extent of Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice. The 
findings show that the average scores of the senior IFIs in Cluster 1 is eleven, which falls 
into the ‘Improved Practice’ category, while IFIs in Clusters 2 and 4 fall into the 
‘Emerging Practice’ category, with average scores of 9.9 and 9.5 respectively. IFIs in 
Cluster 3 show slightly better disclosure practices with an average of 11.5, which falls 
into the ‘Improved Practice’ category.  
 
IFIs in Cluster 4 scored very low on the Sharīʿah governance disclosure index. In fact, 
fewer than five IFIs in Cluster 4 disclosed information on fifteen indicators, namely D1, 
D2, D4, D5, D9, D16, D17, D18, D19, D20, D22, D23, D25, D26 and D27. On the other 
hand, the IFIs in Cluster 3 scored slightly better than the rest of the IFIs in Clusters 1,2 
and 4. Most of the IFIs in Cluster 3 disclosed information on eleven indicators, i.e. D3, 
D6, D7, D8, D10, D11, D12, D14, D21, D24 and D29. These findings affirm the study’s 
proposition of the negative correlation between the age of an IFI based on year of 
incorporation and the level of Sharīʿah governance disclosure practice. The early 
established IFIs in Cluster 1 that have more experience compared to other IFIs in Cluster 
3 have a very minimal score of Sharīʿah governance disclosure indicators. This is rather a 
disappointing result as the earlier IFIs were established by those people closer to the 
aspirational view of an Islamic moral economy. 
9.2 Conclusion 
 
Basically, this study specifically explores the level of disclosure and transparency of 
Sharīʿah governance practices. Disclosure and transparency in Sharīʿah governance 
practices are effective mechanisms for exposing IFIs to market discipline and 
encouraging them towards a good governance framework and, more importantly, 
strengthening the stakeholders’ confidence in the IFIs’ credibility and in their Sharīʿah-
compliant products and services. The study indicates that there are significance 
differences in the disclosure and transparency of Sharīʿah governance practices in 
Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. Despite considerable efforts being made by IFIs to 
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improve the level of transparency and disclosure of Sharīʿah governance, the study 
proves that the level of disclosure practices of Sharīʿah governance-related information is 
relatively low, where 37.5% of IFIs are ranked in the ‘Emerging Practice’ category, 
followed by 30% in ‘Improved Practice’, 15% in ‘Good Practice’, more than 16% in 
‘Underdeveloped Practice’ and only 1.3% in the ‘Best Practice’ category. The results 
further indicate that there are weaknesses and deficiencies in the current system of 
disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices.  
 
The research findings make it clear that the current state of disclosure and transparency of 
Sharīʿah governance practices deserves immediate attention, further reform and 
improvement, at least in the aspects of commitment to Sharīʿah governance, Sharīʿah 
board information, Sharīʿah report, Sharīʿah compliance review, Sharīʿah 
pronouncements and information on products and services. It was observed that IFIs in 
Malaysia are slightly more transparent than their counterparts in GCC countries and the 
UK in all six disclosure aspects of Sharīʿah governance practices. This position denotes 
that a proactive regulatory approach to the Sharīʿah governance framework, as practised 
by Malaysia, significantly influences the state of disclosure and transparency of Sharīʿah 
governance practices as compared to the reactive regulatory approach in the UK and the 
minimalist regulatory approach in GCC countries. In this regard, undeniably, Malaysia’s 
model of Sharīʿah governance has proven that a strong and comprehensive regulatory 
framework for Islamic finance would be able to drive the market towards more 
transparent governance practices.  
 
On top of the analysis from a country-specific behaviour perspective, the study also 
indicates the research proposition that there is a negative correlation between the ages of 
IFIs based on year of incorporation and the level of Sharīʿah governance disclosure 
practice. IFIs in Cluster 3, which were incorporated in 2001–2005, have less experience 
compared to the IFIs in Clusters 1 and 2 yet have a better score on the Sharīʿah 
governance disclosure index. This indicates that the level of Sharīʿah governance 
disclosure practice is determined by other internal and external factors, such as regulation 
and well-conceived by-laws and internal policies of IFIs.  
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In view of the diverse Sharīʿah governance practices and distinct legal environments in 
the UK and GCC countries, the adoption of the Malaysian model alone would not be able 
to foster more transparent Sharīʿah governance practices. In fact, excessive government 
interference and too many regulations and restrictions may affect the level of efficiency 
and competitiveness of IFIs in the market. At this point, an integrated and eclectic 
approach, achieved by identifying the best practices, would be the ideal and appropriate 
way of promoting a good Sharīʿah governance framework. In addition, good practice of 
disclosure and transparency would be able to enhance the comparability of cross-border 
Sharīʿah governance practices that promote stable, coherent and consistent Sharīʿah 
practices. This comparability factor would be useful for regulatory authorities as well as 
financial institutions to make information on the ideal and appropriate Sharīʿah 
governance framework that governs Sharīʿah practices available to all stakeholders; this 
could then be formalized in the forms of institutions, resolutions, regulations, guidelines 
or requirements.  
 






CONTEXTUALISING THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
10.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter represents one of the most important parts of the thesis. It provides a brief 
discussion of the research findings and offers some recommendations for further 
enhancement of the Sharīʿah governance system. Based on the analysis of the survey, the 
semi-structured interview and the content analysis approach carried out in this research, 
subsection 10.1 illustrates how the research findings answer all of the hypotheses and 
research questions formulated in this study in an integrated manner. From these analyses, 
the chapter will extract and identify the issues, weaknesses and problems pertaining to the 
existing Sharīʿah governance system. Eventually, the chapter suggests some practical 
recommendations in subsection 10.2 for policy makers, regulators, IFIs, practitioners and 
other stakeholders to enhance and strengthen the Sharīʿah governance framework that is 
necessary for the development of the Islamic finance industry in the future.  
10.1 Discussion on the Overall Research Findings 
 
This section discusses the overall research findings and attempts to illustrate how they 
answer the research questions and hypotheses. The findings were extracted from three 
different analysis and research methods, namely the survey questionnaires, the semi-
structured interviews and the content analysis. The study employed two methods, the 
questionnaires and the semi-structured interviews, to test the research hypotheses 1–6, 
while the content analysis method was exclusively utilized to answer the research 
hypothesis 7. The analysis in this section will be based on the findings from the survey 
questionnaires and the interviews of the fourteen Sharīʿah scholars as well as the content 
analysis of the annual reports, financial statements and websites of eighty IFIs in 
Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. A brief discussion on all these findings will be 
made in separate subsections 10.1.1–10.1.7. In summary, this study has yielded 
substantial findings and successfully fulfilled all of the research aim and objectives. After 





this brief summary of the research process, the discussion on the findings is now 
presented with reference to each hypothesis. 
10.1.1 Hypothesis 1: There are differences in the various IFIs’ approaches to 
Sharīʿah governance. 
 
In responding to this hypothesis, seven questions were formulated in the questionnaires 
and four questions in the semi-structured interviews. Consistent with the prediction in 
hypothesis 1, the survey findings reveal significant differences in the approaches of 
regulators and IFIs to Sharīʿah governance. The results show that Malaysia presents a 
better commitment to Sharīʿah governance by scoring a higher percentage in every 
question compared to IFIs in GCC countries and the UK; this includes the adoption of the 
internal Sharīʿah governance standards and guidelines, standard processes for Sharīʿah 
compliance, code of ethics and organizational arrangement. It was shown that more than 
70% of IFIs in Malaysia have developed standard processes for Sharīʿah compliance and 
a code of ethics for their Sharīʿah board. On the other hand, IFIs in GCC countries and 
the UK are relatively still in the period of developing their Sharīʿah governance 
framework. Although Malaysia’s approach might not be the ideal model for IFIs in GCC 
countries and the UK, certain positive policies on the Malaysian regulatory-based 
approach might be appropriate to be adopted. Findings from the semi-structured 
interviews affirm the above position. The Sharīʿah advisors also acknowledged the 
differences in Sharīʿah governance approaches in IFIs. In fact, the Sharīʿah scholars 
highlighted four main Sharīʿah governance issues that need to be appropriately 
addressed, namely roles of regulators, regulation, IFIs’ management and Sharīʿah rulings. 
 
Out of the above overall analysis, it is worth highlighting two further very important 
issues, namely the problems with the AAOIFI governance standards and Sharīʿah 
scholars’ understanding of the impact of poor practice of Sharīʿah governance. While the 
AAOIFI governance standards are expected to provide guidelines of best practice of the 
Sharīʿah governance system, it was found that these standards have not been reviewed 
and to a certain extent some of the principles are not relevant or appropriate to implement 





in the current market practice. In addition, some Sharīʿah scholars highlighted their 
concern about the credibility of the standards as they have been approved by the AAOIFI 
Sharīʿah board who are at the same time advising numerous IFIs around the world, which 
is improper and inappropriate. The researcher considers that these two factors are 
amongst the reasons why only 45.7% of IFIs indicated that they have adopted the 
AAOIFI governance standards.  
 
With regards to the second issue, the research findings from the semi-structured 
interviews reveal that some Sharīʿah scholars have a lack of understanding of the aspect 
of Sharīʿah non-compliance risk and its implications. They viewed that the impact of 
poor Sharīʿah governance practice is solely related to the perception and credibility of the 
IFI. This is a serious misconception as the implication of a poor Sharīʿah governance 
system goes beyond image and credibility but may in fact expose the IFIs to significant 
Sharīʿah non-compliance risks. Failure to mitigate this Sharīʿah non-compliance risk will 
lead to numerous impacts for IFIs, both financial and non-financial. Consistent with the 
findings on the attributes of the Sharīʿah board in terms of competence, the study found 
that Sharīʿah boards have generally not received or undergone adequate training to 
expand their knowledge of the technical aspects of Islamic banking and finance or to 
understand any kind of risk management. 
10.1.2 Hypothesis 2: There are differences in the regulatory and internal 
frameworks of Sharīʿah governance in IFIs. 
 
To test this hypothesis, the findings of four questions in the questionnaires and only one 
question in the semi-structured interviews are utilized. The survey reveals that there are 
significant differences in the regulations and by-laws or internal policies of IFIs 
pertaining to Sharīʿah governance. It was found that a small percentage of 6% of IFIs in 
GCC countries viewed that there were separate rules and regulations on Sharīʿah 
governance and 10% claimed that they had written policies pertaining to the Sharīʿah 
board. IFIs in Malaysia, on the other hand, indicated positively to the regulatory and 
internal policies by scoring higher in every question posed in the survey. While the UK 





regulatory authority is still reluctant to interfere with Sharīʿah governance, the survey 
shows that the UK IFIs have developed their own internal by-laws on Sharīʿah 
governance. The answers given by the Sharīʿah scholars in the semi-structured interviews 
affirm that different IFIs have different internal frameworks of Sharīʿah governance and 
only some IFIs have written policies or by-laws on it.  
 
Having considered that the Islamic finance industry is still at a developing stage, the 
findings in this study indicate that the Sharīʿah governance system needs comprehensive 
regulatory frameworks at the macro level as well as internal by-laws at the micro level. 
These two components are very important to complement each other as the internal by-
laws would set clear frameworks and well-defined policy on Sharīʿah governance for 
internal use, whereas the regulatory framework at the macro level will provide clear 
guidelines and principles for the best Sharīʿah governance practice that would be able to 
boost the confidence of the public, investors and other stakeholders. In view of the 
minimal regulations on the Sharīʿah governance system in most of the case countries, the 
researcher insists on the notion of strengthening the practice of Sharīʿah governance by 
adopting the regulatory-based approach as well as self-regulation.  
 
10.1.3 Hypothesis 3: There are differences in the roles and functions of the Sharīʿah 
board. 
 
To answer this hypothesis, four questions were posed in the questionnaires to the 
respondents and two questions to the Sharīʿah scholars. The survey reveals that most of 
the IFIs view that the Sharīʿah board has advisory and supervisory functions and only 3% 
pointed out that it has executive power. The results from the survey show that there are 
significant differences in the ex post and ex ante functions of Sharīʿah boards. With 
respect to the ex ante functions of the Sharīʿah board, such as Sharīʿah pronouncements, 
the Sharīʿah review, endorsing documentation and Sharīʿah compliance, the majority of 
IFIs in Malaysia indicated that their Sharīʿah board clearly had these functions, while the 
IFIs in GCC countries and the UK showed otherwise. Meanwhile, most of the IFIs in the 
case countries demonstrated weak practices in the area of ex post functions of the 





Sharīʿah board. In the semi-structured interviews, most of the Sharīʿah board agreed that 
they have advisory and supervisory authorities.  
 
In discussing the roles of Sharīʿah board, the study strongly recommends the notion of 
expanding its scope of duties and functions. The Sharīʿah board should not only focus on 
and emphasize the legal and mechanistic aspects of Sharīʿah pronouncements but rather 
take into consideration elements of Islamic ethics and values as well as the social 
dimension. On the basis of the stakeholder-oriented system being the aspirational 
dimension of Islamic corporate governance, the Sharīʿah board should play an active role 
as the stakeholders’ representative in promoting Islamic values, ethics and social 
responsibility. It is also important for the Sharīʿah board to have a paradigm shift by 
invoking the principles of substance over form. Despite different views amongst the 
Sharīʿah scholars on this issue, the findings in the semi-structured interviews affirm that 
some Sharīʿah scholars have acknowledged their additional roles in promoting these 
three core elements. This indirectly indicates that Sharīʿah scholars have admitted that 
the current Sharīʿah governance practice pertaining to the scope of responsibilities of the 
Sharīʿah board is very narrow and is mainly confined to the issuance of Sharīʿah rulings. 
10.1.4 Hypothesis 4: There are differences in the attributes of Sharīʿah board 
members in terms of competence, independence, and transparency and 
confidentiality. 
 
In answering this hypothesis, eighteen questions were asked in the questionnaires (eight 
on competence, six on independence and four on transparency and confidentiality) and 
seven questions in the semi-structured interviews (three on competence, two on 
independence and two on transparency and confidentiality). The findings show that most 
of the IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK (77%) have mechanisms in place 
pertaining to the competence of the Sharīʿah board. It was nevertheless found that there 
are significant differences in the fit and proper criteria for the Sharīʿah board, namely 
academic qualifications, experience and exposure, and track record. The survey reveals 
some concerns about the adequacy of the Sharīʿah board’s ability in the technical aspects 
of banking and finance. Only a small percentage of IFIs conduct formal training or 





allocate a certain amount of funds for training for their Sharīʿah board members. This 
was affirmed by the Sharīʿah scholars in the semi-structured interviews. Majority of them 
have not undergone any specific training to enhance and improve their technical ability in 
banking and finance. The Sharīʿah scholars also affirmed that it is not an established 
practice for IFIs to evaluate the Sharīʿah board’s performance. 
 
The survey demonstrates significant differences in the mechanisms of independence of 
the Sharīʿah board. Despite the AAOIFI governance standards requiring the appointment 
to be made by the shareholders, the majority of IFIs have nevertheless made the 
appointments through the BOD. Almost all of the IFIs in Malaysia and the UK appointed 
their Sharīʿah board through the BOD, while most board members in the GCC countries 
were appointed by the shareholders. The Sharīʿah scholars affirm that they were 
generally appointed by the BOD. While Sharīʿah scholars generally agreed on the issue 
of potential conflict of interest and independence, they nevertheless were of the view that 
some other mechanism might be needed to be in place to avoid that in spite of the method 
of appointment. It was also found that there is no restriction on multiple appointments of 
Sharīʿah board members in GCC countries or the UK as in the case of Malaysia. 
Similarly with the issue of mandate and authority, the overall findings indicate that some 
IFIs did not grant clear mandate and authority to the Sharīʿah board.  
 
The study identifies some inconsistencies with reference to the issues of independence 
and potential conflict of interest. While it is generally accepted that there must be 
mechanisms in place to ensure the independence of the Sharīʿah board, the present 
practice indicates that a significant percentage of IFIs have not addressed this issue 
appropriately. In addition, the findings in this study reveal that some Sharīʿah scholars 
have denied any potential conflict of interest as they are bound by Islamic ethical 
principles. In view of these circumstances, the researcher intends to highlight the 
misconceptions of the terms independence and conflict of interest. Independence should 
be the hallmark of Sharīʿah boards’ profession, which means that they are expected to be 
professionally independent and any appearance that may undermine the perception of 





independence must be avoided. With regard to the issue of conflict of interest, although 
ideally Sharīʿah scholars are presumed to be honest, truthful and worthy of confidence, 
considering that they are human beings, in reality the issue of conflict of interest may 
happen, especially when they sit on the boards of various IFIs at one particular time. At 
this point, the researcher considers that the issues of independence and potential conflict 
of interest are real and the framework of Sharīʿah governance must be able to address 
these specific issues in order to ensure that the Sharīʿah board can perform its functions 
effectively and with full credibility.  
 
The survey shows that the majority of IFIs do not have a written policy on the preparation 
and dissemination of Sharīʿah information and not all IFIs grant authority to the Sharīʿah 
board to have full access to information. Similar situation is found in the aspect of 
Sharīʿah rulings that are made known to the public. In addition, the majority of IFIs do 
not have a policy on mechanisms of confidentiality for the Sharīʿah board. The Sharīʿah 
scholars conceived that they have access to information and they are bound by the terms 
of the contract with respect to the issue of confidentiality. In reality, some Sharīʿah 
scholars intentionally or unintentionally have disclosed certain confidential information 
to other third parties which may impede the business strategy of particular IFIs (Madzlan, 
2009). These findings indicate that there are shortcomings and weaknesses in the 
Sharīʿah governance framework in terms of full disclosure, transparency and 
mechanisms to ensure confidentiality, which may result in Sharīʿah and reputational 
risks. 
10.1.5 Hypothesis 5: There are differences in the operational procedures of Sharīʿah 
governance practices.  
 
In examining this hypothesis, twelve questions were formulated in the survey 
questionnaires and three questions in the semi-structured interviews. The survey reveals 
significant differences in the operational procedures of Sharīʿah governance in terms of 
meetings, basis of the decisions, meeting procedures, review of Sharīʿah rulings, the 
Sharīʿah report and its contents. Most of the IFIs in Malaysia have standard operational 





procedures but only a small percentage of IFIs in the UK and GCC countries have the 
same. Similarly in the aspect of the Sharīʿah report, where it is found that only 16% of 
IFIs in GCC countries indicated that the Sharīʿah report was part of their internal 
requirements. In the semi-structured interviews, the Sharīʿah scholars affirmed the 
differences in operational procedures in IFIs. They also heavily rely on the internal 
Sharīʿah audit and are not proactive in carrying out their ex post functions. 
 
In analysing the significant differences in the operational procedures, the researcher to 
highlight three core issues in this subject, namely the requirement of having standard 
operational procedures, the Sharīʿah report and the heavy reliance on the internal 
Sharīʿah audit. The findings from both the questionnaires and the semi-structured 
interviews affirm that a significant percentage of Sharīʿah boards of IFIs are operating 
within unclear and ambiguous frameworks. The absence of standard operational 
procedures on the Sharīʿah governance system may create problems and impede the 
smooth running of the Sharīʿah governance process, which may expose the IFIs to 
potentially significant Sharīʿah non-compliance risk. The study also reveals the weak 
Sharīʿah report practice both in the aspect of reporting structure as well as its content. 
With respect to the ex post functions of Sharīʿah board, the issue of heavily reliance on 
the internal Sharīʿah audit indicates that these functions are actually greatly determined 
by the internal audit department rather than by the Sharīʿah board itself.   
10.1.6 Hypothesis 6: The IFIs are satisfied with the performance and contribution 
of the Sharīʿah board. 
 
In analysing this hypothesis, five questions were asked in the questionnaires and one 
question in the semi-structured interviews. As expected, the survey reveals the broad 
satisfaction of IFIs with the performance and contribution of the Sharīʿah board. Almost 
all of the IFIs were satisfied with the contribution made by the Sharīʿah board in terms of 
organizational accountability, communication, evaluation of Sharīʿah non-compliance 
risk, promotion of Islamic ethics and improvement of Sharīʿah control processes. 
Interestingly, it was nevertheless found that some IFIs in GCC countries indicated that 





they are dissatisfied with the Sharīʿah board’s performance and contribution, particularly 
in the aspects of effective organizational communication, identifying Sharīʿah non-
compliance risks, promoting Islamic ethics and values as well as Sharīʿah control 
processes. On the other hand, in the semi-structured interviews the Sharīʿah scholars 
strongly denied any allegation that they have neglected the social and ethical 
considerations in making Sharīʿah decisions. In fact, some Sharīʿah scholars did mention 
that they are also concerned about the social dimension and ethical values in carrying out 
their functions. However, they highlighted the problems and challenges in influencing the 
IFIs to be more socially responsible due to their commercial and profit-driven nature.  
 
While examining the Sharīʿah governance practices on the aspect of assessment and 
evaluation of the Sharīʿah board’s performance and contribution, the researcher tends to 
emphasize certain negative findings extracted from the questionnaires and the semi-
structured interviews. Despite the majority of IFIs indicating that they are satisfied with 
the Sharīʿah board’s contribution, 2.8% of IFIs viewed that the Sharīʿah board has failed 
to identify and evaluate Sharīʿah non-compliance risk and to promote continuous 
improvement in Sharīʿah control processes and 5.7% of IFIs have neglected the duty to 
promote Islamic values and ethics. Considering the earlier finding that only 57.1% of IFIs 
have conducted a proper evaluation and assessment of the Sharīʿah board, these negative 
findings are considered relatively significant. In fact, the findings from the semi-
structured interviews further reveal that the Sharīʿah board is often unable to influence 
IFIs towards being more ethical and socially responsible due to the conflict between 
profit and social motives. These circumstances indirectly affirm the criticisms and 
concerns of numerous scholars such as Siddiqi (2007), El Gamal (2006), Chapra (2010) 
and even Sheikh Saleh Kamel, the founder of Dallah Baraka Group,219 about the exact 
roles and contribution of the Sharīʿah board towards fulfilling the maqāsid Sharīʿah. 
Having analysed the overall issues relating to the poor evaluation of the Sharīʿah board’s 
performance contribution, the IFIs should continuously perform formal Sharīʿah board 
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assessments at least in respect of effective organizational accountability, communication 
with other organs of governance, ability to identify and evaluate the Sharīʿah risk, effort 
to promote Islamic ethics and values, and continuous improvement of an organization’s 
Sharīʿah control processes. 
10.1.7 Hypothesis 7: There are differences in the extent of disclosure of Sharīʿah 
governance practices. 
 
The study exclusively used the content analysis approach of the annual reports, financial 
statements and websites in answering research hypothesis 7. The study introduced thirty 
Sharīʿah governance disclosure indicators in order to measure and quantify the extent and 
state of disclosure practice in IFIs. The overall findings of the survey reveal that there are 
significant differences in the extent of disclosure of Sharīʿah governance practices. The 
level of disclosure in GCC countries is very minimal, where 55% of IFIs are ranked in 
the ‘Emerging Practice’ category and none of them in the ‘Good Practice’ or ‘Best 
Practice’ categories. Interestingly, the extent of disclosure practices in the UK is fair and 
better than GCC countries as 20% of UK IFIs are ranked in each of the ‘Improved 
Practice’ and ‘Good Practice’ categories. On the other hand, the results for IFIs in 
Malaysia were slightly better than GCC countries and the UK, as more than 80% of IFIs 
fall into the ‘Improved Practice’, ‘Good Practice’ and ‘“Best Practice’ categories.  
 
The finding of poor and fair Sharīʿah governance disclosure practices in the eighty IFIs 
in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK indicates their failure to appreciate the core 
values of Islamic corporate governance, namely accountability and transparency. The 
study also reveals that, in fact, the so-called senior IFIs that were established by those 
people closer to the aspirational view of Islamic economics also only demonstrated ‘fair’ 
Sharīʿah governance disclosure practices. We can see from this finding that good 
commitment and initiative to improve transparency, which indicates accountability, do 
not depend on the years of operation but rather it is determined by the internal organs of 
governance in IFIs, particularly the Sharīʿah board, the BOD and the senior management. 
As Islam strongly emphasizes these two principles, the disclosure of all information 





relating to Sharīʿah advisory services is imperative as it is able to promote the confidence 
of the public and stakeholders as to the credibility of IFIs.  
10.1.8 Overall Conclusion 
 
Based on the overall research findings, this study summarizes the state of Sharīʿah 
governance practices in IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK by classifying them 
into five different categories, as illustrated in Tables 10.1 and 10.2.  
 































17.1% 8.6% 40% 32%  ‘Improved 
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Table 10.1 illustrates the state of Sharīʿah governance practices pertaining to hypotheses 
1–6 whereas Table 10.2 specifically demonstrates the level of Sharīʿah governance 
disclosure practice for hypothesis 7. Both tables reveal that the average level of Sharīʿah 
governance practices in IFIs only falls into the ‘Improved Practice’ category, showing the 
weak governance practices and indicating the need for major improvement in almost all 
aspects of Sharīʿah governance. Within these negative findings, the study demonstrates 
that IFIs in Malaysia have better Sharīʿah governance practices when compared to IFIs in 
GCC countries and the UK in that they fall into the ‘Good Practice’ category for 
hypotheses 1–6 and the ‘Improved Practice’ category for hypothesis 7. The study 
suggests three main propositions from the above research findings. Firstly, a strong 
regulatory framework leads to better Sharīʿah governance practices. Secondly, less 
interference from regulatory authorities and lack of a regulatory framework for Sharīʿah 
governance contribute to the weak Sharīʿah governance practices. Thirdly, the extent of 
Sharīʿah governance practices is also determined by the attitude of IFIs’ management.  
 
A comprehensive regulatory framework is one of the factors that significantly influences 
the level of Sharīʿah governance practices. Well-conceived regulation and a proactive 
approach of the regulatory authorities, such as in the case of Malaysia, contribute to 
better development of a Sharīʿah governance system. Considering the importance of an 
integrated regulatory approach, the study suggests that having numerous rules and 
regulations on Sharīʿah governance will not guarantee the improvement of Sharīʿah 
governance practices in the industry per se. Supervision and enforcement are essential to 
ensure compliance with the existing rules, regulations and guidelines. This important 
point then leads to the formulation of the second proposition.  
 
The study suggests that less interference and lack of a regulatory framework for Sharīʿah 
governance is one of the factors that impedes the extent of Sharīʿah governance practices. 
In view of the market immaturity in the Islamic finance industry, and lack of self-
initiative on the aspect of governance, we cannot expect that IFIs will develop and 
portray strong Sharīʿah governance practices voluntarily and without proper supervision. 





This is affirmed by the findings on the state of Sharīʿah governance practices in GCC 
countries. Although regulatory frameworks in Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar clearly 
mention the adoption of the AAOIFI governance standards, the implementation of these 
governance standards has nevertheless not significantly or positively influenced the level 
of Sharīʿah governance practice. This position denotes that having an appropriate legal 
framework without proper supervision and enforcement will not guarantee the betterment 
of Sharīʿah governance practices in IFIs.  
 
While the first two propositions refer to the external factors of Sharīʿah governance 
practices, the third proposition concerns an internal factor in that it denotes the 
importance of a proactive approach of the individual IFI to facilitate the implementation 
of Islamic finance by emphasizing the requirement of Sharīʿah compliance. In this 
regard, the state of Sharīʿah governance practices in IFIs is greatly dependent on the 
attitude of IFIs’ management, particularly its BOD, senior management and Sharīʿah 
board. Full commitment of the IFIs’ management to the aspect of Sharīʿah compliance is 
one of the determining factors for better Sharīʿah governance practice. Well-conceived 
by-laws and internal policies on Sharīʿah governance at IFI or micro level will then 
complement the rules and guidelines regulated at the macro level.  
 
In summary, the study concludes that the overall Sharīʿah governance practices in 
Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK are still at a very minimal level. Based on the 
whole research analysis and observations, the study suggests that the extent of Sharīʿah 
governance practices is greatly dependent on the regulatory frameworks, the proactive 
approach of regulatory authorities and the positive attitude of the IFIs’ management. 
These three components are the determining factors to ensure better Sharīʿah governance 
practices in IFIs. Therefore, any efforts and initiatives at the micro or macro level for the 
improvement and enhancement of Sharīʿah governance practices must be supported and 
facilitated with a comprehensive and integrated regulatory framework, strong support 
from regulatory authorities and the positive attitude of IFIs’ management. 





10.2 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Based on the revealed findings of the analyses presented in this research, this section 
presents a number of recommendations. It should be stated that the recommendations put 
forward in this study are consistent with the existing guidelines on corporate and 
Sharīʿah governance of the AAOIFI and the IFSB. The study also takes into 
consideration two documents jointly initiated by the IFSB and the Islamic Research and 
Training Institute of the IDB, namely the Islamic Financial Services Industry 
Development; Ten Year Framework and Strategies220 and Islamic Finance and Global 
Financial Stability.221 In this systematic effort, some recommendations might overlap 
with the guiding principles and governance standards as well as the IFSB and IRTI 
documents, but the study takes another approach by emphasizing and detailing out 
necessary measures for further enhancing existing Sharīʿah governance practices. 
Besides, the recommendations also take into account the general principle of good 
corporate governance as promoted by the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and 
the standard on enhancing corporate governance for banking organizations by the 
BCBS.222 The researcher considers that the key principles of corporate governance 
contained in those guidelines and principles are also applicable to Sharīʿah governance in 
IFIs.  
 
As a basis of the recommendations, the study emphasizes six key elements of sound 
corporate governance, as recommended by Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007: 285): “(i) a well 
articulated corporate strategy; (ii) setting and enforcing clear assignments of 
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has existed since the early stage of Islamic civilization. There are numerous verses of al-Qur'an and al-
Sunnah mentioning the principles of accountability, responsibility, disclosure, transparency, business 
ethics, book-keeping and final accounts. 





responsibilities, decision-making authority and accountabilities that is appropriate for the 
bank’s risk profile; (iii) a strong financial risk management function, adequate internal 
control systems and functional process design; (iv) adequate corporate values, codes of 
conduct and other standard appropriate behaviour and effective systems used for ensuring 
compliance; and (v) financial and managerial incentives be consistent with the firm’s 
objectives, performance and ethical values.” The study also offers some 
recommendations to enhance the existing Sharīʿah governance framework by promoting 
the key elements of a good Sharīʿah board and these include independence, competence, 
transparency and disclosure, consistency, well-defined operating procedures, a sound 
code of ethics, and clear mandate and responsibility.  
10.2.1 Sharīʿah Governance Approach  
10.2.1.1 Stakeholder-Oriented Approach 
 
The foundational dimension of Islamic corporate governance is rooted in the stakeholder-
oriented approach, in which its governance style aims at protecting the rights and 
interests of all stakeholders rather than maximizing the shareholders’ profit as in the 
shareholder value orientation. Considering the dominant position of the shareholder value 
model of corporate governance, particularly in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK, the 
researcher strongly insists the IFIs depart from this inappropriate system by adopting the 
stakeholder-oriented approach to corporate governance.223 The adoption of the 
stakeholder-oriented approach would be able to enhance the corporate governance 
dimension of IFIs, where all stakeholders, such as the Sharīʿah board, the BOD, the 
shareholders, the depositors and the managers play significant roles in ensuring the 
realization of the corporation’s goal and fulfilling the maqāsid Sharīʿah. This will help to 
bring the IFIs closer to the aspirational position of an Islamic moral economy. 
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10.2.1.2 Regulatory-Based Approach 
 
The research findings reveal that the jurisdiction with the strongest regulatory framework 
has better Sharīʿah governance practices in almost every aspect. The call for a strong 
regulatory and supervisory framework for IFIs has actually been made since 1981 in the 
detailed report of the governors of the central banks of the OIC countries on the 
“Promotion, Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks” (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002: 
76) and followed by the World Bank Note on Risk Analysis for IFIs (Greuning and Iqbal, 
2008: 193). El Hawary, Grais and Iqbal (2004: 789–791) suggest the need for regulation 
in IFIs by emphasizing the elements of public opinion, protection of public resources, 
integrity of fiduciary duties arising from contractual agreements, and ensuring Sharīʿah 
compliance.  
 
In view of the infancy of the Islamic finance industry and the numerous challenges that 
may impede the development of Islamic finance, it is strongly recommended that a 
Sharīʿah governance system be systematically regulated. In outlining the appropriate 
legal framework for Islamic finance, a study by the IMF on prudential and supervision 
issues in Islamic finance laid down three important key points pertaining to governance 
in IFIs, namely the legal foundation for supervision of IFIs must be in place, all kinds of 
risk must be dealt with, and there must be adequate information disclosure (Errico and 
Farahbaksh, 1998: 15). In this regard, the study strongly recommends that the regulators 
and policy makers should promulgate specific regulations on a Sharīʿah governance 
system by taking into consideration the key points formulated by Errico and Farahbaksh 
(1998). This regulatory framework should cover the whole process of Sharīʿah 
governance by considering the overall market practice and the local legal environment. 
While regulation is expected to govern and regulate the market effectively, it is worth 
noting that over-restrictive regulation can also be counter-productive and may impede the 
development of Islamic finance. With this understanding, the regulators should also take 
into consideration all aspects in tailoring the regulatory framework for Sharīʿah 
governance. 





10.2.1.3 Centralized Sharīʿah Board 
 
The ideal Sharīʿah governance system requires a proper structure for a Sharīʿah board. It 
is good practice to have two layers of Sharīʿah board structure, namely Sharīʿah boards 
at both micro and macro levels. The establishment of a Sharīʿah board at the macro level 
is strongly recommended as it may become the highest authority in Islamic finance in a 
country and may resolve any issues raised in the Sharīʿah boards in IFIs. The setting up 
of a national Sharīʿah board is expected to build and maintain the confidence of various 
stakeholders in IFIs. As an independent body that operates within non-profitable 
institutions, the national Sharīʿah board would be able to play its role to enhance the 
practice of Islamic finance by promoting the integration of maqāsid Sharīʿah where all 
stakeholders’ interests and rights are protected.224 
 
Another layer of Sharīʿah board structure at the international level is needed in order to 
resolve issues involving cross-border jurisdictions and for Sharīʿah harmonization 
purposes. In this aspect, the existing AAOIFI Sharīʿah board may be considered as the 
main reference Sharīʿah board for any jurisdiction. It is worth noting that this 
recommendation may not be appropriate to some jurisdictions, particularly to purely 
secular legal environments. In this instance, the regulatory authorities should have a clear 
understanding of the market practice and identify which model would be appropriate to 
IFIs under their supervision.  
10.2.1.4 Composition of BOD 
 
The ideal function of the Sharīʿah board is advisory and supervisory but with the 
executive power still in the hands of the BOD. The researcher agrees with the principle in 
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the IFSB-10, which requires the BOD and senior management of IFIs to have certain 
minimum criteria in terms of knowledge and experience pertaining to Sharīʿah -related 
matters. The selection of the BOD members and senior management should be based on 
these additional criteria.225  
 
In view of the importance of Sharīʿah input during the BOD meetings, it is strongly 
recommended that the BOD has at least one member with sound knowledge of Sharīʿah 
as an independent director.226 This independent director will be able to provide input, 
information and views on the aspects of Sharīʿah, Islamic ethics and values, which are 
important for any basis of decision-making. This representation is also essential as an 
indication of the stakeholder value orientation in protecting the rights and interests of 
stakeholders, particularly the IAHs. 
10.2.1.5 Composition of the Sharīʿah Board 
 
It is clear from the research findings that different practices with regards the composition 
of Sharīʿah board are currently prevailing. It would be a good practice of the Sharīʿah 
board to have a minimum number of three members. In line with the IFSB-10 and the 
AAOIFI Governance Standards,227 it is recommended for the IFIs to have mixed 
members from different madhahib and different nationalities without neglecting the local 
expertise. Sharīʿah rulings coming out from mixed members of a Sharīʿah board would 
mitigate any potential inconsistency as well as ensure its acceptability in other 
jurisdictions.  
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The practice of appointing non-Sharīʿah experts, such as scholars and experts in law, 
finance, banking, economics, accounting and finance, is also acceptable subject to certain 
limitations. Those members may provide their views and actively participate in the 
Sharīʿah board meetings but they should not have voting rights. This is affirmed by the 
findings from the semi-structured interviews, where the majority of Sharīʿah scholars 
agreed on such a practice and admitted their limited knowledge on subjects other than 
Sharīʿah. It would also be a very good Sharīʿah board practice if the board has an 
executive member who would engage and deal with the day-to-day operations. Unlike the 
normal Sharīʿah board members, those executive members of the Sharīʿah board should 
be full-time staff in the IFIs and work on a daily basis to provide Sharīʿah consultancy 
services from time to time. 
10.2.6  Sharīʿah Advisory Firms 
 
The study reveals that some IFIs opt to engage a Sharīʿah advisory firm as their 
organizational arrangement for Sharīʿah governance and this practice is popular for 
Islamic windows, Islamic investment collective scheme institutions and Islamic fund 
management companies. Since the Sharīʿah advisory firm is not one of the internal 
organs of governance in IFIs, some mechanisms may need to be imposed to regulate such 
a practice. The IFSB-10 seems to fail to adequately address this issue and has only very 
minor provision stating the position pertaining to Sharīʿah advisory firms.228  
 
The regulators should take into consideration the framework for Sharīʿah advisory firms 
and this includes licensing, professional indemnity insurance, mandatory reporting, 
confidentiality and transparency. Another important aspect that needs to be addressed is 
the rules on shareholding of Sharīʿah scholars and advisory services provided by their 
companies.229 It would be a good practice if the regulators issued licences for the 
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Sharīʿah advisory firms and put certain conditions on them. This licence could be 
renewed if the Sharīʿah advisory firms satisfy all the necessary conditions set by the 
regulators. It is also necessary for the regulators to require the Sharīʿah advisory firms to 
have professional indemnity insurance. In the event that the Sharīʿah advisory firms have 
a relationship with particular IFIs, such as common shareholders or directors, they should 
exclude themselves from doing any business with them. This may help the IFIs to 
mitigate risk due to negligence or being wrongly advised by the Sharīʿah advisory firm. 
Furthermore, the policy for the Sharīʿah advisory firm must cover the aspects of 
mandatory reporting, confidentiality and transparency.  
10.2.1.7 Adoption of the IFSB-10 and the AAOIFI Governance Standards  
 
The survey clearly indicates that the level of awareness of IFIs on the development of 
Sharīʿah governance is slightly low, where more than 22% of IFIs were not aware of the 
existence of the IFSB-10. In fact, only 45.7% of IFIs have adopted the AAOIFI 
governance standards.230 This position indicates that numerous IFIs do not have adequate 
and sound guidelines for their Sharīʿah governance system. The AAOIFI governance 
standards lay down key principles, guidelines, standard formats and a code of ethics that 
are very important for the purpose of Sharīʿah governance.231 On top of that, based on the 
comprehensive study of the issue of Sharīʿah governance in various countries, the IFSB-
10 provides guidelines and standards of best practice of Sharīʿah governance for IFIs. 
Furthermore, the key principles of competence, independency, consistency, transparency 
and confidentiality formulated in the IFSB-10 are really important for the purpose of a 
Sharīʿah governance system. The study hence strongly recommends the adoption of the 
IFSB-10 by regulators or supervisors as well as IFIs to enhance and strengthen the 
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 The recommendation for the adoption of the AAOIFI governance standards is subject to the condition 
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Sharīʿah governance framework. Once the documents are adopted, the IFSB, with proper 
coordination by the AAOIFI, can play a watchdog role to monitor, supervise and revise 
the implementation of the Sharīʿah governance system. 
10.2.2 Regulatory and Internal Frameworks 
 
10.2.2.1 Proactive Approach and Integrated Corporate and Sharīʿah 
Governance 
 
In view of the numerous challenges faced by Islamic finance, it is recommended that the 
industry needs a regulatory-based approach framework as explained before. As a 
prerequisite, Sharīʿah governance must be part of the concerns of regulators and 
policymakers. The regulators should proactively monitor the implementation of Sharīʿah 
governance and learn from the experience of other jurisdictions in nurturing the Sharīʿah 
governance framework. The principle of ‘one-size-fits-all’ Sharīʿah governance is not 
appropriate as the market and local legal environments are different from one place to 
another.   
 
In designing the Sharīʿah governance framework, it is a matter of necessity to have an 
integrated corporate and Sharīʿah governance framework. These two things must not be 
segregated as they complement each other. In this aspect, the principles or guidelines on 
corporate governance must take into account the element of Sharīʿah governance when it 
involves institutions offering Islamic financial services. This is important because the 
stakeholder-oriented model of governance in IFIs requires them to protect the rights and 
interests of all stakeholders.  
10.2.2.2 Supervision and Enforcement 
 
The regulators should have a comprehensive framework in the aspects of supervision and 
enforcement and these include written guidelines on supervision for supervisors, 
directives for IFIs issued by supervisors, sufficient resources with adequate knowledge on 
Sharīʿah governance-related matters and full authority to carry out the enforcement 





functions. The supervisors should provide guidelines and make sure that they evaluate the 
internal policies and procedures as well as the implementation of these procedures. It is 
also important for the supervisors to consistently inspect the IFIs by having a proper 
framework in place which allows them to make an assessment of IFIs’ Sharīʿah 
governance policies and tools to redress any deficiencies.  
10.2.2.3 Dispute Settlement  
 
The existing framework for dispute settlement puts Islamic finance cases under the 
jurisdiction of the civil court, with exception of Saudi Arabia where they fall under the 
auspices of the Banking Dispute Settlement. This position raises an issue as to the ability 
of the court or the judge to hear cases involving Sharīʿah matters. Therefore, it would be 
an ideal development if the regulators initiated a special bench for Islamic finance cases 
as part of the court’s structure. In this special bench, the court may appoint judges who 
are knowledgeable in Islamic finance or the regulators may allocate a certain amount of 
funds to provide training for those judges. On top of that, a reliable Sharīʿah litigation 
system must also be in place. It is understood that in a secular legal environment, such as 
in the UK, the above arrangement is slightly difficult to implement. Therefore, it is 
important for the regulators in the secular legal environment to consider a court referral to 
a Sharīʿah board or a Sharīʿah expert to determine cases involving Sharīʿah issues. 
Alternatively, a special tribunal for Islamic finance cases may be established to handle 
disputes involving IFIs in this kind of jurisdiction.  
 
The policymakers should also take into account other legal avenues for dispute 
settlement, such as arbitration and mediation. At this point in time, there are several 
institutions for international dispute resolution, such as the Dubai Centre for Arbitration 
and Conciliation, the GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre, the Bahrain Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration Centre, the International Chamber of Commerce’s 
International Court of Arbitration, the London Court of International Arbitration, the 
Kuwait Centre for Commercial Arbitration, the Kuala Lumpur Arbitration Centre and 
others. In view of these numerous arbitration centres, it is recommended that there should 





be one specific institution that offers alternative dispute resolutions and settlement for 
Islamic finance cases. Alternatively, the existing arbitration centres should develop and 
enhance their expertise and capabilities in Islamic finance in terms of resources, 
frameworks, procedures and facilities. At this point, these institutions for arbitration must 
prepare to facilitate themselves with necessary facilities and resources to address the need 
for dispute settlement involving Islamic finance cases.  
 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the arbitration, the decision or solution of the 
arbitration should be made binding and conclusive. The legally binding effect in 
arbitration is crucial for the purpose of ensuring credibility and confidence in any 
solution made in the arbitration. In spite of that, it is also important for the regulators to 
encourage arbitration as an alternative legal avenue for dispute settlement and to issue 
policies and procedures that clearly acknowledge Islamic law as the main source of law 
as a basis for decision-making.232  
 
The research findings reveal that the Sharīʿah board rulings are non-binding in certain 
jurisdictions. This may create implications as to the aspects of enforcement and 
supervision in the event of disputes. Realizing these potential consequences, the Sharīʿah 
pronouncements should therefore be made binding with a full legal effect that binds the 
IFIs. It is also recommended that the Sharīʿah pronouncement should be made a 
mandatory reference for the court of justice as well as the arbitration of any other 
alternative disputes.  
10.2.2.4  Well-conceived By-laws and Internal Policies 
 
The research findings reveal that many IFIs do not have by-laws or internal policies 
pertaining to Sharīʿah governance. Well-conceived by-laws and internal policies are 
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prerequisites of effective Sharīʿah governance. Realizing this, the IFIs should have 
appropriate by-laws and policies as guidelines for their internal use in terms of meeting 
procedures, decision-making, preparing reports and dissemination of information, records 
and reviews. At this point, the IFSB-10 and the AAOIFI governance standards may be 
the basis for such by-laws, with some modifications that would be appropriate to be 
implemented within the local market and regulatory environment. 
10.2.3 Roles of the Sharīʿah Board 
10.2.3.1 Full Mandate and Clear Definition of Duties and Functions 
 
The regulators should define the Sharīʿah board’s duties and functions precisely and 
these include their areas of responsibilities, authority level and reporting lines. The 
functions of the Sharīʿah board should only be limited to the advisory and supervisory 
roles. The effectiveness of the Sharīʿah board functions can only be achieved if the 
regulators as well as the IFIs precisely define the relationship between the Sharīʿah 
boards and other organs of governance in IFIs. This is crucial to give full mandate and 
authority to the Sharīʿah board and at the same time other organs of governance such as 
management, the BOD and employees must respect and comply with the directions and 
instructions given by the Sharīʿah board. With regard to IFIs operating in numerous 
jurisdictions, the Sharīʿah board should understand IFIs’ operational structure. The 
Sharīʿah board should constantly review the appropriateness of Sharīʿah pronouncements 
and take into consideration all aspects, including the legal environment, difference of 
madhhab and implications of the rulings.  
10.2.3.2 Expanding the Scope of Duties and Functions 
 
The present practice on the scope of the Sharīʿah board’s duties and functions, as 
demonstrated by the research findings, mainly emphasizes the issuance of Sharīʿah 
pronouncements rather than going beyond this horizon and hence their role does not 
include any proactive approach. It is imperative to stress the need to inculcate Islamic 
ethics and values as well as the social dimension into the Sharīʿah board’s responsibility. 





This aspect will truly add value to the existence of Islamic finance as part of the existing 
financial system. At this point, the Sharīʿah board should play more active roles in the 
IFIs’ operations and activities, such as participating in the design of policies, procedures 
and training programmes. The regulators should encourage the IFIs, through the Sharīʿah 
board, to implement Islamic ethics and values and to give more consideration to the 
social dimension. Perhaps, some incentives in the form of awards to individual Sharīʿah 
scholars as well as the institution of a Sharīʿah board systematic programme would be a 
good initiative.  
10.2.3.3 Limitation on Multiple Appointments 
 
The research findings reveal that some Sharīʿah scholars have enjoyed the privilege of 
sitting on the boards of numerous IFIs without any sort of limitation. This may raise a 
serious issue of credibility and damage the image of the Sharīʿah board as well as 
introducing a potential conflict of interest. While the researcher claims that multiple 
sittings on numerous Sharīʿah boards is an acceptable practice due to market 
considerations and, to a certain extent, the shortage of qualified Sharīʿah scholars, the 
study strongly recommends that some limitations must be in place for efficiency and, 
more importantly, for overcoming any conflict of interest and promoting transparency. In 
this regard, a maximum of five Sharīʿah boards at one particular time might be 
appropriate as a standard practice. In the event that there is a potential conflict of interest, 
the IFIs or the Sharīʿah board members themselves must disqualify individuals from 
being involved in those transactions.233 In addition, the IFIs are also recommended to 
monitor and assess the commitment and discipline of the Sharīʿah board members so that 
they will allocate sufficient time and effort to perform their duties with due diligence.  
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10.2.4 Attributes of the Sharīʿah Board on Competence 
10.2.4.1. Minimum and High Standard of Fit and Proper Criteria  
 
The findings in this study reveal that there are significant differences in the attributes of 
Sharīʿah boards relating to competence and independence. Some IFIs did not even have a 
clear policy on the requirement of fit and proper criteria for the Sharīʿah board. In this 
regard, it would be proper if both the regulators and the IFIs set minimum standards on 
the fit and proper criteria for the Sharīʿah board members. Four attributes must be taken 
into consideration, namely academic qualifications, experience and exposure, track 
record and good character. Before their appointment, additional measures may be taken 
requiring the Sharīʿah board members to make statutory declarations pertaining to all of 
those criteria. A particularly high standard of fit and proper criteria might be needed in 
the case of Sharīʿah boards at the international and national levels, including Sharīʿah 
advisory services involving sophisticated Islamic financial products. 
 
It is contended that the effectiveness of the Sharīʿah board mainly depends on the roles 
played by its chairman. At this point, it is important to set up different criteria for the 
chairman of Sharīʿah board. Senior Sharīʿah scholars with vast experience in the industry 
would be ideal for this position. In addition, it is also important to limit individual 
scholars to chairmanship of not more than three IFIs at one particular time as multiple 
chairmanship positions may raise serious issues of conflict of interest. It is also worth 
considering a rotation of the chairman of the Sharīʿah board.  
10.2.4.2 Corporate Governance Committee and Nomination Committee 
 
In line with the recommendation of the IFSB, it is recommended that the IFIs set up a 
corporate governance committee. This committee should consist of mixed expertise from 
interdisciplinary members including representatives of the Sharīʿah board. The function 
of this corporate governance committee is to monitor the IFIs’ implementation with 
respect to corporate and Sharīʿah governance guidelines and principles. Besides this, the 





corporate governance committee should have a function of overseeing and implementing 
the governance framework that will protect the interest of all stakeholders, particularly 
IAHs, since they have no right of governance participation. While the corporate 
governance committee are concerned with the implementation of corporate governance 
matters, the nomination committee that normally aims at selecting and nominating the 
BOD can also be used to identify and filter the appropriate members of the Sharīʿah 
board. This nomination committee will have a specific policy on the fit and proper 
criteria of Sharīʿah board members. 
10.2.4.3 Specific Funds and Continuous Training Programme 
 
The study discloses that the majority of the Sharīʿah scholars do not have backgrounds in 
banking, finance or economics. This position may distract their ability to provide sound 
and solid Sharīʿah rulings because such knowledge is a tool to understanding and 
appreciating the whole picture of certain products and services. With respect to this, the 
Sharīʿah board should undergo ongoing training on technical and industry specific 
knowledge on banking and finance and any other necessary areas that enhance their 
professional, ethical and technical skills. It would be a good practice for newly appointed 
Sharīʿah board members to attend orientation and induction programmes to make them 
familiar with the operational and technical aspects of IFIs. At the same time, the IFIs 
should consistently introduce measures for annual training for Sharīʿah board members.  
 
In light of the above, a specific allocation of funds should be established either at the 
national or IFI level. At the national level, the regulators should allocate a certain amount 
of funds to develop training programmes for Sharīʿah boards as well as Sharīʿah 
auditors. For long-term development, it is also important to consider an academic 
approach, such as developing a syllabus and academic programme in the institution of 
higher learning and any research institutions. At the IFIs’ level, an annual financial 
allocation for the Sharīʿah training programme should be put in place. This is important 
for the purpose of continuous training for employees, Sharīʿah board members, 





managers, directors and even shareholders pertaining to Sharīʿah and its related 
knowledge.  
10.2.4.4 Young Sharīʿah Scholar Programme 
 
The research findings reveal that the top sixteen Sharīʿah scholars hold more than 100 
board positions with an average of 6.5 positions for each scholar. In fact, some individual 
scholars hold up to 78 board positions and twenty-one chairman positions around the 
globe (Unal, 2010: 6). This may entail serious issues as to independence, conflict of 
interest and confidentiality, as well as the ability of Sharīʿah scholars to provide their 
services with due diligence. With the understanding of the issue of the shortage of 
qualified scholars, it is recommended that the regulators, with the cooperation of IFIs, 
develop a “Young Sharīʿah Scholar Programme”. This programme might be in the form 
of ‘mentor–mentee’ approach, where potential young Sharīʿah scholars are allowed to sit 
on the Sharīʿah board under the auspices of senior Sharīʿah scholars.234 After a certain 
stipulated time, with the recommendation of the chairman of the Sharīʿah board, those 
young scholars will then be admitted and qualified to be full members of the Sharīʿah 
board.  
10.2.5 Attributes of the Sharīʿah Board on Independence 
10.2.5.1  Method of Appointment 
 
The research findings reveal that there are significant differences in the method of 
appointment of the Sharīʿah board between IFIs. It is also found that numerous IFIs did 
not comply with the AAOIFI governance standards in that their appointments are made 
by the BOD and not the shareholders. In view of the actual market practice and more 
practical tools for ensuring independence, the researcher considers that there are other 
mechanisms that would be appropriate to achieve such an objective. Firstly, the 
appointment must be made either by the BOD or the shareholders. Secondly, the 
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appointment must be subject to the approval of the regulatory authorities. Thirdly, the 
appointment must not be permanent but rather contractual subject to renewal. Fourthly, 
the termination and dismissal must also be subject to the approval of the regulatory 
authorities.  
10.2.5.2 Code of Conduct 
 
The research clearly indicates that the majority of IFIs do not have a code of ethics for 
Sharīʿah board. The existing practices seem to presume that Sharīʿah board members are 
bound by Islamic ethical principles. In view of the need to have a certain and precise 
code of ethics specific and exclusive to the Sharīʿah board, the regulatory authorities as 
well as the IFIs may prescribe certain acceptable behaviour for Sharīʿah board members. 
It is incumbent upon the IFIs to initiate and develop an internal code of conduct for the 
Sharīʿah board. This code of ethics should be enforceable and there must be a mechanism 
within the organizational structure to ensure its strict implementation. Breach of this code 
of ethics may incur disciplinary action such as suspension, termination or other kinds of 
sanctions. 
10.2.5.3 Professional Body  
 
The study finds that there is no professional body specifically established to set a 
standard practice for the Sharīʿah board as is the case for other professionals such as 
lawyers, accountants, medical practitioners and engineers. The establishment of a 
professional body to set the qualifications of the Sharīʿah board, to introduce a standard 
code of conduct, to develop a training programme and to enhance the professionalism of 
the Sharīʿah board is consider necessary at this point in time. At the moment, different 
bodies attempt to provide qualification programmes for Sharīʿah boards, such as the 
AAOIFI Certified Sharīʿah Adviser and Auditor, the Scholar Development Program 
initiated by the IFC Islamic finance council and the SII and the IBFIM Sharīʿah Scholars 
Introduction Program, but it was found that such qualifications have not been accepted 
universally. The study strongly recommends the establishment of The Association of 





Sharīʿah Advisors at the national and international levels.235 With this association, the 
quality of the Sharīʿah board can then also be rated by an independent agency similar to a 
credit-rating agency.  
10.2.5.4 Remuneration Policy 
 
The research findings demonstrate that there are significant differences in the 
remuneration of different Sharīʿah boards. The absence of any policy limitation or 
guidelines on the Sharīʿah board’s remuneration may lead to unhealthy practices. The top 
ten Sharīʿah scholars who dominated the board positions in IFIs around the world earn a 
very lucrative and significant amount of remuneration. It was found that a chairman of a 
Sharīʿah board could earn USD50,000 to USD100,000 per board (Pasha, 2010a) and a 
top scholar could even gain up to USD250,000 on a typical capital markets deal (Devi, 
2008). This study further estimates that the top five Sharīʿah scholars may earn up to a 
million dollars per year for servicing more than a hundred board and chairman positions 
around the world. While there is no standard benchmark or scale fee for Sharīʿah 
advisors, the regulators as well as the IFIs should establish a specific policy for the 
remuneration of Sharīʿah board members based on the appropriate scale fees. In the 
context of the internal policy of IFIs, the Sharīʿah board scale fees should be approved by 
the shareholders and disclosed in the annual report.  
10.2.6 Attributes of the Sharīʿah Board on Confidentiality 
 
The study reveals that there were Sharīʿah scholars who have unintentionally or 
indirectly disclosed some confidential information, particularly those sitting on the 
boards of numerous IFIs (Madzlan, 2009). In addition, the survey results indicated that 
29% of IFIs view that the Sharīʿah board is not fully aware of the issue of confidentiality. 
Realizing this, the IFIs should have a proper mechanism to resolve this issue and this 
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includes terms of reference in the letter of appointment, enforcement of the code of ethics 
and disciplinary proceedings for any misconduct by the Sharīʿah board. In defining the 
scope of confidentiality, a reference may be made to section 52 of the IFSB-10. The 
IFSB-10 nevertheless does not provide guidelines for disciplinary proceedings in the 
event that Sharīʿah board members breach confidentiality or disclose sensitive or 
confidential information. As such, the IFIs are recommended to have proper disciplinary 
proceedings, such as hearing procedures, and rules of evidence with an appropriate 
organizational structure.  
10.2.7 Consistency 
10.2.7.1 Codification and Sharīʿah Harmonization 
 
The ideal approach to ensure consistency is by way of codification of Sharīʿah standards 
and a Sharīʿah harmonization process. It is worth mentioning that such an approach must 
be carried out with proper coordination, commitment and agreement of the industry 
players. As a good start, the adoption of the AAOIFI Sharīʿah standards should be the 
first approach in minimizing the inconsistency of Sharīʿah rulings. In view of the 
different market environments, legal frameworks and local needs, IFIs in those 
jurisdictions may adopt the AAOIFI Sharīʿah standards with some flexibility as to their 
application.236  
 
The issue of inconsistency of Sharīʿah pronouncements and conflicting views of Sharīʿah 
board can also be resolved by having central Sharīʿah body at the national level. The 
Sharīʿah boards at the IFIs level should try in the first instance to comply with the 
Sharīʿah standards and in the absence of specification of the products in the Sharīʿah 
standards, IFIs should adopt the Sharīʿah pronouncements issued by the central Sharīʿah 
board. This will reconcile the issue of inconsistency as the decision made by the Sharīʿah 
board at the national level will prevail over any Sharīʿah rulings at the individual IFI 
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level. In the event that both the AAOIFI Sharīʿah standards and central Sharīʿah board 
pronouncements are unable to provide any solution, IFIs then may issue new and fresh 
rulings. The efforts to have consistency in the Sharīʿah pronouncements can only be 
achieved if there is proper coordination and alignment of policy and frameworks from all 
Sharīʿah boards at the individual IFI level as well as at national and international levels.  
10.2.7.2 Proper Channel for Conflicting Views of Sharīʿah Scholars 
 
Inconsistency may also happen when the Sharīʿah scholars have conflicting opinions in 
the public forums. This position will confuse the general public as well as the industry 
players, particularly in the event that different Sharīʿah rulings are issued upon the same 
financial products. In view of this issue, it is important for the Sharīʿah scholars to air 
their conflicting views in a proper forum and not in the public forum. In this regard, the 
Sharīʿah board should have a spokesperson that will make a statement on behalf of the 
institution. In the event that the individual Sharīʿah scholars intend to air their own 
opinion, they must clearly make a declaration as to the opinion being their personal one.  
10.2.8 Disclosure and Transparency 
10.2.8.1 Full Access to Information and Disclosure Policy  
 
The IFIs need to improve their transparency and disclosure on Sharīʿah governance as 
the findings show poor disclosure practice. Sharīʿah boards should have access to all 
information pertaining to Sharīʿah compliance matters. They must be granted the right 
and authority to obtain views from the staff, particularly the internal Sharīʿah auditors, as 
well as the external auditors. It is important for the Sharīʿah board to receive adequate 
resources, information and recognition to carry out their duty. 
 
With respect to the nature of operation and structure of IFIs, information disclosure is 
more important than in conventional banking. Unlike conventional banking institutions 
that tend to concentrate on financial disclosure and risk assessment, in addition to these 
the IFIs need to disclose necessary information pertaining to Sharīʿah governance-related 





matters. The regulators as well as the IFIs should develop suitable information on 
disclosure requirements within a market transparency framework. Amongst the types of 
Sharīʿah governance information that should be ordinarily disclosed are the Sharīʿah 
board information, products and services, corporate governance structure, code of 
conduct, treatment of zakah and corporate social responsibility and remuneration of the 
Sharīʿah board. It is also a good practice to disclose in the annual report, the activities, 
products and services, including the percentage of profit contributions that have an 
element of unlawful and doubtful transactions.  
10.2.8.2 Publication of Sharīʿah Rulings 
 
The study found weak practices in IFIs in the aspect of disseminating Sharīʿah 
information, particularly publication of the Sharīʿah rulings. The practice indicates that 
only the Sharīʿah board at the regulatory level proactively publishes and disseminates 
information on Sharīʿah pronouncements. With respect to this, it is recommended that the 
Sharīʿah board compile and publish the Sharīʿah pronouncements and makes them 
known to the public in a consistent manner. In view of the commercial nature of IFIs, the 
researcher admits that publication of the Sharīʿah pronouncements may be considered 
unfair to the industry players as they have to compete with one another and any 
disclosure of information on new products, including new Sharīʿah rulings, may impede 
their business strategy as well as create additional cost to IFIs. At this point, it is 
recommended that the publication of Sharīʿah rulings be made annually with full 
compilation and details of their pronouncements and these can be published via their 
websites.  
10.2.8.3 Sharīʿah Governance Disclosure Index 
 
The content analysis approach in this study attempts to introduce a simple Sharīʿah 
governance index for IFIs, which is quite similar with other types of indexes such as 
Environmental, Social and Governance Index. It is strongly recommended that the 
independent institutions, such as the IFSB or the AAOIFI, with the cooperation of 
another institution develop and introduce a specific Sharīʿah governance index for IFIs. 





The IFIs then can be rated and ranked in accordance with the Sharīʿah governance index 
score which can be formulated from the IFSB-10, the AAOIFI governance standards and 
any other Sharīʿah governance guidelines. Some incentives, such as Award for the Best 
IFI for Sharīʿah Governance, may be introduced at national, regional and international 
levels. As a matter of fact, the Sharīʿah governance index introduced in this study may be 
a good model to develop a more comprehensive index that would be accepted by IFIs 
worldwide. The researcher considers that this Sharīʿah governance index will directly 
and indirectly influence the IFIs to enhance and improve their Sharīʿah governance 
practices.  
10.2.9 Operational Procedures 
10.2.9.1 Sharīʿah Reporting Standards 
 
Baydoun and Willet (2000) view that IFIs need to have a wider scope of Islamic 
corporate reporting due to the nature and foundational dimension of Islamic finance as 
compared to its conventional counterpart. The researcher positively supports the notion of 
having a different scope of Islamic corporate reporting by Baydoun and Willet (2000) 
with some further enhancement to the scope of reporting. In spite of the need for having 
specific Islamic financial reporting standards, the study also suggests the call for Sharīʿah 
reporting standards.237  
In view of the weak practice of Sharīʿah reports, as demonstrated by the sampled IFIs, it 
is very important for the regulatory authorities as well as IFIs to set a minimum standard 
for the Sharīʿah report. The regulatory authorities should issue directives or guidelines on 
the standard format of the Sharīʿah report. The IFIs then should use these standard 
guidelines and format in preparing their Sharīʿah report, which must be submitted to the 
BOD with the approval of shareholders before it can be further reported to the respective 
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regulatory authorities. The ideal Sharīʿah report should contain necessary information on 
Sharīʿah compliance. Unlike the financial reporting format, the Sharīʿah report is 
classified as non-financial disclosure and therefore requires a different format. At this 
point, it is recommended for the Sharīʿah report to contain activities of the Sharīʿah 
board, including training and meetings, details of the meetings, Sharīʿah pronouncements 
with detailed explanations, an ex ante report pertaining to products and services, an ex 
post internal Sharīʿah review report and certification of the Sharīʿah compliance report. 
In terms of the Sharīʿah report structure, the IFIs are encouraged to prepare a separate 
chapter on the Sharīʿah report as part of the annual report or, alternatively, the Sharīʿah 
report may form part of the corporate governance report.  
10.2.9.2 Sharīʿah Coordination 
 
The study reveals that some IFIs have not established a Sharīʿah department to 
coordinate Sharīʿah governance matters or they consider it under the auspices of the 
company secretary or compliance officer. It would be a good practice for IFIs to set up a 
Sharīʿah department that may carry out numerous functions on the Sharīʿah governance 
process, such as coordinating the Sharīʿah board meetings, recording the minutes of the 
meetings, research and development, developing internal policies for Sharīʿah 
governance, conducting Sharīʿah training, publishing the Sharīʿah pronouncements and 
coordinating enquiries from employees, consumers or any other parties.  
 
Another important function of Sharīʿah coordination is to assist the Sharīʿah board and 
IFIs in conducting research and development pertaining to Sharīʿah -related matters. It 
would be a good practice to have a specific unit for Sharīʿah research and development 
under the auspices of the head of the Sharīʿah department. This unit will assist the 
Sharīʿah board in terms of Sharīʿah research and development as well as disseminating 
information for the purpose of educating IFIs, customers, employees and other 
stakeholders about Sharīʿah rules and principles. Appropriate Sharīʿah coordination is 
important to ensure the efficiency of the Sharīʿah board as well as the Sharīʿah control 
process. With high market competitiveness, Sharīʿah coordination to some extent will 





have a considerable impact on the efficiency of IFIs, both in terms of products and 
services offered and also the quality of Sharīʿah compliance.  
 
10.2.9.3 Sharīʿah Internal Control 
 
The research findings reveal that the Sharīʿah board relies heavily on the internal 
Sharīʿah audit and other employees in carrying out its ex post functions. With respect to 
this, it is crucial for the IFIs to enhance the role of internal Sharīʿah auditors by having a 
proper policy on documentation, clear segregation of duties, and appropriate fraud 
prevention and detection controls. To operate this function effectively, the IFIs are 
recommended to establish a Sharīʿah internal audit department or alternatively to set up a 
Sharīʿah internal audit unit under the existing audit department. This is in line with the 
IFSB-10 recommendation of having an Internal Sharīʿah Compliance Unit and Internal 
Sharīʿah Review Unit as a point of reference for Sharīʿah compliance issues, to manage 
the clerical and secretarial matters and to provide Sharīʿah input for executive decisions 
(IFSB, 2009c: 10).  
 
In spite of the above, the IFIs should ensure that the Sharīʿah internal control unit has 
adequate resources and the capability of doing the audit and review effectively. In 
addition, the IFIs are recommended to have an appropriate policy on Sharīʿah internal 
control. These policies should be designed so that Sharīʿah compliance can be inspected 
and monitored in daily activities. The role of the internal audit is to evaluate and assess 
the effectiveness of Sharīʿah governance and compliance with the Sharīʿah rulings. 
Internal Sharīʿah audit department should have a specific charter approved by the BOD 
to guarantee that the review can be made independently, impartially and objectively. In 
terms of reporting structure, the Sharīʿah internal audit should report to the Sharīʿah 
board and the BOD, not to the audit committee since the committee does not have 
expertise in Sharīʿah. The study offers another alternative approach for Sharīʿah internal 
audit reporting lines. The report may be made to the audit committee with the condition 
that one of the audit committee members must be a representative of the Sharīʿah board.  





10.2.9.4 External Sharīʿah Auditors 
 
The research findings show that there are shortcomings with respect to the Sharīʿah 
auditing process and this includes the external audit practices. Chapra and Ahmed (2002: 
68–69) propose three options in addressing the issue of Sharīʿah audit and the most 
preferable one is for the existing chartered audit firm to undertake the Sharīʿah audit 
function. In addition, the researcher considers that Sharīʿah advisory firms that have the 
necessary expertise may also undertake the Sharīʿah audit responsibilities.  
 
To regulate and monitor these external Sharīʿah auditors, appropriate guidelines and 
directives must be in place. In this aspect, the regulators should issue a policy on the 
requirements of external Sharīʿah auditors as well as scope, framework, criteria, 
conditions, process, qualification, training programme and reporting structure. To address 
the issue of the shortage of audit firms and Sharīʿah advisory firms, as well as lack of 
experts capable of performing the Sharīʿah audit, the regulators may initiate some 
incentives and provide support to develop the Sharīʿah audit programme. Another 
important aspect of the external Sharīʿah audit is method of appointment. Similar to the 
normal audit practice, the appointment of the external Sharīʿah auditors should be made 
by the shareholders. 
10.2.9.5 Sharīʿah Board Meetings 
 
The research findings affirm that the majority of Sharīʿah scholars spend most of their 
time and effort on the IFIs during the Sharīʿah board meetings. This point indicates that 
the Sharīʿah board should carefully consider the frequency of their meetings in order to 
enable them to fulfil their responsibility with due diligence. A minimum standard of 
requirements for the meeting should be implemented and calendar meetings should be 
mandatory for them. Furthermore, the Sharīʿah board should proactively plan and 
arrange quarterly interval meetings with the BOD to discuss Sharīʿah -related issues. 
 





In terms of meeting procedures, the study reveals that there are differences in practices 
with regard to the quorum for the meetings. In parallel with the ideal practice of the 
Sharīʿah board, the quorum of a simple majority from the total numbers of Sharīʿah 
board members should be acceptable. With regard to the basis for decision-making, 
unlike principle 57 of the IFSB-10 which requires a consensus decision, the researcher 
thinks that the practice of simple majority votes is acceptable.238 The practice of 
unanimous decision-making may create certain issues for IFIs, such as potential for delay 
and silent disagreement amongst the Sharīʿah scholars. With the simple majority 
approach, the dissenting opinion of the disagreeing Sharīʿah scholars can be evaluated 
and this may contribute to further healthy discussion. In the event that the Sharīʿah board 
consists of non-Sharīʿah scholars, their votes should not be counted. 
10.2.9.6 Well-Defined Lines of Reporting and Proper Communication 
Channels 
 
One of the issues highlighted by the Sharīʿah scholars in the semi-structured interviews 
was communication barriers and unclear lines of reporting. Therefore, the IFIs should 
have well-defined lines of reporting and establish appropriate communication channels 
within the organization as well as with the consumers, regulators and supervisors. In 
terms of reporting structure, the Sharīʿah board should report administratively to the 
BOD and the Sharīʿah report should be approved of and directed by the shareholders to 
be included as part of the annual report as recommended by the IFSB-10. 
 
With respect to communication, there must be proper coordination between the 
supervisory authorities and the IFIs’ Sharīʿah board and other organs of governance, 
particularly senior management and the BOD. In this regard, it is recommended that the 
senior management, such as the CEO, head of risk management department and head of 
legal department, attend the Sharīʿah board meetings. On top of that, some mechanism 
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 This is agreeable to most of the Sharīʿah scholars interviewed in this study including prominent 
Sharīʿah scholar, Mohamed Ali El Gari. Sheikh El Gari considers that empowering the power of voting by 
accepting the simple majority as a basis for decision-making is one of the components for strong Sharīʿah 
governance practice (Parker, 2010).  





can also be invoked allowing customers, employees, business partners, suppliers and 
auditors to indirectly act as agents on the IFIs’ actions, relationships and dealings through 
formal and informal checks such as effective consumer enquiries and complaint policies.  
10.2.9.7 Sharīʿah Non-Compliance Risk Management 
 
Sharīʿah scholars in the semi-structured interview acknowledge that management of 
Sharīʿah non-compliance risk is extremely important. The existing practice puts the 
Sharīʿah board as the main organ of governance to address this risk, with the assistance 
of the Sharīʿah internal audit team, while other types of risks are under the auspices of 
the risk management department. Since Sharīʿah non-compliance risk is one of the 
operational risks which then constitute systemic risks, the risk management department or 
unit should have strong coordination with the Sharīʿah board. A representative of the risk 
management unit should be a permanent attendee of the Sharīʿah board meetings. 
Furthermore, they must have adequate resources and staff who have good knowledge and 
capabilities in Sharīʿah-related matters.  
10.2.9.8 Islamic Quality Management System-Requirement Standard 
 
Quality management system-requirement 9001 via the International Standard of 
Organizations or ISO is the internationally accepted standard on quality management. 
This standard aims at enhancing and improving the quality of the management system by 
providing guidelines and principles for the best management practices. In the absence of 
a specific quality management system-requirement standard for IFIs, it is recommended 
that regulatory authorities, together with other institutions, develop a national or 
international standard of Islamic quality management.239 This Islamic quality 
management system-requirement should be able to improve the quality of the 
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 The Institute of Islamic Understanding of Islam, Malaysia and the Standards and Industrial Research 
Institute of Malaysia under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation have developed the 
internationally accepted Halal Quality Management System-Requirement that incorporates the principles of 
Islamic management known as MS 1900: 2005 (Mustaffa, 2008). This is considered as a very good effort 
and it can be further enhanced and developed so as to suit the requirements and needs of IFIs that offer 
financial products and services.  





management in IFIs by incorporating the Sharīʿah rules and principles as well as 
inculcating Islamic values and ethics. 
10.2.10 Assessment of the Sharīʿah Board 
10.2.10.1 Evaluation of the Sharīʿah Board  
 
The survey and semi-structured interview affirm that numerous IFIs do not evaluate or 
assess the performance of the Sharīʿah board. The assessment of the Sharīʿah board is 
important for the purpose of improving its functions and identifying its previous 
shortcomings and weaknesses. With respect to this, the IFIs are recommended to have 
performance measures for the Sharīʿah board as a collective assessment as well as 
individual member evaluations. The assessment report then should be submitted to the 
BOD for determination and recording. The performance of individual Sharīʿah board 
members and the Sharīʿah board as a whole should be regularly evaluated. Continuous 
monitoring of Sharīʿah board competencies must be carried out so that they may function 
effectively. The IFIs should consistently evaluate the Sharīʿah board, which should 
incorporate an assessment of member competencies, and this should be made mandatory.  
10.2.10.2 Sharīʿah Pronouncements Review 
 
The research findings reveal that the scope of the Sharīʿah review in IFIs only focuses on 
the compliance aspects of the products and services. Another area which is equally 
important for review is revision of the Sharīʿah pronouncements. The Sharīʿah board, 
with the assistance of the Sharīʿah department, should adopt a specific process to ensure 
the revision of all of the Sharīʿah rulings. At this point, it is recommended that the IFIs 
establish a research and development unit under the Sharīʿah department to carry out the 
review process as well as to assist the Sharīʿah board to conduct necessary research on 
Sharīʿah-related matters.  





10.2.10.3 Key Performance Indicators 
 
The semi-structured interviews revealed that some Sharīʿah scholars are aware of the 
assessment of their performance but they had no knowledge about the scope of such 
performance measures. In this instance, it would be good practice if the IFIs set some key 
performance indicators (KPIs) for the Sharīʿah board. The KPIs for the Sharīʿah board 
would not be in the form of financial considerations but rather Sharīʿah compliance, 
meeting the datelines, positive contributions to the organization, having a proactive 
approach and assisting the IFIs in setting goals and direction. The set of KPIs, which 
must be agreed in advance by the individual Sharīʿah board members, should then be 
evaluated by the BOD and be subject to the approval of the shareholders.  
10.3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The distinctive contributions of this study are fourfold. Firstly, it refers to the 
deconstruction of the theoretical framework of a Sharīʿah governance system which 
provides a foundational dimension of governance from an Islamic perspective within the 
context of IFIs. In view of the scarcity of literature on this subject, the study offers 
valuable and beneficial information on the conceptual framework of Sharīʿah governance 
through discourse analysis and comparative overview approaches. The basic 
understanding of the aspects of Sharīʿah governance within the context of IFIs is 
essentially important in order to further analyse and explore its implementation in actual 
practices.  
 
Secondly, the study offers comprehensive examination and exploration of the extent of 
the Sharīʿah governance framework as practised in IFIs. This will substantially provide 
useful information to further enhance and improve the present Sharīʿah governance 
system. Thirdly, the study highlights selected Sharīʿah governance issues as well as 
identifies shortcomings and weaknesses in the present Sharīʿah governance practice. 
Finally, the study proposes several suggestions and policy recommendations derived 
from the research analysis, which require strong cooperation and commitment from all 





stakeholders. Drawing from the whole research analysis, the findings of this study call for 
relevant stakeholders, IFIs, policy makers, practitioners and Sharīʿah scholars to develop 
and enhance the best practice of the Sharīʿah governance system.  
10.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Despite the researcher’s utmost effort to provide comprehensive, reliable and significant 
research on the topic of Sharīʿah governance, undeniably the study has experienced 
several research limitations. Firstly, there is a limitation due to the scarcity of literature, 
which raised difficulties in deconstructing the conceptual framework of Sharīʿah 
governance. Secondly, the researcher acknowledges the limitation on the survey method, 
particularly with regard to the minimal response rate to the survey as well as the small 
number of respondents to the semi-structured interviews. With respect to the content 
analysis approach, the findings may not be robust as the time period of analysis is short, 
involving only data and information from 2007–2008.  
 
Thirdly, the present research also limits the scope of study by focusing on the Sharīʿah 
governance practices in Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. In other words, the 
research findings cannot be concluded as applicable to and representative of the Sharīʿah 
governance systems practised by other jurisdictions. In this regard, the scope of study 
could be broadened further to other countries in future research efforts. Notwithstanding 
these limitations, the study has yielded sufficient facts, evidence, figures and information 
to meet the research aim and objectives as well as being able to answer the research 
questions and to positively prove the research hypotheses. 
10.5 EPILOGUE  
 
This section is a useful point to review the overall contents of the research. The literature 
review on the comparative corporate governance between the western and Islamic models 
clearly indicates the deficiencies of the literature and the gap which thesis is filling. This 
comparative overview set the initial theoretical framework of corporate governance for 
the debate and thoughtful discussion. In search of an Islamic perspective on corporate 





governance through analysing the existing western models particularly shareholder value 
system and stakeholder value orientation, the researcher suggests that corporate 
governance in IFIs is inclined towards the stakeholder value framework. This preposition 
is based on the epistemological orientation founded on the fundamental principles of 
Tawhīd, shura, property rights and commitment to contractual obligation which enhances 
the definition of stakeholders.  
 
Since Islamic corporate governance is considered as having faith-based orientation, 
Sharīʿah rules and principles then becomes part of the corporate governance framework 
in IFIs. At this point, corporate governance in IFIs needs a set of institutional 
arrangement to ensure that there is effective independent oversight of Sharīʿah 
compliance. Whilst Sharīʿah governance is expected to be an effective mechanism to 
ensure Sharīʿah compliance, the discussion on the topic of Sharīʿah governance system 
in IFIs nevertheless indicates that there are certain deficiencies on the existing Sharīʿah 
governance practices including issues pertaining to regulatory challenges.  
 
After identifying and formulating the research question through gap analysis in the 
literature review, the researcher conducted an empirical study to investigate and examine 
the current state of Sharīʿah governance practices in IFIs by employing mixed-method 
research approach namely the survey, the semi-structured interviews and the content 
analysis approach. To sum up the research findings, chapter 10 significantly provides the 
overall conclusion of the study by highligting the significance of the theoretical and 
empirical research conducted and their relationship to the research hypotheses. From the 
research analysis and hypothesis testing analysis, the study positively meets the 
expectations of the research, answers all the research questions and meets the aim and 
objectives.  
 
Despite some research limitations, the study has yielded substantial findings revealing 
that there are shortcomings and weaknesses in numerous aspects of the Sharīʿah 
governance system as practised by IFIs. There are significant differences in the general 





approach to Sharīʿah governance, the regulatory framework and internal policies, the 
roles and functions of the Sharīʿah board, the attributes of Sharīʿah board in terms of 
competence, independence, transparency and confidentiality, operational procedures, and 
performance measures of the Sharīʿah board. In spite of that, the extent of Sharīʿah 
governance disclosure is at a minimal level. With respect to this, the study strongly 
recommends a continuous and systematic approach in enhancing and improving the 
existing Sharīʿah governance practices.  
 
With the IFSB-10 and the AAOIFI governance standards as the main basis for 
recommendations, along with the OECD and the BCBS Principles on Corporate 
Governance, the study has listed several key recommendations in every aspect of the 
Sharīʿah governance system. The recommendations might overlap with the principles 
contained in the aforementioned documents, but this research nevertheless highlights 
some criticisms and disagreement on these and further explains the reasons for such 
recommendations based on the findings extracted from the facts, information, evidence 
and figures found in this study. Despite some of the recommendations put forward in this 
study perhaps seeming too ambitious, considering the importance of the Sharīʿah 
governance system to IFIs, the researcher has strong faith in those recommendations and 
considers that they would be able to facilitate and contribute towards a sound and solid 
Sharīʿah governance system in both the short and long term. It is worth mentioning that 
the expectation of such recommendations will not materialize unless all stakeholders give 
their full support and strong cooperation. It is hoped that this exploratory study can 
further motivate and trigger future research to extend further discourse on the topic of 





APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Your participation in this research is greatly appreciated. Most of the questions 
merely require you to tick the appropriate box. All the information given will be 
treated in the strictest confidence. 
General Instructions and Information 
 
1. The survey aims at providing factual input on the current practice of 
Shari’ah governance system. The present questionnaire is sent to the 
selected IFIs from Malaysia, GCC Countries and the UK. The study may be 
helpful to increase understanding and to promote best practice of Shari’ah 
governance system in IFIs. 
 
2. Please do not worry about questions that seemingly look alike. If you do not 
have the exact answer to a question, please provide your best judgement by 
ticking the appropriate boxes in the questions. Your answers are very 
important to the accuracy of the study. 
 
3. If you wish to make any comment, please feel free to use the space at the 
end of the questionnaire. 
 
For Office Use Only: 
 
Date of Interview/Questionnaire Returned: ___/___/2009  Bank’s Branch Code: €€  








Name and Location of the Institution :       
 
Contact Person   :       
 
Position    :       
 
Composition of the Sharīʿah Board Members : 
 
 Number  
Male        
Female        
 
SHARĪAH GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 
(Please tick (x) in an appropriate box) 
 
H1: General Framework for Sharīʿah Governance 
 
 Yes  No Comment 
Q1. Is the AAOIFI Governance Standards adopted as the guidelines?         
Q2. Are you aware on the recent exposure draft of the IFSB Sharīʿah governance Guiding 
Principles? 
        
Q3. Are there any standards for Sharīʿah governance set for Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs)? 
        
Q4. Are IFIs required to provide any guidelines for Sharīʿah governance?   
      
Q5. Does your institution develop standard processes for Sharīʿah compliance, audit and 
review of the Sharīʿah boards’ legal rulings?  
  
      
Q6. Does your institution have professional code of ethics and conduct for members of the 
Sharīʿah board? 
  
      
Internal Sharīʿah board   
      
Sharīʿah Advisory Firm   
      
Q7. What is the organisational 
arrangement for Sharīʿah 
governance? Others (Please Specify) 
      
        
 
H2: Regulatory Framework 
 
 Yes  No Comment 
Q8. Are there separate rules and regulations concerning Sharīʿah governance?   
      
Q9. Does the bank have any written policies or by-laws specifically referring to the conduct 
of the Sharīʿah board? 
  
      
Civil Court   
      
Sharīʿah Court   
      
Arbitration   
      
Sharīʿah authority of the central bank or the ministry 
of religious affairs 
  
      
Q10. What type of dispute 
settlement is there to redress 
legal matters concerning Islamic 
finance (e.g. conflict of laws)? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
  
      
Binding   
      
Persuasive   
      
Non-binding         
Q11. What is the legal position of 
the Sharīʿah board’s rulings? 
Others (Please specify)  
      





H3: The Role of Sharīʿah Board 
 
 Tick (x)  Comment 
Advisory   
      
Supervisory  
      
Executive   
      
Q12. What are the roles of the 
Sharīʿah board? 
 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
      
Sharīʿah pronouncements?  
      
Sharīʿah review or audit?  
      
Endorsing and validating documentations pertaining 
to the products and services, as well as the internal 
policies, manuals and marketing advertisements, 
etc.? 
 
      
Endorsement of Sharīʿah compliance?  
      
Overseeing the computation and payment of zakah?  
      
Examining any enquiries referred to by the IFIs?  
      
Developing Sharīʿah approved instruments?  
      
Acting as the Sharīʿah highest authority pertaining to 
Islamic finance? 
 
      
Approving model agreements of Islamic modes of 
financing? 
 
      
Achieving harmonization in the concepts and 
applications amongst the Sharīʿah boards? 
 
      
Q13. Do the functions of the 
Sharīʿah board include: 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
      
Yes  
      Q14. Does the Sharīʿah board 
perform the Sharīʿah audit? No  
      
Yes  
      Q15. Does the Sharīʿah board have 
the power to delegate some of its 
functions to the internal Sharīʿah 
compliance unit? 
No   
      
 
H4: Mechanism of Sharīʿah Governance System 
H4.1: Competence  
 
 Yes  No Comment 
 
Q16. Does your institution have policies on the fit and proper criteria for the members of 
the Sharīʿah board? 
 
        
Academic qualification   
      
Experience and exposure (knowledge and skills in 
financial services industry) 
  
      
Track record   
      
Q17. If yes, what are those 
criteria? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
  
      
Specialized in Muāmalāt   
      
Specialised in Islamic Jurisprudence    
      
Knowledge of Arabic and English   
      
Q18. What are the 
requirements in terms of 
academic qualifications? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
  





Understanding of Sharīʿah rules and principles   
      
Understanding of general legal and regulatory 
framework 
  
      
Understanding of the impact of the Sharīʿah 
pronouncements? 
  
      
Skills in the financial services industry   
      
Q19. What are the 
requirements in terms of 
experience and exposure?  
Others (Please specify)  
      
  
      
Good character   
      
Competence, diligence, capability and soundness of 
judgment 
  
      
Q20. What are the 
requirements in terms of track 
record? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
  
      
Well-versed in law   
      
Well-versed in economy    
      
Well-versed in finance   
      
Q21. In the event your 
institution allows a non- 
Sharīʿah background individual 
as a member of the Sharīʿah 
board, what is the qualification 
for such appointment? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
  
      
Yes   
      Q22. Do the Sharīʿah board 
members receive adequate 
training to understand their role 
in the internal control process? 
No   
      
Yes   
      Q23. Is there any evaluation of 
the Sharīʿah board? No   




 Tick (x) Comment 
Shareholders in the Annual General Meeting  
      
BOD  
      
Management  
      
Government  
      
Q24. Who has the power to approve 
the appointment and dismissal of 
the Sharīʿah board? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
      
One year  
      
Two years  
      
Permanent  
      
Q25. How long is the tenure of the 
appointment? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
      
Shareholders  
      
BOD  
      
Management  
      
Q26. What do you think is the 
appropriate body for the Sharīʿah 
board to be accountable to? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
      
Shareholders   
      
BOD  
      
Management        





Others (Please specify)  
      
       
Restriction on multiple appointment  
      
Disclosure on Sharīʿah board’s information   
      
Declaration in writing   
      
Q28. What mechanisms are in place 
to mitigate conflict of interest in 
relation to Sharīʿah scholars sitting 
in various boards?  Others (Please specify)   





Article of association  
      
Memorandum of sssociation  
      
Letter of appointment  
      
Q29. Is the power and authority of 
the Sharīʿah board clearly 
mentioned in the following 
documents?  Others (Please specify)  
      
 
      
 
H4.3: Transparency and Confidentiality 
 
 Yes  No Comment 
Q30. Does the Sharīʿah board have a written policy in respect to the preparation and 
dissemination of Sharīʿah information? 
  
      
Q31. Does the Sharīʿah board have access to all documents, information, records, etc.?   
      
Q32. Are the Sharīʿah pronouncements published and made known to the public?   
      
Q33. Is the Sharīʿah board fully aware of the issue of confidentiality and sensitive 
information obtained in the course of performing their duties? 
  
      
 
H5: Operational Procedure 
 
 Tick (x) Comment 
Yes  
      Q34. Is there any standard operational 
procedure for the Sharīʿah board? No  
      
Weekly   
      
Monthly  
      
Quarterly  
      
Biannually  
      




Others (Please specify)  
      
 
      
Three  
      
Five  
      
Seven  
      
Q36. What is the quorum for the Sharīʿah 
board meeting? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
      
Simple majority  
      
Two-thirds majority  
      
Consensus  
      
Q37. On what basis are decisions made 
at the Sharīʿah board meeting?  
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
 
      
Yes  
      Q38. In the event of the Sharīʿah board 
including non-Sharīʿah background 
members, do they have the right to vote?  
No  
      
A week in advance   
      
Two weeks in advance  
      
A month in advance  
      
Q39. Is an agenda prepared and 
distributed in advance of Sharīʿah board 
meetings? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
 
      
Internal Sharīʿah officer  
      
Company secretary  
      
Head of product development  
      
Head of the legal department  
      
Q40. Who is responsible for dealing with 
the organization of the Sharīʿah board 
meetings? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
 





Representative from the Internal Sharīʿah 
compliance unit 
 
      
Representative from risk management 
department 
 
      
Representative from legal department  
      
Representative from product department  
      
Representative from an external legal firm   
      
Representative from the IFIs ( Example, in the 
case of Sharīʿah board at the regulatory level) 
 
      
Q41. Besides the Sharīʿah board, who 
attends the meeting? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
      
Yes  
      Q42. Are the Sharīʿah pronouncements 
reviewed whenever necessary?  No  
      
Yes  
      Q43. Is the Sharīʿah board required to 
submit a Sharīʿah report? No  
      
Information on duties and services of the 
Sharīʿah board 
 
      
Sharīʿah pronouncements  
      
Sharīʿah board activities  
      
Declaration of Sharīʿah compliance  
      
Q44. What are the contents of the 
Sharīʿah report? 
Others (Please specify)  
      
 
      
Independent division/department  
      
Part of the internal audit department  
      
Q45. What is the organizational 
arrangement for the internal Sharīʿah 
review? Others (Please Specify) 
      
       
 




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q46. The Sharīʿah board has demonstrated effective 
organisational accountability. 
     
Q47. The Sharīʿah board has communicated effectively with 
other organs of governance, including the BOD, management 
and auditors. 
     
Q48. The Sharīʿah board has properly identified and evaluated 
the organization's exposure to Sharīʿah non-compliance risk 
and reputational risk, and effectively communicate that risk 
information to appropriate bodies in the organization. 
     
Q49. The Sharīʿah board promotes Islamic ethics and values 
within the organization. 
     
Q50. The Sharīʿah board promotes continuous improvement of 
the organization’s Sharīʿah control processes. 
     
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your assistance in providing this information is very much 
appreciated. If there is anything else you would like to tell us about this survey or other comments, please provide any 
other insights which you think are relevant to Sharīʿah governance in the space provided below.  





APPENDIX 2: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
H1: General Framework for Sharīʿah Governance 
 
Q1. What is the main issue you currently face in relation to Sharīʿah governance? 
 
Q2. Do you think the adoption of the AAOIFI standard may resolve issues of Sharīʿah governance? 
 
Q3. What is your view on the recent IFSB Sharīʿah governance standard? 
 
Q4. Are you aware any of any failure or serious impact of the IFIs directly or indirectly attributable to poor 
Sharīʿah governance practices? 
 
H2: Regulatory Framework 
 
Q5. Do the bank by-laws allow you to carry out a Sharīʿah review to ensure that the bank’s operation is in 
accordance with Sharīʿah? 
 
H3: The Role of Sharīʿah Board 
 
Q6.  What are the roles of the Sharīʿah board? 
 
Q7.  What is your opinion on the issue of Sharīʿah-compliant and Sharīʿah-based finance? The latter adhere 
to the Sharīʿah objectives and spirit of the Sharīʿah while the former comply with the legal aspect of Sharīʿah 
law but not necessarily the spirit of Sharīʿah. Do you think that the Sharīʿah board should concern solely on 
the fiqh aspect or beyond it? 
 
H4:  Mechanism of Sharīʿah Governance 
 
H4.1: Competence  
 
Q8.  Does the bank organize adequate training for the Sharīʿah board? 
 
Q9.  Is there any assessment or evaluation of the Sharīʿah board? 
 




Q11.  Who has the power to appoint and dismiss the Sharīʿah board? 
  
Q12. What is your view on the issue of Sharīʿah scholars sitting on various Sharīʿah boards? 
 
H4.3: Transparency and Confidentiality 
 
Q13.  Does the Sharīʿah board have access to all documents, information, records, etc.? 
 
Q14.  Is the provision of confidentiality clearly mentioned in the terms of reference in the letter of 
appointment? 
 
H5: Operational Procedure  
 





Q16.  Does the Sharīʿah board hold its meetings regularly? How frequently? 
 
Q17. To what extent does the Sharīʿah board rely on the bank’s internal Sharīʿah audit? 
 
H6: General Assessment of the Sharīʿah board 
 
Q18. Do you think that the Sharīʿah board takes social dimensions into consideration in making their 
decisions?  
 
7: Additional Insights 
 






APPENDIX 3: SAMPLE DESCRIPTION  
 
No.  IFIs Country  
1. Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM) Malaysia 
2. Securities Commission Malaysia 
3. Affin Islamic Bank Malaysia 
4. Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad Malaysia 
5. Asian Finance Berhad Malaysia 
6. Bank Rakyat Malaysia 
7. Bank Islam M Berhad Malaysia 
8. CIMB Islamic Malaysia 
9. Hong Leong Islamic Malaysia 
10. Kuwait Finance House Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 
11. Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 
12. AMIslamic  Malaysia 
13. Al Rajhi Bank (Malaysia) Bhd Malaysia 
14. EONCap Islamic Malaysia 
15. Maybank Islamic Berhad Malaysia 
16. RHB Islamic Malaysia 
17. Public Islamic Bank Malaysia 
18. BSN  Malaysia 
19. HSBC Amanah Malaysia Malaysia 
20. Standard Chartered Saadiq Malaysia 
21. Al Baraka Islamic Bank B.S.C Bahrain     
22. Al Salam Bank       Bahrain     
23. Khaleeji Commercial Bank Bahrain     
24. Bahrain Islamic Bank Bahrain     
25. Shamil Bank of Bahrain Bahrain     
26. Ahli United Bank         Bahrain     
27. Albaraka Banking Group        Bahrain     
28. ABC Islamic Bank Bahrain     
29. Capinnova Investment Bank Bahrain     
30. Ithmaar Bank Bahrain     
31. Global Banking Corporation Bahrain     
32. Investors Bank Bahrain     
33. Kuwait International Bank Kuwait     
34. Al Aman Investment Company Kuwait     
35. Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East  Kuwait     
36. Boubyan Bank             Kuwait     
37. Al Dar Asset Management Company Kuwait     
38. Bayt Al Māl Investment Company Kuwait     
39. Rasameel Structured Finance  Kuwait     
40. International Investment Group Kuwait     
41. Investment Dar            Kuwait     





No.  IFIs Country  
43. Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar      
44 Al Rayan Bank            Qatar      
45. Doha Islamic Bank Qatar      
46. Qatar International Islamic Bank      Qatar      
47. Qatar Islamic Bank          Qatar      
48. QNB Al-Islami Qatar      
49. Investment House Qatar      
50. Qinvest Qatar      
51. The First Investor Qatar      
52. Qatar Islamic Financial Securities  Qatar      
53. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank      UAE     
54. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank        UAE  
55. Ajman Bank  UAE  
56. Amlak Finance            UAE  
57. Dubai Islamic Bank          UAE  
58. Al Hilal Bank UAE  
59. Dubai Bank UAE  
60. Emirates Islamic Bank UAE  
61. Noor Islamic Bank UAE  
62. Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE  
63. Badr Al Islamic Bank UAE  
64. Al Safwa Islamic Financial Services  UAE  
65. Abu Dhabi National Islamic Finance UAE  
66. Bank Al-Jazira         Saudi Arabia  
67. Al Rajhi Bank    Saudi Arabia  
68. Alinma Saudi Arabia  
69. Bank Al Bilad            Saudi Arabia  
70. Al Jazira Capital Saudi Arabia  
71. Arabian Capital Saudi Arabia  
72. Jadwa Investment Saudi Arabia  
73. Riyadh Bank             Saudi Arabia  
74. Siraj Capital Saudi Arabia  
75. Islamic Bank of Britain United Kingdom 
76. Gatehouse Bank United Kingdom 
77. Bank of London and Middle East United Kingdom 
78. European Islamic Investment Bank United Kingdom 
79. European Finance House United Kingdom 
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